- Title
- Towards understanding and mitigating attacks leveraging zero-day exploits
- Creator
- Smit, Liam
- ThesisAdvisor
- Bradshaw, Karen
- Subject
- Computer crimes -- Prevention
- Subject
- Data protection
- Subject
- Hacking
- Subject
- Computer security
- Subject
- Computer networks -- Security measures
- Subject
- Computers -- Access control
- Subject
- Malware (Computer software)
- Date
- 2019
- Type
- text
- Type
- Thesis
- Type
- Masters
- Type
- MSc
- Identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/10962/115718
- Identifier
- vital:34218
- Description
- Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown and therefore not addressed with the result that they can be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorised system access. In order to understand and mitigate against attacks leveraging zero-days or unknown techniques, it is necessary to study the vulnerabilities, exploits and attacks that make use of them. In recent years there have been a number of leaks publishing such attacks using various methods to exploit vulnerabilities. This research seeks to understand what types of vulnerabilities exist, why and how these are exploited, and how to defend against such attacks by either mitigating the vulnerabilities or the method / process of exploiting them. By moving beyond merely remedying the vulnerabilities to defences that are able to prevent or detect the actions taken by attackers, the security of the information system will be better positioned to deal with future unknown threats. An interesting finding is how attackers exploit moving beyond the observable bounds to circumvent security defences, for example, compromising syslog servers, or going down to lower system rings to gain access. However, defenders can counter this by employing defences that are external to the system preventing attackers from disabling them or removing collected evidence after gaining system access. Attackers are able to defeat air-gaps via the leakage of electromagnetic radiation as well as misdirect attribution by planting false artefacts for forensic analysis and attacking from third party information systems. They analyse the methods of other attackers to learn new techniques. An example of this is the Umbrage project whereby malware is analysed to decide whether it should be implemented as a proof of concept. Another important finding is that attackers respect defence mechanisms such as: remote syslog (e.g. firewall), core dump files, database auditing, and Tripwire (e.g. SlyHeretic). These defences all have the potential to result in the attacker being discovered. Attackers must either negate the defence mechanism or find unprotected targets. Defenders can use technologies such as encryption to defend against interception and man-in-the-middle attacks. They can also employ honeytokens and honeypots to alarm misdirect, slow down and learn from attackers. By employing various tactics defenders are able to increase their chance of detecting and time to react to attacks, even those exploiting hitherto unknown vulnerabilities. To summarize the information presented in this thesis and to show the practical importance thereof, an examination is presented of the NSA's network intrusion of the SWIFT organisation. It shows that the firewalls were exploited with remote code execution zerodays. This attack has a striking parallel in the approach used in the recent VPNFilter malware. If nothing else, the leaks provide information to other actors on how to attack and what to avoid. However, by studying state actors, we can gain insight into what other actors with fewer resources can do in the future.
- Format
- 202 leaves, pdf
- Publisher
- Rhodes University, Faculty of Science, Computer Science
- Language
- English
- Rights
- Smit, Liam
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RU Department of Computer Science
| Thumbnail | File | Description | Size | Format | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| View Details | SOURCE1 | SMIT-MSc-TR20-14.pdf | 1 MB | Adobe Acrobat PDF | View Details |