'Fetal "rights"? The need for a unified approach to the fetus in the context of feticide'
- Authors: Kruuse, Helen
- Date: 2009
- Language: English
- Type: Article , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/54163 , vital:26397 , https://store.lexisnexis.co.za/products/tydskrif-vir-hedendaagse-romeinshollandse-reg-journal-of-contemporary-romandutch-law-skuZASKU9780409079241/details
- Description: The issues of fetal protection, fetal rights and the status of unborn life have been debated on a variety of levels in a variety of disciplines over the past centuries. One needs only think of John Milton who asked the “hard” question: “For man to tell how human life began / Is hard: for who himself beginning knew?” (Paradise lost (1667) Bk 8 251–252). While the issue of fetal rights most often arises in abortion debates, the issue of fetal rights in the context of feticide has received scant attention in South Africa. (For a thought-provoking general discussion of fetal rights, see Du Plessis “Jurisprudential reflections on the status of unborn life” 1990 TSAR 44; Van Niekerk (ed) The status of prenatal life (1991) and Kahn (ed) The sanctity of human life (1983).) This note seeks to initiate a discussion on the current legal position in South Africa in respect of feticide.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
- Authors: Kruuse, Helen
- Date: 2009
- Language: English
- Type: Article , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/54163 , vital:26397 , https://store.lexisnexis.co.za/products/tydskrif-vir-hedendaagse-romeinshollandse-reg-journal-of-contemporary-romandutch-law-skuZASKU9780409079241/details
- Description: The issues of fetal protection, fetal rights and the status of unborn life have been debated on a variety of levels in a variety of disciplines over the past centuries. One needs only think of John Milton who asked the “hard” question: “For man to tell how human life began / Is hard: for who himself beginning knew?” (Paradise lost (1667) Bk 8 251–252). While the issue of fetal rights most often arises in abortion debates, the issue of fetal rights in the context of feticide has received scant attention in South Africa. (For a thought-provoking general discussion of fetal rights, see Du Plessis “Jurisprudential reflections on the status of unborn life” 1990 TSAR 44; Van Niekerk (ed) The status of prenatal life (1991) and Kahn (ed) The sanctity of human life (1983).) This note seeks to initiate a discussion on the current legal position in South Africa in respect of feticide.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
'Here's to you, Mrs Robinson' : peculiarities and paragraph 29 in determining the treatment of domestic partnerships
- Authors: Kruuse, Helen
- Date: 2009
- Language: English
- Type: Article , text
- Identifier: vital:26388 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/54083
- Description: There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct. The law is one of the important architects of social norms. At times, it can be a tool to solve problems, eradicate inequalities, and advance the rights of the disadvantaged. At other times, the law is an anchor and a constraint upon social and ideological advances. With regards to equality and non-traditional partnerships, it seems that law falls into this latter category.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
- Authors: Kruuse, Helen
- Date: 2009
- Language: English
- Type: Article , text
- Identifier: vital:26388 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/54083
- Description: There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct. The law is one of the important architects of social norms. At times, it can be a tool to solve problems, eradicate inequalities, and advance the rights of the disadvantaged. At other times, the law is an anchor and a constraint upon social and ideological advances. With regards to equality and non-traditional partnerships, it seems that law falls into this latter category.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
Drawing Lines in the Sand: AM v RM 2010 2 SA 223 (ECP)
- Authors: Kruuse, Helen
- Date: 2009
- Language: English
- Type: Article , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/54107 , vital:26391 , http://www.ufh.ac.za/speculumjuris/files/pdf/SpeculumJuris_2009_Part_2.pdf
- Description: Judge Elna Revelas’s decision in the case of Mohamed v Mohamed 1 may be described as one of those run-of-the-mill applications in terms of rule 43 which are routinely heard on motion court days in any one of our high courts across the country. This case note suggests that her decision belies such a description. Instead, this note suggests that her decision marks a move away from existing jurisprudence on Muslim marriages in a way which may undermine, rather than promote, the recognition and respect for the marriage institutions of different religious systems and beliefs. I tentatively suggest that by granting the rule 43 application the court may have effectively imposed civil marriage obligations on a religious marriage even though the parties had not concluded a marriage in terms of the Marriage Act.2 As such, the decision has potentially radical consequences for parties in Muslim marriages and highlights the complex issues that courts have had to face in the last two decades without any guiding legislation. In order to understand the judgment properly, its context has to be considered. This context includes (1) the numerous judgments extending protection to women in Muslim marriages in the last two decades against the backdrop of the coming into effect of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; and (2) the application by the Women’s Legal Centre Trust (hereafter “WLCT”) to the Constitutional Court to force the President and Parliament to enact legislation to recognise and protect Muslim marriages.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
- Authors: Kruuse, Helen
- Date: 2009
- Language: English
- Type: Article , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/54107 , vital:26391 , http://www.ufh.ac.za/speculumjuris/files/pdf/SpeculumJuris_2009_Part_2.pdf
- Description: Judge Elna Revelas’s decision in the case of Mohamed v Mohamed 1 may be described as one of those run-of-the-mill applications in terms of rule 43 which are routinely heard on motion court days in any one of our high courts across the country. This case note suggests that her decision belies such a description. Instead, this note suggests that her decision marks a move away from existing jurisprudence on Muslim marriages in a way which may undermine, rather than promote, the recognition and respect for the marriage institutions of different religious systems and beliefs. I tentatively suggest that by granting the rule 43 application the court may have effectively imposed civil marriage obligations on a religious marriage even though the parties had not concluded a marriage in terms of the Marriage Act.2 As such, the decision has potentially radical consequences for parties in Muslim marriages and highlights the complex issues that courts have had to face in the last two decades without any guiding legislation. In order to understand the judgment properly, its context has to be considered. This context includes (1) the numerous judgments extending protection to women in Muslim marriages in the last two decades against the backdrop of the coming into effect of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; and (2) the application by the Women’s Legal Centre Trust (hereafter “WLCT”) to the Constitutional Court to force the President and Parliament to enact legislation to recognise and protect Muslim marriages.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
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