Kant and the experience of skepticism: rranscendental arguments, skepticism, and a version of the problem of the justification of foundational assumptions
- Authors: Grecia, Hadley
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 , Transcendental argument , Deductive reasoning , Skepticism , Foundationalism (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/425078 , vital:72207
- Description: Immanuel Kant is a key thinker in the History of Western Philosophy whose ideas continue to fascinate contemporary English-speaking academic philosophers. One such idea is Kant's conception of transcendental arguments. Although these arguments do not originate in Kant's philosophy, Kant's conception of them occupies a special place in the English-speaking literature on the topic. A growing trend in this literature is to claim that Kant's transcendental arguments are unique because they aim to achieve an anti-skeptical end through deductive means. I call the basic assumption behind readings of transcendental arguments like these the deductive/anti-skeptical assumption. This assumption claims that deduction is the best means to achieve an anti-skeptical end. In this thesis, I argue that accepting this assumption is one way to misinterpret transcendental arguments because—even though it seems compelling at first blush—it must be false. The resultant twist is that transcendental arguments cannot be deductive, which, in turn, means that understanding that Kant's transcendental arguments are not deductive in nature is itself no small detail for understanding the version of Kant's 'not-deductive' solution to skepticism developed here. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
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- Authors: Grecia, Hadley
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 , Transcendental argument , Deductive reasoning , Skepticism , Foundationalism (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/425078 , vital:72207
- Description: Immanuel Kant is a key thinker in the History of Western Philosophy whose ideas continue to fascinate contemporary English-speaking academic philosophers. One such idea is Kant's conception of transcendental arguments. Although these arguments do not originate in Kant's philosophy, Kant's conception of them occupies a special place in the English-speaking literature on the topic. A growing trend in this literature is to claim that Kant's transcendental arguments are unique because they aim to achieve an anti-skeptical end through deductive means. I call the basic assumption behind readings of transcendental arguments like these the deductive/anti-skeptical assumption. This assumption claims that deduction is the best means to achieve an anti-skeptical end. In this thesis, I argue that accepting this assumption is one way to misinterpret transcendental arguments because—even though it seems compelling at first blush—it must be false. The resultant twist is that transcendental arguments cannot be deductive, which, in turn, means that understanding that Kant's transcendental arguments are not deductive in nature is itself no small detail for understanding the version of Kant's 'not-deductive' solution to skepticism developed here. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
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Philosophical inquiry into the value of liberal education
- Authors: Wotshela, Siphosihle
- Date: 2023-03-30
- Subjects: Liberal education , Education, Humanistic Philosophy , Education, Humanistic South Africa , Education, Humanistic Social aspects South Africa , Jacob Klein
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/408954 , vital:70540
- Description: Throughout history, scholars have offered numerous conceptions of liberal education, with each scholar providing a slightly and sometimes extremely different idea of what liberal education actually is, what it entails, and what value one stands to gain by partaking in this particular type of education. In this thesis, I inquire into the topic of liberal education in an attempt to clearly understand what value partaking in this type of education offers the contemporary South African. In the process, I offer a defence against what I refer to as the societal context problem—a problem that questions the possibility of a universal benefit that can be obtained by partaking in liberal education. I also offer a comprehensive argument for the preference of Jacob Klein’s conception of liberal education, making the claim that Klein’s conception and the value he identifies with his conception is more convincing than that offered by other scholars because Klein’s conception and the value associated with the conception is universal in a way that allows it to remain relevant even when confronted with the problem of societal context. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
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- Authors: Wotshela, Siphosihle
- Date: 2023-03-30
- Subjects: Liberal education , Education, Humanistic Philosophy , Education, Humanistic South Africa , Education, Humanistic Social aspects South Africa , Jacob Klein
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/408954 , vital:70540
- Description: Throughout history, scholars have offered numerous conceptions of liberal education, with each scholar providing a slightly and sometimes extremely different idea of what liberal education actually is, what it entails, and what value one stands to gain by partaking in this particular type of education. In this thesis, I inquire into the topic of liberal education in an attempt to clearly understand what value partaking in this type of education offers the contemporary South African. In the process, I offer a defence against what I refer to as the societal context problem—a problem that questions the possibility of a universal benefit that can be obtained by partaking in liberal education. I also offer a comprehensive argument for the preference of Jacob Klein’s conception of liberal education, making the claim that Klein’s conception and the value he identifies with his conception is more convincing than that offered by other scholars because Klein’s conception and the value associated with the conception is universal in a way that allows it to remain relevant even when confronted with the problem of societal context. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
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Self-inquiry: Comparing Plato and Patanjali
- Authors: Coughlan, Daniel Michael
- Date: 2021-10
- Subjects: Plato , Patañjali , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Comparison (Philosophy) , Justification (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190066 , vital:44960
- Description: At its most effective my research hopes to re-affirm the central value and importance of self-inquiry. That is, I hope to echo the familiar call of the wise to know thyself. Of the many mouths and temple walls that have lent authority to this precept there is perhaps no mouth more important than one’s own. To know thyself is the task and responsibility of the individual. In order to arrive at the point where I can re-affirm its value I explore the nature of self-inquiry with the help of Plato, Patanjali and a comparison between them. I propose two general senses in which we might understand self-inquiry and seek to bring out the core problems faced by each. We find an account of these two senses and the relationship between them in both Plato and Patanjali, so too, though less obviously, in the comparison between them. The comparison provides the opportunity for reflecting on the ground that it moves from and depends on, the common ground we assume between the two compared philosophers/ies. I contend that this ground is ultimately the comparer, one’s self. The consequence is that the comparative project and the project of self-inquiry both meet and are mutually beneficial. The three together; Plato, Patanjali, and the comparison between them help us account for nature of self-inquiry in helping us to better understand the relationship between the two senses in which we can come to understand and think about it. In the first sense, self-inquiry is cast as the examination of one’s life. In the second sense, we are invited to consider the possibility of an unmediated knowing of the examiner, an unmediated self-knowing. With a better understanding of what self-inquiry is I stand to conclude by re-affirming its value. , Thesis (MPhil) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Authors: Coughlan, Daniel Michael
- Date: 2021-10
- Subjects: Plato , Patañjali , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Comparison (Philosophy) , Justification (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190066 , vital:44960
- Description: At its most effective my research hopes to re-affirm the central value and importance of self-inquiry. That is, I hope to echo the familiar call of the wise to know thyself. Of the many mouths and temple walls that have lent authority to this precept there is perhaps no mouth more important than one’s own. To know thyself is the task and responsibility of the individual. In order to arrive at the point where I can re-affirm its value I explore the nature of self-inquiry with the help of Plato, Patanjali and a comparison between them. I propose two general senses in which we might understand self-inquiry and seek to bring out the core problems faced by each. We find an account of these two senses and the relationship between them in both Plato and Patanjali, so too, though less obviously, in the comparison between them. The comparison provides the opportunity for reflecting on the ground that it moves from and depends on, the common ground we assume between the two compared philosophers/ies. I contend that this ground is ultimately the comparer, one’s self. The consequence is that the comparative project and the project of self-inquiry both meet and are mutually beneficial. The three together; Plato, Patanjali, and the comparison between them help us account for nature of self-inquiry in helping us to better understand the relationship between the two senses in which we can come to understand and think about it. In the first sense, self-inquiry is cast as the examination of one’s life. In the second sense, we are invited to consider the possibility of an unmediated knowing of the examiner, an unmediated self-knowing. With a better understanding of what self-inquiry is I stand to conclude by re-affirming its value. , Thesis (MPhil) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
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