Practicing conciliation: Towards a practical application of the Equal Weight View
- Authors: Hartley, Danyel Jordan
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Opinion (Philosophy) , Verbal self-defense , Epistemics , Interpersonal relations , Equal Weight View
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/188341 , vital:44745
- Description: The Equal Weight View is a frequently discussed position in the philosophy of disagreement. It holds that when someone disagrees with an epistemic peer, they should adjust their belief to be closer to their peer’s belief. While the reasons for adopting this response to disagreement have been debated, there has been less discussion about its utility as a tool for handling real-world disagreements. In this thesis I pursue a version of the Equal Weight View which is useful in practice. I argue that traditional applications of the Equal Weight View do not reflect its underlying principles when they are used to resolve real-world disagreements. I develop an idealized application of the Equal Weight View that addresses the problems traditional applications face in real-world scenarios. Unfortunately, addressing these problems results in an application that is unrealistically cognitively demanding. The application trades being insensitive to the environment it would be used in for being insensitive to the limits of its user. I suggest that we might be able to save the idealized application and work around those limits by either externalizing or simplifying the most demanding aspects of the application. Externalization is best achieved by making use of some kind of computer assistance. Simplification involves replacing taxing data tracking and computation with heuristic methods. While neither approach is ideal, I argue that both get us closer to resolving disagreements in accordance with the underlying principles of the Equal Weight View than traditional applications do. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
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- Authors: Hartley, Danyel Jordan
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Opinion (Philosophy) , Verbal self-defense , Epistemics , Interpersonal relations , Equal Weight View
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/188341 , vital:44745
- Description: The Equal Weight View is a frequently discussed position in the philosophy of disagreement. It holds that when someone disagrees with an epistemic peer, they should adjust their belief to be closer to their peer’s belief. While the reasons for adopting this response to disagreement have been debated, there has been less discussion about its utility as a tool for handling real-world disagreements. In this thesis I pursue a version of the Equal Weight View which is useful in practice. I argue that traditional applications of the Equal Weight View do not reflect its underlying principles when they are used to resolve real-world disagreements. I develop an idealized application of the Equal Weight View that addresses the problems traditional applications face in real-world scenarios. Unfortunately, addressing these problems results in an application that is unrealistically cognitively demanding. The application trades being insensitive to the environment it would be used in for being insensitive to the limits of its user. I suggest that we might be able to save the idealized application and work around those limits by either externalizing or simplifying the most demanding aspects of the application. Externalization is best achieved by making use of some kind of computer assistance. Simplification involves replacing taxing data tracking and computation with heuristic methods. While neither approach is ideal, I argue that both get us closer to resolving disagreements in accordance with the underlying principles of the Equal Weight View than traditional applications do. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
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Control and vulnerability : reflections on the nature of human agency and personhood
- Authors: Paphitis, Sharli Anne
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: Self-control , Vulnerability (Personality trait) , Self (Philosophy) , Social psychology , Cognitive science , Frankfurt, Harry G., 1929- -- Criticism and interpretation , Watson, Gary, 1943- -- Criticism and interpretation , Mele, Alfred R., 1951- -- Criticism and interpretation , Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Criticism and interpretation
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2750 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1018671
- Description: Following the writings of philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Alfred Mele, in this thesis I defend some central claims of the self-control view of human agency. However, I not only defend, but also supplement this view in the following two ways. First, drawing on work by Mary Midgley and Sigmund Freud I advance the claim that self-control requires the experience of internal conflict between an agent’s motivations and intentions. Second, drawing on insights from Simone de Beauvoir and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as recent research in social psychology and cognitive science, I will argue in this thesis that self-control and vulnerability are inextricably intertwined with one another, and that as a result both are to be seen as constitutive of human agency. While it is the capacity for self-control that marks us out as human agents, I argue that it is also our uniquely human vulnerability which distinguishes our agency from the kind of agency which we might attribute to other potential or actual forms of sentience. Further, while the concepts of human agency and personhood are typically conflated in the analytic tradition of philosophy, in this thesis I will show that there are good reasons for understanding these two concepts as subtly distinct from one another. The term personhood, I will argue, can fruitfully be understood in substantive rather than purely formal terms. A person, in the superlative sense, is to be understood as someone who exercises their agency well; and, as such, persons are answerable to a number of normative prescriptions. Following Midgley, Nietzsche and Martha Nussbaum, I argue against Frankfurt’s normative prescription for personhood in the form of what he calls ‘wholeheartedness’, and offer four normative prescriptions for personhood of my own.
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- Authors: Paphitis, Sharli Anne
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: Self-control , Vulnerability (Personality trait) , Self (Philosophy) , Social psychology , Cognitive science , Frankfurt, Harry G., 1929- -- Criticism and interpretation , Watson, Gary, 1943- -- Criticism and interpretation , Mele, Alfred R., 1951- -- Criticism and interpretation , Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Criticism and interpretation
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2750 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1018671
- Description: Following the writings of philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Alfred Mele, in this thesis I defend some central claims of the self-control view of human agency. However, I not only defend, but also supplement this view in the following two ways. First, drawing on work by Mary Midgley and Sigmund Freud I advance the claim that self-control requires the experience of internal conflict between an agent’s motivations and intentions. Second, drawing on insights from Simone de Beauvoir and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as recent research in social psychology and cognitive science, I will argue in this thesis that self-control and vulnerability are inextricably intertwined with one another, and that as a result both are to be seen as constitutive of human agency. While it is the capacity for self-control that marks us out as human agents, I argue that it is also our uniquely human vulnerability which distinguishes our agency from the kind of agency which we might attribute to other potential or actual forms of sentience. Further, while the concepts of human agency and personhood are typically conflated in the analytic tradition of philosophy, in this thesis I will show that there are good reasons for understanding these two concepts as subtly distinct from one another. The term personhood, I will argue, can fruitfully be understood in substantive rather than purely formal terms. A person, in the superlative sense, is to be understood as someone who exercises their agency well; and, as such, persons are answerable to a number of normative prescriptions. Following Midgley, Nietzsche and Martha Nussbaum, I argue against Frankfurt’s normative prescription for personhood in the form of what he calls ‘wholeheartedness’, and offer four normative prescriptions for personhood of my own.
- Full Text:
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