Anonymous testimony and epistemic responsibility
- Authors: Ajiboro, Aderonke Adeyinka
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Anonymity , Assertion , Credibility , Truthfulness and falsehood , Responsibility , Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/432286 , vital:72858 , DOI 10.21504/10962/432286
- Description: In this thesis, I examine anonymous testimony in both offline (face-to-face) and online (internet and social media) interactions and the epistemic concerns it raises in relation to belief, knowledge, justification, and normative assessments of assertions. I discuss anonymous testimony as involving a relation between the hearer and the content of the testimony in comparison to ordinary cases where the speaker of an assertion is known. In anonymous testimony, the hearer has the burden of epistemic responsibility to arrive at a testimonial belief or arguably acceptance. The hearer is also accountable for the anonymous testimony in the event of re-assertion. I also assess the norms of assertion for anonymous testimony and argue that knowledge, truth, and belief norms that apply in cases where the speaker is known should not be applied to cases of anonymous speakers. Epistemologists have paid little attention to anonymous testimony and its implications on the norms of interaction. This is a study in the epistemology of testimony and it aims at providing further understanding of the epistemic responsibility of hearers of anonymous testimony. In Chapter One, I argue that anonymous testimony can be appropriately described as testimony; where the properties of an assertion to induce belief in the hearer are sufficient to describe the assertion as testimony. I examine the kinds of anonymity and the burden of epistemic responsibility for the hearer. I introduce basically anonymous testimony in offline and online contexts of interaction. A basically anonymous testimony occurs where, at the instance of receiving testimony and making an epistemic decision on it, the speaker is unidentifiable to the hearer. In Chapter Two, I discuss the kinds of epistemic attitudes hearers may have when they receive anonymous testimony. I discuss reductionism, antireductionism, and entitlement theory as accounts of the justification for believing testimony. I argue that acceptance is the appropriate attitude and the entitlement theory provides a basis for accepting anonymous testimony. I also argue that practical reasons are a sufficient to accept anonymous testimony. Also, I discuss the possibility that a hearer of anonymous testimony can make a wrongful presumption by assigning an identity to a person as the speaker of an anonymous testimony. This can cause harm to the ‘person’ of the presumed speaker such as an unwarranted credibility assessment of the person by other people in the community. I also argue that making a credibility assessment of a presumed speaker constitutes harm to a proper epistemic assessment of the content. In Chapter Three, I discuss the possibility of trust relations between an anonymous speaker and a hearer. I argue that the hearer is solely responsible for making an epistemic decision from anonymous testimony. I argue that anonymous testimony can be relevant to a hearer given the value of its content. In Chapter Four, I discuss the applicability of knowledge, truth, belief, reasonable to believe and supportive reasons norms for the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. Hence, I argue that the supportive reasons norm, which acknowledges acceptance of an assertion, the relevance of contexts, and admits both epistemic and practical reasons to make an assertion, should guide the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. I also argue that a hearer should be epistemically conscientiousness for responsible re-assertion of received anonymous testimony. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
- Authors: Ajiboro, Aderonke Adeyinka
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Anonymity , Assertion , Credibility , Truthfulness and falsehood , Responsibility , Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/432286 , vital:72858 , DOI 10.21504/10962/432286
- Description: In this thesis, I examine anonymous testimony in both offline (face-to-face) and online (internet and social media) interactions and the epistemic concerns it raises in relation to belief, knowledge, justification, and normative assessments of assertions. I discuss anonymous testimony as involving a relation between the hearer and the content of the testimony in comparison to ordinary cases where the speaker of an assertion is known. In anonymous testimony, the hearer has the burden of epistemic responsibility to arrive at a testimonial belief or arguably acceptance. The hearer is also accountable for the anonymous testimony in the event of re-assertion. I also assess the norms of assertion for anonymous testimony and argue that knowledge, truth, and belief norms that apply in cases where the speaker is known should not be applied to cases of anonymous speakers. Epistemologists have paid little attention to anonymous testimony and its implications on the norms of interaction. This is a study in the epistemology of testimony and it aims at providing further understanding of the epistemic responsibility of hearers of anonymous testimony. In Chapter One, I argue that anonymous testimony can be appropriately described as testimony; where the properties of an assertion to induce belief in the hearer are sufficient to describe the assertion as testimony. I examine the kinds of anonymity and the burden of epistemic responsibility for the hearer. I introduce basically anonymous testimony in offline and online contexts of interaction. A basically anonymous testimony occurs where, at the instance of receiving testimony and making an epistemic decision on it, the speaker is unidentifiable to the hearer. In Chapter Two, I discuss the kinds of epistemic attitudes hearers may have when they receive anonymous testimony. I discuss reductionism, antireductionism, and entitlement theory as accounts of the justification for believing testimony. I argue that acceptance is the appropriate attitude and the entitlement theory provides a basis for accepting anonymous testimony. I also argue that practical reasons are a sufficient to accept anonymous testimony. Also, I discuss the possibility that a hearer of anonymous testimony can make a wrongful presumption by assigning an identity to a person as the speaker of an anonymous testimony. This can cause harm to the ‘person’ of the presumed speaker such as an unwarranted credibility assessment of the person by other people in the community. I also argue that making a credibility assessment of a presumed speaker constitutes harm to a proper epistemic assessment of the content. In Chapter Three, I discuss the possibility of trust relations between an anonymous speaker and a hearer. I argue that the hearer is solely responsible for making an epistemic decision from anonymous testimony. I argue that anonymous testimony can be relevant to a hearer given the value of its content. In Chapter Four, I discuss the applicability of knowledge, truth, belief, reasonable to believe and supportive reasons norms for the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. Hence, I argue that the supportive reasons norm, which acknowledges acceptance of an assertion, the relevance of contexts, and admits both epistemic and practical reasons to make an assertion, should guide the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. I also argue that a hearer should be epistemically conscientiousness for responsible re-assertion of received anonymous testimony. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
Institutional self-deception
- Jacot-Guillarmod, Genevieve Nicole
- Authors: Jacot-Guillarmod, Genevieve Nicole
- Date: 2022-04-07
- Subjects: Self-deception , Business ethics , Social responsibility of business , Responsibility , Collective behavior Moral and ethical aspects , Attribution (Social psychology)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/294548 , vital:57231 , DOI https://doi.org/10.21504/10962/294548
- Description: There are many examples of institutions which have made false claims, or performed certain acts, that have had, to varying degrees, a negative impact on their societies. For example, many corporations go to great lengths to present themselves as being environmentally friendly when in fact they are not. Many corporations have also been forced to recall dangerous products which they at one time or another insisted were safe. Research teams have misled participants with regard to what they can expect from their participation in studies, with grave consequences. Governments throughout the world are mired in corruption, and yet deny that this is so. One possible explanation is that in such situations these institutions are simply lying. However, another possible explanation is that these institutions are self-deceived, or lying to themselves. Recently it has been suggested that self-deception is something that affects certain groups as well as individuals. Given that institutions can wield a great deal of political, social and economic power, if institutions are capable of self-deception there is room for things to go awry on a very large scale with potentially dire consequences. Yet the explanations currently on offer for group-level self-deception appear to amount to instances of individual self-deception (either to certain key individual members of those groups being self-deceived, or to all or most members of a group sharing the same self-deceptive belief), and as such I do not regard the explanations currently on offer as satisfactory. I propose that there are certain situations in which we ought to see institutions themselves as self-deceived or lying to themselves. While the terms ‘self-deception’ and ‘lying to oneself’ are often used interchangeably, I differentiate between the two and argue that both institutional self-deception and an institution lying to itself are institution-level phenomena, and do not rely on any individual within the institution being self-deceived or lying to themselves. That this is so is of relevance to our attributions of accountability, and makes changes to institutional structure and procedures the focus of concern when it comes to preventing an institution succumbing to self-deception or lying to itself. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-04-07
- Authors: Jacot-Guillarmod, Genevieve Nicole
- Date: 2022-04-07
- Subjects: Self-deception , Business ethics , Social responsibility of business , Responsibility , Collective behavior Moral and ethical aspects , Attribution (Social psychology)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/294548 , vital:57231 , DOI https://doi.org/10.21504/10962/294548
- Description: There are many examples of institutions which have made false claims, or performed certain acts, that have had, to varying degrees, a negative impact on their societies. For example, many corporations go to great lengths to present themselves as being environmentally friendly when in fact they are not. Many corporations have also been forced to recall dangerous products which they at one time or another insisted were safe. Research teams have misled participants with regard to what they can expect from their participation in studies, with grave consequences. Governments throughout the world are mired in corruption, and yet deny that this is so. One possible explanation is that in such situations these institutions are simply lying. However, another possible explanation is that these institutions are self-deceived, or lying to themselves. Recently it has been suggested that self-deception is something that affects certain groups as well as individuals. Given that institutions can wield a great deal of political, social and economic power, if institutions are capable of self-deception there is room for things to go awry on a very large scale with potentially dire consequences. Yet the explanations currently on offer for group-level self-deception appear to amount to instances of individual self-deception (either to certain key individual members of those groups being self-deceived, or to all or most members of a group sharing the same self-deceptive belief), and as such I do not regard the explanations currently on offer as satisfactory. I propose that there are certain situations in which we ought to see institutions themselves as self-deceived or lying to themselves. While the terms ‘self-deception’ and ‘lying to oneself’ are often used interchangeably, I differentiate between the two and argue that both institutional self-deception and an institution lying to itself are institution-level phenomena, and do not rely on any individual within the institution being self-deceived or lying to themselves. That this is so is of relevance to our attributions of accountability, and makes changes to institutional structure and procedures the focus of concern when it comes to preventing an institution succumbing to self-deception or lying to itself. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-04-07
Robot Rights, an approach appealing to Animal Rights Theory
- Authors: Millin, Murray David
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Artificial intelligence , Singer, Peter, 1946- , Dennett, D C (Daniel Clement) , Animal rights , Ethics , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992 Criticism and interpretation , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Bicentennial man , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Sally , Preference utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/191854 , vital:45172
- Description: This thesis proposes that Peter Singer’s theory of preference utilitarianism, which is designed to be universally applicable to humans and animals, can be applied to robots of a particular kind — such as those seen in Isaac Asimov’s work. I shall do this by using Singer’s conception of interests as a framework, and appealing to Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance to deal with methodological issues about other minds. I shall then apply those theories to Isaac Asimov’s Sally and The Bicentennial Man. These two narratives show the importance of the intentional stance as an ethical tool and provide an example of how we might talk about the interests of a robot. Sally’s behaviour and ethical status is examined according to how she is perceived, and so I shall investigate how various persons engage with her and why they do so in those manners. This narrative demonstrates the value of the intentional and design stance as methods to approach other minds problems with regards to ethical status. The Bicentennial Man’s Andrew allows us to look for interests in a more concrete way. I look to see how he situates himself in his world, as well as investigate how and why he makes the demand to be morally considerable. This will be done by examining his creativity, personal development and drive for mortality throughout the narrative. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Millin, Murray David
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Artificial intelligence , Singer, Peter, 1946- , Dennett, D C (Daniel Clement) , Animal rights , Ethics , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992 Criticism and interpretation , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Bicentennial man , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Sally , Preference utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/191854 , vital:45172
- Description: This thesis proposes that Peter Singer’s theory of preference utilitarianism, which is designed to be universally applicable to humans and animals, can be applied to robots of a particular kind — such as those seen in Isaac Asimov’s work. I shall do this by using Singer’s conception of interests as a framework, and appealing to Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance to deal with methodological issues about other minds. I shall then apply those theories to Isaac Asimov’s Sally and The Bicentennial Man. These two narratives show the importance of the intentional stance as an ethical tool and provide an example of how we might talk about the interests of a robot. Sally’s behaviour and ethical status is examined according to how she is perceived, and so I shall investigate how various persons engage with her and why they do so in those manners. This narrative demonstrates the value of the intentional and design stance as methods to approach other minds problems with regards to ethical status. The Bicentennial Man’s Andrew allows us to look for interests in a more concrete way. I look to see how he situates himself in his world, as well as investigate how and why he makes the demand to be morally considerable. This will be done by examining his creativity, personal development and drive for mortality throughout the narrative. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Moral reform and the desiderata of responses to wrongdoing: the production of a "morally autonomous person freely attached to the good"
- Authors: Waller, Heath Frederick
- Date: 2004 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Victims of crimes -- Attitudes , Criminals -- Rehabilitation , Punishment -- Psychological aspects , Social ethics , Punishment
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2730 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003805 , Victims of crimes -- Attitudes , Criminals -- Rehabilitation , Punishment -- Psychological aspects , Social ethics , Punishment
- Description: Moral reform is a neglected response to wrongdoing that has been incorrectly portrayed as a practice involving illegitimate treatment of wrongdoers and as totally unsatisfying to those theorists advocating backward-looking practices such as retributive punishment. A clear explanation of the ethical legitimacy and practical necessity of the reformative techniques moral reform involves has been missed, and this paper details the design of moral reform proper in order to fill this gap in punishment theory. The moral reform of an offender is identified as a desideratum of responses to wrongdoing and it is explained what moral reform ought to entail. The claim that moral reform qualifies as the overriding aim of responses to wrongdoing is argued for on the grounds that this practice is capable of achieving all the established ends of responses to wrongdoing. The legitimate desiderata of our practices are identified as those usually selected as the ends of punishment practices, and moral reform must accomplish these if it is to be accepted. Moral reform is shown to realise the goals of punishments as the fortunate effects of what is done to achieve an offender's moral improvement and of what reformees do in taking responsibility for their actions. The suffering involved in moral reform receives particular emphasis since the practice will never satisfy unless it accommodates the widely-held intuition that the offender must suffer sufficiently as a consequence of his wrongdoing. Moral reform is further portrayed as the most meaningful practice for its ability to satisfy the appropriate needs and desires victims have in response to their victimization. A central claim of the thesis is that moral reform best serves the victim, since it most effectively relieves the victim's emotional responses to wrongdoing and is as adept as punishment at the expression of these same emotions. Reformers advocate a constructive response to wrongdoing that benefits all affected parties. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2004
- Authors: Waller, Heath Frederick
- Date: 2004 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Victims of crimes -- Attitudes , Criminals -- Rehabilitation , Punishment -- Psychological aspects , Social ethics , Punishment
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2730 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003805 , Victims of crimes -- Attitudes , Criminals -- Rehabilitation , Punishment -- Psychological aspects , Social ethics , Punishment
- Description: Moral reform is a neglected response to wrongdoing that has been incorrectly portrayed as a practice involving illegitimate treatment of wrongdoers and as totally unsatisfying to those theorists advocating backward-looking practices such as retributive punishment. A clear explanation of the ethical legitimacy and practical necessity of the reformative techniques moral reform involves has been missed, and this paper details the design of moral reform proper in order to fill this gap in punishment theory. The moral reform of an offender is identified as a desideratum of responses to wrongdoing and it is explained what moral reform ought to entail. The claim that moral reform qualifies as the overriding aim of responses to wrongdoing is argued for on the grounds that this practice is capable of achieving all the established ends of responses to wrongdoing. The legitimate desiderata of our practices are identified as those usually selected as the ends of punishment practices, and moral reform must accomplish these if it is to be accepted. Moral reform is shown to realise the goals of punishments as the fortunate effects of what is done to achieve an offender's moral improvement and of what reformees do in taking responsibility for their actions. The suffering involved in moral reform receives particular emphasis since the practice will never satisfy unless it accommodates the widely-held intuition that the offender must suffer sufficiently as a consequence of his wrongdoing. Moral reform is further portrayed as the most meaningful practice for its ability to satisfy the appropriate needs and desires victims have in response to their victimization. A central claim of the thesis is that moral reform best serves the victim, since it most effectively relieves the victim's emotional responses to wrongdoing and is as adept as punishment at the expression of these same emotions. Reformers advocate a constructive response to wrongdoing that benefits all affected parties. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2004
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