The meaning of expenditure actually incurred in the context of share-based payments for trading stock or services rendered
- Authors: Nguta, Mbulelo
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: South African Revenue Service , Labat Africa , Stocks -- Taxation -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Income tax deductions for expenses , Income tax -- Accounting -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Actions and defenses
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MCom
- Identifier: vital:920 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1018661
- Description: Section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 entitles taxpayers to a deduction in respect of expenditure actually incurred, provided that all the other requirements of section 11 and section 23 of the Act have been met. A company may issue its own shares, credited as fully paid up, as a payment for trading stock or services rendered, as was the case in C:SARS v Labat Africa (2011) 74 SATC 1. The question that was raised by this decision is whether the issue of shares constitutes “expenditure” as contemplated in section 11(a) of the Act. It is trite that a share in a company is a bundle of rights which entitle the holder to dividends when declared and to a vote in shareholders’ meetings and that a share does not come into the hands of a shareholder by way of transfer from the company, but is rather created as a bundle of rights for him in the company. In C: SARS v Labat Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that to issue shares as a payment for goods is not expenditure as contemplated in section 11(a) of the Act. The Act does not define “expenditure”. It has been interpreted in certain cases as a payment of money or disbursement, while it has been interpreted as the undertaking of a legal obligation in other cases. The Labat Africa case has been criticised for its interpretation of expenditure on the grounds that it is contrary to the principle that “actually incurred” does not mean “actually paid”. This research has argued that, in the context of the Labat Africa case, which related to an issue of shares in payment for goods, Harms AP’s judgment was concerned with showing why a share issue is not expenditure. He could not have intended to deny a deduction to transactions such as credit purchases.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
- Authors: Nguta, Mbulelo
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: South African Revenue Service , Labat Africa , Stocks -- Taxation -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Income tax deductions for expenses , Income tax -- Accounting -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Actions and defenses
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MCom
- Identifier: vital:920 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1018661
- Description: Section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 entitles taxpayers to a deduction in respect of expenditure actually incurred, provided that all the other requirements of section 11 and section 23 of the Act have been met. A company may issue its own shares, credited as fully paid up, as a payment for trading stock or services rendered, as was the case in C:SARS v Labat Africa (2011) 74 SATC 1. The question that was raised by this decision is whether the issue of shares constitutes “expenditure” as contemplated in section 11(a) of the Act. It is trite that a share in a company is a bundle of rights which entitle the holder to dividends when declared and to a vote in shareholders’ meetings and that a share does not come into the hands of a shareholder by way of transfer from the company, but is rather created as a bundle of rights for him in the company. In C: SARS v Labat Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that to issue shares as a payment for goods is not expenditure as contemplated in section 11(a) of the Act. The Act does not define “expenditure”. It has been interpreted in certain cases as a payment of money or disbursement, while it has been interpreted as the undertaking of a legal obligation in other cases. The Labat Africa case has been criticised for its interpretation of expenditure on the grounds that it is contrary to the principle that “actually incurred” does not mean “actually paid”. This research has argued that, in the context of the Labat Africa case, which related to an issue of shares in payment for goods, Harms AP’s judgment was concerned with showing why a share issue is not expenditure. He could not have intended to deny a deduction to transactions such as credit purchases.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
A critical analysis of the practical man principle in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd
- Authors: Grenville, David Paul
- Date: 2014
- Subjects: Unilever (Firm) , South African Revenue Service , Taxation -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Income tax -- Law and legislation -- South Africa -- Cases , Income tax -- South Africa -- Cases , Business enterprises -- Taxation -- South Africa , Law -- South Africa -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MCom
- Identifier: vital:909 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013238
- Description: This research studies the practical person principle as it was introduced in the case of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441. In its time the Lever Brothers case was a seminal judgment in South Africa’s tax jurisprudence and the practical person principle was a decisive criterion for the determination of source of income. The primary goal of this research was a critical analysis the practical man principle. This involved an analysis of the extent to which this principle requires judges to adopt a criterion that is too flexible for legitimate judicial decision-making. The extent to which the practical person principle creates a clash between a philosophical approach to law and an approach that is based on common sense or practicality was also debated. Finally, it was considered whether adopting a philosophical approach to determining the source of income could overcome the problems associated with the practical approach. A doctrinal methodology was applied to the documentary data consisting of the South African and Australian Income Tax Acts, South African and other case law, historical records and the writings of scholars. From the critical analysis of the practical person principle it was concluded that the anthropomorphised form of the principle gives rise to several problems that may be overcome by looking to the underlying operation of the principle. Further analysis of this operation, however, revealed deeper problems in that the principle undermines the doctrine of judicial precedent, legal certainty and the rule of law. Accordingly a practical approach to determining the source of income is undesirable and unconstitutional. Further research was conducted into the relative merits of a philosophical approach to determining source of income and it was argued that such an approach could provide a more desirable solution to determining source of income as well as approaching legal problems more generally.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2014
- Authors: Grenville, David Paul
- Date: 2014
- Subjects: Unilever (Firm) , South African Revenue Service , Taxation -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Income tax -- Law and legislation -- South Africa -- Cases , Income tax -- South Africa -- Cases , Business enterprises -- Taxation -- South Africa , Law -- South Africa -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MCom
- Identifier: vital:909 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013238
- Description: This research studies the practical person principle as it was introduced in the case of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441. In its time the Lever Brothers case was a seminal judgment in South Africa’s tax jurisprudence and the practical person principle was a decisive criterion for the determination of source of income. The primary goal of this research was a critical analysis the practical man principle. This involved an analysis of the extent to which this principle requires judges to adopt a criterion that is too flexible for legitimate judicial decision-making. The extent to which the practical person principle creates a clash between a philosophical approach to law and an approach that is based on common sense or practicality was also debated. Finally, it was considered whether adopting a philosophical approach to determining the source of income could overcome the problems associated with the practical approach. A doctrinal methodology was applied to the documentary data consisting of the South African and Australian Income Tax Acts, South African and other case law, historical records and the writings of scholars. From the critical analysis of the practical person principle it was concluded that the anthropomorphised form of the principle gives rise to several problems that may be overcome by looking to the underlying operation of the principle. Further analysis of this operation, however, revealed deeper problems in that the principle undermines the doctrine of judicial precedent, legal certainty and the rule of law. Accordingly a practical approach to determining the source of income is undesirable and unconstitutional. Further research was conducted into the relative merits of a philosophical approach to determining source of income and it was argued that such an approach could provide a more desirable solution to determining source of income as well as approaching legal problems more generally.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2014
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