Challenging retributivist intuitions
- Authors: Hawkes, Jonathan
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Lex talionis Punishment -- Philosophy Restorative justice
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2711 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002841
- Description: Can punishment, a practice which involves the deliberate infliction of suffering, be justified? Retributivists and consequentialists argue that punishment can be justified, whereas abolitionists argue that it cannot. Retributivists argue that punishment is justified because wrongdoers deserve it, whereas punishment is justified for consequentialists because it is beneficial for society. A popular form of abolitionism is restorative justice, which is the view that all those affected by crime (perpetrators, victims and members of society) should be reconciled. In this thesis I argue that retributivist justifications for punishment are mistaken, and argue in favour of a consequentialist view. I also argue that consequentialism can accommodate the valuable features of restorative justice while avoiding the challenges faced by it. My arguments against retributivism will turn on a thought experiment. The experiment is designed to draw out the fundamental retributivist intuition that people who cause harm deserve to suffer harm in return, yet excludes most of the principles retributivists would use to justify the intuition. I will go on to argue that, even if the retributivist considerations did apply to the experiment, they would still not justify the claim that wrongdoers deserve to be punished. Most of the retributivist considerations are, therefore, not necessary for the intuition, and none of the considerations are sufficient for it. The retributivist considerations are, I contend, rationalisations, as the claim that wrongdoers deserve to suffer is based, not on good reasons, but on an unreliable intuition. I shall argue that the consequentialist considerations, while not being necessary, are sufficient for the claim that wrongdoers should be punished, and they should be punished, I maintain, in the interests of preventing greater harm from occurring.
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Personal autonomy : philosophy and literature
- Authors: Vice, Samantha Wynne
- Date: 1999
- Subjects: Autonomy (Philosophy) , Ishiguro, Kazuo, 1954- -- Remains Of The Day , James, Henry, 1843-1916. Portrait of a lady
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2723 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002853 , Autonomy (Philosophy) , Ishiguro, Kazuo, 1954- -- Remains Of The Day , James, Henry, 1843-1916. Portrait of a lady
- Description: Gerald Dworkin's influential account of Personal Autonomy offers the following two conditions for autonomy: (i) Authenticity - the condition that one identify with one's beliefs, desires and values after a process of critical reflection, and (ii) Procedural Independence - the identification in (i) must not be "influenced in ways which make the process of identification in some way alien to the individual" (Dworkin 1989:61). I argue in this thesis that there are cases which fulfil both of Dworkin's conditions, yet are clearly not cases of autonomy. Specifically, I argue that we can best assess the adequacy of Dworkin's account of autonomy through literature, because it provides a unique medium for testing his account on the very terms he sets up for himself - ie. that autonomy apply to, and make sense of, persons leading lives of a certain quality. The examination of two novels - Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day and Henry James's The Portrait of a Lady - shows that Dworkin's explanation of identification and critical reflection is inadequate for capturing their role in autonomy and that he does not pay enough attention to the role of external factors in preventing or supporting autonomy. As an alternative, I offer the following two conditions for autonomy: (i) critical reflection of a certain kind - radical reflection, and (ii) the ability to translate the results of (i) into action - competence. The novels demonstrate that both conditions are dependent upon considerations of the content of one's beliefs, desires, values etc. Certain of these will prevent or hinder the achievement of autonomy because of their content, so autonomy must be understood in relation to substantial considerations, rather than in purely formal terms, as Dworkin argues.
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