The trouble with culture : Plato's critique of poetry
- Authors: Ansell, James D'Olier
- Date: 2007 , 2013-07-25
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2733 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004460
- Description: In this thesis I argue that Plato's critique of poetry, taken in its proper context, is a serious and relevant critique of popular culture. In the first chapter I argue that the poetic reforms proposed in Books 2 and 3 and Book 10 of Republic stand at the front of a total reform of Greek culture. I argue for the consistency of Plato's whole argument and then I claim that if we get Plato's targets right, not fine art or literature, and focus on appropriate modern analogues then we can see why his critique is still important. If we share his claim that we are influenced by popular culture in important and often insidious ways and agree that culture can promote corrupt values, then we have accepted the core of Plato's challenge. If we find his solution distasteful, then the task is to come up with a democratic alternative. In the remaining two chapters I focus specifically on the challenge to the poets, putting the other reforms to the side. In the second chapter I consider a possible reply to the challenge focusing on the worth of the poetry that was expelled. I first look elsewhere in the Platonic oeuvre at the account of beauty in Symposium and Phaedrus but I argue that neither of them gives anything like aesthetic value that could be usefully applied to poetry. Next I look to some modern accounts of aesthetic value. I argue that while they might go some of the distance against Plato's challenge, they face a difficult task because it is not sufficient positing the value, an account is needed of their positive benefit. In the third chapter I turn to a more direct response to the challenge. Arguably Aristotle offers such a response in the Poetics, in terms of the notion of katharsis. I consider two interpretative candidates for katharsis. The first takes the benefit of poetry to be psychological - katharsis is a purgation of otherwise pathological emotions. I argue that this fails because it misunderstands precisely what Plato's concerns about poetry are, and, furthermore, this account could even be compatible with Plato's worries. The second interpretation takes the benefit of poetry to be ethical- katharsis is a type of ethical clarification which is beneficial in training our emotional responses. I claim that the clarification, and education, is worryingly conventionalist, and doesn't take seriously that Plato's target was popular culture and not great, educative literature. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2007
- Authors: Ansell, James D'Olier
- Date: 2007 , 2013-07-25
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2733 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004460
- Description: In this thesis I argue that Plato's critique of poetry, taken in its proper context, is a serious and relevant critique of popular culture. In the first chapter I argue that the poetic reforms proposed in Books 2 and 3 and Book 10 of Republic stand at the front of a total reform of Greek culture. I argue for the consistency of Plato's whole argument and then I claim that if we get Plato's targets right, not fine art or literature, and focus on appropriate modern analogues then we can see why his critique is still important. If we share his claim that we are influenced by popular culture in important and often insidious ways and agree that culture can promote corrupt values, then we have accepted the core of Plato's challenge. If we find his solution distasteful, then the task is to come up with a democratic alternative. In the remaining two chapters I focus specifically on the challenge to the poets, putting the other reforms to the side. In the second chapter I consider a possible reply to the challenge focusing on the worth of the poetry that was expelled. I first look elsewhere in the Platonic oeuvre at the account of beauty in Symposium and Phaedrus but I argue that neither of them gives anything like aesthetic value that could be usefully applied to poetry. Next I look to some modern accounts of aesthetic value. I argue that while they might go some of the distance against Plato's challenge, they face a difficult task because it is not sufficient positing the value, an account is needed of their positive benefit. In the third chapter I turn to a more direct response to the challenge. Arguably Aristotle offers such a response in the Poetics, in terms of the notion of katharsis. I consider two interpretative candidates for katharsis. The first takes the benefit of poetry to be psychological - katharsis is a purgation of otherwise pathological emotions. I argue that this fails because it misunderstands precisely what Plato's concerns about poetry are, and, furthermore, this account could even be compatible with Plato's worries. The second interpretation takes the benefit of poetry to be ethical- katharsis is a type of ethical clarification which is beneficial in training our emotional responses. I claim that the clarification, and education, is worryingly conventionalist, and doesn't take seriously that Plato's target was popular culture and not great, educative literature. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2007
Against supererogationism
- Authors: Van Niekerk, Jason Bradley
- Date: 2006
- Subjects: Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2731 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004268 , Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Description: In this thesis, I argue that we have no reason to accept the existence of a category of supererogatory moral goods: that is, good acts that carry no pressure to bring them about. Despite the counterintuitive nature and suspicious provenance of the concept, Supererogationism is the orthodoxy in Ethics, and I examine promising but unsuccessful responses to it by Peter Singer and Kwame Gyekye. Responding in particular to David Heyd's Supererogationism - but also to J. O. Urmson, Susan Wolf, and Jonathan Dancy - I develop an account of the principle "Good implies Ought" that does not entail absurd over-obligation. I argue that this Anti-Supererogationist model stands up to the four strongest arguments against such a position, and that it embraces a more accurate account of the relation between values and oughts than Supererogationists are capable of supplying. Finally, I sketch a detailed eudaimonist account of the principle umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu - that our commitment to the good of others stems from our flourishing being caught up with theirs.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2006
- Authors: Van Niekerk, Jason Bradley
- Date: 2006
- Subjects: Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2731 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004268 , Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Description: In this thesis, I argue that we have no reason to accept the existence of a category of supererogatory moral goods: that is, good acts that carry no pressure to bring them about. Despite the counterintuitive nature and suspicious provenance of the concept, Supererogationism is the orthodoxy in Ethics, and I examine promising but unsuccessful responses to it by Peter Singer and Kwame Gyekye. Responding in particular to David Heyd's Supererogationism - but also to J. O. Urmson, Susan Wolf, and Jonathan Dancy - I develop an account of the principle "Good implies Ought" that does not entail absurd over-obligation. I argue that this Anti-Supererogationist model stands up to the four strongest arguments against such a position, and that it embraces a more accurate account of the relation between values and oughts than Supererogationists are capable of supplying. Finally, I sketch a detailed eudaimonist account of the principle umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu - that our commitment to the good of others stems from our flourishing being caught up with theirs.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2006
Food, philosophy and love
- Authors: Ristic, Nevenka
- Date: 2006 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Plato -- Symposium , Food -- Philosophy , Eating (Philosophy) , Love -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2738 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007478 , Plato -- Symposium , Food -- Philosophy , Eating (Philosophy) , Love -- Philosophy
- Description: This thesis is a metaphilosophical investigation into how food can be handled philosophically. The first chapter considers the question of whether food can be the subject matter of philosophy, and concludes that there are three possible ways: Foodist Philosophy, Philosophy of Food, and Philosophy and Food. This thesis focuses on the category Foodist Philosophy. The second chapter develops an account of foodist philosophy: it is a style of philosophy that assumes that our food and eating practices are fundamental aspects of the human condition. The third chapter analyses Plato's concept of love in the Symposium and these conclusions are objected to in a foodist critique in the fourth chapter. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2006
- Authors: Ristic, Nevenka
- Date: 2006 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Plato -- Symposium , Food -- Philosophy , Eating (Philosophy) , Love -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2738 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007478 , Plato -- Symposium , Food -- Philosophy , Eating (Philosophy) , Love -- Philosophy
- Description: This thesis is a metaphilosophical investigation into how food can be handled philosophically. The first chapter considers the question of whether food can be the subject matter of philosophy, and concludes that there are three possible ways: Foodist Philosophy, Philosophy of Food, and Philosophy and Food. This thesis focuses on the category Foodist Philosophy. The second chapter develops an account of foodist philosophy: it is a style of philosophy that assumes that our food and eating practices are fundamental aspects of the human condition. The third chapter analyses Plato's concept of love in the Symposium and these conclusions are objected to in a foodist critique in the fourth chapter. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2006
Animal suffering in factory farming and the best way to prevent it
- Authors: Watkins, Gareth
- Date: 2005
- Subjects: Vegetarianism -- Moral and ethical aspects Food animals -- Moral and ethical aspects Animal rights Animal welfare Animal welfare -- Moral and ethical aspects Vegetarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2728 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003736
- Description: This thesis moves beyond the traditional approaches of how we ought to treat animals, and instead concentrates on the best strategy for preventing animal suffering in the farming industry. Chapter 1 considers the question of how we can know that animals feel pain, and concludes not only that it is rational to believe that they can, but also that this is a significant fact. Chapter 2 then analyses one possible strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering, namely demi-vegetarianism. For a number of reasons, however, this strategy is found to be flawed, therefore Chapter 3 analyses a second possible strategy, namely vegetarianism, and concludes that this is, in fact, the best strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering in the farming industry.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2005
- Authors: Watkins, Gareth
- Date: 2005
- Subjects: Vegetarianism -- Moral and ethical aspects Food animals -- Moral and ethical aspects Animal rights Animal welfare Animal welfare -- Moral and ethical aspects Vegetarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2728 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003736
- Description: This thesis moves beyond the traditional approaches of how we ought to treat animals, and instead concentrates on the best strategy for preventing animal suffering in the farming industry. Chapter 1 considers the question of how we can know that animals feel pain, and concludes not only that it is rational to believe that they can, but also that this is a significant fact. Chapter 2 then analyses one possible strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering, namely demi-vegetarianism. For a number of reasons, however, this strategy is found to be flawed, therefore Chapter 3 analyses a second possible strategy, namely vegetarianism, and concludes that this is, in fact, the best strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering in the farming industry.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2005
The motivating force of moral beliefs
- Authors: Vos, James Antony
- Date: 2005 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2729 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003804 , Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Description: I investigate the issue of whether or not one's holding a moral belief is sufficient to motivate one to act as that belief prescribes. I argue that rational persons who hold a moral belief that is also a 'self-referential belief' will form a desire to act as that belief prescribes and thereby be motivated to act on the moral belief. I argue for this claim by, firstly, showing that the demand that moral judgements must be intrinsically motivating, Internalism, should only apply to rational persons, that is, the link between moral judgement and motivation can be broken in cases of irrationality. Secondly, I argue against the Humean claim that one cannot rationally form a desire simply because one believes that one ought to have that desire. This claim requires an investigation into a variety of views of Practical Reason and an argument concluding that Practical Reason is broader in scope than the Instrumentalist or Humean allows. I undertake this task in chapter 2. Thirdly, I argue that believing that I ought to perform a certain action will give me an internal commitment to perform that action, insofar as I am rational. I argue that an internal commitment is a form of desire. Once I recognise that I have a moral belief and an internal commitment, I will be motivated to act as that belief and commitment prescribe. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2005
- Authors: Vos, James Antony
- Date: 2005 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2729 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003804 , Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Description: I investigate the issue of whether or not one's holding a moral belief is sufficient to motivate one to act as that belief prescribes. I argue that rational persons who hold a moral belief that is also a 'self-referential belief' will form a desire to act as that belief prescribes and thereby be motivated to act on the moral belief. I argue for this claim by, firstly, showing that the demand that moral judgements must be intrinsically motivating, Internalism, should only apply to rational persons, that is, the link between moral judgement and motivation can be broken in cases of irrationality. Secondly, I argue against the Humean claim that one cannot rationally form a desire simply because one believes that one ought to have that desire. This claim requires an investigation into a variety of views of Practical Reason and an argument concluding that Practical Reason is broader in scope than the Instrumentalist or Humean allows. I undertake this task in chapter 2. Thirdly, I argue that believing that I ought to perform a certain action will give me an internal commitment to perform that action, insofar as I am rational. I argue that an internal commitment is a form of desire. Once I recognise that I have a moral belief and an internal commitment, I will be motivated to act as that belief and commitment prescribe. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2005
"From the inside": how to attribute emotions to others
- Authors: Mitova, Velislava Atanasova
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2741 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007661 , Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Description: I argue that a specific version of Theory theory is necessary and sufficient for attributions and predictions of others' emotions. Theory theory is the view that we attribute and predict others' mental states on the basis of a (tacit) body of generalisations about mental states, their situational input, and behavioural output. Theory's antagonist, Simulation theory, is the view that we ascribe mental states to others by simulating - or running ' off-line ' - their doxastic, emotional, and contextual situations. My argument for Theory's necessity and sufficiency develops in three stages: First, I show that some version of Theory is necessary for predictions of all mental states on the basis of the ascriber's knowledge of the subject's other mental states. The linchpin of the arguments here consists of considerations from relevant similarity between the ascriber's and the subject's mental states. Simulation cannot provide criteria for such similarity, and so, I argue, predictions must advert to Theory. Second, I develop a sui generis model of emotions, according to which (i) emoticns' necessary objects and typical causes are concern-based construals; and (ii) emotions qua attitudes are (a) complex states embedded in a narrative structure, (b) characterised in terms of their object, their expressive behaviour, and their phenomenology. Third, I show that, considering the nature of the objects of emotions, some Theory is necessary for emotion-predictions and -attributions. Moreover, I develop a version of Theory, based on my analysis of emotions and narrative structures, and argue that this version of Theory is both necessary and sufficient for emotion-predictions and -attributions.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
- Authors: Mitova, Velislava Atanasova
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2741 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007661 , Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Description: I argue that a specific version of Theory theory is necessary and sufficient for attributions and predictions of others' emotions. Theory theory is the view that we attribute and predict others' mental states on the basis of a (tacit) body of generalisations about mental states, their situational input, and behavioural output. Theory's antagonist, Simulation theory, is the view that we ascribe mental states to others by simulating - or running ' off-line ' - their doxastic, emotional, and contextual situations. My argument for Theory's necessity and sufficiency develops in three stages: First, I show that some version of Theory is necessary for predictions of all mental states on the basis of the ascriber's knowledge of the subject's other mental states. The linchpin of the arguments here consists of considerations from relevant similarity between the ascriber's and the subject's mental states. Simulation cannot provide criteria for such similarity, and so, I argue, predictions must advert to Theory. Second, I develop a sui generis model of emotions, according to which (i) emoticns' necessary objects and typical causes are concern-based construals; and (ii) emotions qua attitudes are (a) complex states embedded in a narrative structure, (b) characterised in terms of their object, their expressive behaviour, and their phenomenology. Third, I show that, considering the nature of the objects of emotions, some Theory is necessary for emotion-predictions and -attributions. Moreover, I develop a version of Theory, based on my analysis of emotions and narrative structures, and argue that this version of Theory is both necessary and sufficient for emotion-predictions and -attributions.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
A phenomenological study of how South African entrepreneurs experience and deal with ethical dilemmas
- Authors: Robinson, David Alan
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Entrepreneurship -- South Africa Business ethics -- South Africa Decision making -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:1175 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002791
- Description: This research sets out to examine how entrepreneurs experience and deal with ethical dilemmas. An entrepreneur is defined as a person who creates something of value and assumes the risk of establishing and managing a business around it. An ethical dilemma comes about when the entrepreneur must choose between alternatives and where the morally correct choice is unclear. This may be due to conflicting personal values or loyalties, tensions arising out of the realization that the moral action is not in line with his self-interest, cross-cultural conflict, or moral ambiguity. Because of the nature of entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur typically lives with ever-present threats arising from limited resources, competition, and the risk of business failure. His actions must simultaneously ensure survival, maximize profit, limit risk, counter threats, optimize the use of resources, and reward him with a feeling of satisfaction. It is hardly surprising that conflicting priorities sometimes ensue. It is also widely believed that these entrepreneurial pursuits supersede the more general need to act in morally appropriate ways. This is a phenomenological study, based on interviews with seven entrepreneurs in established service-oriented ventures. They were asked to describe their business, any dilemmas they have experienced, how they were handled, and what challenges they experience as entrepreneurs in South Africa today. Using phenomenology as my vehicle for data collection and analysis, I sought to enter the lived-worlds of my participants to discover the essence of how ethical dilemmas are experienced in the entrepreneurial milieu. The study’s findings reflect that each entrepreneur has a distinctive world-view, which is represented by a complex mosaic of virtue ethics, deontology, utilitarianism and metaethical perspectives. The permutations are numerous, thus negating the possibility of typecasting entrepreneurs. Instead this research introduces the reader to aspects of entrepreneurial reality such as the complexity of cultural diversity, the freedom to limit the amount of personal energy given to business, and the existence of a more sensitive, searching inner soul beneath the apparent hard-nosed business-oriented public image. While examining entrepreneurial dilemmas in depth, this research introduces the dilemma drum as a tool to portray the argument form of any dilemma by making explicit the ethical component inherent in every business decision and facilitating its effective resolution in a non-prescriptive way. The findings identify certain individual characteristics of participant entrepreneurs that are unlike anything in the mainstream literature, dispelling notions of the entrepreneur as a societal misfit, an essential innovator with vision and flair, or a compulsive risk-taker, while confirming success as the key motivator rather than money per se, the importance of significant others, and the influence of culture and gender. They provide fresh insights into the psyche of the entrepreneur, which include: the existence of inner conviction - marrying the concept of goal-directedness with that of making a contribution to society; exercising the virtues in order to support a delicate balance between business and ethical imperatives; learning to respect energy flow; an alternative morality based on attracting and allowing benevolent or serendipitous events to happen naturally and redefining success as ‘being able to create what is needed as and when needed’; focusing one’s energy on the telos; developing a personal marketing formula suited to a culturallydiverse society; and the anxiety associated with being out-there on one’s own. The general statement, which is ultimately distilled from the seven situated descriptions, introduces a theory of entrepreneurial ethics that presents a new and different view of the lived-world of entrepreneurship, consisting of: Firstly, the key components of entrepreneurial success – having clear goals, energy, making a contribution to society, being connected, getting others on board, and work as an extension of self; secondly, what drives entrepreneurs – goal-orientation, sense of personal excitement, inner conviction, autonomy, and external recognition of success; thirdly, the entrepreneurial ethic – concern for credibility, commitment to service, contributing to quality of life; fourthly, the nature of entrepreneurial dilemmas - conflicting responsibilities, authenticity and credibility, risk and expansion, and awareness of diversity; fifthly, how entrepreneurs deal with ethical issues in their own distinctive ways – by holding fast to authentic virtues, bowing to community expectations, avoiding friction, adopting a ‘come-what-may’ or ‘what’s in it for me’ attitude, or pursuing a higher purpose where both parties benefit; sixthly, entrepreneurs’ world -views – beliefs, goals, ways of deriving satisfaction, virtuous behaviour; pen-ultimately, the challenges facing entrepreneurs in South Africa – overcoming the legacies of apartheid, containing crime, fostering an acceptable business ethic, and facilitating reconciliation between ethnic groups; and lastly, finding the power within – that illusive entrepreneurial spirit – self-reliance, looking beyond immediate obstacles, grasping opportunities, and understanding serendipity.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
- Authors: Robinson, David Alan
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Entrepreneurship -- South Africa Business ethics -- South Africa Decision making -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:1175 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002791
- Description: This research sets out to examine how entrepreneurs experience and deal with ethical dilemmas. An entrepreneur is defined as a person who creates something of value and assumes the risk of establishing and managing a business around it. An ethical dilemma comes about when the entrepreneur must choose between alternatives and where the morally correct choice is unclear. This may be due to conflicting personal values or loyalties, tensions arising out of the realization that the moral action is not in line with his self-interest, cross-cultural conflict, or moral ambiguity. Because of the nature of entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur typically lives with ever-present threats arising from limited resources, competition, and the risk of business failure. His actions must simultaneously ensure survival, maximize profit, limit risk, counter threats, optimize the use of resources, and reward him with a feeling of satisfaction. It is hardly surprising that conflicting priorities sometimes ensue. It is also widely believed that these entrepreneurial pursuits supersede the more general need to act in morally appropriate ways. This is a phenomenological study, based on interviews with seven entrepreneurs in established service-oriented ventures. They were asked to describe their business, any dilemmas they have experienced, how they were handled, and what challenges they experience as entrepreneurs in South Africa today. Using phenomenology as my vehicle for data collection and analysis, I sought to enter the lived-worlds of my participants to discover the essence of how ethical dilemmas are experienced in the entrepreneurial milieu. The study’s findings reflect that each entrepreneur has a distinctive world-view, which is represented by a complex mosaic of virtue ethics, deontology, utilitarianism and metaethical perspectives. The permutations are numerous, thus negating the possibility of typecasting entrepreneurs. Instead this research introduces the reader to aspects of entrepreneurial reality such as the complexity of cultural diversity, the freedom to limit the amount of personal energy given to business, and the existence of a more sensitive, searching inner soul beneath the apparent hard-nosed business-oriented public image. While examining entrepreneurial dilemmas in depth, this research introduces the dilemma drum as a tool to portray the argument form of any dilemma by making explicit the ethical component inherent in every business decision and facilitating its effective resolution in a non-prescriptive way. The findings identify certain individual characteristics of participant entrepreneurs that are unlike anything in the mainstream literature, dispelling notions of the entrepreneur as a societal misfit, an essential innovator with vision and flair, or a compulsive risk-taker, while confirming success as the key motivator rather than money per se, the importance of significant others, and the influence of culture and gender. They provide fresh insights into the psyche of the entrepreneur, which include: the existence of inner conviction - marrying the concept of goal-directedness with that of making a contribution to society; exercising the virtues in order to support a delicate balance between business and ethical imperatives; learning to respect energy flow; an alternative morality based on attracting and allowing benevolent or serendipitous events to happen naturally and redefining success as ‘being able to create what is needed as and when needed’; focusing one’s energy on the telos; developing a personal marketing formula suited to a culturallydiverse society; and the anxiety associated with being out-there on one’s own. The general statement, which is ultimately distilled from the seven situated descriptions, introduces a theory of entrepreneurial ethics that presents a new and different view of the lived-world of entrepreneurship, consisting of: Firstly, the key components of entrepreneurial success – having clear goals, energy, making a contribution to society, being connected, getting others on board, and work as an extension of self; secondly, what drives entrepreneurs – goal-orientation, sense of personal excitement, inner conviction, autonomy, and external recognition of success; thirdly, the entrepreneurial ethic – concern for credibility, commitment to service, contributing to quality of life; fourthly, the nature of entrepreneurial dilemmas - conflicting responsibilities, authenticity and credibility, risk and expansion, and awareness of diversity; fifthly, how entrepreneurs deal with ethical issues in their own distinctive ways – by holding fast to authentic virtues, bowing to community expectations, avoiding friction, adopting a ‘come-what-may’ or ‘what’s in it for me’ attitude, or pursuing a higher purpose where both parties benefit; sixthly, entrepreneurs’ world -views – beliefs, goals, ways of deriving satisfaction, virtuous behaviour; pen-ultimately, the challenges facing entrepreneurs in South Africa – overcoming the legacies of apartheid, containing crime, fostering an acceptable business ethic, and facilitating reconciliation between ethnic groups; and lastly, finding the power within – that illusive entrepreneurial spirit – self-reliance, looking beyond immediate obstacles, grasping opportunities, and understanding serendipity.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
In defence of moral objectivity
- Authors: McKaiser, Eusebius
- Date: 2003 , 2013-05-23
- Subjects: Ethics , Objectivity
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2740 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007599 , Ethics , Objectivity
- Description: This thesis examines the problem of moral objectivity, which is constituted by the ontological, epistemological and motivational challenges. It gradually develops an account of moral objectivity that has the dual function of dealing with the enemies of moral objectivity as well as giving a positive account of what moral objectivity is. It establishes these aims by arguing for the following theses. The first set of arguments show that relativist theories of ethics provide us with no forceful grounds for being sceptical about moral objectivity. The second set of arguments deepens the response to those who are sceptical about moral objectivity. It does so by showing in greater detail how rationality plays a substantive role in our practical deliberation, our notion of agency as well as our reactive attitudes. These arguments provide further reasons why we should have faith in the possibility of developing an adequate account of moral objectivity. The last set of arguments provides the positive account of moral objectivity. This positive account ends with the discussion of a paradigmatic moral fact that gives full expression (to the features of moral objectivity that have been articulated and defended.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
- Authors: McKaiser, Eusebius
- Date: 2003 , 2013-05-23
- Subjects: Ethics , Objectivity
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2740 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007599 , Ethics , Objectivity
- Description: This thesis examines the problem of moral objectivity, which is constituted by the ontological, epistemological and motivational challenges. It gradually develops an account of moral objectivity that has the dual function of dealing with the enemies of moral objectivity as well as giving a positive account of what moral objectivity is. It establishes these aims by arguing for the following theses. The first set of arguments show that relativist theories of ethics provide us with no forceful grounds for being sceptical about moral objectivity. The second set of arguments deepens the response to those who are sceptical about moral objectivity. It does so by showing in greater detail how rationality plays a substantive role in our practical deliberation, our notion of agency as well as our reactive attitudes. These arguments provide further reasons why we should have faith in the possibility of developing an adequate account of moral objectivity. The last set of arguments provides the positive account of moral objectivity. This positive account ends with the discussion of a paradigmatic moral fact that gives full expression (to the features of moral objectivity that have been articulated and defended.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
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