Environmental conflict resolution: a critical analysis of the role of interests and value
- Authors: Mweshi, John
- Date: 2015
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/55842 , vital:26740
- Description: This thesis intends to contribute to an enhanced understanding of environmental conflicts and their resolution. To accomplish this task the thesis will ascertain the role that value and interests play in environmental conflicts in order to establish an adequate basis upon which they can be resolved. In the process, the thesis will also examine three different approaches, namely, the Standard Approach; the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) framework; and the Structured Decision Making (SDM) approach. First, the standard approach is informed by the understanding that focusing on interests instead of human values makes the resolution of conflicts more tractable. In contrast, this thesis argues that an exclusive focus on interests, in the context of environmental conflict resolution, is inadequate in some important respects because there are other factors to be considered such as the environmental impacts at the root of the conflict. Second, the thesis examines the focus on impacts that characterises EIAs. It argues that this approach remedies the limitations of the standard approach insofar as impacts are understood in terms of object value. However, the EIA approach does not provide much guidance on how to deal with conflicting human values. Third, taking into account the fact that the standard approach does not address the question of object value, while the EIA addresses object value but does not deal directly with human values, the thesis examines the SDM approach to environmental risk decisions. The thesis argues that while the SDM approach claims to deal with conflicts involving human values head-on, it does not provide a viable alternative in terms of environmental conflict resolution. This is because it fails to recognise the key distinction between human values and object value despite acknowledging the presence of multiple value dimensions as a major obstacle to value trade-offs and therefore to the resolution of value conflicts. Finally, the thesis recommends an adequate basis upon which environmental conflicts can be resolved.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
- Authors: Mweshi, John
- Date: 2015
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/55842 , vital:26740
- Description: This thesis intends to contribute to an enhanced understanding of environmental conflicts and their resolution. To accomplish this task the thesis will ascertain the role that value and interests play in environmental conflicts in order to establish an adequate basis upon which they can be resolved. In the process, the thesis will also examine three different approaches, namely, the Standard Approach; the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) framework; and the Structured Decision Making (SDM) approach. First, the standard approach is informed by the understanding that focusing on interests instead of human values makes the resolution of conflicts more tractable. In contrast, this thesis argues that an exclusive focus on interests, in the context of environmental conflict resolution, is inadequate in some important respects because there are other factors to be considered such as the environmental impacts at the root of the conflict. Second, the thesis examines the focus on impacts that characterises EIAs. It argues that this approach remedies the limitations of the standard approach insofar as impacts are understood in terms of object value. However, the EIA approach does not provide much guidance on how to deal with conflicting human values. Third, taking into account the fact that the standard approach does not address the question of object value, while the EIA addresses object value but does not deal directly with human values, the thesis examines the SDM approach to environmental risk decisions. The thesis argues that while the SDM approach claims to deal with conflicts involving human values head-on, it does not provide a viable alternative in terms of environmental conflict resolution. This is because it fails to recognise the key distinction between human values and object value despite acknowledging the presence of multiple value dimensions as a major obstacle to value trade-offs and therefore to the resolution of value conflicts. Finally, the thesis recommends an adequate basis upon which environmental conflicts can be resolved.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
Creating a new declaration of rights : a critical reconstruction of earth jurisprudence's global legislative framework
- Authors: Lenferna, Georges Alexandre
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Universal Declaration , Rights , Earth , Environment , Ethics , Environmental law, International -- Research , Environmental law, International -- Philosophy , Environmental ethics -- Research , Nature conservation -- Law and legislation -- Research , Jurisprudence -- Research , Law -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2704 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001979
- Description: This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2013
- Authors: Lenferna, Georges Alexandre
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Universal Declaration , Rights , Earth , Environment , Ethics , Environmental law, International -- Research , Environmental law, International -- Philosophy , Environmental ethics -- Research , Nature conservation -- Law and legislation -- Research , Jurisprudence -- Research , Law -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2704 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001979
- Description: This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2013
The artistic path to virtue
- Authors: Sher, Gavin
- Date: 2007
- Subjects: Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2732 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370 , Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Description: Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2007
- Authors: Sher, Gavin
- Date: 2007
- Subjects: Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2732 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370 , Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Description: Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2007
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