Pessimism and the secular problem of evil
- Authors: Ruiters, Siphamandla
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Good and evil , Pessimism , Optimism , Secularism , Quality of life
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190111 , vital:44964
- Description: How should we respond to the prevalence of ubiquitous evil? In this thesis, I present two responses to the secular problem of evil. The secular problem of evil exists because we want to live good lives, but we are all existentially vulnerable to evil. Consequently, we can think of various ways in which evil's existence poses a problem for us. When faced with such evil, I distinguish two responses that we may adopt, namely, optimistic or pessimistic responses to the secular problem of evil. These responses may be understood as stances that we may adopt about the relative evil and goodness in the world. Once I have made a thorough evaluation of the discussion around the secular problem of evil and the responses, I will suggest that pessimism is an appealing and appropriate response that we should adopt. To achieve the aims of this thesis, I will first clarify the kind of evil at stake in this thesis and then explain how philosophers have historically responded to this problem. Secondly, I will focus on the contemporary discussion on the secular problem of evil and show the responses are optimistic responses. Finally, I will provide a case against optimism and then show why pessimism is the most appealing and appropriate response. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Ruiters, Siphamandla
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Good and evil , Pessimism , Optimism , Secularism , Quality of life
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190111 , vital:44964
- Description: How should we respond to the prevalence of ubiquitous evil? In this thesis, I present two responses to the secular problem of evil. The secular problem of evil exists because we want to live good lives, but we are all existentially vulnerable to evil. Consequently, we can think of various ways in which evil's existence poses a problem for us. When faced with such evil, I distinguish two responses that we may adopt, namely, optimistic or pessimistic responses to the secular problem of evil. These responses may be understood as stances that we may adopt about the relative evil and goodness in the world. Once I have made a thorough evaluation of the discussion around the secular problem of evil and the responses, I will suggest that pessimism is an appealing and appropriate response that we should adopt. To achieve the aims of this thesis, I will first clarify the kind of evil at stake in this thesis and then explain how philosophers have historically responded to this problem. Secondly, I will focus on the contemporary discussion on the secular problem of evil and show the responses are optimistic responses. Finally, I will provide a case against optimism and then show why pessimism is the most appealing and appropriate response. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Understanding of biological teleology from a naturalistic perspective
- Authors: Abrahams, Sanaa
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Teleology , Biology -- Philosophy , Evolution (Biology) -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/140534 , vital:37896
- Description: To the extent that teleological thinking is metaphysically suspect, many theorists attempt to shift the stigma of functional explanations by reducing function ascriptions, and aim thus to de-legitimise an appeal to teleological causal relations in an analysis of function. The point is to dispel the mystery which envelops the application of function concepts by reformulating biological functional explanations so as to dispense with teleology. My project is to interrogate the success with which teleological explanations have thus been eliminated in the biological sciences, and, over the course of this thesis, I conclude that a kind of teleological causation nevertheless remains the most adequate explanatory ground of natural products. My proposal is that functional explanations are causal explanations for the presence and maintenance of self-reproducing systems. I contend that, insofar as the attribution of function presupposes the valuation of a function-bearing system as a causal necessity for its constituent parts, functional explanation references distinct and irreducible holistic properties. Using Kantian metaphysics to frame the discussion, this thesis aims first to explore critically the subject of functional characterisations of biological phenomena, and second, the metaphysical basis of modern science. Its chief contributions to the philosophical function debate reside in proposing novel arguments in justification of what I consider is an improved formulation of an attempted definition of biological function, in which teleological causal powers are explicitly recognised and accommodated in functional explanation. Moreover, this thesis attempts a naturalistic reconstruction of the metaphysical entailments of the real causality of a whole
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2020
- Authors: Abrahams, Sanaa
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Teleology , Biology -- Philosophy , Evolution (Biology) -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/140534 , vital:37896
- Description: To the extent that teleological thinking is metaphysically suspect, many theorists attempt to shift the stigma of functional explanations by reducing function ascriptions, and aim thus to de-legitimise an appeal to teleological causal relations in an analysis of function. The point is to dispel the mystery which envelops the application of function concepts by reformulating biological functional explanations so as to dispense with teleology. My project is to interrogate the success with which teleological explanations have thus been eliminated in the biological sciences, and, over the course of this thesis, I conclude that a kind of teleological causation nevertheless remains the most adequate explanatory ground of natural products. My proposal is that functional explanations are causal explanations for the presence and maintenance of self-reproducing systems. I contend that, insofar as the attribution of function presupposes the valuation of a function-bearing system as a causal necessity for its constituent parts, functional explanation references distinct and irreducible holistic properties. Using Kantian metaphysics to frame the discussion, this thesis aims first to explore critically the subject of functional characterisations of biological phenomena, and second, the metaphysical basis of modern science. Its chief contributions to the philosophical function debate reside in proposing novel arguments in justification of what I consider is an improved formulation of an attempted definition of biological function, in which teleological causal powers are explicitly recognised and accommodated in functional explanation. Moreover, this thesis attempts a naturalistic reconstruction of the metaphysical entailments of the real causality of a whole
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2020
Intelligent design and biology
- Authors: Ramsden, Sean
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Hume, David, 1711-1776 , Darwin, Charles, 1809-1882 , Paley, William, 1743-1805 , Dembski, William A., 1960- , Behe, Michael J., 1952- , Evolution (Biology) , Probabilities , Naturalism , Intelligent design (Teleology)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2739 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007561 , Hume, David, 1711-1776 , Darwin, Charles, 1809-1882 , Paley, William, 1743-1805 , Dembski, William A., 1960- , Behe, Michael J., 1952- , Evolution (Biology) , Probabilities , Naturalism , Intelligent design (Teleology)
- Description: The thesis is that contrary to the received popular wisdom, the combination of David Hume's sceptical enquiry and Charles Darwin's provision of an alternative theoretical framework to the then current paradigm of natural theology did not succeed in defeating the design argument. I argue that William Paley's work best represented the status quo in the philosophy of biology circa 1800 and that with the logical mechanisms provided us by William Dembski in his seminal work on probability, there is a strong argument for thr work of Michael Behe to stand in a similar position today to that of Paley two centuries ago. The argument runs as follows: In Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 1 I introduce the issues. In Section 3 I argue that William Paley's exposition of the design argument was archetypical of the natural theology school and that given Hume's already published criticism of the argument, Paley for one did not feel the design argument to be done for. I further argue in Section 4 that Hume in fact did no such thing and that neither did he see himself as having done so, but that the design argument was weak rather than fallacious. In Section 5 I outline the demise of natural theology as the dominant school of thought in the philosophy of biology, ascribing this to the rise of Darwinism and subsequently neo-Darwinism. I argue that design arguments were again not defeated but went into abeyance with the rise of a new paradigm associated with Darwinism, namely methodological naturalism. In Chapter 2 I advance the project by a discussion of William Dembski's formulation of design inferences, demonstrating their value in both everyday and technical usage. This is stated in Section 1. In Sections 2 and 3 I discuss Dembski's treatment of probability, whilst in Section 4 I examine Dembski's tying of different levels of probability to different mechanisms of explanation used in explicating the world. Section 5 is my analysis of the logic of the formal statement of the design argument according to Dembski. In Section 6 I encapsulate objections to Dembski. I conclude the chapter (with Section 7) by claiming that Dembski forwards a coherent model of design inferences that can be used in demonstrating that there is little difference between the way that Paley came to his conclusions two centuries ago and how modem philosophers of biology (such as I take Michael Behe to be, albeit that by profession he is a scientist) come to theirs when offering design explanations. Inference to the best explanation is demonstrated as lying at the crux of design arguments. In Chapter 3 I draw together the work of Michael Behe and Paley, showing through the mechanism of Dembski's work that they are closely related in many respects and that neither position is to be lightly dismissed. Section 1 introduces this. In Section 2 I introduce Behe's concept of irreducible complexity in the light of (functional) explanation. Section 3 is a detailed analysis of irreducible complexity. Section 4 raises and covers objections to Behe with the general theme being that (neo-) Darwinians beg the question against him. In Section 4 I apply the Dembskian mechanic directly to Behe's work. I argue that Behe does not quite meet the Dembskian criteria he needs to in order for his argument to stand as anything other than defeasible. However, in Section 5 I conclude by arguing that this is exactly what we are to expect from Behe's and similar theories, even within competing paradigms, in the philosophy of biology, given that inference to the best explanation is the logical lever therein at work. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
- Authors: Ramsden, Sean
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Hume, David, 1711-1776 , Darwin, Charles, 1809-1882 , Paley, William, 1743-1805 , Dembski, William A., 1960- , Behe, Michael J., 1952- , Evolution (Biology) , Probabilities , Naturalism , Intelligent design (Teleology)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2739 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007561 , Hume, David, 1711-1776 , Darwin, Charles, 1809-1882 , Paley, William, 1743-1805 , Dembski, William A., 1960- , Behe, Michael J., 1952- , Evolution (Biology) , Probabilities , Naturalism , Intelligent design (Teleology)
- Description: The thesis is that contrary to the received popular wisdom, the combination of David Hume's sceptical enquiry and Charles Darwin's provision of an alternative theoretical framework to the then current paradigm of natural theology did not succeed in defeating the design argument. I argue that William Paley's work best represented the status quo in the philosophy of biology circa 1800 and that with the logical mechanisms provided us by William Dembski in his seminal work on probability, there is a strong argument for thr work of Michael Behe to stand in a similar position today to that of Paley two centuries ago. The argument runs as follows: In Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 1 I introduce the issues. In Section 3 I argue that William Paley's exposition of the design argument was archetypical of the natural theology school and that given Hume's already published criticism of the argument, Paley for one did not feel the design argument to be done for. I further argue in Section 4 that Hume in fact did no such thing and that neither did he see himself as having done so, but that the design argument was weak rather than fallacious. In Section 5 I outline the demise of natural theology as the dominant school of thought in the philosophy of biology, ascribing this to the rise of Darwinism and subsequently neo-Darwinism. I argue that design arguments were again not defeated but went into abeyance with the rise of a new paradigm associated with Darwinism, namely methodological naturalism. In Chapter 2 I advance the project by a discussion of William Dembski's formulation of design inferences, demonstrating their value in both everyday and technical usage. This is stated in Section 1. In Sections 2 and 3 I discuss Dembski's treatment of probability, whilst in Section 4 I examine Dembski's tying of different levels of probability to different mechanisms of explanation used in explicating the world. Section 5 is my analysis of the logic of the formal statement of the design argument according to Dembski. In Section 6 I encapsulate objections to Dembski. I conclude the chapter (with Section 7) by claiming that Dembski forwards a coherent model of design inferences that can be used in demonstrating that there is little difference between the way that Paley came to his conclusions two centuries ago and how modem philosophers of biology (such as I take Michael Behe to be, albeit that by profession he is a scientist) come to theirs when offering design explanations. Inference to the best explanation is demonstrated as lying at the crux of design arguments. In Chapter 3 I draw together the work of Michael Behe and Paley, showing through the mechanism of Dembski's work that they are closely related in many respects and that neither position is to be lightly dismissed. Section 1 introduces this. In Section 2 I introduce Behe's concept of irreducible complexity in the light of (functional) explanation. Section 3 is a detailed analysis of irreducible complexity. Section 4 raises and covers objections to Behe with the general theme being that (neo-) Darwinians beg the question against him. In Section 4 I apply the Dembskian mechanic directly to Behe's work. I argue that Behe does not quite meet the Dembskian criteria he needs to in order for his argument to stand as anything other than defeasible. However, in Section 5 I conclude by arguing that this is exactly what we are to expect from Behe's and similar theories, even within competing paradigms, in the philosophy of biology, given that inference to the best explanation is the logical lever therein at work. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
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