An analysis of selected World Trade Organisation agreements to determine whether they discriminate unfairly against developing economices
- Authors: Grimett, Leticia Anthea
- Date: 2013-07-29
- Subjects: World Trade Organization Foreign trade regulation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) Free trade -- Developing countries Foreign trade regulation -- Developing countries Competition, Unfair -- Developing countries
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:3718 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1008368
- Description: The focus of this thesis is the question whether or not the WTO discriminates unfairly against developing economies. In the absence of a test of guidelines for detennining unfairness or fairness of WTO provisions or Agreements has been drawn up using welfare economic and constitutional law principles as a foundation. Unfairness is therefore determined by asking whether the provisions of each Agreement are rational, proportional, efficient and whether they prevent the abuse of power amongst states. In addition, the economic effects of the provisions of the selected Agreements have been analysed to determine whether the relevant provisions are welfare enhancing and conclusive to promoting growth and development within developing economies. The Agreements chosed for analysis are the Agreements on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMS), Trade-related Intellectual Property (TRIPS), Agriculture and Services (GATS). The dispute settlement and negotiating process, labour standards and the impact of decreasing most-favoured nation rates on developing economy competitiveness is also discussed. Application of the test has shown that the WTO provisions do not reflect the interests of all members. Even though most member states are developing economies, the3 Agreements constantly cater foe developed country concerns and interests. Where provision is made for developing country interests, it is the LDC's who are favoured, with nonnal developing economies being bound by the same provisions as the developed economies. A fonnal, as opposed to a substantive, defmition has been adopted by the WTO, with a result that the process of equality is placed above the outcomes. While concessions have been made to development, members have not gone for enough. A main reason for the imbalance can be attributed to the negotiating process, which is based upon concessionary bargaining and trade-off. Those states with greater economic power are therefore at an advantage as they have the leverage needed to influence the outcomes of negotiations and hence the provisions of the various Agreements. Even with the LDC's, the WTO has been found to discriminate unfairly against developing economies because it does not adequately address developing country concerns. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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Protectionism and compliance with the GATT article XXIV in selected regional trade arrangements
- Authors: Grimett, Leticia Anthea
- Date: 1999
- Subjects: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) , International trade , Tariff -- Law and legislation , Protectionism , Free trade -- South Africa , South Africa -- Commerce
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:3673 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003188 , General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) , International trade , Tariff -- Law and legislation , Protectionism , Free trade -- South Africa , South Africa -- Commerce
- Description: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 has resulted in the GATT Contracting States making a renewed commitment to freer global trade and trade liberalisation. These Contracting States signalled their commitment to GATT policies and principles by undertaking to abolish all those non-tariff barriers which were not converted to tariffs and to decrease all tariffs applied by their domestic economies. The movement away from protectionism is intended to bring contracting states in line with the GATT most-favoured-nation and national treatment principles. The only exceptions to these principles are the regional trade arrangements which can be implemented in accordance with Article XXIV of GATT 1947 and the Understanding on the Implementation of Article XXIV of GATT 1947. Regional trade arrangements such as customs unions and free-trade areas have been allowed by the GATT as they are deemed to promote trade liberalisation through the removal of substantially all trade restrictions between countries party to these trade arrangements. In practice this has not been the case, however, as these regional trade arrangements have been known to apply very protectionist trade policies. This research determines whether regional trade arrangements are inherently protective ie does the nature of these regional trade arrangements encourage protectionism? The external trade policies of the European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are analysed to determine whether the contracting parties to regional trade arrangements have corrupted the GATT provisions and so contributed towards the protectionist nature of these regional trade arrangements. The internal trade provisions relating to the implementation of these regional trade arrangements have also been discussed to determine their compliance with Article XXIV of GATT 1947. As all the selected regional trade arrangements have direct or indirect links to South Africa, the implications of the policies chosen by these parties for South Africa have also been discussed. Analysis of the EU, SADC, SACU and ASEAN has shown that prior to the adoption of the GATT 1994, the free-trade areas and customs unions were not implemented in accordance with Article XXIV provisions. These regional trade arrangements have been moulded to fit the economic aspirations of the relevant contracting states. Of the regional trade arrangements accepted by the GATT, free-trade areas have been found to be the least protectionist and are the least likely to be perverted by contracting parties. Customs unions, on the other hand, may encourage contracting parties to protect their economies as they rely on group participation rather than individual participation. Individual Member States become responsible to the group which provides these states with greater economic power. As a result Member States are motivated to protect the new group entity from outside competition. In this way, they are inherently protective. Safeguards are therefore necessary to protect individual non-Member States from such behaviour. The implications of protectionism for South Africa, SADC and SACU have also been discussed.
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- Date Issued: 1999