Going against the tide: seeking regulations for private military/security companies in a globalized world
- Authors: Juma, Laurence
- Date: 2011
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/128822 , vital:36163 , https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC85398
- Description: This article discusses the role of privatization of security in Africa, but its focus is on private military and security companies (PMSCs). The article proceeds on the basis that there is need for effective regulatory frameworks for PMSCs that operate in conflict zones of Africa. Thus, it begins by appraising the existing normative standards at the international, regional and domestic level that apply to these companies, and thereafter, identifies their shortcomings in light of the prevailing security conditions within the continent. The article then posits broad theoretical imperatives for designing a more effective regulatory framework for PMSCs and concludes by proposing the establishment an overarching continental regime constructed on the basis of the suggested imperatives.
- Full Text: false
- Authors: Juma, Laurence
- Date: 2011
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/128822 , vital:36163 , https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC85398
- Description: This article discusses the role of privatization of security in Africa, but its focus is on private military and security companies (PMSCs). The article proceeds on the basis that there is need for effective regulatory frameworks for PMSCs that operate in conflict zones of Africa. Thus, it begins by appraising the existing normative standards at the international, regional and domestic level that apply to these companies, and thereafter, identifies their shortcomings in light of the prevailing security conditions within the continent. The article then posits broad theoretical imperatives for designing a more effective regulatory framework for PMSCs and concludes by proposing the establishment an overarching continental regime constructed on the basis of the suggested imperatives.
- Full Text: false
Pecuniary interests and the rule against adjudicative bias: the automatic disqualification or objective reasonable approach?
- Okpaluba, Chuks, Juma, Laurence
- Authors: Okpaluba, Chuks , Juma, Laurence
- Date: 2011
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/129093 , vital:36217 , https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC122974
- Description: This article deals with the issue of bias arising from pecuniary interest of a judge. Essentially, it asks the question: when does the pecuniary interest of a judge diminish his/her ability to apply his/her mind impartially to the dispute before him/her. To answer this question, the article undertakes a synthesis of the various rules and tests applied across Commonwealth jurisdictions and then compares them with the South African approach as outlined in two recent cases, namely Bernert v ABSA Bank Ltd 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC) and Ndimeni v Meeg Bank Ltd (Bank of Transkei) 2011 (1) SA 560 (SCA). Broadly, the article discusses the key aspects of the automatic disqualification approach preferred by the English courts, the Canadian objective reasonable approach and the realistic possibility approach recently adopted by the Australian courts. The article concludes that the South African approach that places emphasis on the objective reasonable test, complemented by the realistic possibility approach, may be most suitable, given the nature of complaints so far dealt with by the courts and the full propriety of the injunction in section 34 of the Constitution.
- Full Text: false
- Authors: Okpaluba, Chuks , Juma, Laurence
- Date: 2011
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/129093 , vital:36217 , https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC122974
- Description: This article deals with the issue of bias arising from pecuniary interest of a judge. Essentially, it asks the question: when does the pecuniary interest of a judge diminish his/her ability to apply his/her mind impartially to the dispute before him/her. To answer this question, the article undertakes a synthesis of the various rules and tests applied across Commonwealth jurisdictions and then compares them with the South African approach as outlined in two recent cases, namely Bernert v ABSA Bank Ltd 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC) and Ndimeni v Meeg Bank Ltd (Bank of Transkei) 2011 (1) SA 560 (SCA). Broadly, the article discusses the key aspects of the automatic disqualification approach preferred by the English courts, the Canadian objective reasonable approach and the realistic possibility approach recently adopted by the Australian courts. The article concludes that the South African approach that places emphasis on the objective reasonable test, complemented by the realistic possibility approach, may be most suitable, given the nature of complaints so far dealt with by the courts and the full propriety of the injunction in section 34 of the Constitution.
- Full Text: false
The dialogue between the bench and the bar: implications for adjudicative impartiality
- Okpaluba, Chuks, Juma, Laurence
- Authors: Okpaluba, Chuks , Juma, Laurence
- Date: 2011
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/129078 , vital:36215 , https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC53998
- Description: What is the role of the judge in the conduct of a trial? Can he or she engage counsel in legal argument and ask questions on legal issues without breaking the brittle bond of justice or be said to have 'descended into the arena'? Assuming that these actions are permissible, at what point will the judge's dialogue with counsel or line of questioning go beyond permissible limits? These are the questions with which this article grapples. Based on an analysis of the Constitutional Court decisions in State v Basson (2) 2007 (1) SACR 566 (CC) and Bernert v ABSA Bank Ltd 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC), and several Supreme Court of Appeal and other Commonwealth decisions, the article explores the circumstances in which the recusal of judges has been sought, or judicial decisions have been challenged on appeal on the basis of an allegation that there have been violations of the principle of fair hearing as enshrined in the Constitution. The article draws on the 'apprehension of bias' jurisprudence to establish the utility of the presumption of impartiality and the hybrid test of double-reasonableness in contexts where a judge's conduct is in question. The article concludes that the dialogue between the bench and bar is a useful component of adjudication in our adversarial system and should be limited by the rules of impartiality only in very exceptional circumstances.
- Full Text: false
- Authors: Okpaluba, Chuks , Juma, Laurence
- Date: 2011
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/129078 , vital:36215 , https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC53998
- Description: What is the role of the judge in the conduct of a trial? Can he or she engage counsel in legal argument and ask questions on legal issues without breaking the brittle bond of justice or be said to have 'descended into the arena'? Assuming that these actions are permissible, at what point will the judge's dialogue with counsel or line of questioning go beyond permissible limits? These are the questions with which this article grapples. Based on an analysis of the Constitutional Court decisions in State v Basson (2) 2007 (1) SACR 566 (CC) and Bernert v ABSA Bank Ltd 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC), and several Supreme Court of Appeal and other Commonwealth decisions, the article explores the circumstances in which the recusal of judges has been sought, or judicial decisions have been challenged on appeal on the basis of an allegation that there have been violations of the principle of fair hearing as enshrined in the Constitution. The article draws on the 'apprehension of bias' jurisprudence to establish the utility of the presumption of impartiality and the hybrid test of double-reasonableness in contexts where a judge's conduct is in question. The article concludes that the dialogue between the bench and bar is a useful component of adjudication in our adversarial system and should be limited by the rules of impartiality only in very exceptional circumstances.
- Full Text: false
- «
- ‹
- 1
- ›
- »