'Growing up tough': A national survey of South African youth
- Authors: Everatt, David , Orkin, Mark
- Date: 1993-03
- Subjects: Youth -- South Africa -- Attitudes -- Congresses , Youth -- Research , Youth -- South Africa -- Social conditions , Social surveys -- South Africa -- Congresses , Marginality, Social -- South Africa Congresses
- Language: English
- Type: text , book
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/65862 , vital:28849
- Description: The Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) was commissioned by the Joint Enrichment Project (JEP) to undertake research for the National Youth Development Conference. The research programme had three components:the compilation of a computerised and annotated youth database, comprising domestic research into youth, and the extraction of five policy papers covering the areas of education, employment-creation, AIDS, violence and social context, and historical context. an international comparative component, which focused on the youth brigades in Botswana, and the whole range of youth development initiatives taking place in Kenya and Uganda, covered in an additional two position papers. a national baseline and attitudinal survey into youth in South Africa. The results of all three components of the research project will be published in book form later this year. The summary reports of the local and international comparative policy papers are available in a separate booklet. This is the report of the national survey into youth in South Africa. Aims of the survey The survey has four main aims: demographic: to accurately describe how many youth are in the different parts of South Africa, how many are in or out of school or work, and so on. attitudinal: to allow youth to express their views on a range of social, economic, political and personal issues.to analyse youth marginalisation: to scientifically analyse and describe the marginalisation of youth within South African society. programmatic: to provide results which directly assist organisations designing programmes which target youth. Designing the survey The survey was designed by the CASE senior research team of Professor Mark Orkin, Director of C A S E; Dr David Everatt, Deputy Director of CASE and project co-ordinator; and Dr Ros Hirschowitz, Specialist Researcher at C A S E. The design process was lengthy and complex, because the aims of the survey were complicated. As a first step, CASE gathered together existing youth research and survey data, in order to see what we could learn from them. We then convened a design workshop to assist us. Participants in the C A S E national youth survey for JEP 1 workshop comprised people who had experience with youth, or with survey design. They included John Aitchison (CASE and the Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal), Debbie Budlender (CASE and the National Women's Coalition), Dr Jannie Hofmeyr (Research Surveys), Ms Vanessa Kruger and Professor Ari Sitas (University of Natal), Ms Anne Letsebe (SABSWA), Mr Steve Mokwena (JEP), Mr Rory Riordan (Human Rights Trust) and Dr Jeremy Seekings (University of Cape Town). We also needed input from the youth themselves. Discussion groups with youth (called 'focus groups') were held with youth from Alexandra and Soweto, from Ciskei and the eastern Cape, from Bophuthatswana and the northern transvaal, from Chatsworth and Claremont in Durban, and elsewhere. We reached youth from cities, squatter camps, towns and rural areas. The focus groups were organised by C A S E and Research Surveys, a professional market research company. The youth told us what their concerns were, what their aspirations and fears were, and what interventions they felt are necessary to improve their lives. CASE then designed a draft survey. We had to try it out (called 'piloting') to find out if the survey tapped the youth's actual views and experiences, and so give the JEP the information they sought. The survey was piloted on a representative sample of 100 youth (aged between 16 and 30) by Research Surveys. Using the results of the focus groups and the pilots, the CASE research team then produced the final questionnaire, which went into the field in November/December 1992.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Everatt, David , Orkin, Mark
- Date: 1993-03
- Subjects: Youth -- South Africa -- Attitudes -- Congresses , Youth -- Research , Youth -- South Africa -- Social conditions , Social surveys -- South Africa -- Congresses , Marginality, Social -- South Africa Congresses
- Language: English
- Type: text , book
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/65862 , vital:28849
- Description: The Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) was commissioned by the Joint Enrichment Project (JEP) to undertake research for the National Youth Development Conference. The research programme had three components:the compilation of a computerised and annotated youth database, comprising domestic research into youth, and the extraction of five policy papers covering the areas of education, employment-creation, AIDS, violence and social context, and historical context. an international comparative component, which focused on the youth brigades in Botswana, and the whole range of youth development initiatives taking place in Kenya and Uganda, covered in an additional two position papers. a national baseline and attitudinal survey into youth in South Africa. The results of all three components of the research project will be published in book form later this year. The summary reports of the local and international comparative policy papers are available in a separate booklet. This is the report of the national survey into youth in South Africa. Aims of the survey The survey has four main aims: demographic: to accurately describe how many youth are in the different parts of South Africa, how many are in or out of school or work, and so on. attitudinal: to allow youth to express their views on a range of social, economic, political and personal issues.to analyse youth marginalisation: to scientifically analyse and describe the marginalisation of youth within South African society. programmatic: to provide results which directly assist organisations designing programmes which target youth. Designing the survey The survey was designed by the CASE senior research team of Professor Mark Orkin, Director of C A S E; Dr David Everatt, Deputy Director of CASE and project co-ordinator; and Dr Ros Hirschowitz, Specialist Researcher at C A S E. The design process was lengthy and complex, because the aims of the survey were complicated. As a first step, CASE gathered together existing youth research and survey data, in order to see what we could learn from them. We then convened a design workshop to assist us. Participants in the C A S E national youth survey for JEP 1 workshop comprised people who had experience with youth, or with survey design. They included John Aitchison (CASE and the Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal), Debbie Budlender (CASE and the National Women's Coalition), Dr Jannie Hofmeyr (Research Surveys), Ms Vanessa Kruger and Professor Ari Sitas (University of Natal), Ms Anne Letsebe (SABSWA), Mr Steve Mokwena (JEP), Mr Rory Riordan (Human Rights Trust) and Dr Jeremy Seekings (University of Cape Town). We also needed input from the youth themselves. Discussion groups with youth (called 'focus groups') were held with youth from Alexandra and Soweto, from Ciskei and the eastern Cape, from Bophuthatswana and the northern transvaal, from Chatsworth and Claremont in Durban, and elsewhere. We reached youth from cities, squatter camps, towns and rural areas. The focus groups were organised by C A S E and Research Surveys, a professional market research company. The youth told us what their concerns were, what their aspirations and fears were, and what interventions they felt are necessary to improve their lives. CASE then designed a draft survey. We had to try it out (called 'piloting') to find out if the survey tapped the youth's actual views and experiences, and so give the JEP the information they sought. The survey was piloted on a representative sample of 100 youth (aged between 16 and 30) by Research Surveys. Using the results of the focus groups and the pilots, the CASE research team then produced the final questionnaire, which went into the field in November/December 1992.
- Full Text:
South Africa, the prospects of peaceful change: an empirical enquiry into the possibility of democratic conflict regulation
- Hanf, Theodor, 1936-, Weiland, Heribert, 1942-, Vierdag, Gerda, Schlemmer, Lawrence 1936-2011, Hampel, Rainer, Krupp, Burkhard, Richardson, John, Orkin, Mark
- Authors: Hanf, Theodor, 1936- , Weiland, Heribert, 1942- , Vierdag, Gerda , Schlemmer, Lawrence 1936-2011 , Hampel, Rainer , Krupp, Burkhard , Richardson, John , Orkin, Mark
- Date: 1981 , 2021
- Subjects: South Africa Race relations , South Africa Politics and government 1961-1978
- Language: English
- Type: Book , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/179720 , vital:43164
- Description: Our aim in this book is not to tell black or white South Africans what they ought to do. Rather, we try to establish through empirical social research what the various groups would like to do, and what they are in fact able to do. The overall issue which we consider is whether conflict can be regulated both peacefully and democratically. The events of 1976 and 1977 established beyond doubt that conflict exists on a large scale in South Africa. The conflict is both open and latent. Its causes include the distribution of income and wealth between different groups, the enforced social segregation of the groups from each other, and the monopoly of power by one of the groups. This one group has used and continues to use its power to regulate the conflict, and does so unilaterally and towards its own ends. Now conflict can be regulated in this way for a considerable period of time—longer than the whites dare hope and the blacks concede. But it is unlikely that power can be exercised indefinitely without the consent of the majority. Indeed, the longer a group exercises power without consent, the more likely is violent change. Given the distribution of power in contemporary South Africa, violent change would involve enormous sacrifices all round. So we consider the chances of peaceful change. Unfortunately, the chances seem slim. A glance at history shows that minorities tend to cling obstinately to their privileges, and then lose everything in defending them. One is far less likely to find minorities who have made timely sacrifices of some things in order to hold onto others. Similarly, once the tables are turned, the majorities that have been exploited and maltreated more often give vent to their long-suppressed feelings of hate and revenge than explore the possibilities for a peaceful take-over of power. Even so, however likely such developments may be when seen from a historical perspective, there is no ‘iron law of history’ which categorically excludes the possibility of peaceful change under the conditions obtaining in South Africa. And the ‘social costs’—a euphemism in social science for human suffering—of violent change are so high that one is surely justified in exploring the constraints, however narrow they might be, within which the current system of conflict regulation in South Africa might be peacefully transformed. This consideration is even more important in the present global political situation; for change by violent means will not only endanger the parties directly concerned, but may also endanger the peace of the African continent and perhaps that of the rest of the world. We also want to know whether conflict can be regulated democratically. We assume that the rule of law, social justice, and democratic rights are not the prerogatives of wealthy Western states. We believe that all the members of a society should be able to decide freely on how they want to shape their economic, cultural, and political coexistence. This study is thus motivated by a specific interest: we want to ascertain what scope there is in contemporary South Africa for changing the existing system of domination, so as to allow the democratic regulation of conflict, more social justice, a greater diversity of cultural expression, and wider freedom for all South Africans. We stress that we are concerned with the democratic regulation of conflict. For this purpose, the context in which conflict originated in South Africa is only relevant to the extent that it may still influence the present situation. Similarly, explanations of the phenomenon of conflict will be relevant only if they let us formulate more precisely the problem of how conflict may be peacefully and democratically regulated. This problem is important not because it contributes to the progress of social science—that contribution may be modest—but because it bears on the fate of many human beings. We have tried to offer answers which can be supported by empirical inquiry. Although the literature on conflict regulation in South Africa has expanded rapidly in recent years, it is characterized by a lack of empirical data on the attitudes and opinions of the groups and individuals involved in the political process. We felt it would be useful if we lessened these gaps in our knowledge by empirical means. But data on the attitudes and opinions of black and white South Africans are hardly a sufficient basis for reliable predictions about South Africa’s future. Events in South Africa will not only be determined by the opinions and wishes of its inhabitants but also, as is becoming increasingly evident, by forces and influences outside the country. However, the latter have been expressly excluded from the present study; it is concerned, ceteris paribus, with internal South African developments. But even with respect to internal developments, what actually happens in a society is only partly determined by what the members of the society think and want. It would thus be foolhardy to base a comprehensive prognostication on opinion surveys alone. On the other hand, empirical surveys may facilitate a precise answer to the overall problem we have set ourselves. Empirical research can indicate how far white South Africans are prepared for peaceful change and democratic conflict regulation, and similarly, what change black South Africans expect and what means of conflict regulation they are prepared to accept. Does the preparedness of the whites match or fall far short of the expectations of the blacks? The question is crucial to change without violence. Thus, in respect of our motivation and of the limitations we have set on the nature of our inquiry, this study must be seen as an empirical contribution to research into conflict and peace.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Hanf, Theodor, 1936- , Weiland, Heribert, 1942- , Vierdag, Gerda , Schlemmer, Lawrence 1936-2011 , Hampel, Rainer , Krupp, Burkhard , Richardson, John , Orkin, Mark
- Date: 1981 , 2021
- Subjects: South Africa Race relations , South Africa Politics and government 1961-1978
- Language: English
- Type: Book , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/179720 , vital:43164
- Description: Our aim in this book is not to tell black or white South Africans what they ought to do. Rather, we try to establish through empirical social research what the various groups would like to do, and what they are in fact able to do. The overall issue which we consider is whether conflict can be regulated both peacefully and democratically. The events of 1976 and 1977 established beyond doubt that conflict exists on a large scale in South Africa. The conflict is both open and latent. Its causes include the distribution of income and wealth between different groups, the enforced social segregation of the groups from each other, and the monopoly of power by one of the groups. This one group has used and continues to use its power to regulate the conflict, and does so unilaterally and towards its own ends. Now conflict can be regulated in this way for a considerable period of time—longer than the whites dare hope and the blacks concede. But it is unlikely that power can be exercised indefinitely without the consent of the majority. Indeed, the longer a group exercises power without consent, the more likely is violent change. Given the distribution of power in contemporary South Africa, violent change would involve enormous sacrifices all round. So we consider the chances of peaceful change. Unfortunately, the chances seem slim. A glance at history shows that minorities tend to cling obstinately to their privileges, and then lose everything in defending them. One is far less likely to find minorities who have made timely sacrifices of some things in order to hold onto others. Similarly, once the tables are turned, the majorities that have been exploited and maltreated more often give vent to their long-suppressed feelings of hate and revenge than explore the possibilities for a peaceful take-over of power. Even so, however likely such developments may be when seen from a historical perspective, there is no ‘iron law of history’ which categorically excludes the possibility of peaceful change under the conditions obtaining in South Africa. And the ‘social costs’—a euphemism in social science for human suffering—of violent change are so high that one is surely justified in exploring the constraints, however narrow they might be, within which the current system of conflict regulation in South Africa might be peacefully transformed. This consideration is even more important in the present global political situation; for change by violent means will not only endanger the parties directly concerned, but may also endanger the peace of the African continent and perhaps that of the rest of the world. We also want to know whether conflict can be regulated democratically. We assume that the rule of law, social justice, and democratic rights are not the prerogatives of wealthy Western states. We believe that all the members of a society should be able to decide freely on how they want to shape their economic, cultural, and political coexistence. This study is thus motivated by a specific interest: we want to ascertain what scope there is in contemporary South Africa for changing the existing system of domination, so as to allow the democratic regulation of conflict, more social justice, a greater diversity of cultural expression, and wider freedom for all South Africans. We stress that we are concerned with the democratic regulation of conflict. For this purpose, the context in which conflict originated in South Africa is only relevant to the extent that it may still influence the present situation. Similarly, explanations of the phenomenon of conflict will be relevant only if they let us formulate more precisely the problem of how conflict may be peacefully and democratically regulated. This problem is important not because it contributes to the progress of social science—that contribution may be modest—but because it bears on the fate of many human beings. We have tried to offer answers which can be supported by empirical inquiry. Although the literature on conflict regulation in South Africa has expanded rapidly in recent years, it is characterized by a lack of empirical data on the attitudes and opinions of the groups and individuals involved in the political process. We felt it would be useful if we lessened these gaps in our knowledge by empirical means. But data on the attitudes and opinions of black and white South Africans are hardly a sufficient basis for reliable predictions about South Africa’s future. Events in South Africa will not only be determined by the opinions and wishes of its inhabitants but also, as is becoming increasingly evident, by forces and influences outside the country. However, the latter have been expressly excluded from the present study; it is concerned, ceteris paribus, with internal South African developments. But even with respect to internal developments, what actually happens in a society is only partly determined by what the members of the society think and want. It would thus be foolhardy to base a comprehensive prognostication on opinion surveys alone. On the other hand, empirical surveys may facilitate a precise answer to the overall problem we have set ourselves. Empirical research can indicate how far white South Africans are prepared for peaceful change and democratic conflict regulation, and similarly, what change black South Africans expect and what means of conflict regulation they are prepared to accept. Does the preparedness of the whites match or fall far short of the expectations of the blacks? The question is crucial to change without violence. Thus, in respect of our motivation and of the limitations we have set on the nature of our inquiry, this study must be seen as an empirical contribution to research into conflict and peace.
- Full Text:
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