Issues and concerns in developing regulated markets for endangered species products: the case of rhinoceros horns
- Collins, Alan, Fraser, Gavin C G, Snowball, Jeanette D
- Authors: Collins, Alan , Fraser, Gavin C G , Snowball, Jeanette D
- Date: 2015
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/124877 , vital:35706 , https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bev076
- Description: A proposal for addressing rhinoceros poaching is to legalise the trade in rhino horn and adopt a regulated market approach, overturning the current trade ban. This orthodox economic prescription aims to reduce incentives to poach endangered wildlife by driving down the market price of their products via auctioned stockpile releases. Biologists are clear, however, that securing a stockpile for some species needs biological success in captive breeding programmes (CBPs), which varies markedly across species and habitats. Rhinoceros herds in a CBP would need spatially extensive terrain and costly permanent security measures; this only appears feasible for the less aggressive ‘white’ rhino. We argue that the market price would actually need to be sustained at a high level to cover protection costs over the longer reproduction cycles in CBPs and that, without extensive monitoring and the correct institutional structures being in place, legalising trade may encourage, rather than prevent, poaching. Supplementary policy measures that differentiate among consumer groups would also likely prove necessary.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Collins, Alan , Fraser, Gavin C G , Snowball, Jeanette D
- Date: 2015
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/124877 , vital:35706 , https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bev076
- Description: A proposal for addressing rhinoceros poaching is to legalise the trade in rhino horn and adopt a regulated market approach, overturning the current trade ban. This orthodox economic prescription aims to reduce incentives to poach endangered wildlife by driving down the market price of their products via auctioned stockpile releases. Biologists are clear, however, that securing a stockpile for some species needs biological success in captive breeding programmes (CBPs), which varies markedly across species and habitats. Rhinoceros herds in a CBP would need spatially extensive terrain and costly permanent security measures; this only appears feasible for the less aggressive ‘white’ rhino. We argue that the market price would actually need to be sustained at a high level to cover protection costs over the longer reproduction cycles in CBPs and that, without extensive monitoring and the correct institutional structures being in place, legalising trade may encourage, rather than prevent, poaching. Supplementary policy measures that differentiate among consumer groups would also likely prove necessary.
- Full Text:
Could a regulated market approach for rhinoceros horns work in South Africa? Some practical issues and concerns
- Collins, Alan, Fraser, Gavin C G, Snowball, Jeanette D
- Authors: Collins, Alan , Fraser, Gavin C G , Snowball, Jeanette D
- Date: 2013
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/68600 , vital:29292 , http://www.essa2013.org.za/fullpaper/essa2013_2708.pdf
- Description: Publisher version , One of the proposals for fighting rhinoceros poaching is to legalise the trade in rhino horn and adopt a regulated market approach (RMA), which would require a vote at the 2016 CITES meeting in order to overturn the ban on the trade in rhino horn. The legal trade in rhino horn would enable the auctioning of stockpiles of horn and encourage captive breeding programmes. The aim of increasing the supply of horn is to reduce incentives to poach by driving down the price. This paper uses a conceptual/theoretical approach to consider the practical implications of the adoption of an RMA, drawing on demand, supply and production theory. The intention is explicitly to set out some practical concerns and issues that seem to have been underplayed or neglected in most published economic discourse on the subject. To secure a stockpile for some species needs biological success in captive breeding programs (CBPs) but this varies across species and habitats. Rhinoceros herds in a CBP would need relatively spatially extensive terrain and costly permanent security measures, and only appear feasible for the less aggressive “white” rhino. Thus, market price would actually need to be sustained at a high level to cover the start-up and security costs of such a programme that are unlikely to fall significantly. This is a double-edged sword in that the persistent high price of rhino horn provides an incentive for continued poaching activities. Supplementary policy measures that differentiate among consumer groups may also prove necessary.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Collins, Alan , Fraser, Gavin C G , Snowball, Jeanette D
- Date: 2013
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/68600 , vital:29292 , http://www.essa2013.org.za/fullpaper/essa2013_2708.pdf
- Description: Publisher version , One of the proposals for fighting rhinoceros poaching is to legalise the trade in rhino horn and adopt a regulated market approach (RMA), which would require a vote at the 2016 CITES meeting in order to overturn the ban on the trade in rhino horn. The legal trade in rhino horn would enable the auctioning of stockpiles of horn and encourage captive breeding programmes. The aim of increasing the supply of horn is to reduce incentives to poach by driving down the price. This paper uses a conceptual/theoretical approach to consider the practical implications of the adoption of an RMA, drawing on demand, supply and production theory. The intention is explicitly to set out some practical concerns and issues that seem to have been underplayed or neglected in most published economic discourse on the subject. To secure a stockpile for some species needs biological success in captive breeding programs (CBPs) but this varies across species and habitats. Rhinoceros herds in a CBP would need relatively spatially extensive terrain and costly permanent security measures, and only appear feasible for the less aggressive “white” rhino. Thus, market price would actually need to be sustained at a high level to cover the start-up and security costs of such a programme that are unlikely to fall significantly. This is a double-edged sword in that the persistent high price of rhino horn provides an incentive for continued poaching activities. Supplementary policy measures that differentiate among consumer groups may also prove necessary.
- Full Text:
- «
- ‹
- 1
- ›
- »