Substantive equality and the challenge to affimative action as justification for unfair discrimination
- Authors: Delport, Petrus Jacobus
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Discrimination in employment , Affirmative action programs , Equality
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10948/15467 , vital:28256
- Description: South Africa’s history as a nation is replete with examples of inequality and unfair discrimination. The working arena was no exception to the rule. In fact, it was one of the areas where inequality was most prevalent. Discriminatory legislation was promulgated under the Apartheid regime. These laws enforced differential treatment of employees along racial lines. After 1994, the newly democratic South Africa, through the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”), regarded all people as equal before the law and entitled to equal benefit and protection under the law. National legislation was subsequently promulgated to give effect to this constitutional objective. The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the “EEA”), specifically, gave effect to all employees’ constitutional right to equality in the workplace. Under the EEA, unfair discrimination was forbidden. The EEA also required employers to implement measures to eradicate the injustices of the past. Subsequent to the enactment of the EEA, the Courts reiterated two tests to determine whether unfair discrimination had taken place in the workplace. It also tested whether an affirmative action measure could justify such unfair discrimination. These two tests, referred to in Harksen v Lane NO and others (CCT9/97) [1997] ZACC 12 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) (Hereinafter referred to as the “Harksen test”) and Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC) (Hereinafter referred to as the “Van Heerden test”), were unfortunately applied by the Courts in an inconsistent manner. This created confusion about which test found application in specific circumstances. The Constitutional Court then clarified the confusion through the South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard (2014) ZACC 23 (CC) (Hereinafter referred to as the “Barnard” decision”). It is important to note that this study does not seek to evaluate the correctness of the Barnard decision, nor does it consider the cases prior to the Barnard decision. Rather, this study considers the extent to which the Barnard decision informed later cases dealing with unfair discrimination and affirmative action. In the remaining chapters of this treatise the writer will attempt to answer this question as follows: In chapter two, the legislative framework applicable to issues of unfair discrimination and the application of affirmative action is discussed. Chapter three comprises of a detailed analysis of the Barnard decision. In chapters four and five the writer investigates how the Barnard decision informed four recent cases concerning affirmative action and unfair discrimination in the workplace. These discussions enabled the writer to, in the final chapter; conclude that all four cases were indeed informed by the Barnard decision. The Department of Correctional Services case, however, reiterated the Barnard decision to its fullest extent.
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- Date Issued: 2017
A comparison between the approaches to unfair discrimination in employment in South Africa and Nigeria
- Authors: Odeyemi, Hannah Olubunmi
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: Discrimination in employment -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Discrimination in employment -- Law and legislation -- Nigeria , Unfair labor practices -- South Africa , Unfair labor practices -- Nigeria
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10270 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1012054 , Discrimination in employment -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Discrimination in employment -- Law and legislation -- Nigeria , Unfair labor practices -- South Africa , Unfair labor practices -- Nigeria
- Description: Issues concerning employment are some of the most serious issues of our time. But it is in the last two decades or so that these started receiving consideration. For instance, South Africa has experienced changes in the landscape of employment relations in organisations in the last decades. And no area of South Africa law is more critical than the prohibition of unfair discrimination, especially in the workpalce. The enactment of the Constitution brought about the need to eradicate unfair discrimination in the workpalce. Section 9 of the Constitution states that no person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone and that national legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. To enforce this, certain legislations like the Labour Law Act, Employment Act, Promotion of Equality and Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination Act (Equality Act), were enacted to give effect to the equality provision of the Constitution. In a similar vein, in Nigeria, workplace discrimination which is at the top of human rights violation perpetrated by employers of labour is of paramount concern to legislators and the government. Sex , age, ethinicty, religion, trade union membership and political opinion are some of the grounds upon which workers may not be discriminated against in Nigeria. Section 17 of the Constitution states that the State social order is founded on the ideals of freedom, equality and justice. It goes on to provide that every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law. More specifically, the section stipilates that the State shall ensure that all citizens, without discrimination of any group whatsoever, have the opportunity of livehood as well as adequate opportunity to secure suitable employment and that there is equal pay for equal work without discrimination on account of sex, or any ground. Hence, there are The Nigerian Labour Act, the Federal Character Commission, etc that are saddled with the responsibility of addressing unfair discrimination and giving force to the provision of the Constitution. Despite the anti-discrimination laws and provisions made available in both countries, it is still alarming to see that unfair discrimination in the workplace is still on the increase. This, as will be discussed later, is probably due to factors such as lack of communication, long-stading patterns of educational inequalities that have resulted in inequalities in manpower, differences in drive, motivation, cultural disposition and geographical opportunities, racial difference and ethnicity, domination of one group by the other, etc. This research will briefly focus on the comparison between the approaches to unfair discrimination in employment between South Africa and Nigeria. It will discuss the development of unfair discrimination, grounds on which it is perpetrated, defences relating to unfair discrimination, and anti-discrimination laws put in place by the two jurisdictions to curb discrimination, as well as suggest on how to forestall unfair discrimination.
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- Date Issued: 2012
Determinism and reactive attitudes: reflections on our alleged unrenounceable commitments
- Authors: Kelland, Lindsay-Ann
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Free will and determinism Responsibility
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2713 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002843
- Description: There seems to exist a tension between our metaphysical and phenomenological commitments in the free will debate. On the one hand, I argue that at the metaphysical level we cannot coherently defend the belief that we are morally responsible in the sense that we deserve to be rewarded and punished for our actions, where desert-entailing moral responsibility is the primary understanding of moral responsibility presupposed in the free will debate. I argue that we are responsible for our actions but only in the weaker sense, termed ‘attributability’ by Gary Watson. On the other hand, we are allegedly unrenounceably committed at the phenomenological level to conceiving of, and treating, ourselves and one another as morally responsible beings in the desert-entailing sense. P. F. Strawson famously defends this claim in his seminal work, ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In my thesis I will set out this tension by exploring both commitments in turn. I then aim to show that the tension can be dissolved by arguing, contra P. F. Strawson, that our phenomenological commitment is not in fact unrenounceable. The dissolution of this tension entails, I argue, that we must examine our conception of self and other. We must explore the implications of adopting a position which denies that we are morally responsible beings for our life-hopes, personal feelings, inter-personal relationships and projects. Most importantly, I argue that we must renounce our current retributive condemnatory practices which are based on the unjustified belief that we are morally responsible beings.
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- Date Issued: 2009