"Tell me how you read and I will tell you who you are": children's literature and moral development
- Authors: Van der Nest, Megan
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Children's literature -- Philosophy Children's literature -- Moral and ethical aspects Children's literature -- History and criticism Literature and morals Ethics in literature Reader-response criticism Moral conditions in literature Literature -- Study and teaching
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2722 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002852
- Description: It is a common intuition that we can learn something of moral importance from literature, and one of the ways in which we teach our children about morality is through stories. In selecting books for children to read a primary concern is often the effect that the moral content of the story will have on the morality of the child reader. In this thesis I argue in order to take advantage of the contribution that literature can make to moral development, we need to teach children to read in a particular way. As a basis for this argument I use an account of moral agency that places emphasis on the development of moral skills - the ability to critically assess moral rules and systems, and the capacity to perceive and respond to the particulars of individual situations and to choose the right course of action in each - rather than on any particular kind of moral content. In order to make the most of the contribution that literature can make to the development of these skills, we need to teach children to immerse themselves in the story, rather than focusing on literary criticism. I argue that, contrary to the standard view of literary criticism as the only form of protection against possible negative effects, an immersed reading will help to prevent the child reader from taking any moral claims made in the story out of context, and so provide some measure of protection against possible negative moral effects of the story. Finally I argue that there are certain kinds of stories - recognisable by features that contribute to a high literary quality - that will enrich the experience of an immersed reading, and will therefore make a greater contribution to moral development than others.
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- Date Issued: 2010
The role of reasonableness in the review of labour arbitration awards
- Authors: Botma, Carli Helena
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Arbitration and award -- South Africa , Arbitration, Industrial -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10194 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1035 , Arbitration and award -- South Africa , Arbitration, Industrial -- South Africa
- Description: The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 in section 145 and the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 in section 33 uses wording very similar to one another to specifically enable the labour court to review CCMA and private arbitration awards respectively. As a result, labour arbitration award reviews are regarded as part of the family of special statutory reviews; the implication of such a classification being that the situation specific statutory provision(s) and the jurisprudential principles developed thereunder are applicable rather than those applicable to reviews in general. When the common purpose of the review procedure is then read with the legislature’s objective of quickly and finally resolving labour disputes at arbitration level as well as the limited grounds for review as provided for in the LRA and the AA, indications are that the labour courts’ review powers should be restrictively interpreted. However, because the making of CCMA arbitration awards also constitutes administrative action, the review thereof is also influenced by the constitutional right to just administrative action and reasonableness in particular. This does however not mean that applicants on review can rely directly on section 33 of the Final Constitution or on the broader grounds of section 6 of the PAJA to review CCMA arbitration awards on the basis of unreasonableness. Section 145 of the LRA constitutes administrative action legislation within the specialised labour law sphere and reasonableness is not a ground mentioned therein. A constitutionally consistent interpretation of section 145 however has the effect that reasonableness suffuses the statutory defined grounds for review; a state of affairs that does not threaten the restrictive scope of CCMA arbitration award reviews. In terms thereof, courts on review must establish whether the decision, alleged to have been reached by the commissioner as a result of the occurrence of one or more of the section 145 grounds for review, is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach. This interpretation accords far better with the legislature’s specific objectives pertaining to labour arbitration award reviews and the permissible range of reasonableness further ensures that awards are not easily interfered with on review. When a court is then called upon to determine whether or not a decision is reviewable in terms of section 145, it is entitled to have regard to both the award and the record of the proceedings. If, after such scrutiny, the court is of the opinion that the decision was arrived at as a result of the occurrence of a defect as contemplated by section 145 of the LRA, the decision should be reviewed and set aside irrespective of the fact that the outcome can be sustained by other reasons also identifiable from the record; the focus of review always being on the commissioner’s process of reasoning and the way in which he arrived at his findings rather than the outcome of the process. A court should however be mindful of the fact that erroneous reasons for findings per se are not reviewable grounds, but at best serve as evidence of a reviewable ground that will in conjunction with other considerations have to be sufficiently compelling to justify an inference that the decision is unreasonable. In the case of jurisdictional reviews, the reasonableness standard is also applicable because the focus is on the commissioner’s subjective reasons for his findings rather than the jurisdictional fact’s objective existence. A court on review can accordingly set aside a decision following upon the non-observance of a jurisdictional fact if the commissioner, in deciding that the jurisdictional fact existed, committed one or more of the section 145 grounds for review. In the case of private arbitration awards, applicants seeking a review must do so on the grounds recognised in section 33 of the AA and reasonableness is not one of them. This is however not the only reason why these awards are also not subject to the scrutiny of the reasonableness test on review. The other reason relates to the fact that the issuing of private arbitration awards does not constitute administrative action. The disputing parties can also not by agreement incorporate the reasonableness standard into private arbitration award reviews conducted by the labour court. Such parties are however entitled to establish a private appeal or private review body in their arbitration agreement, clothing it with the powers that they wish to confer upon it, including the ability to review an award subject to the reasonableness standard. , Abstract
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- Date Issued: 2009