Liberal aristocracy & the limits of democracy
- Authors: Wareham, Christopher
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2725 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002855 , Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Description: I define and defend a non-democratic authority with the power to annul the decisions of democratic branches of government when such decisions infringe upon citizens’ basic rights and liberties. I refer to this non-democratic authority as Liberal Aristocracy. The argument for Liberal Aristocracy has two parts: the first part demonstrates that Liberal Aristocracy will arrive at decisions that further the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights; the second part holds that Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means to this end. First, I discuss two existing arguments for non-democratic authorities – Platonic Aristocracy and Constitutional Court Judges. I claim that Plato’s argument is unsuccessful because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that are unlikely to provide a basis for rights. Liberal justifications of the power of Constitutional Courts are argued to be incomplete because they do not designate an authority that is qualified to decide when citizens’ rights are infringed by democratic branches of government. Nor do they show that such an authority is in fact required if citizens’ rights are to be protected. In order to supplement the liberal argument for the power of Constitutional Courts I develop an account of Liberal Aristocracy, which rests on the idea that Constitutional Court Judges should possess moral expertise. I claim that (i) moral expertise qualifies Judges to decide when citizens’ rights are violated by democratic decisions. Furthermore, I argue that (ii) decisions taken democratically will sometimes encroach on citizens’ rights. Claims (i) and (ii) are shown to justify the non-democratic authority of Liberal Aristocracy. The second part of the argument for Liberal Aristocracy examines arguments to the effect that only democratic procedures can be morally legitimate, even if other decision procedures arrive at outcomes that provide greater support for citizens’ rights. Three claims are offered in support of this idea. First, democracy is claimed to be necessary to support deliberation. Second, democracy is seen as the only procedure that can uphold the value of autonomy by securing citizens’ consent. Third, it is argued that non-democratic procedures will not recognise the equal status of citizens. I hold that these three claims are false and that Liberal Aristocratic procedures can be morally legitimate.
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- Date Issued: 2004
The legal effect of a coup d'etat on traditional constitutional concepts
- Authors: Mkwentla, Nelson Koala
- Date: 2002
- Subjects: Coups d'état , Constitutional law
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:3684 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003199 , Coups d'état , Constitutional law
- Description: This thesis deals with constitutional law and other legal subjects such as Jurisprudence and Judicial Review. One constitution is distinguishable from another by its own provisions. These provisions are usually referred to as either the basic characteristics or features of the particular constitution and these are invariably derived from the basic political philosophy and constitutional arrangements of the particular country. A coup affects these characteristics in different ways. Some automatically disappear as being incompatible with the revolution; some are modified, others are strengthened. The usurpers may choose to set aside the constitution completely and replace it with another, or amend it to suit the new situation, or rule without any constitution. This often happens amidst the rattle of weapons and the whirr of military engines in and around the capital of a given country on that awesome occasion. This thesis sets out to examine the legal aspects of a coup d’ etat. The thesis is divided into six broad sections. Part one will deal with the theoretical background. I shall discuss an overview of Kelsen’s pure theory of law. The second part deals with the scope of its application in revolutionary situations and will also touch upon the reason behind the Kelsen’s theory as shown by decided cases from country to country. The third part deals with the essence as well as the significance of the doctrine of necessity to validate unconstitutional acts in the case of a coup d’ etat. This discussion is to pave the way for the fourth part which is to explore the position of judges who took oath of office under the old constitution. I am to explain their position after a coup d’ etat. The fifth part forms the gist of my research. I shall examine the effect of a coup d’ etat on traditional constitutional concepts such as fundamental rights, separation of powers, rule of law and judicial review in the military regime. The sixth part will deal with African experience. I shall include recommendations and conclusions drawn from the Lesotho and Uganda experiences.
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- Date Issued: 2002