Liberal aristocracy & the limits of democracy
- Authors: Wareham, Christopher
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2725 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002855 , Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Description: I define and defend a non-democratic authority with the power to annul the decisions of democratic branches of government when such decisions infringe upon citizens’ basic rights and liberties. I refer to this non-democratic authority as Liberal Aristocracy. The argument for Liberal Aristocracy has two parts: the first part demonstrates that Liberal Aristocracy will arrive at decisions that further the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights; the second part holds that Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means to this end. First, I discuss two existing arguments for non-democratic authorities – Platonic Aristocracy and Constitutional Court Judges. I claim that Plato’s argument is unsuccessful because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that are unlikely to provide a basis for rights. Liberal justifications of the power of Constitutional Courts are argued to be incomplete because they do not designate an authority that is qualified to decide when citizens’ rights are infringed by democratic branches of government. Nor do they show that such an authority is in fact required if citizens’ rights are to be protected. In order to supplement the liberal argument for the power of Constitutional Courts I develop an account of Liberal Aristocracy, which rests on the idea that Constitutional Court Judges should possess moral expertise. I claim that (i) moral expertise qualifies Judges to decide when citizens’ rights are violated by democratic decisions. Furthermore, I argue that (ii) decisions taken democratically will sometimes encroach on citizens’ rights. Claims (i) and (ii) are shown to justify the non-democratic authority of Liberal Aristocracy. The second part of the argument for Liberal Aristocracy examines arguments to the effect that only democratic procedures can be morally legitimate, even if other decision procedures arrive at outcomes that provide greater support for citizens’ rights. Three claims are offered in support of this idea. First, democracy is claimed to be necessary to support deliberation. Second, democracy is seen as the only procedure that can uphold the value of autonomy by securing citizens’ consent. Third, it is argued that non-democratic procedures will not recognise the equal status of citizens. I hold that these three claims are false and that Liberal Aristocratic procedures can be morally legitimate.
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- Date Issued: 2004
The individual and the social order in Mill and Hegel : seeking common principles in liberal and communitarian ancestry
- Authors: Koseff, Justin Adam
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831 , Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873 , Liberalism , Communitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2843 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005624 , Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831 , Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873 , Liberalism , Communitarianism
- Description: This thesis seeks to establish a significant commonality and compatibility between the principles underpinning the political and social philosophies of GWF Hegel and John Stuart Mill. The role of the individual and the social order in both their theories is discussed and assessed separately and in turn in reference to their respective seminal works on the proper structure, principles and function of modern political infrastructure. Through an interpretation of the fundamental tenets and goals of their theories of the social order I argue for a coherent modern reconstruction of their doctrines, within which I locate parallels and contrasts as they apply. Both theorists as ultimately put forward similar arguments for freedom as an intersubjectively·developed capacity, the ideal social order as rational framework for the management of ethical and political engagement, linked to a social holism that ties individual and social progress inextricably. A respect for individual particularity of perspective and practice is integral both of their social frameworks, but that such a space must be harmonised within a rational political community worthy of individual obligation. Finally their social and political theories can be understood as complementary, each providing insights which the other lacks. Mill suffers from an insufficient regard for the social basis of identity and interconnected nature of the modern institutional framework, while Hegel displays an insufficient regard for Mill's caveats concerning the repressive potential of institutional structures and the dangers of overly empowered bureaucracies. In conclusion key elements of the two theorists' projects stand as separate but not in any way fundamentally opposed to each other. This points to the possibility of a via media between a politics of individualism and a politics of community, suggesting strong potential for reconciliation between liberal and communitarian perspectives.
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- Date Issued: 2003