Remote fidelity of Container-Based Network Emulators
- Authors: Peach, Schalk Willem
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Computer networks Security measures , Intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Computer security , Host-based intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Emulators (Computer programs) , Computer network protocols , Container-Based Network Emulators (CBNEs) , Network Experimentation Platforms (NEPs)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192141 , vital:45199
- Description: This thesis examines if Container-Based Network Emulators (CBNEs) are able to instantiate emulated nodes that provide sufficient realism to be used in information security experiments. The realism measure used is based on the information available from the point of view of a remote attacker. During the evaluation of a Container-Based Network Emulator (CBNE) as a platform to replicate production networks for information security experiments, it was observed that nmap fingerprinting returned Operating System (OS) family and version results inconsistent with that of the host Operating System (OS). CBNEs utilise Linux namespaces, the technology used for containerisation, to instantiate \emulated" hosts for experimental networks. Linux containers partition resources of the host OS to create lightweight virtual machines that share a single OS kernel. As all emulated hosts share the same kernel in a CBNE network, there is a reasonable expectation that the fingerprints of the host OS and emulated hosts should be the same. Based on how CBNEs instantiate emulated networks and that fingerprinting returned inconsistent results, it was hypothesised that the technologies used to construct CBNEs are capable of influencing fingerprints generated by utilities such as nmap. It was predicted that hosts emulated using different CBNEs would show deviations in remotely generated fingerprints when compared to fingerprints generated for the host OS. An experimental network consisting of two emulated hosts and a Layer 2 switch was instantiated on multiple CBNEs using the same host OS. Active and passive fingerprinting was conducted between the emulated hosts to generate fingerprints and OS family and version matches. Passive fingerprinting failed to produce OS family and version matches as the fingerprint databases for these utilities are no longer maintained. For active fingerprinting the OS family results were consistent between tested systems and the host OS, though OS version results reported was inconsistent. A comparison of the generated fingerprints revealed that for certain CBNEs fingerprint features related to network stack optimisations of the host OS deviated from other CBNEs and the host OS. The hypothesis that CBNEs can influence remotely generated fingerprints was partially confirmed. One CBNE system modified Linux kernel networking options, causing a deviation from fingerprints generated for other tested systems and the host OS. The hypothesis was also partially rejected as the technologies used by CBNEs do not influence the remote fidelity of emulated hosts. , Thesis (MSc) -- Faculty of Science, Computer Science, 2021
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- Authors: Peach, Schalk Willem
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Computer networks Security measures , Intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Computer security , Host-based intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Emulators (Computer programs) , Computer network protocols , Container-Based Network Emulators (CBNEs) , Network Experimentation Platforms (NEPs)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192141 , vital:45199
- Description: This thesis examines if Container-Based Network Emulators (CBNEs) are able to instantiate emulated nodes that provide sufficient realism to be used in information security experiments. The realism measure used is based on the information available from the point of view of a remote attacker. During the evaluation of a Container-Based Network Emulator (CBNE) as a platform to replicate production networks for information security experiments, it was observed that nmap fingerprinting returned Operating System (OS) family and version results inconsistent with that of the host Operating System (OS). CBNEs utilise Linux namespaces, the technology used for containerisation, to instantiate \emulated" hosts for experimental networks. Linux containers partition resources of the host OS to create lightweight virtual machines that share a single OS kernel. As all emulated hosts share the same kernel in a CBNE network, there is a reasonable expectation that the fingerprints of the host OS and emulated hosts should be the same. Based on how CBNEs instantiate emulated networks and that fingerprinting returned inconsistent results, it was hypothesised that the technologies used to construct CBNEs are capable of influencing fingerprints generated by utilities such as nmap. It was predicted that hosts emulated using different CBNEs would show deviations in remotely generated fingerprints when compared to fingerprints generated for the host OS. An experimental network consisting of two emulated hosts and a Layer 2 switch was instantiated on multiple CBNEs using the same host OS. Active and passive fingerprinting was conducted between the emulated hosts to generate fingerprints and OS family and version matches. Passive fingerprinting failed to produce OS family and version matches as the fingerprint databases for these utilities are no longer maintained. For active fingerprinting the OS family results were consistent between tested systems and the host OS, though OS version results reported was inconsistent. A comparison of the generated fingerprints revealed that for certain CBNEs fingerprint features related to network stack optimisations of the host OS deviated from other CBNEs and the host OS. The hypothesis that CBNEs can influence remotely generated fingerprints was partially confirmed. One CBNE system modified Linux kernel networking options, causing a deviation from fingerprints generated for other tested systems and the host OS. The hypothesis was also partially rejected as the technologies used by CBNEs do not influence the remote fidelity of emulated hosts. , Thesis (MSc) -- Faculty of Science, Computer Science, 2021
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An analysis of the use of DNS for malicious payload distribution
- Authors: Dube, Ishmael
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Internet domain names , Computer networks -- Security measures , Computer security , Computer network protocols , Data protection
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/97531 , vital:31447
- Description: The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol is a fundamental part of Internet activities that can be abused by cybercriminals to conduct malicious activities. Previous research has shown that cybercriminals use different methods, including the DNS protocol, to distribute malicious content, remain hidden and avoid detection from various technologies that are put in place to detect anomalies. This allows botnets and certain malware families to establish covert communication channels that can be used to send or receive data and also distribute malicious payloads using the DNS queries and responses. Cybercriminals use the DNS to breach highly protected networks, distribute malicious content, and exfiltrate sensitive information without being detected by security controls put in place by embedding certain strings in DNS packets. This research undertaking broadens this research field and fills in the existing research gap by extending the analysis of DNS being used as a payload distribution channel to detection of domains that are used to distribute different malicious payloads. This research undertaking analysed the use of the DNS in detecting domains and channels that are used for distributing malicious payloads. Passive DNS data which replicate DNS queries on name servers to detect anomalies in DNS queries was evaluated and analysed in order to detect malicious payloads. The research characterises the malicious payload distribution channels by analysing passive DNS traffic and modelling the DNS query and response patterns. The research found that it is possible to detect malicious payload distribution channels through the analysis of DNS TXT resource records.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Dube, Ishmael
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Internet domain names , Computer networks -- Security measures , Computer security , Computer network protocols , Data protection
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/97531 , vital:31447
- Description: The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol is a fundamental part of Internet activities that can be abused by cybercriminals to conduct malicious activities. Previous research has shown that cybercriminals use different methods, including the DNS protocol, to distribute malicious content, remain hidden and avoid detection from various technologies that are put in place to detect anomalies. This allows botnets and certain malware families to establish covert communication channels that can be used to send or receive data and also distribute malicious payloads using the DNS queries and responses. Cybercriminals use the DNS to breach highly protected networks, distribute malicious content, and exfiltrate sensitive information without being detected by security controls put in place by embedding certain strings in DNS packets. This research undertaking broadens this research field and fills in the existing research gap by extending the analysis of DNS being used as a payload distribution channel to detection of domains that are used to distribute different malicious payloads. This research undertaking analysed the use of the DNS in detecting domains and channels that are used for distributing malicious payloads. Passive DNS data which replicate DNS queries on name servers to detect anomalies in DNS queries was evaluated and analysed in order to detect malicious payloads. The research characterises the malicious payload distribution channels by analysing passive DNS traffic and modelling the DNS query and response patterns. The research found that it is possible to detect malicious payload distribution channels through the analysis of DNS TXT resource records.
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Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security
- Authors: Murisa, Wesley Vengayi
- Date: 2013 , 2013-03-31
- Subjects: Internet domain names , Computer security , Computer network protocols , Computer security -- Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: vital:4577 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003053 , Internet domain names , Computer security , Computer network protocols , Computer security -- Africa
- Description: The Domain Name System (DNS), a name resolution protocol is one of the vulnerable network protocols that has been subjected to many security attacks such as cache poisoning, denial of service and the 'Kaminsky' spoofing attack. When DNS was designed, security was not incorporated into its design. The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) provides security to the name resolution process by using public key cryptosystems. Although DNSSEC has backward compatibility with unsecured zones, it only offers security to clients when communicating with security aware zones. Widespread deployment of DNSSEC is therefore necessary to secure the name resolution process and provide security to the Internet. Only a few Top Level Domains (TLD's) have deployed DNSSEC, this inherently makes it difficult for their sub-domains to implement the security extensions to the DNS. This study analyses mechanisms that can be used by domains in islands of security to deploy DNSSEC so that the name resolution process can be secured in two specific cases where either the TLD is not signed or the domain registrar is not able to support signed domains. The DNS client side mechanisms evaluated in this study include web browser plug-ins, local validating resolvers and domain look-aside validation. The results of the study show that web browser plug-ins cannot work on their own without local validating resolvers. The web browser validators, however, proved to be useful in indicating to the user whether a domain has been validated or not. Local resolvers present a more secure option for Internet users who cannot trust the communication channel between their stub resolvers and remote name servers. However, they do not provide a way of showing the user whether a domain name has been correctly validated or not. Based on the results of the tests conducted, it is recommended that local validators be used with browser validators for visibility and improved security. On the DNS server side, Domain Look-aside Validation (DLV) presents a viable alternative for organizations in islands of security like most countries in Africa where only two country code Top Level Domains (ccTLD) have deployed DNSSEC. This research recommends use of DLV by corporates to provide DNS security to both internal and external users accessing their web based services. , LaTeX with hyperref package , pdfTeX-1.40.10
- Full Text:
- Authors: Murisa, Wesley Vengayi
- Date: 2013 , 2013-03-31
- Subjects: Internet domain names , Computer security , Computer network protocols , Computer security -- Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: vital:4577 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003053 , Internet domain names , Computer security , Computer network protocols , Computer security -- Africa
- Description: The Domain Name System (DNS), a name resolution protocol is one of the vulnerable network protocols that has been subjected to many security attacks such as cache poisoning, denial of service and the 'Kaminsky' spoofing attack. When DNS was designed, security was not incorporated into its design. The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) provides security to the name resolution process by using public key cryptosystems. Although DNSSEC has backward compatibility with unsecured zones, it only offers security to clients when communicating with security aware zones. Widespread deployment of DNSSEC is therefore necessary to secure the name resolution process and provide security to the Internet. Only a few Top Level Domains (TLD's) have deployed DNSSEC, this inherently makes it difficult for their sub-domains to implement the security extensions to the DNS. This study analyses mechanisms that can be used by domains in islands of security to deploy DNSSEC so that the name resolution process can be secured in two specific cases where either the TLD is not signed or the domain registrar is not able to support signed domains. The DNS client side mechanisms evaluated in this study include web browser plug-ins, local validating resolvers and domain look-aside validation. The results of the study show that web browser plug-ins cannot work on their own without local validating resolvers. The web browser validators, however, proved to be useful in indicating to the user whether a domain has been validated or not. Local resolvers present a more secure option for Internet users who cannot trust the communication channel between their stub resolvers and remote name servers. However, they do not provide a way of showing the user whether a domain name has been correctly validated or not. Based on the results of the tests conducted, it is recommended that local validators be used with browser validators for visibility and improved security. On the DNS server side, Domain Look-aside Validation (DLV) presents a viable alternative for organizations in islands of security like most countries in Africa where only two country code Top Level Domains (ccTLD) have deployed DNSSEC. This research recommends use of DLV by corporates to provide DNS security to both internal and external users accessing their web based services. , LaTeX with hyperref package , pdfTeX-1.40.10
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