Remote fidelity of Container-Based Network Emulators
- Authors: Peach, Schalk Willem
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Computer networks Security measures , Intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Computer security , Host-based intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Emulators (Computer programs) , Computer network protocols , Container-Based Network Emulators (CBNEs) , Network Experimentation Platforms (NEPs)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192141 , vital:45199
- Description: This thesis examines if Container-Based Network Emulators (CBNEs) are able to instantiate emulated nodes that provide sufficient realism to be used in information security experiments. The realism measure used is based on the information available from the point of view of a remote attacker. During the evaluation of a Container-Based Network Emulator (CBNE) as a platform to replicate production networks for information security experiments, it was observed that nmap fingerprinting returned Operating System (OS) family and version results inconsistent with that of the host Operating System (OS). CBNEs utilise Linux namespaces, the technology used for containerisation, to instantiate \emulated" hosts for experimental networks. Linux containers partition resources of the host OS to create lightweight virtual machines that share a single OS kernel. As all emulated hosts share the same kernel in a CBNE network, there is a reasonable expectation that the fingerprints of the host OS and emulated hosts should be the same. Based on how CBNEs instantiate emulated networks and that fingerprinting returned inconsistent results, it was hypothesised that the technologies used to construct CBNEs are capable of influencing fingerprints generated by utilities such as nmap. It was predicted that hosts emulated using different CBNEs would show deviations in remotely generated fingerprints when compared to fingerprints generated for the host OS. An experimental network consisting of two emulated hosts and a Layer 2 switch was instantiated on multiple CBNEs using the same host OS. Active and passive fingerprinting was conducted between the emulated hosts to generate fingerprints and OS family and version matches. Passive fingerprinting failed to produce OS family and version matches as the fingerprint databases for these utilities are no longer maintained. For active fingerprinting the OS family results were consistent between tested systems and the host OS, though OS version results reported was inconsistent. A comparison of the generated fingerprints revealed that for certain CBNEs fingerprint features related to network stack optimisations of the host OS deviated from other CBNEs and the host OS. The hypothesis that CBNEs can influence remotely generated fingerprints was partially confirmed. One CBNE system modified Linux kernel networking options, causing a deviation from fingerprints generated for other tested systems and the host OS. The hypothesis was also partially rejected as the technologies used by CBNEs do not influence the remote fidelity of emulated hosts. , Thesis (MSc) -- Faculty of Science, Computer Science, 2021
- Full Text:
- Authors: Peach, Schalk Willem
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Computer networks Security measures , Intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Computer security , Host-based intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Emulators (Computer programs) , Computer network protocols , Container-Based Network Emulators (CBNEs) , Network Experimentation Platforms (NEPs)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192141 , vital:45199
- Description: This thesis examines if Container-Based Network Emulators (CBNEs) are able to instantiate emulated nodes that provide sufficient realism to be used in information security experiments. The realism measure used is based on the information available from the point of view of a remote attacker. During the evaluation of a Container-Based Network Emulator (CBNE) as a platform to replicate production networks for information security experiments, it was observed that nmap fingerprinting returned Operating System (OS) family and version results inconsistent with that of the host Operating System (OS). CBNEs utilise Linux namespaces, the technology used for containerisation, to instantiate \emulated" hosts for experimental networks. Linux containers partition resources of the host OS to create lightweight virtual machines that share a single OS kernel. As all emulated hosts share the same kernel in a CBNE network, there is a reasonable expectation that the fingerprints of the host OS and emulated hosts should be the same. Based on how CBNEs instantiate emulated networks and that fingerprinting returned inconsistent results, it was hypothesised that the technologies used to construct CBNEs are capable of influencing fingerprints generated by utilities such as nmap. It was predicted that hosts emulated using different CBNEs would show deviations in remotely generated fingerprints when compared to fingerprints generated for the host OS. An experimental network consisting of two emulated hosts and a Layer 2 switch was instantiated on multiple CBNEs using the same host OS. Active and passive fingerprinting was conducted between the emulated hosts to generate fingerprints and OS family and version matches. Passive fingerprinting failed to produce OS family and version matches as the fingerprint databases for these utilities are no longer maintained. For active fingerprinting the OS family results were consistent between tested systems and the host OS, though OS version results reported was inconsistent. A comparison of the generated fingerprints revealed that for certain CBNEs fingerprint features related to network stack optimisations of the host OS deviated from other CBNEs and the host OS. The hypothesis that CBNEs can influence remotely generated fingerprints was partially confirmed. One CBNE system modified Linux kernel networking options, causing a deviation from fingerprints generated for other tested systems and the host OS. The hypothesis was also partially rejected as the technologies used by CBNEs do not influence the remote fidelity of emulated hosts. , Thesis (MSc) -- Faculty of Science, Computer Science, 2021
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Amber : a aero-interaction honeypot with distributed intelligence
- Authors: Schoeman, Adam
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: Security systems -- Security measures , Computer viruses , Intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Computer security
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: vital:4716 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1017938
- Description: For the greater part, security controls are based on the principle of Decision through Detection (DtD). The exception to this is a honeypot, which analyses interactions between a third party and itself, while occupying a piece of unused information space. As honeypots are not located on productive information resources, any interaction with it can be assumed to be non-productive. This allows the honeypot to make decisions based simply on the presence of data, rather than on the behaviour of the data. But due to limited resources in human capital, honeypots’ uptake in the South African market has been underwhelming. Amber attempts to change this by offering a zero-interaction security system, which will use the honeypot approach of decision through Presence (DtP) to generate a blacklist of third parties, which can be passed on to a network enforcer. Empirical testing has proved the usefulness of this alternative and low cost approach in defending networks. The functionality of the system was also extended by installing nodes in different geographical locations, and streaming their detections into the central Amber hive.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Schoeman, Adam
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: Security systems -- Security measures , Computer viruses , Intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Computer security
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: vital:4716 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1017938
- Description: For the greater part, security controls are based on the principle of Decision through Detection (DtD). The exception to this is a honeypot, which analyses interactions between a third party and itself, while occupying a piece of unused information space. As honeypots are not located on productive information resources, any interaction with it can be assumed to be non-productive. This allows the honeypot to make decisions based simply on the presence of data, rather than on the behaviour of the data. But due to limited resources in human capital, honeypots’ uptake in the South African market has been underwhelming. Amber attempts to change this by offering a zero-interaction security system, which will use the honeypot approach of decision through Presence (DtP) to generate a blacklist of third parties, which can be passed on to a network enforcer. Empirical testing has proved the usefulness of this alternative and low cost approach in defending networks. The functionality of the system was also extended by installing nodes in different geographical locations, and streaming their detections into the central Amber hive.
- Full Text:
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