A study of malicious software on the macOS operating system
- Authors: Regensberg, Mark Alan
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Malware (Computer software) , Computer security , Computer viruses , Mac OS
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/92302 , vital:30701
- Description: Much of the published malware research begins with a common refrain: the cost, quantum and complexity of threats are increasing, and research and practice should prioritise efforts to automate and reduce times to detect and prevent malware, while improving the consistency of categories and taxonomies applied to modern malware. Existing work related to malware targeting Apple's macOS platform has not been spared this approach, although limited research has been conducted on the true nature of threats faced by users of the operating system. While macOS focused research available consistently notes an increase in macOS users, devices and ultimately in threats, an opportunity exists to understand the real nature of threats faced by macOS users and suggest potential avenues for future work. This research provides a view of the current state of macOS malware by analysing and exploring a dataset of malware detections on macOS endpoints captured over a period of eleven months by an anti-malware software vendor. The dataset is augmented with malware information provided by the widely used Virus. Total service, as well as the application of prior automated malware categorisation work, AVClass to categorise and SSDeep to cluster and report on observed data. With Windows and Android platforms frequently in the spotlight as targets for highly disruptive malware like botnets, ransomware and cryptominers, research and intuition seem to suggest the threat of malware on this increasingly popular platform should be growing and evolving accordingly. Findings suggests that the direction and nature of growth and evolution may not be entirely as clear as industry reports suggest. Adware and Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs) make up the vast majority of the detected threats, with remote access trojans (RATs), ransomware and cryptocurrency miners comprising a relatively small proportion of the detected malware. This provides a number of avenues for potential future work to compare and contrast with research on other platforms, as well as identification of key factors that may influence its growth in the future.
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- Authors: Regensberg, Mark Alan
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Malware (Computer software) , Computer security , Computer viruses , Mac OS
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/92302 , vital:30701
- Description: Much of the published malware research begins with a common refrain: the cost, quantum and complexity of threats are increasing, and research and practice should prioritise efforts to automate and reduce times to detect and prevent malware, while improving the consistency of categories and taxonomies applied to modern malware. Existing work related to malware targeting Apple's macOS platform has not been spared this approach, although limited research has been conducted on the true nature of threats faced by users of the operating system. While macOS focused research available consistently notes an increase in macOS users, devices and ultimately in threats, an opportunity exists to understand the real nature of threats faced by macOS users and suggest potential avenues for future work. This research provides a view of the current state of macOS malware by analysing and exploring a dataset of malware detections on macOS endpoints captured over a period of eleven months by an anti-malware software vendor. The dataset is augmented with malware information provided by the widely used Virus. Total service, as well as the application of prior automated malware categorisation work, AVClass to categorise and SSDeep to cluster and report on observed data. With Windows and Android platforms frequently in the spotlight as targets for highly disruptive malware like botnets, ransomware and cryptominers, research and intuition seem to suggest the threat of malware on this increasingly popular platform should be growing and evolving accordingly. Findings suggests that the direction and nature of growth and evolution may not be entirely as clear as industry reports suggest. Adware and Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs) make up the vast majority of the detected threats, with remote access trojans (RATs), ransomware and cryptocurrency miners comprising a relatively small proportion of the detected malware. This provides a number of avenues for potential future work to compare and contrast with research on other platforms, as well as identification of key factors that may influence its growth in the future.
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Amber : a aero-interaction honeypot with distributed intelligence
- Authors: Schoeman, Adam
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: Security systems -- Security measures , Computer viruses , Intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Computer security
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: vital:4716 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1017938
- Description: For the greater part, security controls are based on the principle of Decision through Detection (DtD). The exception to this is a honeypot, which analyses interactions between a third party and itself, while occupying a piece of unused information space. As honeypots are not located on productive information resources, any interaction with it can be assumed to be non-productive. This allows the honeypot to make decisions based simply on the presence of data, rather than on the behaviour of the data. But due to limited resources in human capital, honeypots’ uptake in the South African market has been underwhelming. Amber attempts to change this by offering a zero-interaction security system, which will use the honeypot approach of decision through Presence (DtP) to generate a blacklist of third parties, which can be passed on to a network enforcer. Empirical testing has proved the usefulness of this alternative and low cost approach in defending networks. The functionality of the system was also extended by installing nodes in different geographical locations, and streaming their detections into the central Amber hive.
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- Authors: Schoeman, Adam
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: Security systems -- Security measures , Computer viruses , Intrusion detection systems (Computer security) , Computer security
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: vital:4716 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1017938
- Description: For the greater part, security controls are based on the principle of Decision through Detection (DtD). The exception to this is a honeypot, which analyses interactions between a third party and itself, while occupying a piece of unused information space. As honeypots are not located on productive information resources, any interaction with it can be assumed to be non-productive. This allows the honeypot to make decisions based simply on the presence of data, rather than on the behaviour of the data. But due to limited resources in human capital, honeypots’ uptake in the South African market has been underwhelming. Amber attempts to change this by offering a zero-interaction security system, which will use the honeypot approach of decision through Presence (DtP) to generate a blacklist of third parties, which can be passed on to a network enforcer. Empirical testing has proved the usefulness of this alternative and low cost approach in defending networks. The functionality of the system was also extended by installing nodes in different geographical locations, and streaming their detections into the central Amber hive.
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Limiting vulnerability exposure through effective patch management: threat mitigation through vulnerability remediation
- Authors: White, Dominic Stjohn Dolin
- Date: 2007 , 2007-02-08
- Subjects: Computer networks -- Security measures , Computer viruses , Computer security
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: vital:4629 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1006510 , Computer networks -- Security measures , Computer viruses , Computer security
- Description: This document aims to provide a complete discussion on vulnerability and patch management. The first chapters look at the trends relating to vulnerabilities, exploits, attacks and patches. These trends describe the drivers of patch and vulnerability management and situate the discussion in the current security climate. The following chapters then aim to present both policy and technical solutions to the problem. The policies described lay out a comprehensive set of steps that can be followed by any organisation to implement their own patch management policy, including practical advice on integration with other policies, managing risk, identifying vulnerability, strategies for reducing downtime and generating metrics to measure progress. Having covered the steps that can be taken by users, a strategy describing how best a vendor should implement a related patch release policy is provided. An argument is made that current monthly patch release schedules are inadequate to allow users to most effectively and timeously mitigate vulnerabilities. The final chapters discuss the technical aspect of automating parts of the policies described. In particular the concept of 'defense in depth' is used to discuss additional strategies for 'buying time' during the patch process. The document then goes on to conclude that in the face of increasing malicious activity and more complex patching, solid frameworks such as those provided in this document are required to ensure an organisation can fully manage the patching process. However, more research is required to fully understand vulnerabilities and exploits. In particular more attention must be paid to threats, as little work as been done to fully understand threat-agent capabilities and activities from a day to day basis. , TeX output 2007.02.08:2212 , Adobe Acrobat 9.51 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Authors: White, Dominic Stjohn Dolin
- Date: 2007 , 2007-02-08
- Subjects: Computer networks -- Security measures , Computer viruses , Computer security
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: vital:4629 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1006510 , Computer networks -- Security measures , Computer viruses , Computer security
- Description: This document aims to provide a complete discussion on vulnerability and patch management. The first chapters look at the trends relating to vulnerabilities, exploits, attacks and patches. These trends describe the drivers of patch and vulnerability management and situate the discussion in the current security climate. The following chapters then aim to present both policy and technical solutions to the problem. The policies described lay out a comprehensive set of steps that can be followed by any organisation to implement their own patch management policy, including practical advice on integration with other policies, managing risk, identifying vulnerability, strategies for reducing downtime and generating metrics to measure progress. Having covered the steps that can be taken by users, a strategy describing how best a vendor should implement a related patch release policy is provided. An argument is made that current monthly patch release schedules are inadequate to allow users to most effectively and timeously mitigate vulnerabilities. The final chapters discuss the technical aspect of automating parts of the policies described. In particular the concept of 'defense in depth' is used to discuss additional strategies for 'buying time' during the patch process. The document then goes on to conclude that in the face of increasing malicious activity and more complex patching, solid frameworks such as those provided in this document are required to ensure an organisation can fully manage the patching process. However, more research is required to fully understand vulnerabilities and exploits. In particular more attention must be paid to threats, as little work as been done to fully understand threat-agent capabilities and activities from a day to day basis. , TeX output 2007.02.08:2212 , Adobe Acrobat 9.51 Paper Capture Plug-in
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