Constitutional damages for the infringement of a social assistance right in South Africa are monetary damages in the form of interest a just and equitable remedy for breach of a social assistance right
- Authors: Batchelor, Bronwyn Le Ann
- Date: 2011
- Subjects: South Africa -- Constitution -- Bill of Rights , Constitutional law -- South Africa , Human rights -- South Africa , Constitutional history -- South Africa , Social security -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Civil rights -- South Africa , Common law -- South Africa , Compensation (Law) , Damages
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:11117 , http://hdl.handle.net/10353/388 , South Africa -- Constitution -- Bill of Rights , Constitutional law -- South Africa , Human rights -- South Africa , Constitutional history -- South Africa , Social security -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Civil rights -- South Africa , Common law -- South Africa , Compensation (Law) , Damages
- Description: This dissertation will explore the revolutionary progression in the provision of monetary damages and the availability thereof due to the change in South Africa’s legal system from Parliamentary sovereignty to Constitutional supremacy after the enactment of the final Constitution in 19961. The Constitution of South Africa brought with it the concepts of justification and accountability as the Bill of Rights enshrines fundamental rights and the remedies for the infringement of same. The available remedies for the infringement of a fundamental right flow from two sources, being either from the development of the common law remedies in line with the Bill of Rights or alternatively from Section 38 of the Constitution, which provides for a remedy which provides ‘appropriate’ relief. The question that will be raised in this dissertation is, ‘does appropriate relief include an award of delictual damages?’ or a question related thereto ‘is an award of monetary damages an appropriate remedy?’ The motivation for this dissertation arises from the plethora of case law, especially in the Eastern Cape, that has come to the fore in the last sixteen years, highlighting the injustice of cancellations of social assistance grants and the non-payment of such in South Africa’s social security system, as well as the precedent that was set by our Constitutional Court and Supreme Court in remedying that injustice. The central case to this dissertation is that of Kate v Member of Executive Council for Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD; Member of Executive Council, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA), which is generally regarded as having paved the way for the granting of monetary damages for the infringement of an individual’s constitutional right as same require legal protection. Firstly the past approach to damages will be explored in relation to South Africa’s common law, being the Roman-Dutch law. The common law Aquilian action is the focal point of this dissertation in relation to the common law in that the granting of damages for the infringement of an individual’s social assistance right (being a specific constitutional right framed within the 1996 Constitution) results in pure patrimonial loss which in our common law system was remedied by the actio legis Aquilae. In delict, an award of damages is the primary remedy, aimed at affording compensation in respect of the legal right or interest infringed. After the common law system of damages has been explored, this dissertation will then examine the changes that have developed therefrom, and largely shaped by the current state of disorganization in the National Department of Welfare coupled with the all encompassing power of the final Constitution. The final Constitution provides the power, in section 38 of the 1996 Constitution, for the court to award a monetary remedy for the breach of a constitutional right. The question, however, is “does the award of monetary damages not merely throw money at the problem, whereas the purpose of a constitutional remedy is to vindicate guaranteed rights and prevent or deter future violations?” The battle for domination between the common law approach and the constitutional approach to damages is witnessed as the two systems eventually amalgamate to form an essentially new remedy, unique to South Africa. South Africa’s new system is aligned with the Constitution as the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and underpins the awarding of all damages and, especially, the awarding of constitutional damages. For the sake of completeness, alternatives to monetary damages will also be canvassed in this dissertation. It is hoped that the reader will, in the end, realize that the final Constitution is the supreme law of the land and as such dictates the manner and form in which damages are provided. If such provision is not in alignment with the Constitution, it will be declared invalid. The flexibility of our common law is put to the test, yet it is found to be adaptable to the ever-developing boni mores of society exemplified in the embracing constitutional principles and the production of this new remedy. The courts develop the common law under section 39(2) of the Constitution in order to keep the common law in step with the evolution of our society and the ever changing nature of bonos mores. , National Research Foundation
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- Date Issued: 2011
Access to land as a human right the payment of just and equitable compensation for dispossessed land in South Africa
- Authors: Yanou, Michael A
- Date: 2005
- Subjects: Human rights -- South Africa , Compensation (Law) -- South Africa , Right of property -- South Africa , Land reform -- South Africa , Land tenure -- South Africa , Constitutional history -- South Africa , Restitution -- South Africa , Land tenure -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Land reform -- Law and legislation -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:3699 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003214 , Human rights -- South Africa , Compensation (Law) -- South Africa , Right of property -- South Africa , Land reform -- South Africa , Land tenure -- South Africa , Constitutional history -- South Africa , Restitution -- South Africa , Land tenure -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Land reform -- Law and legislation -- South Africa
- Description: This thesis deals with the conceptualization of access to land by the dispossessed as a human right and commences with an account of the struggle for land between the peoples of African and European extractions in South Africa. It is observed that the latter assumed sovereignty over the ancestral lands of the former. The thesis discusses the theoretical foundation of the study and situates the topic within its conceptual parameters. The writer examines the notions of justice and equity in the context of the post apartheid constitutional mandate to redress the skewed policy of the past. It is argued that the dispossession of Africans from lands that they had possessed for thousands of years on the assumption that the land was terra nullius was profoundly iniquitous and unjust. Although the study is technically limited to dispossessions occurring on or after the 13th June 1913, it covers a fairly extensive account of dispossession predating this date. This historical analysis is imperative for two reasons. Besides supporting the writer’s contention that the limitation of restitution to land dispossessed on or after 1913 was arbitrary, it also highlights both the material and non-material cost of the devastating wars of dispossessions. The candidate comments extensively on the post apartheid constitutional property structure which was conceived as a redress to the imbalance created by dispossession. This underlying objective explains why the state’s present land policy is geared towards facilitating access to land for the landless. The thesis investigates the extent to which the present property structure which defines access to land as a human right has succeeded in achieving the stated objective. It reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the land restitution process as well as the question of the payment of just and equitable compensation for land expropriated for restitution. The latter was carefully examined because it plays a crucial role in the success or otherwise of the restitution scheme. The writer argues that the courts have, on occasions, construed just and equitable compensation generously. This approach has failed to reflect the moral component inherent in the Aristotelian corrective justice. This, in the context of South Africa, requires compensation to reflect the fact that what is being paid for is land dispossessed from the forebears of indigenous inhabitants. It seems obvious that the scales of justice are tilted heavily in favour of the propertied class whose ancestors were responsible for this dispossession. This has a ripple effect on the pace of the restitution process. It also seems to have the effect of favouring the property class at the expense of the entire restitution process. The candidate also comments on the court’s differing approaches to the interpretation of the constitutional property clause. The candidate contends that the construction of the property clause and related pieces of legislation in a manner that stresses the maintenance of a balance between private property interest and land reform is flawed. This contention is supported by the fact that these values do not have proportional worth in the present property context of South Africa. The narrow definition of “past racially discriminatory law and practices” and labour tenant as used in the relevant post apartheid land reform laws is criticized for the same reason of its uncontextual approach. A comparative appraisal of similar developments relating to property law in other societies like India and Zimbabwe has been done. The writer has treated the post reform land evictions as a form of dispossession. The candidate notes that the country should guard against allowing the disastrous developments in Zimbabwe to influence events in the country and calls for an amendment of the property clause of the constitution in response to the practical difficulties which a decade of the operation of the current constitution has revealed.
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- Date Issued: 2005