Track-one diplomacy and post-conflict reconstruction : Kenya's mediation of Somali conflict and strategic intervention avenues
- Authors: Mwanika, Philip Arthur Njuguna
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Mediation -- Somalia , Mediation -- Kenya , Diplomacy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , DPhil
- Identifier: vital:8338 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1020628
- Description: This study focuses on the Kenyan mediation of the Somali conflict and strategic intervention engagement between 2002 and 2012. The core aim of the study was to establish and evaluate the role and effects of track-one diplomacy on conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction as pertains to the Somali conflict and on the basis of the Kenyan experience. A qualitative approach was followed in this study. It employed a descriptive, explanatory and analytical case-study method. The data were collected through interviews and documentary analysis. The twenty-two participants in the study were drawn from the Kenyan Foreign Ministry, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), the East African Standby Force Co-ordination Mechanism (EASFCOM), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the African Peace Forum Organization (APFO), and selected respondents representing the Somali people. The documents comprised policy treatises, protocols, treaties, and communiqués highlighting the actions of the Kenyan government and other track-one actors in the Somali peace endeavour. Other scholarly research on official diplomacy, soft-power and conflict management by small States – in particular African case studies – were also utilised. The study revealed that Kenya’s diplomatic and stabilisation efforts had their own dynamics and challenges. This is especially so with regard to the preferred policy option of exercising diplomacy that utilises soft-power resources. This diplomacy had to contend with the challenges of dealing with sensitive aspects of the process. These sensitive aspects involved a recognition of and complicated engagement with the Somali conflict-constituencies, and a complex mapping of various actors and their respective interests. Contrary to the expected outcomes, interests and issues 17 proliferated, and the original peace-making agenda was consistently slowed down and complicated. The study also revealed that Kenya ought to have exercised a non-directive role in dealing with the different Somali conflict players. This role provides that such an “interested mediator” ought to exercise some considerable influence over the mediation environment. It also emerged from the study that as pertains to the current peace-making developments in Somalia that began in 2005 onwards to 2012, it is important that different intermediary co-operative roles be recognized and utilised. Towards this end, the study recommends that Kenya’s diplomacy should adopt a strategy of co-operation with those regional regimes that it helped to establish. A case in reference is the diplomatic opportunity of utilising regional arms control and disarmament diplomacy. This is Kenya’s intermediary co-operative role with RECSA, which is mandated to support arms control and disarmament implementation efforts in the East African region. The study also recommends that strategic foreign policy and regional actions by Kenya should be taken up given its new lease of engagement, noting that it was officially integrated into AMISOM in 2012. The study posited that in the ongoing engagement environment there would be a ‘revisiting’ of the experiences and complexities of the first phase of engagement (2002-2004). It is, therefore, recommended that Kenya should seize this opportunity and continue with its ‘facilitative and enabling role’ in its peace diplomacy, while utilising the lessons learnt in past engagements.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2013
An analysis of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) preventive diplomacy in the kingdom of Lesotho: a case study
- Authors: Bukae, Nkosi Makhonya
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: Southern African Development Community , Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes , Diplomacy , Conflict management -- Lesotho , Africa, Southern -- Politics and government , Lesotho -- Politics and government
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , DPhil
- Identifier: vital:8196 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1008296 , Southern African Development Community , Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes , Diplomacy , Conflict management -- Lesotho , Africa, Southern -- Politics and government , Lesotho -- Politics and government
- Description: The focus of this study is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) preventive diplomacy interventions in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. The core aim of the study was to evaluate the efficacy of the SADC security mechanism (the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in conflict prevention, management and resolution on the basis of the Lesotho experience. Data for this qualitative case study was collected through interviews and document analysis. The twenty four participants for the study were drawn from the SADC OPDS unit, Lesotho political parties, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Academics from the University of Botswana (UB) and the National University of Lesotho (NUL), retired Botswana Defence officers who participated in the Lesotho missions and office of the post-2007election dispute dialogue facilitator in Lesotho. Documents on the SADC Treaties, Protocols, Communiqués and interventions in other set ups were used to highlight its operational policies, mandate, structures, successes and challenges. Lesotho was chosen as a case study because SADC employed both non-coercive (SADC Troika and Eminent Person mediation, 1994 and 2007 respectively) and coercive measures (the 1998 military intervention). The findings of the study revealed that SADC as a regional body had its own successes and challenges. Different perceptions on the SADC interventions in Lesotho emerged mainly between the participants from the ruling party and the opposition parties. While the former commended SADC for successfully mitigating the calamitous effects of 1994, 1998 and 2007 post-electoral violence, the opposition parties viewed the regional organisations as engaged in illegal interference in the domestic affairs of the country to defend the incumbent governing party. It also emerged from the study that the SADC security mechanism has numerous structural and operational flaws. There were several unanswered questions revolving around the legality and mandate of some of the missions. For instance, no concrete evidence emerged as to whether the 1998 military intervention was authorised by the SADC. The study also revealed that SADC has learnt valuable lessons from the Lesotho missions. Some of the reforms which the SADC has introduced in the OPDS such as the establishment of the SADC Stand by Force, Early Warning structures, the Mediation Unit, and a panel of expert mediators emanated mainly from the Lesotho experiences. The study recommends that SADC needs to harmonise the efforts of its OPDS structures such as the Mediation Unit; the Troika; the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Summit of Heads of States and Governments for rapid, coherent and well coordinated interventions in future regional preventive missions. It is also recommended that SADC should focus on identifying and mitigating underlying causal factors such as underdevelopment; poverty; deprivation of freedoms, marginalisation and other forms of social stratifications and oppression in its preventive diplomacy missions if durable peace is to be achieved in Lesotho and any other future cases.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012