Emotions, social transformation and education
- Authors: Delport, Aletta Catherine
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Educational sociology -- South Africa , Education -- Philosophy , Emotions (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , DEd
- Identifier: vital:11009 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/318 , Educational sociology -- South Africa , Education -- Philosophy , Emotions (Philosophy)
- Description: This thesis addresses the topic of the education of the emotions in the context of a rapidly transforming South African society. It attempts to reconfigure the conceptual landscape in terms of which we think about rationality, social transformation and education, and contests the intellectual and instrumental prejudice in the currently dominant ways of thinking about education. It reclaims a sense of what it would be to think of education in terms of cultivating humanity, as a key to the profound transformation of the South African society. It argues that the emotions should be relocated in our conception of transformation and education, because without it, education will fail to assist South African society to transform into a society where most people are able to live improved quality lives. The thesis comprises three distinct parts. The first part consists of an account of a particular cognitive theory of the emotions, as developed by Martha Nussbaum in her book, Upheavals of thought. The Intelligence of Emotions (2001). This theory is then applied in Part 2 to examine the complexities of social transformation in South Africa at the more profound, personal level. This investigation is presented as a narrative and comprises the perspectives of the author, who is a white Afrikaner female, who grew up in South Africa in the heyday of Apartheid. In the final part, the concept of ‘education for transformation’ is discussed. It is argued that, in order for education to enhance the social transformation of South Africa, social transformation should be conceived according to a fundamental aspect of Rousseau’s political philosophy, namely that the ideal society comprises two reciprocally related spheres, the political and the personal sphere. Part 3 argues that ‘education for transformation’ should be conceived according to a conception of transformation, which acknowledges this double-layered texture. It further argues that ‘education for transformation’ should primarily be concerned with transformation at the personal level, since, according to Rousseau’s philosophy, this dimension is fundamental to ensuring the stability and legitimacy of the political order. However, built on the main insights of Part 2, this thesis also argues that personal transformation is only possible within a framework of rationality, which acknowledges the emotions as constitutive elements of rationality itself. Essentially, this thesis is about the conception of human being, which should be esteemed as the most fundamental and crucial element of successful social transformation.
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- Date Issued: 2004
"From the inside": how to attribute emotions to others
- Authors: Mitova, Velislava Atanasova
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2741 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007661 , Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Description: I argue that a specific version of Theory theory is necessary and sufficient for attributions and predictions of others' emotions. Theory theory is the view that we attribute and predict others' mental states on the basis of a (tacit) body of generalisations about mental states, their situational input, and behavioural output. Theory's antagonist, Simulation theory, is the view that we ascribe mental states to others by simulating - or running ' off-line ' - their doxastic, emotional, and contextual situations. My argument for Theory's necessity and sufficiency develops in three stages: First, I show that some version of Theory is necessary for predictions of all mental states on the basis of the ascriber's knowledge of the subject's other mental states. The linchpin of the arguments here consists of considerations from relevant similarity between the ascriber's and the subject's mental states. Simulation cannot provide criteria for such similarity, and so, I argue, predictions must advert to Theory. Second, I develop a sui generis model of emotions, according to which (i) emoticns' necessary objects and typical causes are concern-based construals; and (ii) emotions qua attitudes are (a) complex states embedded in a narrative structure, (b) characterised in terms of their object, their expressive behaviour, and their phenomenology. Third, I show that, considering the nature of the objects of emotions, some Theory is necessary for emotion-predictions and -attributions. Moreover, I develop a version of Theory, based on my analysis of emotions and narrative structures, and argue that this version of Theory is both necessary and sufficient for emotion-predictions and -attributions.
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- Date Issued: 2003