An analysis of Samuel P. Huntington's theories
- Authors: Kirkby, Daniela M
- Date: 2011
- Subjects: Liberalism , Politics and literature , Political science -- History
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:8271 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1015964
- Description: The traditional notion of Western liberal democracy has in recent years been met with a barrage of negative criticism. Liberal democracy from both a minimalist and substantive position appears to be backsliding, and once more falling into what Samuel P. Huntington (1991) termed a reverse wave. The analysis which Huntington (1991) presented ended in an era in which liberal democracy once more dominated the political landscape for a third consecutive wave, without any indication that it was going to relapse. In light of Huntington’s (1991) closure, this study has attempted to continue with his analysis and point to the possible existence of a third wave reversal. In order to do so, this study has meticulously used the same methodological approach as Huntington (1991) did to highlight previous wave reversals. This has been done by critically discussing, with examples, the existence of those factors that lead to a global decline in liberal democratic practice as prescribed by Huntington (1991). This study attempts not only to point to the possible existence of a third wave reversal, but also to explain the contextual reasons behind such an increase in anti-democratic rhetoric. The application of Huntington’s (1991) wave theory does not explain the subjective reasoning behind the contemporary deterioration of liberal democracy, as his factors leading to wave reversals may be too pragmatic for this study. It is in this light that a second argument as brought forward by Huntington in 1996, serves as the contextual layer for the decrease in democratic support as it provides the basis for the application of a critical discourse analysis. Therefore, this study serves not only as an investigation of the possible existence of a current third wave reversal, but also as an analysis into the discursive nature of liberal democracy’s historical and future trajectory.
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- Date Issued: 2011
Liberal aristocracy & the limits of democracy
- Authors: Wareham, Christopher
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2725 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002855 , Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Description: I define and defend a non-democratic authority with the power to annul the decisions of democratic branches of government when such decisions infringe upon citizens’ basic rights and liberties. I refer to this non-democratic authority as Liberal Aristocracy. The argument for Liberal Aristocracy has two parts: the first part demonstrates that Liberal Aristocracy will arrive at decisions that further the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights; the second part holds that Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means to this end. First, I discuss two existing arguments for non-democratic authorities – Platonic Aristocracy and Constitutional Court Judges. I claim that Plato’s argument is unsuccessful because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that are unlikely to provide a basis for rights. Liberal justifications of the power of Constitutional Courts are argued to be incomplete because they do not designate an authority that is qualified to decide when citizens’ rights are infringed by democratic branches of government. Nor do they show that such an authority is in fact required if citizens’ rights are to be protected. In order to supplement the liberal argument for the power of Constitutional Courts I develop an account of Liberal Aristocracy, which rests on the idea that Constitutional Court Judges should possess moral expertise. I claim that (i) moral expertise qualifies Judges to decide when citizens’ rights are violated by democratic decisions. Furthermore, I argue that (ii) decisions taken democratically will sometimes encroach on citizens’ rights. Claims (i) and (ii) are shown to justify the non-democratic authority of Liberal Aristocracy. The second part of the argument for Liberal Aristocracy examines arguments to the effect that only democratic procedures can be morally legitimate, even if other decision procedures arrive at outcomes that provide greater support for citizens’ rights. Three claims are offered in support of this idea. First, democracy is claimed to be necessary to support deliberation. Second, democracy is seen as the only procedure that can uphold the value of autonomy by securing citizens’ consent. Third, it is argued that non-democratic procedures will not recognise the equal status of citizens. I hold that these three claims are false and that Liberal Aristocratic procedures can be morally legitimate.
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- Date Issued: 2004
The individual and the social order in Mill and Hegel : seeking common principles in liberal and communitarian ancestry
- Authors: Koseff, Justin Adam
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831 , Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873 , Liberalism , Communitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2843 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005624 , Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831 , Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873 , Liberalism , Communitarianism
- Description: This thesis seeks to establish a significant commonality and compatibility between the principles underpinning the political and social philosophies of GWF Hegel and John Stuart Mill. The role of the individual and the social order in both their theories is discussed and assessed separately and in turn in reference to their respective seminal works on the proper structure, principles and function of modern political infrastructure. Through an interpretation of the fundamental tenets and goals of their theories of the social order I argue for a coherent modern reconstruction of their doctrines, within which I locate parallels and contrasts as they apply. Both theorists as ultimately put forward similar arguments for freedom as an intersubjectively·developed capacity, the ideal social order as rational framework for the management of ethical and political engagement, linked to a social holism that ties individual and social progress inextricably. A respect for individual particularity of perspective and practice is integral both of their social frameworks, but that such a space must be harmonised within a rational political community worthy of individual obligation. Finally their social and political theories can be understood as complementary, each providing insights which the other lacks. Mill suffers from an insufficient regard for the social basis of identity and interconnected nature of the modern institutional framework, while Hegel displays an insufficient regard for Mill's caveats concerning the repressive potential of institutional structures and the dangers of overly empowered bureaucracies. In conclusion key elements of the two theorists' projects stand as separate but not in any way fundamentally opposed to each other. This points to the possibility of a via media between a politics of individualism and a politics of community, suggesting strong potential for reconciliation between liberal and communitarian perspectives.
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- Date Issued: 2003