Self-respecting practical reason: an analysis of self-respect and its implications for practical reason
- Authors: Roberts, Deborah Joan
- Date: 2002
- Subjects: Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen -- Ethics , Ethics, Modern -- 20th century , Self-esteem
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2719 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002849 , Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen -- Ethics , Ethics, Modern -- 20th century , Self-esteem
- Description: What should I do? As long as I am aware of the relevant facts of the situation and deliberating soundly, Bernard Williams argues that I should do what I want to do. It makes no sense to say that there are reasons that are fixed objects of concern, or values, that exist for an agent regardless of what she is in fact motivated to do. Reasons, for Williams, are hypothetical. I argue that he takes this view of practical reason because of a prior answer to the question “How should I live?”. A universal account of the good life would mean an account of values, or interests, that all human beings should have. Williams thinks it is not possible to give a universal account of the good life for human beings; any such account must be constructed out of the particular reasons of a community. But, he takes a constructivist view of the good life because he thinks that to be universal an account of the good life would have to be objective. Since objectivity cannot be achieved, he argues, neither can universality. Williams is only half right. That objectivity is not possible is inconsequential. A foundation for ethics has to be internal, but this does not preclude it being universal. I develop such a foundation based on the Aristotelian conception of human nature. A life cannot be wholly good if it is not self-respecting. Moreover, self-respect fits the framework for the specification of the good life that this foundation provides: I argue that self-respect can be shown to have a structure which provides an account of real interests - reasons that are objects of fixed concern. As such, reasons recognise rather than construct the good, making categorical reasons possible. A person can have a reason to change or act, even if reason itself cannot effect that change or action. Thus, I can be wrong about what I should do not only by being wrong about what would count as a satisfaction of my interests, but also by being wrong about what my interests are.
- Full Text:
- Authors: Roberts, Deborah Joan
- Date: 2002
- Subjects: Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen -- Ethics , Ethics, Modern -- 20th century , Self-esteem
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2719 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002849 , Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen -- Ethics , Ethics, Modern -- 20th century , Self-esteem
- Description: What should I do? As long as I am aware of the relevant facts of the situation and deliberating soundly, Bernard Williams argues that I should do what I want to do. It makes no sense to say that there are reasons that are fixed objects of concern, or values, that exist for an agent regardless of what she is in fact motivated to do. Reasons, for Williams, are hypothetical. I argue that he takes this view of practical reason because of a prior answer to the question “How should I live?”. A universal account of the good life would mean an account of values, or interests, that all human beings should have. Williams thinks it is not possible to give a universal account of the good life for human beings; any such account must be constructed out of the particular reasons of a community. But, he takes a constructivist view of the good life because he thinks that to be universal an account of the good life would have to be objective. Since objectivity cannot be achieved, he argues, neither can universality. Williams is only half right. That objectivity is not possible is inconsequential. A foundation for ethics has to be internal, but this does not preclude it being universal. I develop such a foundation based on the Aristotelian conception of human nature. A life cannot be wholly good if it is not self-respecting. Moreover, self-respect fits the framework for the specification of the good life that this foundation provides: I argue that self-respect can be shown to have a structure which provides an account of real interests - reasons that are objects of fixed concern. As such, reasons recognise rather than construct the good, making categorical reasons possible. A person can have a reason to change or act, even if reason itself cannot effect that change or action. Thus, I can be wrong about what I should do not only by being wrong about what would count as a satisfaction of my interests, but also by being wrong about what my interests are.
- Full Text:
Self-esteem and aggressive behaviour: a pilot study
- Authors: Rossouw, Gabriel Johannes
- Date: 1987
- Subjects: Aggressiveness , Self-esteem
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:3151 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007471 , Aggressiveness , Self-esteem
- Description: From Introduction: "That man is an aggressive creature will hardly be disputed. With the exception of certain rodents, no other vertebrate habitually destroys members of his own species. No other animal takes positive pleasure in the excercise of cruelty upon another of his kind" (A. Storr, 1968 p. ix). It is a sombre fact that man is the cruellest and most ruthless specie that has ever walked on earth. We recoil in horror when we read the daily newspaper or in a history book of the atrocities committed by man, but as A. Storr puts it: "....., we know in our hearts that each one of us harbours within himself those savage impulses which lead to murder, to torture and to war." (p. ix). Our warranted concern with this phenomenon is portrayed by the tremendous amount of research in this field which can be sub-divided into two distinct categories. The first category consist of those that emphasize nurture in their attempt to gain a deeper understanding of human aggression, of which the behaviourists and social learning theorists are staunch supporters. Underlying their concern and endeavour is the personal belief that aggression is attributable to environmental factors. In short, they maintain that humans are not aggressive by nature and if one follows their argument to its logical conclusion it would allow for a sigh of relief and inspiration. Their research results indicate that well deliberated methods of control would most certainly result in the extinction or near extinction of aggression. The second category consist of those, notably the psycho-analytic school of thought, who emphasize nature in their understanding of human aggression and do not allow themselves the naivety of projecting aggression into environmental conditions and situations. In short, they argue that aggression is innate and serves a particular function in the psychological development of the human being. It is their contention that aggressiveness supports the individual in his drive towards independence. The aim of this paper is to present both stances and to broaden the perspective by introducing a view that straddles both nature and nurture. Following this view, of whom Rollo May (1972) is a strong supporter, to its logical conclusion would indicate that aggression is the result of nature as well as nurture and that it serves the function of re-establishing a sense of worth and significance that has otherwise been thwarted. Finally, this paper sets out to prove that aggression and violence "feeds on a low self- esteem and self-doubt" (Toch. 69, p. 212).
- Full Text:
- Authors: Rossouw, Gabriel Johannes
- Date: 1987
- Subjects: Aggressiveness , Self-esteem
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:3151 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007471 , Aggressiveness , Self-esteem
- Description: From Introduction: "That man is an aggressive creature will hardly be disputed. With the exception of certain rodents, no other vertebrate habitually destroys members of his own species. No other animal takes positive pleasure in the excercise of cruelty upon another of his kind" (A. Storr, 1968 p. ix). It is a sombre fact that man is the cruellest and most ruthless specie that has ever walked on earth. We recoil in horror when we read the daily newspaper or in a history book of the atrocities committed by man, but as A. Storr puts it: "....., we know in our hearts that each one of us harbours within himself those savage impulses which lead to murder, to torture and to war." (p. ix). Our warranted concern with this phenomenon is portrayed by the tremendous amount of research in this field which can be sub-divided into two distinct categories. The first category consist of those that emphasize nurture in their attempt to gain a deeper understanding of human aggression, of which the behaviourists and social learning theorists are staunch supporters. Underlying their concern and endeavour is the personal belief that aggression is attributable to environmental factors. In short, they maintain that humans are not aggressive by nature and if one follows their argument to its logical conclusion it would allow for a sigh of relief and inspiration. Their research results indicate that well deliberated methods of control would most certainly result in the extinction or near extinction of aggression. The second category consist of those, notably the psycho-analytic school of thought, who emphasize nature in their understanding of human aggression and do not allow themselves the naivety of projecting aggression into environmental conditions and situations. In short, they argue that aggression is innate and serves a particular function in the psychological development of the human being. It is their contention that aggressiveness supports the individual in his drive towards independence. The aim of this paper is to present both stances and to broaden the perspective by introducing a view that straddles both nature and nurture. Following this view, of whom Rollo May (1972) is a strong supporter, to its logical conclusion would indicate that aggression is the result of nature as well as nurture and that it serves the function of re-establishing a sense of worth and significance that has otherwise been thwarted. Finally, this paper sets out to prove that aggression and violence "feeds on a low self- esteem and self-doubt" (Toch. 69, p. 212).
- Full Text:
- «
- ‹
- 1
- ›
- »