Regulating cartel activity in South Africa
- Authors: Mushi, Walter
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: South Africa. -- Competition Act, 1998 , Antitrust law -- South Africa , Competition
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10286 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1018685
- Description: Competition among firms is a central feature in all free market economies such as South Africa. One of the biggest threats to competition is the presence of cartels in markets. Cartels are firms which collude and compete unfairly in order to obtain monopoly-like profits. For more than fifty years South Africa’s economic landscape has been dominated by a vast network of cartels invital industries, such as bread, cement and fertiliser. South Africa promulgated the Competition Act 89 of 1998 to eradicate cartels and promote and maintain competition within the South African economy. The Competition Act 89 of 1998 prohibits cartel activity and provides for a fine of 10% of turn over for firms found to have engaged in cartel activity. For a variety of reasons, these administrative fines have failed to deter firms from commencing and/or continuing to engage in cartel activity. This is evidenced by the increasing number of firms engaged in large -scale cartels in essential industries, such as construction and food. Public outcry and global trends have persuaded legislators to enactment more stringent penalties in the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. Section 12 of the Competition Amendment Act , which inserts section 73A, creates a cartel of fence in terms of which a director who causes his firm to engage in cartel activity faces ten year imprisonment or a fine of R500, 000. This research shall critically analyse the Competition Amendment Acts effect on deterring cartel activity in South Africa. Despite the legislators’ aim to provide a bigger deterrent for engaging in cartel activity, section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act arouses scrutiny. Firstly, the promulgation of the new cartel offence is contrary to the decimalisation trend in South African company law which recognises the difficulty in enforcing complex regulatory offences with criminal provisions. Secondly, Section 73(5)A appears to infringe an accused director's right to be presumed innocent. Lastly there are co-ordination issues between the National Prosecuting Authority and the Corporate Leniency Policy relating to the granting of prose cutorial immunity for firms which cooperate with the Competition Commission. There search will out line these problems in full. With regards to the problems caused by section 73A, the research will use a comparative analysis with the positionin the United States. Of all the jurisdictions which criminalise cartel activity, the United States was one of the earliest and the most prolific insecuring convictions for directors who cause their firms to engage in cartel activity. The United States has taken innovative steps to supplement their public cartel enforcement drive such as the prosecution of international cartels and the use of private actions. In this regard, the research will extrapolate favourable cartel enforcement measures from the United States for recommendation in order to assist with South Africa’s cartel enforcement and alleviate the problems caused by section 73A, outlined above.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
- Authors: Mushi, Walter
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: South Africa. -- Competition Act, 1998 , Antitrust law -- South Africa , Competition
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10286 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1018685
- Description: Competition among firms is a central feature in all free market economies such as South Africa. One of the biggest threats to competition is the presence of cartels in markets. Cartels are firms which collude and compete unfairly in order to obtain monopoly-like profits. For more than fifty years South Africa’s economic landscape has been dominated by a vast network of cartels invital industries, such as bread, cement and fertiliser. South Africa promulgated the Competition Act 89 of 1998 to eradicate cartels and promote and maintain competition within the South African economy. The Competition Act 89 of 1998 prohibits cartel activity and provides for a fine of 10% of turn over for firms found to have engaged in cartel activity. For a variety of reasons, these administrative fines have failed to deter firms from commencing and/or continuing to engage in cartel activity. This is evidenced by the increasing number of firms engaged in large -scale cartels in essential industries, such as construction and food. Public outcry and global trends have persuaded legislators to enactment more stringent penalties in the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. Section 12 of the Competition Amendment Act , which inserts section 73A, creates a cartel of fence in terms of which a director who causes his firm to engage in cartel activity faces ten year imprisonment or a fine of R500, 000. This research shall critically analyse the Competition Amendment Acts effect on deterring cartel activity in South Africa. Despite the legislators’ aim to provide a bigger deterrent for engaging in cartel activity, section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act arouses scrutiny. Firstly, the promulgation of the new cartel offence is contrary to the decimalisation trend in South African company law which recognises the difficulty in enforcing complex regulatory offences with criminal provisions. Secondly, Section 73(5)A appears to infringe an accused director's right to be presumed innocent. Lastly there are co-ordination issues between the National Prosecuting Authority and the Corporate Leniency Policy relating to the granting of prose cutorial immunity for firms which cooperate with the Competition Commission. There search will out line these problems in full. With regards to the problems caused by section 73A, the research will use a comparative analysis with the positionin the United States. Of all the jurisdictions which criminalise cartel activity, the United States was one of the earliest and the most prolific insecuring convictions for directors who cause their firms to engage in cartel activity. The United States has taken innovative steps to supplement their public cartel enforcement drive such as the prosecution of international cartels and the use of private actions. In this regard, the research will extrapolate favourable cartel enforcement measures from the United States for recommendation in order to assist with South Africa’s cartel enforcement and alleviate the problems caused by section 73A, outlined above.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
Legal remedies against corruption: lessons from Guatemala
- Cordell, Cameron George Thomas
- Authors: Cordell, Cameron George Thomas
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Remedies (Law) -- Guatemala , Remedies (Law) -- South Africa Criminal law -- Guatemala Criminal law -- South Africa Public law -- South Africa Public law -- Guatemala
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10948/38013 , vital:34281
- Description: Corruption is a crime which has affected all levels of government in South Africa. Despite the multi-agency system developed since the advent of democracy, levels of corruption are still on the rise, with greater levels of impunity. It is clear that reform is needed within South Africa’s anti-corruption framework. The state of Guatemala has meanwhile achieved results that have been described as transcendental in the fight against corruption, via a novel anti-corruption commission formed in collaboration with the United Nations, known as the Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). This dissertation begins with an examination of the content of the crime of corruption via a historical approach – charting the course of corruption and effort to curb it from Ancient Greece, Mesoamerica and Africa, through the various legal systems that have resulted in the modern-day legal frameworks of South Africa and Guatemala. In doing so, a working definition of corruption has been developed – namely the unlawful and unethical enrichment of the self at the expense of the state. This definition aids in clearly defining proven instances of corruption within the public sector in modern South Africa. While corruption as a crime is generally clandestine in nature and difficult to deal with quantitatively, it is clearly demonstrated from the instances of corruption that have been proven that the offence is dealt with ineffectually by the existing policy and legal framework. Examinations of corruption scandals such as the capture of the state by private family corporations, to the collapse of South Africa’s Social Security Agency (SASSA), show that even when proven, corrupt politicians rarely face consequences for their actions. This is due to the lack of clarity in the primary legislation dealing with corruption – the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activity Act (PRECCA), combined with a multi-agency approach wherein the various bodies tasked with combatting corruption are not working cohesively. The solution to this problem is a single commission to integrate the anti-corruption framework, as well as providing a fresh perspective about how to deal with the crime. The CICIG has served this role in Guatemala, resulting in successful investigations and prosecutions of former Presidents, judges and members of the legislature. It has achieved this by supporting and working with the existing anti-corruption bodies, as well as advising government on effective policy reform. It is further staffed by anti-corruption experts who are from the Central and South American region, providing a level of trust and regional knowledge. There is no bar in South African law for the creation of a similar international body. Such a move is necessary to provide a fresh outlook on the fight against corruption in South Africa. An international body, staffed by African anti-corruption experts, would be an effective means to work with the multi-agency system currently in place to aid it in working cohesively, but also to provide African solutions to the scourge of corruption through policy reform.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
- Authors: Cordell, Cameron George Thomas
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Remedies (Law) -- Guatemala , Remedies (Law) -- South Africa Criminal law -- Guatemala Criminal law -- South Africa Public law -- South Africa Public law -- Guatemala
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10948/38013 , vital:34281
- Description: Corruption is a crime which has affected all levels of government in South Africa. Despite the multi-agency system developed since the advent of democracy, levels of corruption are still on the rise, with greater levels of impunity. It is clear that reform is needed within South Africa’s anti-corruption framework. The state of Guatemala has meanwhile achieved results that have been described as transcendental in the fight against corruption, via a novel anti-corruption commission formed in collaboration with the United Nations, known as the Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). This dissertation begins with an examination of the content of the crime of corruption via a historical approach – charting the course of corruption and effort to curb it from Ancient Greece, Mesoamerica and Africa, through the various legal systems that have resulted in the modern-day legal frameworks of South Africa and Guatemala. In doing so, a working definition of corruption has been developed – namely the unlawful and unethical enrichment of the self at the expense of the state. This definition aids in clearly defining proven instances of corruption within the public sector in modern South Africa. While corruption as a crime is generally clandestine in nature and difficult to deal with quantitatively, it is clearly demonstrated from the instances of corruption that have been proven that the offence is dealt with ineffectually by the existing policy and legal framework. Examinations of corruption scandals such as the capture of the state by private family corporations, to the collapse of South Africa’s Social Security Agency (SASSA), show that even when proven, corrupt politicians rarely face consequences for their actions. This is due to the lack of clarity in the primary legislation dealing with corruption – the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activity Act (PRECCA), combined with a multi-agency approach wherein the various bodies tasked with combatting corruption are not working cohesively. The solution to this problem is a single commission to integrate the anti-corruption framework, as well as providing a fresh perspective about how to deal with the crime. The CICIG has served this role in Guatemala, resulting in successful investigations and prosecutions of former Presidents, judges and members of the legislature. It has achieved this by supporting and working with the existing anti-corruption bodies, as well as advising government on effective policy reform. It is further staffed by anti-corruption experts who are from the Central and South American region, providing a level of trust and regional knowledge. There is no bar in South African law for the creation of a similar international body. Such a move is necessary to provide a fresh outlook on the fight against corruption in South Africa. An international body, staffed by African anti-corruption experts, would be an effective means to work with the multi-agency system currently in place to aid it in working cohesively, but also to provide African solutions to the scourge of corruption through policy reform.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
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