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# **DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

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MIGRANCY AND DEVELOPMENT:  
PRELUDE AND VARIATIONS ON A THEME  
M.G. Whisson, C.J. de Wet, C.W. Manona,  
P.A. McAllister, R.C.G. Palmer

Working Paper No. 11



**Rhodes University**

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	<u>Page</u>
I. Migrancy and Development	1
- Prelude	1
II. Largo: Some Conservative Xhosa	6
III. Ronde Capriccioso: A Ciskei Village with Betterment	14
- The Setting: Chatha Village	14
- Some Factors Influencing Development	14
- Migration and Agricultural Production	15
- Migration, Local Government and Decision Making	18
- Labour, Migration and Betterment	19
<u>Migrancy and Development:</u>	
IV. Allegro Ma Non Troppo: Household Land <u>Prelude and Variations on a Theme</u>	23
V. Fugue: An Italian Case Study	29
- Introduction	29
- Abbazia, an Emigrant Community in the Eastern Apennines	31
- Conclusion	37
VI. Finale	40
References	45

M.G. Whisson, C.J. de Wet, C.W. Manona  
P.A. McAllister, R.C.G. Palmer

Working Paper No. 11

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### MIGRANCY AND DEVELOPMENT

	<u>Page</u>
I. Migrancy and Development	1
- Prelude	1
II. Largo: Some Conservative Xhosa	6
III. Rondo Capriccioso: A Ciskei Village with Betterment	14
- The Setting: Chatha Village	14
- Some Factors Influencing Development	14
- Migration and Agricultural Production	15
- Migration, Local Government and Decision Making	18
- Labour, Migration and Betterment	19
IV. Allegro Ma Non Troppo: A Ciskei Village with Freehold Land	23
V. Fugue: An Italian Case Study	29
- Introduction	29
- Abbazzia, an Emigrant Community in the Emilian Appenines	31
- Conclusion	37
VI. Finale	40
References	45

Communities which have been characterized by migrancy for a long period of time, such as the Xhosa and the Italians considered in this paper, develop sets of terms which describe migrants. The Xhosa have varied criteria for their categories, e.g. amaJoyini - those on contract to mainly the mining and construction industries; abafaduga - those who deliberately sell up and go elsewhere; smago-duka - those who intend to return home; isfiki - impoverished migrants from white owned farms. Italians tend to view the crossing of international boundaries as the essence of migration and classify their migrants by the state in which they work e.g. Inglese, Americani, rather than by the more complex terminology of the Xhosa. Some terms are simply descriptions, others are categories with wider connotations, into which people place others and themselves. As far as possible we shall use the peoples' own categories, which define their relationships to "home", the region to which they migrate and to migrancy as a way of life, as these have important implications for what happens at home.

Together with those who remain at "home", the migrants form a non-territorial

## I. MIGRANCY AND DEVELOPMENT

### Prelude

Since both the terms in our title have been used very widely in different disciplines with and without moral value glosses, we begin by indicating what we mean by the terms which will be used in this paper.

A Migrant is a person who leaves his place of birth or family domicile to live and work in another place. He may stay for a season, a contract, his whole working life, or for ever. He may support a family or the community at "home" consistently, intermittently, or not at all. He may encourage family, other kin or friends to join him on a temporary or permanent basis. He may perceive himself as having left his former home for ever, or as having moral and material obligations - whether or not he actually returns home or discharges those obligations. When neither he, nor the people of his "home" community, consider him to be a person of that place, and when the community in which he lives perceive him as one of themselves, then the term migrant ceases to be applicable.

Communities which have been characterised by migrancy for a long period of time, such as the Xhosa and the Italians considered in this paper, develop sets of terms which describe migrants. The Xhosa have varied criteria for their categories, e.g. amajoyini - those on contract to mainly the mining and construction industries; abafuduga - those who deliberately sell up and go elsewhere; amagoduka - those who intend to return home; imfiki - impoverished migrants from white owned farms. Italians tend to view the crossing of international boundaries as the essence of migration and classify their migrants by the state in which they work e.g. Inglesi, Americani, rather than by the more complex terminology of the Xhosa. Some terms are simply descriptions, others are categories with wider connotations, into which people place others and themselves. As far as possible we shall use the peoples' own categories, which define their relationships to "home", the region to which they migrate and to migrancy as a way of life, as these have important implications for what happens at home.

Together with those who remain at "home", the migrants form a non-territorial

community, a network of people bound together by sentiments associated with their place of origin. Whether they have any intention of returning or contribute directly to "home" or not, as long as they and their fellows recognise their common place of origin as meaningful, they continue to be a potential social resource to the local group and area, and may be a major factor in its on-going life.

The concept Development presents more serious problems of definition, since it is not only used as a "hurrah" word (as in a statement heard at a conference, "they may not know what it means, but they certainly want it"), it is also used to reflect the moral convictions of the person using it. "Development" then means "change in the direction and manner which I think good", an evaluation which may be based on the views of the people experiencing the change. We endeavour to use the term unambiguously and in a way which distinguishes it from concepts with which it is often confused.

By change we mean an irreversible alteration in the pattern of relationships, both material and social, within a social group. No direction is implied. Thus the arrival of ships in Table Bay on a regular basis in the 16th century brought about a change in the trading economy, and hence the social organisation of the Khoi-speaking people who interacted with them. This statement does not imply that the Khoi were enriched by the exchanges, or that had the ships ceased coming the economy would have continued to diversify or grow - only that new knowledge and a new set of economic options were introduced to the people, which modified previous sets of relationships.

Change need not be progressive in the conventional sense. One goal of migrants may well be to obtain the resources needed to resist modernisation and to re-constitute what they perceive as the good old ways. Change occurs in the manner in which income is generated and even in its distribution, but the intentions of the actors involved are such that we speak of conservative change.

By evolution we mean a process of change according to identifiable rules, leading inevitably to a new and predictable social order. This definition implies a theory of change, a dynamic force and a direction. Herbert Spencer, writing of the nature of society, states:-

"Thus in all respects is fulfilled the formula of evolution. There is progress towards greater size, coherence, multiformity, and definiteness" (1898: 138).

Marx likewise identifies the process, the direction and the inevitable end:-

"In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the feudal and the modern bourgeois methods of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production. ...the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism" (1859: 143).

The concept is by no means passé, as Service asserts in his explanation of "General Evolution":-

"Progress is measured by some absolute criterion, such as complexity of structure or level of integration, and the forms are classified in broad overall stages" (1962: 5).

By modernisation we mean a process of change involving the introduction of new forms of technology and/or organisation to an area hitherto unaffected by them. It does not imply any increase in the gross product of the region concerned, and may even reduce the real income of the community. For example, the introduction of rifles, ammunition and whisky to the Eskimos, modernised their economies. Hunters could sell the pelts of furry animals to the store, and so pay for the rifles and ammunition necessary to increase the rate at which they obtained pelts. With the surplus income generated, they bought whisky. Thus the economy modernised, but neither grew nor acquired the capacity for growth. On the contrary, as the furry animals were slowly eliminated, the overall productivity of the modernised economy tended to fall.

By growth we mean an increase in the gross product of the area under scrutiny. The exploitation of oil or other mineral deposits will promote the growth of an economy, but when they are exhausted, the region may become derelict. Ghost towns in Australia and North America bear mute testimony to gold rush days, when economies blossomed overnight, grew and collapsed in a matter of years.

By development we mean a process which may conform to the models of evolutionists, will generally involve some modernisation and must involve a measure of growth. However, its distinctive characteristics are that the increase in the product of the community (region or state) shall take place in such a way that it has a tendency to continue growing. As a secondary characteristic one might add -- and be distributed so that all members of the community increase their real income. Whether development has taken place, as distinct from transitory growth, is obviously demonstrable only over time, but there are some reasonable indicators of development such as the extent to which an economy is dependent upon non-renewable resources, the rate of educational expansion and the rate of capital investment.

The above definitions and explanations indicate a problematical relationship between development and migrancy. We have defined a migrant as a person with a relationship to two economies or sub-economies, that of "home" and that of his place of work. If those two sub-systems are seen as a single whole, then the relationship between migrancy and growth essentially turns on whether the migrant process represents the optimum long term movement of factors of production to meet in the production process. If we see the sub-systems as being disconnected, other than through the mediation of the migrant himself, then we can concentrate attention on the home region as an independent entity and enquire how institutionalised migration contributes to the development of that region. If migrancy actually reduces the income available for consumption and investment in the "home" community or region, and reduces the capacity of the area to generate economic activity, then we speak of a process of under-development (as distinct from a state of under-development, which is an evaluation of the relationship between utilisable factors of production in the area).

With the foregoing in mind, we ask ourselves two initial questions. First, why do people with some commitment to their home migrate, rather than remain at home in order to assist in its survival or development? Second, how do those at home respond to the situation and range of choices created by the migrant process.

The areas selected for comparison are a conservative or "red" Xhosa parish in the Transkei; two areas in the Ciskei originally settled by Mfengu "loyalists" after the expulsion of the Xhosa in 1850, and a parish in Northern Italy.



## II. LARGO : SOME CONSERVATIVE XHOSA

P.A. McAllister

The apparent 'conservatism' of the Cape Nguni has been widely remarked upon in the anthropological literature of southern Africa. Hammond-Tooke (1975: 19) comments that some of the Cape Nguni chiefdoms, including the Xhosa, "have resisted change to a degree unprecedented in Bantu Africa". As is well known, Xhosa speakers have been divided for analytical purposes into two distinct sub-cultural groups - 'Red' and 'School' (Mayer 1961, 1980). Red people are associated with a stubborn conservatism, an adherence to tradition, and a resistance to 'Western' values and influences. School people are thought to be more 'progressive'; they are associated with an acceptance of certain aspects of Western culture (notably Christianity) and with a departure from traditional Xhosa values and customs.

This ideal-type dichotomy is, as Mayer (1980) indicates, becoming largely irrelevant in the present day. The old School sub-culture is merging with a newly developed middle category, secular in character and influenced primarily by urban black culture (ibid: 2). Red people, too, are thought to be dwindling in numbers.

"School people nearly everywhere in the Ciskei and Western Transkei have turned into 'just people' ...The surviving Red communities are now the odd man out. They still cling to their rejection of town standards, consumer goods, and total proletarianization..." (Ibid: 67)

No doubt the Red sub-culture is eventually bound to disappear in its present form, but for the moment it survives, and development is a question of immediate, not future, concern. In any case, any development strategy must take into account the possibility of cultural heterogeneity in the country or area in question, if it is to succeed.

My assumption, then, is that the problems and issues arising with the question of development have to be approached from the point of view of those who might be regarded as being out of step as well as that of their better drilled contemporaries. My purpose here is to look at what development means to Red Xhosa, bearing in mind that in terms of the definitions outlined in the

introduction to this paper, development is not incompatible with conservatism and resistance to modernization, as distinct from resistance to change.

My data for this section of the paper are drawn from Red Gcaleka residing in Shixini administrative area of Willowvale district, Transkei. The Gcaleka are the senior branch of the Xhosa proper, and they appear to be generally more conservative than the other major branch of the Xhosa, the Rharhabe, who are found mainly in the Ciskei. My understanding of the Red Gcaleka view of development is drawn from two key factors in their lives that make development and change possible - migrant labour and rural agricultural 'betterment' schemes. I shall deal with the former first.

Migrant labour is viewed by Red Gcaleka as a necessary evil. To go out to work is seen as going 'to battle' (emfazweni); being in town is spoken of as being 'at the place of the white man' (emlungwini). The urban workplace is regarded as dangerous - it is the place where accidents and misfortune may easily befall one, where one is vulnerable to attack by witches, and where one may lose one's true identity as a Xhosa and betray ubuqaba ('the Red way of life') through coming into contact with, and being influenced by, urban ways and values. The ultimate in moral degradation is to become an itshipha (absconder), implying a severance of ties with the country and a rejection of rural home, kin, community and the shades. The consequences of ukutshipha are perceived as loss of ancestral protection and failure in life. Going to town to earn money is but a means to an end, defined in unquestionably Red terms. (c.f. Mayer, 1961; McAllister, 1980)

The objective of labour migration is viewed as 'to build the homestead' (ukwakha umzi). This is, of course, a rationalization of the sheer economic necessity of obtaining wage employment, but the implications of the term 'to build the homestead' are fairly wide. Firstly, there is the economic aspect - the material 'building' of the homestead and things associated with it (livestock, garden, fields, etc.). Secondly, there is a social aspect, which hinges on the economic. A true homestead is a social entity, it is one that co-operates with neighbours and kin, that brews beer for the community, that provides food and shelter for visitors. The third aspect is religious and concerns the 'work' of the shades. Successful building of the homestead includes the performance the customary obligations and rituals for the shades, in order to ensure the blessings and protection of the shades for the homestead and its inhabitants.

Every Red Gcaleka man aspires to having his own homestead for this is a mark of independence, standing and social responsibility. Through establishing an umzi he is able to enter into a full and mutually satisfying relationship with his shades (since the umzi and its cattle byre are the chief places of worship), and he is able to fulfil his social responsibilities to the community, forming part of a network of co-operating neighbours and kinsmen, and living out a cardinal moral principle that a man's homestead 'is not his alone'.

The link between migrant labour and building the homestead is made explicit by Gcaleka elders in the course of the rituals associated with departure for and return from work (McAllister 1979, 1980). The most elaborate of these rituals is a beer drink called umsindleko at which the returned migrant is formally addressed by the elders and seniors of the community, and incorporated back into rural society after his wage-earning absence (see McAllister 1981). Here is an extract from one of the umsindleko speeches. The speaker is Dwetya, son of Tela, of the Bamba clan. He is addressing Dombothi, son of Poni, Ntshilibe clan.

"Here is something, Dombothi... You have returned from service (work), from the business of serving Poni's homestead; and with me (when I worked), I was building Tela's homestead. This has been the custom ever since I was born... Child of my grandmother! Dombothi! I say engrave these words in your mind... I wish you good health always. Go back again to work for Poni's homestead..."

This extract also makes explicit the link between migrant labour and the shades, and the religious sanctioning of the interpretation of migrant labour in terms of the rural umzi. Neither Tela nor Poni were still alive, and neither Dwetya nor Dombothi live in the homesteads or on the sites occupied by their late fathers. Nevertheless they are seen to be working for their fathers as well as for themselves in building their homesteads.

So to the Red Gcaleka the primary aim in going out to work is seen as being to 'build' the homestead. Ideally, from the Gcaleka point of view, 'build' in this context means growth or conservative change, as these terms have been defined. In practice, however, 'building' seldom means more than maintenance - providing the material necessities of life for the homestead and its inhabitants, directly through the purchase of food and other necessities, and indirectly

through investment in livestock and agriculture. The reasons for this are well known - low wages, over-populated areas, etc., and the ambiguous nature of migrant work, which both helps provide the necessities of life, yet leads to an absence of able-bodied male labour in the rural areas, and consequent undevelopment of agricultural potential (to mention but one aspect of a complex ambiguity). People go out to work because they are poor, and remain poor because they go out to work. Precious little remains after meeting subsistence needs to allow for growth.

Nevertheless, most Red Gcaleka are continually striving to 'develop' their rural assets - to add a few additional livestock to their herds, to build another hut to improve the homestead, to extend the garden, and so on. Some succeed in lessening their dependence on migratory wage earnings; most remain trapped in the vicious circle.

In the light of the above discussion the vigorous resistance of Red people in the Transkei and Ciskei to rural 'betterment' schemes (commonly referred to as itrasti) makes some sense. In theory betterment is designed to result in improved agricultural practices and increased production; whether it does have such results or not remains a matter for empirical investigation. Red people in Shixini and elsewhere have grave doubts about the claims of the proponents of betterment, and are explicitly (and sometimes violently) opposed to such schemes. Betterment involves dividing the area to be 'bettered' into three clearly demarcated and fenced sections - residential, arable and grazing. In many cases where such schemes have been instituted, the people have to leave their existing homesteads and establish new ones in the new residential area.

Certain parts of Shixini have not yet experienced the effects of itrasti, while others have had betterment for some years. People in the areas yet to come under the scheme view its coming with much trepidation. The point out that with itrasti, the new homestead sites, and particularly the gardens which adjoin the homesteads, are very small. They dislike the fact that homesteads in the residential section are so close to each other, in contrast to the traditional pattern of widely scattered homesteads. Above all, they are opposed to having to abandon their present homesteads and build new ones. Where betterment has yet to be instituted, the people have been given some indication of where they will have to live, where the new fields will be, and where they will have to graze their cattle. They are convinced that they

will be considerably worse off once betterment arrives, and they do not foresee any compensation for the trouble and the expense that they will have to endure.

The question of fields and gardens is particularly important. Statistics on yields indicate that gardens (in an area not yet subjected to the betterment scheme) are more important, in subsistence terms, than fields. These gardens are often as large as fields, but their soil is more fertile and the yields from them are better (McAllister 1979). Furthermore, it is common knowledge among the people of Shixini that the development of a new field or garden (not previously cultivated) not only entails considerable expense, but will bear fruit only after two or three seasons. This is possible due to the fact that the organic matter in a newly ploughed field takes time to be properly broken down, and because humus (provided in a previously cultivated field by the old maize stalks) is lacking. Turning to the question of grazing camps, this would seem to be an unacceptable intrusion into a man's right to decide where to find the best grazing for his cattle. Furthermore, betterment is associated, in the minds of the people, with the culling of livestock.

In the light of these factors, which affect the material building of the umzi, opposition to itrasti is understandable. But as I have pointed out above, building the homestead also involves social and religious aspects. Leaving one's old umzi for a new site means abandoning a place intimately associated with the shades. It also means leaving an established network of inter-homestead relationships, based largely on neighbourhood (see McAllister 1979) and involving, among other things, close co-operation in the economic sphere, and having to forge new relationships, or at least reassess and realign old ones, in the new residential area. If all people are neighbours, as the new residential pattern would imply, the principle of co-operation based on a territorially defined 'neighbourhood' (as under the scattered pattern) had to be reassessed. That there is reluctance to do so is indicated by the fact that where betterment has taken place, association between people in the new residential area (for example with regard to the groups which are allocated beer at umgidi) occurs with reference to the old territorial pattern, where such groups were associated largely with a common territory (Bigalke 1969; ch. 1).

So far as betterment is concerned it is clear that rather than involving growth and conservative change, it involves, at least in the first few years,

no growth, (in fact it may mitigate against growth), and a degree of modernization, in the sense that it introduces elements regarded as being not in accordance with tradition, and because it is associated with a wider controlling power (the South African or Transkeian state). This does not necessarily mean that Red Xhosa reject any growth or modernization. It should be clear from the discussion of building the homestead that growth involving conservative change is fundamental to the Red Gcaleka world view. And one can go further; modernization is tolerated to a certain extent, as long as it is compatible with Red Xhosa values. Thus education for children, for example, is highly valued among some Red people, who argue that education will secure better paid work and thus contribute to the building of the homestead. Wilson points out that the Xhosa "wanted both the goods of civilization and to maintain traditional custom" (1969: 271). Much of what is regarded as traditional today is of fairly recent origin - the plough, the ox-draught, the role of men in agriculture, the mud-brick hut, etc. Conservative Gcaleka accept that new circumstances require adaptation, and that a degree of modernization is acceptable even to the shades. Much change has been experienced over the generations, and it is clear that the appeal to tradition is selective.

How then do we account for this conservatism, for this stubborn and apparently irrational clinging to an outmoded way of life and value system? Why has migrant labour, the major source of contact with the outside world, and the major potential source of 'development' (in the absence of any development schemes other than betterment) come to be interpreted in terms of the values of a traditional rural society? Obviously such questions are not merely of general sociological interest; they have a direct bearing on the problems of development and, in terms of the scope of this paper, on the relationship between development and labour migration.

Some writers on the Nguni have associated conservatism with the ancestor cult, claiming that the cult acts as a conservative force. The shades are believed to be opposed to change, and angered by departure from custom or tradition (Mayer 1961; Hammond-Tooke 1962). This explanation amounts to no more than saying that people are conservative because they are conservative, while specifying one aspect of that conservatism (belief in the power of the shades) which is linked to its other aspects. Hunter suggests that people cling to a traditional lifestyle in a situation of rapid and radical change, in the face of disorder and the unknown (1936: xii-xiii). Tradition is stressed

"when a remnant is standing against the tide of change" (Wilson 1971:32).

Yet much change has taken place in many aspects of Gcaleka life, and the response seems to have been a continual adjustment and accommodation, where change was inevitable and perhaps acceptable, along with a continued adherence to the ancestor cult. Red Xhosa have been living with labour migration for well over a century and contact with western influences is by now well established enough for it to be 'known', and for it no longer to pose the threat of 'rapid and radical' change. In my opinion, opposition to change, the appeal to 'tradition' and conservatism are selective and amount, in the final analysis, to a political ideology, but of a passive rather than an active kind.

Mayer has suggested that Xhosa conservatism is perhaps best understood as a nationalism that rejects white domination and therefore Western culture and values. Red people view themselves as 'nationalist resisters' and see School people as 'collaborators'. Opposition to white ways symbolizes opposition to whites and an appreciation of 'tribal' ones (Mayer 1961: 31). However, the facts of Xhosa resistance do not bear this out. Conservative Xhosa-speakers appear to become politically involved only in issues which affect them directly, and which threaten aspects of their livelihood, as in the case of the Pondo revolt in 1960. The standard-bearers of the black resistance movement in South Africa appear to have been drawn primarily from the educated (urban) elite. Nevertheless, Mayer's suggestion merits closer scrutiny, and makes sense if we look at people such as conservative Gcaleka within the wider South African socio-political framework.

At this stage we need to look at the question of migrant labour a little more critically. Gcaleka are not simply involved in migrant labour; they are involved in a system of unaccompanied, oscillating, male labour migrancy. It is a system because it takes place within a well defined legal framework, which includes the 'pass laws', and laws governing the accommodation and employment of migrants while in the urban areas. It is unaccompanied because a migrant worker is legally prohibited from being accompanied by his spouse and children when he goes to work. It is oscillatory in character because it is governed by contracts (yearly, but with certain exceptions) renewable only from the rural (home) end. It is 'male' because the overwhelming majority of workseekers are male, although females, too, may become labour migrants. And it is labour migrancy because people migrate to other areas in order to exchange their labour for a wage, due to the lack of wage-earning opportunities at home.

In such a situation the question is not 'Does the migrant intend to return home, and if so, when?', but 'What is the migrant's attitude towards his workplace and home respectively?', or 'How does he rationalize his position as 'a man of two worlds'?'. Given the legal restrictions, the segregation of migrants in hostels or compounds when in the urban areas, and the general insecurity and impoverishment of life in the urban townships, it is hardly surprising that many migrant workers are unable to identify with the workplace and urban life and that they look to their rural homes and to the remnants of their traditional social structures for meaning and a sense of belonging. Red Gcaleka have to look to their rural homes for their ultimate security, and to the rural structure and ideology (i.e. to 'tradition') for meaning in life. One can only agree with Mafeje when he comes to the 'inescapable' conclusion that Red people, by their conservatism, have "saved themselves from self-alienation" (1975:178). A man's rural home and community provide him with the status and dignity not obtainable elsewhere, with full and satisfying human relationships unlike the uncertain and fragmented links in town or mine. The ancestor cult affords a sense of continuity, belonging and moral satisfaction. Red conservatism, then, is an ideology, a response to domination and subordination, though it is inward looking; it finds expression not in active resistance to the status quo, but in passive rejection of it and affirmation of another reality. But it is an ideology which persists because of the conditions regulating the participation of Xhosa migrants in the dominant economy.

#### Some Factors Influencing Development

### III. RONDO CAPRICCIOSO - A CISKEI VILLAGE WITH BETTERMENT

C.J. De Wet

#### The Setting: Chatha Village

Chatha is a rural village in the Keiskammahoek magisterial district of the Ciskei. It is about 16 km by dirt road from the town of Keiskammahoek where the magisterial offices are situated, as well as an hotel, 10 trading stores, a garage, a bank, a private doctor and a hospital. A daily bus service runs between Chatha and Keiskammahoek.

There are 415 occupied homesteads in Chatha, with an average of 7,5 people associated with each homestead (whether living there permanently or returning there from work or school elsewhere). This gives a total of 3 105 people. One-fifth of the members of the community are away, working as migrants.

In the mid-1960s an agricultural betterment scheme was implemented in the village which involved the people moving to concentrated residential settlements within the village, in order to divide the village area into arable allotments, grazing camps and residential areas. An irrigation scheme was introduced which has given 24 households (5,8% of the total) access to level, irrigated arable land, and to the services of an agricultural extension officer. Of the remaining 391 households (the drylanders), 59% have access to arable allotments averaging half-a-morgen in size.

The households of Chatha, including the drylanders with access to arable land, are heavily dependent upon money received from migrant remittances and old age pension grants.

#### Some Factors Influencing Development

The influence of labour migration on the capacity for development of a rural Ciskei village such as Chatha is perhaps best seen in conjunction with other factors, such as alternative sources of income and the presence and effectiveness of infrastructure and of governmental services, such as agricultural extension, school, health and transport services.

Income is derived mainly from migrant remittances, pensions, local employment (which derives largely from involvement in the state sector, e.g. administration, teaching, maintenance work) and the 'business sector'. The less developed the local infrastructure and government services, the more dependent people will be on migrant remittances for income, and the more money they will have to spend on obtaining goods and services.

Infrastructure is limited in Chatha, which has a primary school, a clinic, two shops, a liquor store, a shed-cum-office for the agricultural officer, a house and outbuildings for the forester, and several church buildings. Local government consists of a salaried headman, who is assisted by a committee.

The 'business sector' is likewise limited, consisting of a few housebuilders, three men who hire out tractors, a few diviners and those people who sell local medicines or firewood. There is no market in the village.

Half (50%) of dryland homesteads receive income from old age or disability pensions, which in 1981 amounted to R33 per month. A limited sample (20%) of dryland homesteads shows the following income distribution for 1981.

Average monthly household income	=	R62,50
Percentage derived from remittances	=	46%
Percentage derived from pension grants	=	34%
Percentage derived from employment obtained from Chatha and from 'business sector' activities	=	20%

The community is thus unable to generate an income for itself and is almost totally dependent on money coming in from outside, particularly migrant remittances from absent economically active members who might otherwise promote development within the village.

#### Migration and Agricultural Production

Sixty per cent of dryland households have access to arable allotments averaging half-a-morgen each. During the 1980/81 season just less than half of these allotments were cultivated. Major factors constraining people's ability to plough were: lack of labour; lack of cattle; lack of tractors; lack of capital equipment, such as fences and planters; and lack of money and organization to gain access to these necessities.

Lack of labour is directly related to migration. Against this one may argue that the women and the children of the homestead should be able to cultivate. However, the availability of their labour is often sporadic, as women are involved in time-consuming household tasks, such as fetching water and firewood, and cooking, while teenage children are available only in the late afternoon and during weekends.

Weekends are often taken up with social and ceremonial activity or with sports competitions with neighbouring villages. The availability of money to hire a tractor or labour may therefore make a critical difference in one's ability to cultivate. Very few women actually do the ploughing, and if this has been done by the tractor, then the sporadic labour of women and children may suffice for hoeing. Assuming that the money for hiring a tractor is available, the ability to cultivate still depends on the availability of tractors. The three tractors owned by villagers are not always functioning and cannot meet the demand. Tractors may be hired from the Department of Agriculture of the Ciskei Government. However, it is often difficult to obtain these, as they are in demand and the local office of that department is not always accessible or prompt in acting. The farmers on the irrigation scheme were also largely unable to cultivate this winter because they could not obtain tractors from the Department of Agriculture.

Where tractors or the finance for tractors are not available, people attempt to plough with cattle. Here labour is again required and households with access to cattle are sometimes unable to cultivate because of lack of labour or lack of money to hire labour. The lack of labour is thus exacerbated by lack of income and lack of available tractors - factors which may otherwise have mitigated the effects of a labour shortage in the fields.

Lack of Cattle. Households without sufficient draught oxen may obtain them by hiring or by pooling their own with those of another household in a 'company', whereby both households pool their resources of cattle and labour to plough both fields. The ability to hire cattle or to form a company may be constrained by the fact that the necessary male labour may be absent, and that remittances are often low and sporadic which make it difficult to plan to hire cattle.

Lack of Capital Equipment. People cite lack of equipment, notably fences, as a reason for their not cultivating land. Their fences are broken, and so

cattle enter their fields and destroy their crops. Repairing fences requires finance as well as labour - both factors constrained by the migratory process.

Problems within the local agricultural extension service have also kept people from cultivating. Recently a dam has been built downstream from the village. This involved the construction of a new high-level road which cut through the fence between the adjacent village's grazing camp and a large tract of Chatha's arable land. As a result the adjacent village's cattle now enter the fields which have not been cultivated for three years. The headman has appealed to the local offices of the Department of Agriculture, who say that they have been able to obtain poles, but not fencing wire. Several other fences dividing arable lands from roads and grazing camps within the village are also in need of repair.

Inaccessibility of seed, fertilizer and insecticide also affect a household's ability to cultivate. Seed is often bought at shops in Keiskammahok or elsewhere. The local agricultural officer has made attempts to establish a primary agricultural co-operative in the village. She has however been unable to elicit a response from the central agricultural co-operative for over a year. People cannot obtain seed, fertilizer, insecticide and fencing equipment at government prices, and therefore sometimes cannot afford seed. They rarely use fertilizer or insecticide.

Lack of Agricultural Extension Services. The agricultural extension officer is only intended to assist the 24 households on the irrigation scheme. Up to the beginning of 1981, the 391 dryland households have had no official to help them with their fields and gardens. From the beginning of 1981, the dryland households have been allocated an agricultural officer, whom they share with the adjacent village. Up till now, agricultural extension in the village has been handicapped by the fact that there has been a fairly high turnover of agricultural officers on the irrigation scheme (3 officers in less than 3 years). This means that there is a lack of continuity in agricultural extension policy and practice and that the necessary contacts with officialdom and trust and contact with the farmers have not been built up.

Lack of Money. It must be emphasized that, because of the small size of holdings, the cost of cultivation is relatively high. Lack of money directly affects one's ability to gain access to means of ploughing, labour, and capital equipment.

Whereas migrant labour creates problems by making for a shortage of labour, it should in theory compensate by providing the necessary finances to obtain tractors for ploughing and to obtain and maintain equipment. In fact migrant remittances do not provide a sufficiently large or sufficiently regular or predictable income to enable many households to plan and to cultivate. Remittances are used to meet more immediate needs first, and risk on cultivation second, only if they are sufficiently high.

The absence of labour and of sufficient income is aggravated by inadequate agricultural extension services which might otherwise have alleviated these problems, enabled more households to cultivate more effectively, and thus increase the domestic community product. Agriculture is not able to contribute to the development of the village as its product is too low to be anything but a supplementary source of food. In the absence of any market links outside the village, agriculture is not seen as a source of income. Only households on the irrigation scheme sell their produce, and then within the village. However, even those houses retain a dependency on migrant remittances. Without means or incentives, agricultural production remains low.

#### Migration, Local Government and Decision-Making

Village business is conducted through public meetings which all adult members of the village may attend and at which both men and women may speak. These meetings are presided over by the village headman and his committee, all of whom are male. Village decisions are in effect taken by the men.

Labour migration means that most of the able-bodied men are away at work. Accordingly the men who are continuously at home, and who make village decisions and serve on the headman's committee are old-age pensioners.

While working men come home at various times of the year and attend meetings, their effective participation is limited as they are generally home for only short periods. Power gravitates towards the older men who become accepted as village spokesmen by virtue of their permanence. Effective village decision-making is thereby hampered. The headman must commit the village to decisions in the absence of many male household heads who are away. These men then come home to find that their households have been committed to e.g. R15 to contribute towards new school buildings, or to moving house or to moving their field because

of the construction of the nearby dam. They feel that they have not been consulted and express anger.

All this undermines the authority of the headman, who is in any event a salaried government employee, whose decisions are ultimately subjected to the magistrate's approval. This further undermines his authority. The headman of Chatha was particularly caught between his people and officialdom during the betterment scheme, and was seen as serving the government's interests. During that time his houses burned down. The headman's lack of any real power is aggravated by the fact that absent migrants tend to hold him responsible for decisions which he is often powerless to stop.

In the absence of many male heads of houses, their wives make the decisions affecting the household. While these women may speak at village meetings, men predominate and take the decisions. This means that many of the de facto heads of households who take household decisions are not the decision makers at village level, and that there is not always congruence and continuity between these two levels of decision-making.

The fact that many wives are effectively heads of their households also makes for tensions between married couples. A husband coming home on holiday may find that his wife has taken decisions with which he may disagree, or in which he feels he has not been consulted. For the month or so that he is at home, a man believes that he is in charge, but for the rest of the year the situation is not so clear.

Migratory labour thus makes for divided authority at both village and household levels. Particularly at the village level, this affects the ability of a village to plan and organize any developments it may feel are desirable. These problems are further aggravated by lack of infra-structure and of effective governmental services.

#### Labour Migration and Betterment

The agricultural betterment scheme implemented in the mid-1960s was intended to create a 'stable rural peasantry' by making it possible for a number of families to make a living by agriculture, thereby freeing them from the need to migrate to cities in search of work (Report on the Rehabilitation and Settlement

of Gxulu, Emnyameni and Chatha Locations, p. 16).

The betterment report found that only 193 of the 495 morgen under cultivation in 1958 were suitable for use as arable land, as the rest was eroded or on steep slopes. Today, after betterment, 193 morgen are available for cultivation (this includes the arable land taken up by the irrigation scheme). Before betterment, the average arable allotment was 1,7 morgen per family with land rights. Today the average allotment per dryland family with land rights is 0,5 morgen.

In real terms the betterment scheme has drastically reduced the amount of land available for cultivation (however poor it may previously have been). By implication this has rendered households even more dependent on migrant labour than they may have been before.

By contrast, the 5,8 per cent of the households on the irrigation scheme have gained by betterment. They have access to 1,5 morgen of level, irrigated land, as well as the services of an on-site agricultural officer and (fairly) regular access to tractors. However, they have not succeeded in breaking into the King William's Town market. A previous agricultural officer argued that this was because their crops were not up to standard, while the irrigation farmers argued that it was because the agricultural officer had not been able to organize transport to take their crops to market. At present all the irrigation farmers sell their produce within the village, and it may be argued that their income is thus derived from the migrant remittances of other households.

It is a sad irony that not even the irrigation farmers have become independent of the need to migrate. Members of their households migrate to cities, and households without migrants have difficulty in raising the money to cultivate their land.

An area in which the betterment scheme could have made a real contribution to lessening households' dependency on migrancy is stock-farming. The fencing off and controlling of grazing camps which has followed has probably rehabilitated the grass. The amount of grazing land available per cattle unit has also increased. The quality of stock has therefore probably improved. The possibility of households obtaining substantial income from sale of stock, particularly

cattle, has accordingly increased.

However, for a variety of reasons, the sale of stock in the Ciskei is very low. Stock sold to butchers, abattoirs and at auctions in the Keiskammahoe district in 1975-76 averaged about 8 cattle units per village (Annual Report, Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 1975-76). This would amount to 0,6% of Chatha's stock holding.

The betterment scheme has thus failed to help create a source of cash income for the village through agriculture. It has not been able to decrease dependency on migration, and by removing considerable areas of arable land, betterment may unwittingly have increased that dependency.

The fact that considerable numbers of men were migrating at the time of betterment caused hardships in its implementation.

Women were evidently not present at all the meetings at which betterment was discussed. Every household did not have an equally clear understanding of what the betterment scheme involved, as their decision-makers were either women or men away at work. When the time came for people to move to the new residential areas, women had to make the decision as to where and when to move, but without adequate information and without the consent of their husbands. When these male household heads came home, the move was either in process, or completed, and the perception was formed that the betterment scheme had been forced upon the village. This feeling is still very strongly and resentfully held today by many people in the village.

This perception of betterment by force has had very negative results with regard to people's attitudes to the morality and activities of government officials. People have reacted negatively to the lessons and possibilities of betterment. Part of the reason for this unfortunate perception was the absence of household heads whose comprehension and co-operation was required to make betterment a success.

The importance people attach to labour migration is reflected in the reaction to the betterment scheme. When sites on the irrigation scheme were made available to any household that wished to join it, people were reluctant to do so. It took several years before the last few sites were occupied. One of the reasons

given for not joining was that people who had a stable job in town, with a predictable income, were not prepared to lose it in return for an unproven venture. Perception of agriculture as an uncertain, low cash-return investment militated against taking the risks which were necessary to reap the possible benefits of the irrigation scheme.

The reasons for these negative perceptions of agriculture and of betterment generally are partly the result of the vacuum of labour, finance, co-ordinated decision-making, and effective local government, which are brought about, inter alia by migrant labour. It is the combination of these factors that has retarded development in Chatha.

IV. ALLEGRO MA NON TROPPO: A CISKEI VILLAGE WITH FREEHOLD LAND

C.W. Manona

Before attempting to discuss the relationship between migrancy and development a few comments on the background of Burnshill are necessary. Fifty four per cent of the families living here are descendants of people who came under missionary influence during the first half of the last century. After the 1850/53 war between the Xhosa and the British, chief Sandile was expelled from the Keiskammahoek district (in which Burnshill is situated) and in accordance with the government policy of the time provision was made for the settlement of this territory by colonists and 'loyal' Africans. As a result some of the best land was taken up by people of German descent while the bulk of the rest was granted to groups of Mfengu people who had assisted the British against the Xhosa.

When the Xhosa had left the area, the immigrants (together with a few Xhosa who returned) were quickly drawn into the colonial order, largely through the efforts of the Rev. James Laing of the Free Church of Scotland who served the community from 1830 to 1872. He was so successful that towards the end of the century the residents were producing a large variety of crops for the market, had orchards and an irrigation scheme. Some had training in trades like blacksmithing and building. This mission-educational work was continued by other white missionaries who served the community until 1931.

After settling in Burnshill some families became wealthy in land through the purchase of small holdings under freehold tenure. Between 1868 and 1869, through the insistence of Rev. Laing, surveyed building sites and fields were granted under quitrent tenure. Under mission influence the residents adapted to the new conditions by taking advantage of the wider market economy of the time. The period of their prosperity, however, was short. Primarily on account of opposition from white agricultural interests and limitations on further acquisition of land peasant farming declined. Although a few families were still producing surplus agricultural products for the local market in the 1930s, the majority of the people had long been dependent on wage earning.

The shift from self-sufficient peasant farming to dependence on wage employment fostered an acute awareness of the value of education and, while earlier

generations rarely went beyond primary school, many of their descendants went much further. Increasing commitment to education prepared children for life outside the village and made emigration easier. Though rural retirement is unavoidable for many of the people, some abandoned the village long ago and settled permanently in the towns. The main reason why they were able to do so was that schooling gave them better chances of competing for jobs in the cities and many were able to stay long enough in a particular city to qualify for accommodation for their families. Others can afford to be 'long-term migrants', visiting their homes very infrequently since they can return to their quitrent or freehold land when they retire.

The second category of people who live in Burnshill (46% of the village population) immigrated after 1945, having lived as landless people on the farms. The immigration was made possible by the introduction of the S.A. Trust tenure in 1936 which was implemented in 1945. They include the majority of the landless people whose educational level is generally lower than that of the old residents. Many of them are contract workers employed on the mines and other enterprises which recruit workers locally. Contract work limits their mobility, hence they tend to be 'short-term migrants' who continually move between their homes and towns. Few of them have managed to emigrate entirely from the village.

So far very little has been done by the state to develop Burnshill. The rehabilitation measures undertaken by the administration since the early 1940s had limited objectives and were concerned mainly with the resettlement of the people in clearly demarcated residential areas, creation and fencing of separate areas for grazing and cultivation, control of stock numbers and the introduction of contour banks in the fields. The measures were thus aimed at soil conservation and control and not at increasing production per se. Further, due to lack of funds and shortage of personnel, the scheme only touched the fringe of the problem. The bad condition of the fence around the fields indicates that no large sustained capital investment has yet been available for this scheme. Also, the advent of limited self-government in the Ciskei since 1968 has not altered the infrastructure much apart from the establishment of a health clinic and a hall which is used by the local authority.

It is also necessary to assess the role played here by the Fort Cox agricultural college which is situated next to the village. The college was established during the early 1930s and trains agricultural extension officers who work

in various parts of the Ciskei. Although it has several agricultural projects, its activities are confined within its boundaries and its expertise and resources are not freely available to the people nearby. Since its establishment it has remained rather exclusive and has not contributed much to the general improvement of farming methods among the people who live in the neighbouring villages.

Although people are attracted by the higher rates of pay in the cities, they do take jobs locally when opportunities arise. The largest employer in the vicinity of Burnshill is the agricultural college. In 1977 a construction company began erecting a water purification plant here and provided some of the people with jobs. The chances of finding employment locally, however, are limited. With respect to the sample homesteads, of the 72 adult males who were at home only 12 were employed locally. Eight were labourers at Fort Cox, three were school teachers within the district and one was a labourer in the Keiskammahoek village. Local jobs for women are even more limited. In our sample of 144 adult women living in the village only six were employed (five as domestic workers at Fort Cox and one by the Ciskei Forestry Department).

During the past three decades the agricultural productivity of the community has declined significantly. The large-scale immigration referred to above, together with the natural increase of the population, increased the pressure of population on limited land and at present 58% of the families have neither fields nor grazing rights. Among the families that cultivate the yields are very small; e.g. for the 1949-50 summer season the 42 families that sowed maize here obtained an average yield of 8,5 bags per family (Houghton and Walton 1952: 162). A comparable figure for 1975-76 was less than three bags per family. Similarly, the number of families without cattle has increased during this period.

Compared to a few decades ago there are now more inhibitions on people using the available land productively. Many families simply do not have strong adults to work the fields. Migration not only starts at an early age (at about 17 years for boys and about 18 years for girls) but also necessitates long periods of absence from home. Most workers visit their homes for only a few weeks each year and continue working till very late in their lives. This situation is different from that obtaining in regions where seasonal migration is common and migrants leave for work abroad when agriculture does not require their presence. In Burnshill migration contributes significantly to the fall in

land utilization in that most men settle permanently at home only when they are too old to undertake farming effectively. Cultivation and the rearing of stock is not an easy task for the women who live at home permanently: the work can only be done in conjunction with other duties relating to the management of the household. Very little can be contributed by the children who almost invariably attend school and leave for work thereafter. This largely accounts for the fact that many land-owning families cultivate only small portions of their fields and large amounts of arable land lie fallow for several years. Others have given up agriculture altogether. This negates one goal of the migrant labour system which is that the women who must remain at home while their husbands go out to work are fully occupied with subsistence agriculture and domestic tasks in their rural homes. In so far as women themselves migrate they no longer guarantee a dependable domestic base which is necessary for viable economic activities. Long-term planning in farming is not easy in a situation where the bulk of the adult population is constantly on the move.

The extent to which the homes benefit from the wages earned in town further accounts for the problems of development encountered in Burnshill. Generally, migrants spend a large share of their earnings in town and only a small proportion is sent or brought home. Besides, few homes can rely on the receipt of regular and fixed remittances. At the same time, scarcity of labour and cattle necessitates the expenditure of large sums of money on the hiring of tractors. Due to increased needs for money very little can be invested in the improvement of agriculture, e.g. through the purchase of implements and better quality stock. Apart from this, migrancy reduces peoples' dedication to land in that many migrants return with little interest to engage in agriculture. While at home many of them do little work and regard their home visits as time for rest from work. In this situation land has lost much of its economic value and continues to be important primarily for the social security it affords.

The shrinking productive capacity of land in the community has increased peoples' commitment to education. In 1949 about a third of the parents in the Keiskammahoeck district did not send their children to school (Wilson 1952: 144). At present virtually all children attend school for at least a few years. The expansion of the educational system during the past few decades made this development possible. Largely through the co-operation of the residents who contribute 50% of the expenses towards the erection of new school buildings, a secondary school was established in 1950 and up-graded to a high school in 1979. Recently

school enrolment has risen significantly. The present high school had 117 pupils in 1952 and 521 in March 1980. Also, in one of the primary schools there were 78 pupils enrolled in 1955, 140 in 1975 and 221 in 1980. The number of teachers and classrooms has also increased in recent years. In 1955 one of the primary schools had two teachers and no officially approved classrooms (small rondavels were used as school buildings). In 1980 it had five teachers and three officially approved classrooms. The present high school had two classrooms when it was established in 1950 and these had increased to 11 by 1980. There were three teachers in the school in 1952 and 14 in 1980.

As education is now considered as the most important investment, many families have to meet high educational expenses especially in the homes where children remain at school for many years. The difficulty in making ends meet is further complicated by consumer orientation and the rising expectations in the quality and style of living. The traditional thatched rondavels are increasingly giving way to the more expensive iron-roofed houses and people make great sacrifices to acquire factory-made furniture. Clothing needs to include church attire and school uniforms as well as working clothes. Likewise, the decline in the production of staple items like maize, milk, pumpkins and melons stimulates increasing use of packaged foods which the stores offer. As virtually all the men and most of the women have been out to work and are conversant with present developments in the urban areas the general acceptance of this new mode of living is not surprising. Moreover, in this respect education plays an important role in that it increases peoples' desire for new goods faster than it provides them with the commercial skills to obtain them. It is in this context that the moral value on sharing is declining and increasing individualism emerging.

At present there are only three shops in the village and few entrepreneurs have succeeded in establishing business undertakings here. One of the shops was taken from a well-established white trader in 1969 and, because the people concerned apparently did not have sufficient capital or experience in the venture, the business changed hands several times thereafter. All the shops carry a limited range of goods and are more expensive than those in Keiskammahok, Alice and King William's Town. As a result the residents do most of their purchases outside the village. The low level of entrepreneurship in this sphere is indicative of problems relating to the acquisition of loans and licences.

In conclusion, we need to note that even though the process of modernization started here over a century ago, the prospects of making a living in Burnshill dwindled as land became more scarce and funds for the adequate rehabilitation of this area were not forthcoming. These adverse conditions have forced many of the better educated people to emigrate and thereby the community is selectively creamed of its initiative. In this situation migrancy is undoubtedly a major hindrance to development in that it does not only lead to a fall in land utilization but also to new needs and aspirations. To meet these new needs the men and some of the women have to continue working till late in their lives. Besides, few migrants can afford to invest their earnings in any rural economic activity since the bulk of their remittances have to be spent on consumer goods.

## V. FUGUE: AN ITALIAN CASE-STUDY

R.C.G. Palmer

### Introduction

This final contribution to our comparative analysis of migration and (under) development in rural situations represents a considerable ethnographic leap. Nine thousand kilometres separate the Transkei/Ciskei and Italy; along every parameter that societies may be compared, Xhosa and Italians have very little in common so why treat the two nations in the same paper?

It is a good question, but there are also good answers. [ Xhosa and Italians may differ radically in terms of language, social organization, religion, cuisine and the levels of complexity or scale of their societies, yet there are experiences the two nations have shared. Industrialization and modernization for most Italians as for most Transkeians, are comparatively recent experiences. Until the post-war period, Italy was largely an agrarian society; to a large extent it still is. Furthermore, much of the Italian countryside is too barren or too mountainous to have appealed to large landowners and capitalist farming entrepreneurs: in South Italy, in the Alps, and all along the Apennine backbone of the peninsula peasants have farmed small holdings they either owned or share-cropped, using family labour and a technology unchanged in centuries. They have exploited an environment not dissimilar to parts of Transkei/Ciskei in a manner any rural Xhosa would find familiar.

Nor would the citizen of Transkei/Ciskei find the history of Italy entirely strange. Ever since the time of the ancient Greeks the peninsula had been subjected to waves of invaders, their regimes becoming ever more onerous and exploitative from the peasants' point of view. Even when unification of the nation was achieved after 1861, the people of South Italy (including Sicily) experienced little relief from their secular underdevelopment: the peasants on the periphery received little assurance that the developing centre had their best interests at heart. During the Fascist Period (1922-43) the dissonance between centre and periphery, urban and rural, the political establishment and the proletariat, the rich and the poor, was at its most acute. Since then, 30 years of political domination by a single conservative party, the Christian Democrats, has tended to prevent the full realization of Italy's participation

in the international economic upswing of the fifties and sixties. Yet this did not prevent the whole of Italian society from being subjected to the most profound cultural upheavals it had ever faced. [In short, despite the physical and socio-cultural distance between Italians and Xhosa, both have experienced rural poverty, tyranny and bewildering, largely external, forces of change.]

For rural Italians, as for rural Xhosa, a long experience of external domination and local underdevelopment has been associated with emigration. Since 1876, 25 800 000 Italians, mainly from the rural areas, mainly from the South, have emigrated to other countries; in addition, the Italian industrial revolution has caused 10 000 000 Italians to move within their country, mainly from the impoverished South to the industrial cities of the North (Favero and Tassello 1978; Nichols 1973). While millions of rural Italians have settled permanently abroad, or in the Italian cities, a large proportion of the emigrants, (in the early stages of each new stream a majority) has returned to the natal village after a few months, a few years, a working life. Length of sojourn was entirely up to the individual migrant in most cases. Even when the New World countries which received so many Italian migrants restricted immigration from Italy, they did not dictate to Italians who had already immigrated and the relatively few who entered subsequently how long they should stay. In the years since the second world war, however, Germany and Switzerland took gastarbeiters on short-contract only and practiced a form of international influx control the Xhosa would find only too familiar.

[Although Italians and Xhosa share the dubious distinction of being among the great migrating nations of history, the Italian proclivity to migrate both internationally and internally, facing significantly fewer restrictions than the black migrant in Southern Africa, made the two nations' experience of migration and its consequences quite significantly different. This difference is reflected in the differential socio-economic position and prospects of the two sets of migrants in the opportunity structures of the centres of destination, and in development consequences for the sending communities.]

[Mass migration has brought rural depopulation and underdevelopment in its wake in many regions of Italy, most notably in the South, but in general the compensatory remittances have been at a higher level than among Xhosa migrants, and forced, mass resettlement is unknown in rural Italy.]

Having demonstrated that there is some relevance in cross-cultural comparison between Xhosa and Italians, especially among rural cultivators who have become involved in migration, the case-study that will occupy us for the remainder of this section can now be presented.

### Abbazia, an emigrant community in the Emilian Apennines

[It is conventional to compare the shape of the Italian peninsula with that of a boot, a thigh-boot. In a great arc from the 'knee' to the back of the 'thigh', the Apennines and Alps accommodate thousands of mountain comuni, or communes, for which emigration has long been a way of life, the essential supplement to small-scale farming on poor soil at altitudes where the growing season is short and the winters severe.] Abbazia is the name I have given a parish in one such mountain commune where I undertook fieldwork in 1973 (see also Palmer 1977, 1981).

[Abbazia is a constellation of small hamlets extending over 20 square kilometres of hillside, at the head of the Val Trevi, Piacenza.] One of the 22 hamlets or farm-houses is slightly larger than the others, and contains the church, a shop, a bar-pensione and a bar-shop. Rough dirt roads link the hamlets, only the section of road through the principal hamlet being tarred. Some of the old stone buildings have fallen into ruins; but some of the houses are quite new. The ruins belong to the families which moved away and never returned; the new houses, equally deserted, at least for ten months of the year, belong to the relatively few emigrants who have built new villas for holidays and eventual retirement.

[The parish records of Abbazia reveal what can be regarded as an optimum local population level of roughly 650, remaining constant over the centuries, until the infant mortality rate began to drop in the last century. Being poor and uneducated, the Abbazzini did not have the option of bringing technology to bear on the problem of their rising population, and they had already put as much land as they could under the hoe and the plough. They strived to stem the fragmentation of holdings through cousin marriage and a curious local custom which forbade marriage for all but one or two siblings in the family (thereby creating a de facto primogeniture in a culture where partible inheritance is the rule, and inheritance took place at marriage). (But in the end the most feasible solution was to develop the practice of seasonal migration, which

had taken Abbazzini men into neighbouring countries, on foot, in search of employment, customers for their crafts, audiences for the impromptu recitals on the pipes and their dancing bears, and other cash-generating activities during the fallow winter months. From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, some Abbazzini tended to remain beyond their valley the whole year round, sometimes for years on end, and if conditions permitted, they returned to marry, or to collect their wives and children and established themselves permanently abroad. When the recruitment of Italian labour by the Americans began in earnest, the Abbazzini were among those millions who responded. The men worked as agricultural labourers; a proportion settled in Massachusetts with their families, founding a chain which continued to draw Abbazzini to the Boston area, where there are currently about 40 families.]

But of all the venues selected by Abbazzini migrants, London has proved the most enduringly popular. I traced 184 families (about 650 individuals) from Abbazzia in that city during 1973-74. Beginning, as before, with male pioneers attracted by opportunities in the British catering industry and other service sector activities in the second half of the last century, the Abbazzini continued to chain-migrate to London in modest fashion until, after the war, the numbers of migrants bound for London, of both sexes, increased suddenly and rapidly, drawing off almost a whole generation of Abbazzini in the twenty years between 1945 and 1965.

The existence of recruitment schemes in the immediate post-war period in Britain, notably the notorious European Voluntary Workers schemes, was an important factor in the choice-making of the Abbazzini. After 1945, for this parish at the centre of the partisan wars, with a local economy which had always been at best precarious, it was never a question of whether to emigrate, so much as where to go. The European Voluntary Workers scheme was one attraction in Britain; the existence of earlier generations of Abbazzini who had found security, in some cases prosperity, in London's catering niche, was another. From the point of view of the Abbazzini in London who had businesses of their own (cafes, restaurants, ice firms, terrazzo contractors, etc.) the new preparedness of their kin and paesani (co-villagers) to emigrate coincided happily with the post-war economic upswing in Britain, yielding partners and employees. The result was a burgeoning diaspora community of Abbazzini in London, which grew to two and a half times the residual populace in the parish and came to dominate from afar the affairs of the non-territorial community.

By 1973, then, the parish of origin, Abbazzia, was nothing more than the drastically diminished base of a large rural-based network. In terms of numbers, economic power and general influence (political power, broadly conceived) the London Abbazzini were pre-eminent. Next most important, at a fifth of the size of the London community, was the Boston network. A long way after, among the international emigrants, came the networks or communities in Montreal and Paris, and the one or two families in Argentina, Australia, Kenya and Switzerland. The situation was far from static. Following the Italian 'economic miracle' of the late 1950s and early 1960s, economic alternatives had mushroomed locally, notably in the Po valley, only a couple of hours by road from Abbazzia. After 1965 any increase in Abbazzia's dispora tended to be through sexual reproduction rather than new emigration: increasingly, the new generation of Abbazzini was either migrating to the industrial areas, or commuting from the parish. But, either way, Abbazzia was being progressively denuded of its active population of both sexes, and had been for some decades. This process of depopulation was of itself a 'push factor', since a parish with a quarter of its population over 65, and no household head under 40 is not an attractive environment for young adults, precisely those who are most prone to emigrate for other reasons as well. Since there was no sign of the process decelerating - on the contrary - it was possible to foresee, within a decade or two, the virtual extinction of the parish as a social entity, unless the emigrants resettled in the parish.

Although There had always been return migration. To begin with, as has been noted, Abbazzini only stayed away for the winter season. Even the shift of emphasis to venues farther afield, in America and Britain, and the emigration of couples and families, other than single men, did not preclude return. I encountered old 'Americani' in Abbazzia, and equally superannuated 'Ingesi', both sets having repatriated themselves as soon as they had saved sufficient to support themselves on the land for the rest of their lives. Had this tendency increased in the post-war period, when so many more Abbazzini emigrated, the parish might have enjoyed considerable development, especially as, coincidentally, Abbazzia abuts into the province's premier public park, and itself enjoys an attractive setting and summer climate, making it ideal for conversion into a resort. But in fact, as the rate of emigration from Abbazzia in all directions mounted, so proportionately fewer Abbazzini returned to the parish even for purposes of retirement. The long-discussed resort development never materialized. I might never have gained any insights into the apparent paradox, but for a period of participant-observation in Abbazzia during high summer, when the

emigrants returned in droves to spend their summer holidays in their birth-place.)

#### A Development Opportunity Missed: The Human Factor

The insights of that summer in Abbazzia are discussed in detail elsewhere (Palmer 1980). But it is worth reiterating my findings in this context because they offer a good illustration not only of the relationship between migration and development in a single instance, but also of the extent to which macro-determinants can prove inadequate for the explication of human behaviour in the kinds of communities anthropologists generally study.

(Reconstructing the history of emigration from Abbazzia, it appears that emigrants returned and resettled in the parish (a) when their emigration tended to involve only single males sojourning seasonally or temporarily at not too far a remove from Abbazzia, (b) when international migrants were relatively few, and did not form very large or stable communities in the diaspora, and (c) when they enjoyed high status and had many dependents in the parish. All this changed when the rate of emigration increased and involved families instead of single males. The communities in the diaspora became more stable, more autonomous, more fulfilling; property and foreign-born, foreign-socialized children also conspired to make the 'myth of return' less likely of fulfilment. Abbazzini always had a perhaps exceptionally strong attachment to the parish, because for them it has long been the focus of what must be described as a cult. For eight centuries, until the fifteenth century, Abbazzia was the site of a powerful Benedictine Abbey and ever since the decline of Italian monasticism, the Abbazzini, emigrant and non-emigrant together, have endeavoured to maintain and expand the ecclesiastical buildings of the parish. This task, in which the permanent residents have contributed their labour, and the emigrants have supplied the funds, has been a powerful centripetal agent in an otherwise centrifugal community. Every emigrant hopes to be buried in the new R80 000 cemetery they helped to build; many emigrants hope to spend their declining years in the parish they regard as hallowed ground. But, increasingly, this ambition has been thwarted by the dwindling community of permanent residents in Abbazzia.)

When the emigrants were few, they were only moderately threatening to the local people. As the diaspora grew, and the number of returning emigrants on visits or on holiday increased, the threat did not diminish through domestication

(as might have been predicted) but became amplified. The local people were very ambivalent about their kin and paesani abroad, especially the 'Ingesi' who, being most numerous, were most in evidence at the principal festivals, and at important 'rites de passage'. It seemed that a fundamental misunderstanding between the migrants and non-migrants had arisen. Returning only at holiday times, for the most part, the emigrants tended to forget that there were other times of the year when life was hard in Abbazzia, and when their relatives had to work hard. They did not seem to realise that the idlers they encountered year after year, at Easter and in the summer, had organised their agricultural tasks to be free at these times. By the same token, the non-migrants appeared to be thoroughly taken in by the impressive cars and new clothes of the 'Ingesi' families on holiday, and by the tendency of the 'Ingesi' to 'throw their money around'. They little realised that the 'Ingesi' who returned regularly were the wealthier members of the London community, and that they were not necessarily as rich as they looked. 'Ingesi' worked long hours in London, and did not have much time to spend money at other times of the year; also, they set more store by items of conspicuous consumption than solid investments, in many cases. By parading their 'wealth' in Abbazzia, and spending the money they had saved, they tended to deceive their paesani as to their real wealth and power. Both ways, as the years went by, members of what was once a single moral community with a single world view, became differentiated into not so much classes, as two factions with apparently different world-views values and life-styles, as each judged the other during these sporadic encounters.

Still, co-participation in the cult of historic Abbazzia and the fact of the dependency of some locals on emigrant remittances kept the two factions from flying apart - but not entirely, and with diminishing efficacy since the rise of the Italian Welfare State, and the possibility of subsidies and pensions to peasants (who were expected to vote Christian Democrat in return). As the community which had shifted from an economy of subsistence agriculture to an economy of emigration and then to an economy of welfare came to find its diaspora more and more expendable for everyday needs, so the dissonance between the non-migrants and migrants could be more openly expressed. The worsening relationship expressed itself in more or less explicit boycotts. Increasingly the 'Ingesi' developed a number of reverse-chains, extant since before the war. Instead of resettling in the parish, some 'Ingesi' had established themselves in less remote communes, close to the provincial capital, Piacenza. This tendency, which could be called chain-repatriation (in contrast to return migration,

which implies resettlement in the village of origin) accelerated heavily as the emigrants of the forties and fifties reached ages and stages at which a return to Italy was feasible. Obviously, the process deflected much-needed capital and expertise from Abbazzia, to the rich communes of the plain which were already developed. As if to ensure that as many repatriates as possible opted for this alternative to resettlement in the parish, the non-migrants, for their part, refused to sell the emigrants the few prime sites for villa construction in this parish of heavily sloping, unserviced, ground.

The cutting off of noses to spite faces, long recognised in the anthropological literature as a proclivity of peasant communities (see e.g. Foster 1965) was permitting the non-migrant Abbazzini to live out their lives on welfare payments of various kinds, undisturbed by strutting 'Inglesi' in their midst 12 months of the year; it was successfully thwarting the plans of the 'Inglesi'-dominated Committee of Val Trevi, with headquarters in London, which planned to have all able-bodied Abbazzini milking tourists instead of cows in the near future, running and staffing corporately owned hotels and inns and converted cottages to let. Whether this proposed development would have really developed Abbazzia is another question. But with the stock in the hands of at least some Abbazzini, and none of it owned by outside interests, the projected attempt at modernization would have coincided reasonably closely with the definition of development given in the introduction to this paper.

There was thus an opportunity, some twenty to twenty-five years after emigration from Abbazzia had turned into depopulation, to invest the fruits of emigration (which in the case of the 50% entrepreneurial component of the 'Inglesi' were not inconsiderable, both with respect to capital accumulated and experience in business gained) in the development of the parish into a 'lung' for the population of the growing cities of the Po Valley. Due at least in part to factors at the interpersonal and intergroup levels within the non-territorial international community of the Abbazzini, the opportunity was missed. Considering what happened to the political economies of both Britain and Italy following the Oil Crisis, it was an opportunity that was unlikely to recur. After more than two millenia of human occupation the upper Val Trevi seems destined to ultimately revert to the wilderness, the site of a few holiday homes for those sons and daughters of the parish who cannot relinquish the secular ties, and possibly a place of pilgrimage for those Abbazzini who have not settled too far away, at the principal festivals of Easter and Ferragosto.

## Conclusion

If this case-study has a lesson, it must be that even in situations in which emigration has been relatively unrestricted, and opportunities for considerable socio-economic advancement have existed outside the rural area, to say nothing of the existence in latter years of subsidies and pensions which reduce dependence of emigrants for day-to-day needs, local development and the stemming of depopulation are problematical.

It would appear that emigration and modernization must be detrimental to the persistence, let alone the growth, of rural communities in areas where large-scale agriculture is impractical, and the tertiarization of the local economy to accommodate tourism is either not an option, or not a realisable option (as was the case with the Abbazzini). This, anyway, is the belief of the more recent investigators of the impact of emigration on communities in the European periphery (Schneider, Schneider and Hansen 1972; Castles and Kosack 1973).

The Marxist perspective increasingly employed in such studies flatly contradicts the liberal approach of earlier scholars in the same field, such as Lopreato (1967), whose approach to underdevelopment in south Italy, utilizing both macro and micro techniques yielded opposite findings. Lopreato concludes that;

"...emigration is recognized by southern Italian peasants as the most rational, perhaps the only feasible, way in which they can guide their destiny. It is the major avenue through which they strive and achieve. Through it, many have achieved in their home society a degree of economic well-being and independence unimaginable until a few decades ago. By emigrating, they have rapidly gained a degree of social recognition that until recent times seemed to be the monopoly of the signorial class. Through it, they have achieved the social and psychological vitality with which to challenge the old social order and to demand the recognition their achievements deserve. Finally, and more important still, the southern Italian peasant has won a sense of security in relation to the present and the future as well. In short, through emigration, the peasant has broken the formidable bonds of his secular miseria and disperazione." (Ibid: 257)

Although clashes of paradigms largely account for the contradictions in the literature of migration and development, in Europe as in Africa, it seems to

be more a problem of fitting the appropriate models to the appropriate level of analysis in this kind of study. For instance, the Marxist approach was developed for large units of analysis: the political economy, at the national and global levels. It is therefore understandable that radical models of development fix on territorial units, interpreting development as a function of access to primary resources, and the extent to which there is local control over the means of production. However (and this is what I believe underpins Lopreato's analysis, though the assumption is not made explicit in his study) there is another way of defining the unit of analysis in community studies; the way the Abbazzini sample was defined.

In this study territorialism was suppressed in favour of a non-territorial approach. The total network of a community, comprising diaspora as well as rural base, was taken as the context for research and assessment. Thus, the resource base of an emigrant community (and most rural communities are emigrant communities nowadays) was held to include the resources to which members of the community's external network has access. The 'development' of this external network is part of the development of the community as a whole - so long as community regards itself as a community.

This is an important caveat, for while the external Abbazzini had been historically a vital source of remittances and patronage for the people of Abbazzia, a split in the moral community had occurred, causing wastage in the system: Yet even so, the total network of the Abbazzini had greatly increased their economic power and range, and ties between individuals (both kin and friends) were still strong enough to ensure that should economic or social life become untenable in the parish, more fortunate children, kin and friends beyond the community would supply hospitality, subsidies, loans and strategic contacts.

I believe that the empirical existence of an external network and local awareness of its advantages also made for the optimism noted by Lopreato for the people of rural South Italy, with their vast, hundred year old international diaspora. But Lopreato practised before the growth of the network approach in anthropology, and so he could not articulate the basis for the psychological and sociological revolution in the otherwise underdeveloped Calabrian community on which he concentrated his empirical investigation. Therefore, Lopreato could not explain in a way that would satisfy Marxist materialists the basis of the change in

local-level attitudes he observed and measured except to attribute the development rather vaguely to emigration. To a paradigm which does not readily acknowledge development in situations of apparent dependency on outside economic interests, this explanation was patently not good enough. Only the suggestion that the external network might be construed as part of the base, an extension of the community's control over primary as well as secondary resources would stand a chance gaining the respect of scholars who are not prepared to acknowledge that modernization can also be an agent of development unless community control can be effectively demonstrated.

The total network of the Abbazzini have an impressive command of economic resources and strategic contacts. There is no doubt that the once obscure Apennine community, regarded as a whole, has developed. But as this brief summary of the situation has shown, there is also the problem of another kind of development, the internal possibility of schismogenesis within the non-territorial community which can create factions, lead to self-destructive conflict, and the non-realization of development plans with the potential for mutual benefits on an unprecedented scale (cf. Bateson 1935).

Evidently, at least in the case of the entrepreneurial Abbazzini, Italian emigrant communities in even the most unpromising areas have a range of opportunities quite unheard of in Transkei/Ciskei. Mass expatriation, for various reasons, was not attempted by Xhosa during the long period when there was rapid development in Europe or the New World, and immigrants could prosper. Localized migration, from the rural to the urban areas, has always been more constrained than anywhere else in the world, as is well known. Xhosa have had few opportunities to earn above the subsistence level, and to build stable external networks, like the Abbazzini in London, the 'Ingesi'. Nevertheless, in my opinion the concept of the non-territorial community, based on the observation that to study only territorial communities in a period of rapid urbanization and rural depopulation all over the world is absurd, is eminently transferable from Italy to Transkei/Ciskei, such that any estimation of development in local emigrant communities is made only after an assessment of the economic power of the external network has been added to the audit of the rural base. Until anthropologists can provide non-territorial studies of this kind, the measuring of development among emigrant communities will remain highly problematical.

V. FINALE

M.G. Whisson

Malinowski defined the goal of the ethnographer as being "to grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of his world" (1922: 25). It is here that the particular contribution of the anthropologist to the problems of migrancy and development must be made. In the foregoing ethnographic sections, the importance of the anthropological perspective has been implicit rather than explicit. Here we endeavour to explicate.

Migrancy and development, as popularly conceived and as presented by economists, are generally seen as macro-problems. Migrants are numbered in thousands and their remittances in thousands of rands (or millions of lira), while development is measured in per capita income, gross national or regional product, capital invested and other mean or global figures. Our evidence suggests that while certain basic economic truths are inescapable - analogous perhaps to the biological facts which underlie kinship systems - what each sub-culture builds upon them is unique and comprehensible primarily in its own terms. "Development" in particular is a phenomenological and cultural reality rather than a reality subject to measurement by universal yardsticks. When attempts are made to promote development in the latter terms, rather than in terms of the people's own perceptions of their needs and goals, the results tend to be frustrating for all concerned.

We consider the problems from their economic base. Development presupposes a process of saving and investment - setting aside resources which could be consumed and using them to generate consumable resources for the future. The disposition of those resources tends to be determined largely by the person or group which accumulates them - hence state-financed investment reflects the values and priorities of the government, while private investment reflects the interests of the individual. The volume of resources available for private investment is the total income of the community, less the amount that its members perceive as necessary or desirable for immediate consumption.

(Migrancy represents an attempt to increase the total income of the non-territorial community, each migrant investing his labour, entrepreneurial skill and even capital in a distant enterprise which he believes will yield him a better return

than that which he could obtain at home. His evaluation may include non-material as well as material rewards, which makes simple computation impossible, and experience may teach him that his hopes or beliefs were unrealistic. Where, as in the cases considered in this paper, migrancy has continued for several generations, it must be assumed that, for the migrants, their beliefs have been reasonably based and their enterprise rewarded. Shifts in the regions to which the migrants go in search of an income reflect their evaluation of the benefits and costs (including the risk of arrest or repatriation) of going to each area.)

(Here we meet with an initial problem in migrancy as a means of increasing the income of the community. The more successful the migrant, the more likely he is to sever all connections with his place of origin and so cease to be a member of the community. Not all communities and individuals conform to that generalisation, and specific studies may suggest reasons for the variation between them. Religious commitment to home, as indicated in sections II and V, persecution or discrimination at one's place of work, and freedom to come and go, may well help to secure the continuing loyalty of the successful migrant to his place of origin.) NBS

A second problem relates to those who do retain their commitment to home. While migrancy may increase the income of the non-territorial community very considerably, it will certainly increase the real cost of sustaining a constant standard of living. Transport costs to and from work, if borne by the migrants, will be greater than those for the people at home. Two places of residence and two commissaries are more costly to maintain than one. In general also the cost of living at a locally acceptable level tends to be greater in areas of relatively high (urban) incomes which attract migrants, than in the poorer (rural) areas. Thus while the total cash income of the non-territorial group may be increased as a result of migrancy, the real income in terms of goods and services available after expenses have been met, is not necessarily increased.

As a rider to that general point, we may note that the migrant is not in a position to generate what one might call secondary, rather than informal, real income by the work that he may do at home in his spare time. The locally employed man can usually repair his own house, grow crops in his garden and do other unpaid but valuable odd jobs about the home. The negative sides of

this are that the migrant may have to pay somebody else to do those things if he retains his rural property, and that if he is not producing value at home he may well be consuming income in his spare time in the vicinity of his work. As is noted in section III, these costs of absence may be social as well as material and affect the relationship between migrants and their local government.

A third problem builds upon the second. As is noted in section IV, education tends to increase people's desire for new goods more rapidly than it provides them with the commercial skills to obtain them, at least in black South African communities. One consequence of this may be that while the real income of the non-territorial community increases substantially as a result of migrancy, the amount that its members perceive as being necessary or desirable for immediate consumption may increase to absorb most or all of that real increase. The 'Ingesi' described in section V who "set more store by items of conspicuous consumption than solid investments" do not display a uniquely Italian culture trait. The antithesis of such values and behaviour is manifested by the 'red' Transkeians who conform to their elders injunctions to abjure the temptations of the town and "build the umzi".

Thus migrancy, even if it increases the real income of the community, does not necessarily increase the volume of resources that the community is willing to set aside for investment in productive enterprise at home, or anywhere else. One may go further, and argue that where an individual does generate a balance of savings adequate for investment, the return that he can expect in town may well be higher than that which he can expect in his home area where capital is unlikely to be used efficiently. In crude material terms it may be possible to measure the level of investment, and the return on investment, although where priority is given to basic education measurement in local terms is extremely difficult. Investment in other forms of social capital e.g. attractive cemeteries or good inter-generational relations, which may have long term implications for attracting successful migrants home and for limiting burgeoning material wants, defy material measurement.

Development, as is dramatically clear from all the ethnographic sections, means different things to different people, even if, like happiness, they all want it. For the 'red' Transkeians it is essentially conservative, which means that they try to invest as much as possible in subsistence agriculture and

good traditional housing. Their investments in good relations through beerdrinks yield a dividend in so far as they inhibit rising material expectations in the migrants and direct their interests into umzi building. In the heterogeneous communities of the Ciskei, development certainly means a heavy investment in education to enhance the long term employment prospects of their children (despite the risk of losing them if they progress very far), but our evidence indicates more vividly what development does not mean to them. "Betterment" constitutes a form of forced saving and investment in the land, the yield of which may be no more than a slowing down of the process of land degradation. As such it may be perceived as primary development by the agricultural authorities but it is experienced as deprivation by the villagers who must walk further to smaller fields. At the same time, many of the Burnshill and Chatha migrants do not remit enough to meet their families' perceived consumer needs and leave an adequate balance for investment in agriculture. The perceptions of the migrants, cut off from the daily life of the village, increasingly diverge from those of the people at home in the Ciskei as in Abbazzia. Conflicts over the appropriate use of remittances and the industry of the people at home replicate at the familial and interpersonal level the conflicting perceptions of government and villagers over what constitutes development and what should be done about it.

The experience of Abbazzia illustrates the possibility of a rural community, if not exactly dying with dignity, at least fading away in reasonable comfort. Italian migrant earnings are more substantial, pensions and grants are on a single national scale, state agricultural subsidies are larger, yet what distinguishes the Italian village most sharply from the Xhosa villages is demography. The Abbazzini are able to leave, to live and work anywhere in Italy, minimally restricted in most of Europe and acceptable as long term migrants or settlers overseas. Hundreds have seized those opportunities. Xhosa villagers have no such freedom of movement and choice except within the narrow confines of their designated homelands. A growing population on a limited area of land can only experience development in its own terms and in those of its government, by massive investments of capital and skill, or by depopulation.

Migrants contribute substantially to the gross product of the regions in which they work - if they did not, they would not be employed. Not all the value that they generate goes to enrich their own non-territorial community; a part of their product goes to their employers and to the state in the form of taxation,

while much of their income is returned to the importing region through their spending there. They may thus assert a moral claim to a substantial proportion of funds available for redistribution, which should be directed into improving the quality of life in their home areas. Thus state expenditure on agricultural development, school systems, pensions and grants is not to be seen as charity, but as the discharge of an obligation in terms of the morality of reciprocity.

If this last element is added into the equations of income and expenditure, consumption and investment, then what most of our research areas experience as a process of underdevelopment i.e. a reduction in the ability of the home area to generate an income adequate to meet its perceived needs, and of a slow deterioration in their quality of life in relation to their aspirations, could be reversed. Migrancy could then be seen for what it is - the movement of a factor of production to its point of optimal utilisation - and the return to it be used to benefit the exporting community, not only through personal remittances, but through the redistributive machinery of a benign government. Failing that, migrancy must tend to continue to be incompatible with development, as the village produces the worker, but the importing area reaps a substantial share of the fruits of his labour, thus underdeveloping even the non-territorial community.

not necessarily... the experience of... if not exactly... Italian migrant... state agricultural... distinguishes... demography... minimally restricted... have no such freedom... of their designated... can only experience... by massive investments... Migrants contribute... they work - if they... that they generate... of their product goes...

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## **DEVELOPMENT STUDIES INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH**

The concept of development has two distinct faces. It refers to man's continual attempts to gain more control over his environment: by mining, by farming, or by flying jet aircraft, for example. Development also refers to a process of emancipation, a process whereby groups of people as well as individuals gain the freedom to decide together on their futures. These two faces of development merge in certain cases. The provision of sufficient food and shelter leaves time for other things, for choices. On the other hand, development often appears Janus-faced: emancipatory ideologies and activities seeming to stunt economic growth.

In Southern Africa today, development strategies reflect such strains and ambiguities. In the Eastern Cape/Ciskei region in particular, political and economic boundaries cut across one another, and complicate strategies aimed at improving the life chances and living conditions of all South Africans. This series of working papers is issued in the hope that more research into development problems will make some contribution to a better understanding of these problems, and to a more effective strategy in tackling them.

The Stella and Paul Loewenstein Charitable and Education Trust established a Chair of Development Studies in the Institute of Social and Economic Research. As a result, a number of research projects related to developmental issues have been launched since 1979. Project results will be reported in these working papers.

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