

‘Leaders Like Children Playing With A Grenade’?
An Analysis of How The Arab Spring Was Received In South Africa

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Abstract

When the Arab Spring took place, it took the world by surprise and sparked renewed interest in the idea of revolution. With differing opinions on what caused such a revolutionary wave throughout the North African and Middle Eastern region, many began looking at their own countries, and South Africa was no different. A debate was sparked in South Africa, as to whether there would be a revolution or not. What I originally set out to accomplish is to find out which side of the debate would be correct through the philosophical context of revolutionary theory. Initially, we attempted to define and consider the history of revolutionary theory. We found that revolutionary theory has gone through four generations and that even finding a theoretically informed definition is difficult. Following this, we considered some social-psychological theories of revolution as well as theories of moral indignation. We found that these theories were incredibly informative and that they provide some insight into the reasoning for revolutionary fear in the South African debate. Through the use of opinion pieces, we then considered the South African debate, and – using social-psychological theories and the theories of moral indignation - found that both sides of the argument had valuable points, however, they often lacked some foresight. With tentative agreement, we found that the side arguing that there would be a revolution in South Africa had a more valuable argument, despite its limitations. However, far more research is required before one can – with more accuracy – predict a revolutionary occurrence in such a way as was done in South Africa.

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Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Chapter One: Revolutions	6
3. Chapter Two: Social-Psychological Theories	35
4. Chapter Three: Moral Indignation, Moral Economy	50
5. Chapter Four: The Debate in South Africa	65
6. Conclusion	95
7. Reference List	100

Introduction

At the time this project began in 2011, the revolutionary movements that were taking place across North Africa and the Middle East were in full swing. President Zine El Acidine Ben Ali had been removed from his position in Tunisia and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak had fallen when the wave consumed Egypt shortly afterwards. The waves of mass protest then gradually spread across the North African and Middle Eastern (Mena) region, through to Syria and Jordan, amongst other countries. Some of these revolutionary movements successfully removed their original leaders; others were either crushed by the ruling regimes or failed to bring about lasting change, while others have fallen into bitter civil conflict. Regardless, the wave of revolutionary movements, which became known as the “Arab Spring” sparked an interest in revolution once again and there were lively debates in various countries as to what caused the revolutions and whether their own countries were at risk.

South Africa was one of those countries relatively unaffected by the Arab Spring, that watched these developments with interest. It was observed that while there were obvious shortcomings in the regimes overthrown, and indeed, those regimes replacing them have tended to lack many forms of stability since the previous regime was overthrown. This led to several questions as to what the scenario would be in South Africa if it found itself in a similar situation. One of these questions was whether there was a similar economic and political climate existing in South Africa as there was in those countries experiencing the Arab Spring that could possibly indicate whether there is a chance of revolution in South Africa? This thesis seeks to address this question. However, in order to start answering this, we need to consider the opinions of some influential South Africans, such as Moeletsi Mbeki and Steven Friedman.

In South Africa the debate began after Moeletsi Mbeki published an article claiming that South Africa was on a path to similar type of revolutionary action. Mbeki, and later, his supporters, focused on the potentially explosive role that would be played by social inequality, with unemployment, corruption and weak service delivery – amongst several

other factors – being the main factor that he thought could lead to revolutionary action. On the other hand, Steven Friedman, and later his supporters, argued that revolution was unlikely in South Africa. Friedman based his argument on South African's ability to choose our leaders and that South Africa does not have the repressive nature that plagued countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. In other words for Mbeki, inequality was likely to lead to revolution whereas for Friedman, democracy was likely to mean that there would be no revolution in South Africa. This project began with the naïve hope of wanting to examine the debate that was sparked in South Africa as a result of the Arab Spring and to come to a firm conclusion as to which side was correct. As well as trying to make sense of what some of the great minds in South Africa had put forward I also wanted to discover whether we were going to see a revolution in South Africa. However, the enormity and complexity of the subject of revolutions, as well as the impossibility of being able to foretell events before they happen has placed a limitation on any attempt to provide a definite answer as to whether there will be a revolution or not. However, the debate in South Africa opened up incredible insights into how South Africa is received by some of its great minds, and what they put forward to support their arguments gives us an insightful idea of what they deem to be important. This thesis therefore does not, as I had originally hoped, offer a firm analysis as to whether or not the Mbeki or Friedman point of view in this debate is correct. What it does do, however, is to take the debate that happened in the South African public sphere and to examine it in the context of the political theory on revolutions. The thesis places each position taken in this debate in a theoretical context, offers some analysis of what the theories show us about the arguments in questions and provides some observations about the limits of both arguments, and the theoretical resources with which we can flesh them out. Finally reading the debate, and the theory with which we can deepen our understanding of it, in the context of recent developments in South Africa leads me to offer a tentative view that suggests that Mbeki's position is possibly has more value than Friedman's position. However, I stress that Friedman does make some good points and that no one is in a position to offer any sort of firm guides to the future. The factors that lead to revolutions are simply too complex to enable an exact science of predication.

The basic task of the opening chapter in this thesis is to provide a theoretically informed definition of the term revolution and, in so doing, to show that there is no agreement in this regard and that in fact there is considerable complexity that needs to be negotiated. However

while this chapter teases out some of this complexity it does arrive at a working definition. The chapter examines several theories of revolution and also looks at how theories of revolution have unfolded in a series of generations. There is often considerable difference within a single generation itself and this has led to confusion and contributed to the dilution of the clarity of term “revolution”. As a result, we will find the definition of revolution to be a daunting task with no definite answer, although we will have a greater understanding of revolution and by the chapter’s end we will have a working definition to which we can apply to the term revolution. In addition, we will have a look at the role that spontaneity, conspiracy and catalytic arguments and what role they play in the perception of revolutions. We shall also consider a theory of revolution that will play a minor role – but still a role – in the potential factor contributing to a cause of a revolution in South Africa and the Mena regions. This theory is the role of rationality as a deterrent in revolution, although we shall adapt this at stages during the thesis. We will end the chapter with a greater understanding of the processes and history of revolutionary theory. We will also have a clearer idea of how revolution will be defined in this thesis, which will give us greater clarity with what we are dealing with.

The second chapter of this thesis continues to build a theoretical approach to revolution offering further nuance via an examination of social-psychological theories of revolution. The main theories we will be considering in this chapter will be that of Frustration-Aggression and that of Relative Deprivation. Under the theories of Relative Deprivation, we will consider models presented by Ted Robert Gurr, James C. Davies and Mark Hagopian. It will be shown that these theories rest on the idea that individuals have wants and needs, and that they may rebel if they feel that they are unjustly blocked from fulfilling those wants and needs. These theories are not the newest of revolutionary theories; however their ideas continuously are invoked when people talk about revolution, such as we shall see in the fourth chapter which considers the South African debate. Although these theories are not without flaws, they provide interesting insight into the possible mood of society, with the potentially explosive concoction that may be contained in a frustrated crowd. Social-psychological theories may aid in our analysis of the South African situation when considering many of the factors that have been presented by the various authors on both sides of the debate, such as unemployment, social inequality in general, as well as political freedom. These theories will help us in our understanding of the South African debate, and

will be used to analyse the some various factors that the authors of the South Africa debate have put forward, and will allow us to identify if a revolutionary situation is being created in South Africa.

The third chapter brings theories rooted in a conception of the political consequences of moral indignation into the discussion. These theories aid us in our analysis of the situation, for there have been various elements present in all the varying authors concept on what caused the Arab Spring, and more specifically the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. These theories are largely based on the idea certain acts will cause individuals to take to the streets. These acts will include acts that are so horrific that individuals feel that they just cannot remain as bystanders. The deaths of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia and Khaled Said in Egypt have been noted as triggers for revolution in their countries, and South Africa has no exception of deaths caused by repression, as the death of Andries Tatane and the 34 miners in the Marikana shooting have shown. Other events such as corruption and the South African government not listening and actively lying to the people of South Africa may also cause outrage, just as the rising food prices may affect the moral economy of the society in South Africa is they are perceived as unjust. All these factors have been found to trigger or cause individuals to take to the streets in revolt. These theories are useful in our consideration of the South African debate for they can be used to explain why certain factors, such as corruption may play a role in starting a revolution in South Africa or not.

In the final chapter of this thesis we get to grips with the South African debate. We shall begin by laying out the different sides of the debate and placing under the broad theoretical categories political liberation and social inequality. It will be shown that both sides of the debate are correct and incorrect in certain of their formulation of factors that can and may not cause a revolution in South Africa. Although we shall consider both side of the debate, it will be argued that the side arguing that there will be no revolution in South Africa's near future are correct in various factors that they have presented, but also have some serious limitations, such as their failure to note the increasing use of violent police intervention in protests, and the apparent gradual increase in deaths as a result of police action, or the political exploitation of voters, lying to them to gain their support. As such, once giving an overview of the two sides – as well as the argument presented by Jacob Dlamini which takes

something of the middle ground – we shall go into slightly more depth with certain factors of the social inequality argument. As such, we shall consider the factors of increasing service delivery protests in South Africa, the corruption levels and the unemployment levels within the country, especially if one considers the level of youth unemployment and perhaps the diminishing loyalty towards the ruling party. We will also consider why moral indignation appears to be failing to trigger a revolution in South Africa in much the same way as it did in Egypt and Tunisia.

Both Mbeki and Friedman, as well as their supporters however, have weaknesses in their argument which provide the difficulty in fully supporting either argument. As such, we will be unable to provide a definite answer as to whether there will be a revolution in South Africa or not, we will be able to see that both sides of the arguments do provide interesting factors that do credit both sides of the argument¹. However, it will be noted that there are factors which make one think revolution is more possible in South Africa today than ever before particularly if one notes the increasing mobilisation of various segments of the population.

¹ An example being that repression in South Africa is nowhere close to the formalized oppression in Egypt; however, it is on the increase. In addition, the claim that unemployment will lead to revolution in South Africa seems rather arbitrary, as South Africa has a much higher level of unemployment than many of the Mena region states had, so why hasn't there been a revolution already?

Chapter One:

Revolution

Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.

Karl Marx

The Eighteenth Brumaire

Revolution as a form of civil unrest has received an enormous amount of attention throughout history. They very often appear, much like those of the Arab Spring as well as the French Revolution (1789), Russian Revolutions of 1917 and Iranian Revolution (1978-1979) in a first sudden, spontaneous burst that takes the world completely by surprise (Kuran, 1989: 41). Some succeed, many fail, but they all often have lasting effects – although not necessarily the positive effects that one might consider.

These events however, have often left theorists scrambling to understand one of the fundamental questions of revolution: why did a revolution occur in a given society and not in another? This question is especially pertinent in societies that have similar situations. This phenomenon shows that the term revolution has become – to borrow from Perez Zagorin (1973:27) – a very complex term that is often used to explain varying events. Indeed, in a project that is dealing with the idea of revolution, it becomes fundamental that we at least take a glance at the extensive history behind such a term. As such, it becomes important for us to consider how the “revolution” has been used throughout the years and why it has become so complex.

As a result of this, the main focus of this chapter will be to attempt to give us some background as to how revolutions have been defined and the progression of revolutionary theory, especially over the twentieth century. We will consider a mere fraction of the definitions that has been presented by the multiple theorists. We will look particularly at the definitions of Chalmers Johnson, Theda Skocpol and Jack Goldstone. These are just three of the many revolutionary theorists. We will also explore the difficulty in choosing a single definition of the term revolution when we consider the four generations of revolutionary theory. We shall largely consider the work of Goldstone, who was possibly the most successful theorist of revolution to separate these four generations of revolutionary theory by their analytical tools in a fairly comprehensible manner. It will be seen that throughout the twentieth century, revolutionary theory has progressed through various stages and the focus has shifted to different analytical tools, even within the very same generation.

We will also briefly consider the debate over the spontaneity and conspiracy theories that appear as a reoccurring element when one talks about revolutions. One cannot deny that the explosions of mass protest, leading to the revolutionary movements, in Tunisia and Egypt did appear to be completely spontaneous events, without formal leadership. Yet there are those who argue that it is part of a great conspiracy for some devious purpose. The London Riots of 2011 for example, were thought by some to be street gangs causing trouble. There is still a third option to be considered and that is a mixture of the conspiracy and spontaneity theories. This third option becomes important when considering our definition, and becomes even more useful in the fourth chapter, where we will consider the South African debate in more depth.

Finally, we shall consider the role that rationality plays in revolution – or rather how rationality may prevent revolution. Rationality is based on the idea that because people are unsure as to whether they will be joined in their revolt, they will not revolt. While this idea is still relevant, the introduction of social media is adding a new dimension as information is dissipated far more rapidly and further afield. This increases the individual's perception that there are others that feel the same as they do, and increases the likelihood of them participating a revolutionary action.

In summary, by the end of this chapter we will have considered the various definitions of revolution and will have come up with a definition that will be used in this paper – even if it is a basic idea that is only helpful for this paper. We will have also considered the theories of spontaneity and conspiracy and the role that rationality may or may not play in the revolutionary process. With all this information, we will have a clearer idea of revolution before moving into some revolutionary theories.

What is a Revolution?

In attempting to understand revolution, one needs to define what a revolution is. This has become increasingly difficult, as the use of the word has become so widespread. Zagorin (1973: 27) explains

revolution has come to contain a vague assorted medley of meanings and to be applied to developments of the most varied kinds ... This loose and confusing use of the term merely illustrates how closely the idea of revolution has become equated with change.

Indeed, Isaac Kramnick (1972: 26; also see Kimmel, 1990: 1) points out that

Like the Duc de Liancourt explaining to Louis XVI that the storming of the Bastille represented not a revolt but a revolution, many scholars are busy differentiating revolution from rebellion, revolt, and coups.

There is confusion as to what events should be classified as a revolution, with some theorists describe particular events as revolutions, while others disagree and argue those same events are other forms of civil unrest. There have even been some theorists who claim – in what Mark Hagopian (1974) calls the success-failure dichotomy - that revolutions and revolts

are only differentiated by the latter being a failed revolution. Many differing criteria have been put forward to describe a revolution, criteria such as “the number of participants, the objective, social class, social goals” and the like (Kramnick, 1972: 26). As each generation of revolutionary theory moves on, more analytical tools are presented, and the complexity grows as previous definitions are found to be too narrow. Added to the definitions being too narrow there are questions as to in what way it is they are different to other forms of civil unrest such as revolts, rebellion, coups, and the like. This becomes very evident when considering the various theories of revolution, where it appears the theorists have moulded the definition of revolution around their theory.

Lawrence Stone (1966: 159; also see Zagorin, 1973: 28) for example, initially gives a wide definition of revolution that is put forward by Chalmers Johnson, arguing “According to one view, [revolution] is change, effected by the use of violence², in government, and/or regime, and/or society³.” Skocpol (cited in Goldstone, 2001: 140) defines revolution as “rapid, basic transformation of society’s state and class structures ... accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”. The first generation of revolutionary theory considered only the great revolutions⁴, which resulted in it being extremely narrow, while the second generation of revolutionary theory attempted to encompass vastly more, and ended up becoming far too broad⁵. As a result, the list of what a revolution can be defined as has grown, from generation to generation, and theorist to theorist.

² For this definition, Stone (1966: 159) notes: “Violence ... is not the same as force; it is used with unnecessary intensity, unpredictability, and usually destructively.”

³ “By *society* is meant the consciousness and the mechanics of communal solidarity, which may be tribal, peasant, kinship, national, and so on; by *regime* is meant the constitutional structure—democracy, oligarchy, monarchy; and by *government* is meant specific political and administrative institutions” (Stone, 1966: 159)

⁴ These revolutions being the English Revolution of 1640, the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789 and finally the Russian Revolution of 1917 (Goldstone, 1982: 189; Goldstone, 2003: 2; also see Brinton, 1965; who is one of the “First Generation” theorists). One must note the absence, as shown by Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995; especially pages 70-107), of the Haitian Revolution in what is termed the Great Revolutions. This, he argues, is as a result of the structural – or rather lack of structural change, “the narrative structures of the Western historiography have not broken with the ontological order of the Renaissance” (Trouillot, 1995: 106).

⁵ It is interesting to note that as a result of this, a section of revolutionary and civil unrest theorists (see Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (1970) as examples) broke from the use of “revolution”, and instead employed the term “internal war”. “Internal war” was defined as “[h]ighly organized political violence with the widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerilla wars, civil wars, and revolutions” (Gurr, 1970: 11). This was short-lived however.

To consider the idea of “revolution” in this paper we need to have a clearer idea of what the word means in terms of this discussion. Goldstone (2001) found that there are several commonalities in revolutionary events, and that

these events [described as revolutionary in character] still have a common set of elements at their core: (a) efforts to change the political regime that draw on a competing vision (or visions) of a just order, (b) a notable degree of informal or formal mass mobilization, and (c) efforts to force change through noninstitutionalized actions such as demonstrations, protests, strikes, or violence (Goldstone, 2001: 142).

Following from this, Goldstone (2001: 142) offers the following definition:

Revolution: an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine the existing authorities.

We will find below that even this definition appears to fall short however, and will make a few minor alternations for the purposes of this thesis.

We must now look to the various generations of revolution, to consider where the studies of revolution have taken us, and perhaps gain a little more clarity in the confusion that is revolutionary theory and better understand the theories that will be presented in the following chapters. We will also give a working definition for revolution, to be considered when we speak of it in this thesis.

The Various Generations of Revolution

For this thesis, we will largely consider the research of Goldstone when considering the stops in revolutionary theory – the separation between each generation – which occur when the established norms of revolutionary theory are overthrown by sometimes better tools of analysis. In his research, he quite successfully manages to separate the revolutionary theorists into generations by using their emphasis on different points of analysis. He is able to portray these differences in a logical and comprehensible manner.

In addition, the separation into the generations also effectively shows the complexity of the manner in which revolutions have been defined, with the more structural theories of the third generation defining revolutions in a slightly different manner to the second generation as an example. With this being said however, one must note that the periods considered are not necessarily as clear cut as Goldstone appears to make out, and one often finds overlaps of different generations, or theories that persist throughout several generations – such as the social-psychological theories. These social-psychological theories appear to be particularly relevant when one considers what is being said about whether there will be a revolution in South Africa or not and the reason put forward as to why the Arab Spring took place.

In the early 1900s, theorists attempted to explain some of the greatest revolutions. The theories that were considered in this period were known as “First Generation” theories of revolution – or “The Natural History of Revolutions” (see Goldstone, 1982: 189; also see (Goldstone, 2003: 2). Goldstone (1982: 189-192; also see Goldstone, 2003: 2-4), in his ‘The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions’ provides a very brief outline of some of the phases and causes that were discovered as a result of the comparisons of what were considered the great revolutions. He summarises these revolutions in ten stages. While it is not essential that each revolution goes through each of these stages, it is very common that they follow this path. Goldstone (1982: 189; Goldstone, 2003: 3) begins

[1] *Prior to a revolution, the bulk of the “intellectuals” - journalists, poets, playwrights, essayists, teachers, members of the clergy, lawyers, and trained members of the bureaucracy- cease to support the regime, write condemnations, and demand major reforms* (emphasis in text).

Thus, the loss of intellectual support forms the first of these steps. The importance of this support cannot be underestimated. It begins to show many different flaws in the old regime, most notably that there is no consensus or that the elite are dissatisfied with the current regime (Goldstone, 2003: 3). It is often the case that the elites who are unsatisfied will be much more reluctant to suppress popular uprisings (Goldstone, 1982: 190). It is important to note that the transference of allegiance of the “intellectuals” does not simply end at a loss of support for the old regime and scathing criticisms of said regime. As Crane Briton (1965: 46-47) argues

To what did our successful revolutionary intellectuals transfer allegiance? To another and better world than that of the corrupt and inefficient old regimes. From a thousand pens and voices there are built up in the years before the revolution actually breaks out what one must now fashionable call the foundations of the revolutionary myth-or folklore, or symbols, or ideology. We might even say simply, the revolutionary ideal.

More recent theorists – those that do not fall under first generation theorists – such as Eric Hobsbawm (1959: 57) also present arguments of revolts sparked by the idea of a “better” world in his chapters on millenarian movements, being movements with the “hope of a complete and radical change in the world ... a world shorn of all its present deficiencies”.

This leads to the second stage, being “[2] *Just prior to the fall of the old regime, the state attempts to meet its sharpest criticism by undertaking major reforms*” (Goldstone, 1982: 190; Goldstone, 2003: 3; emphasis in text). In this, the old regime attempts to quell unrest by presenting additional and alienated groups a place in the regime often undermining rather than assisting the regime, largely without giving these groups noticeable influence (Goldstone, 1982: 190). The recent Arab Spring clearly showed this happening with politicians of the old regime making various promises. Machiavelli (1513, Ch 8; cited in Goldstone, 1982: 190) argues

If the necessity for [reforms] comes in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them.

In the case of Tunisia, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire on the 17th December, 2010, in protest at unemployment⁶ in Sidi Bouzid. About 3 days after this incident the Tunisian development minister, Mohamed Al Nouri Al Juwayni visited the town and announced a \$10 000 000 employment programme (Rifai, 2011). In the days that followed, the governors of Sidi Bouzid, Jendouba and Zaghouan were all dismissed, along with the ministers of communication, trade and handicrafts, and religious affairs (Rifai, 2011). Around the 13th January, 2011, Tunisian president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali announced “unprecedented” concessions and promised not to seek re-election in 2014⁷ (Rifai, 2011). Finally, on the 14th January, 2011, Ben Ali fired the country’s government and promised elections within six months (Rifai, 2011).

As in Tunisia, Egypt also faced a series of major reforms after mass revolt. In January, 2011, protesters rose up against the Egyptian government with apparently similar reasons as those protesting in Tunisia. These reasons, being poverty, corruption, unemployment and the rule of Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian president⁸ (Al Jazeera(a), 2011). On the 29th of January, Mubarak dismissed his entire cabinet, in addition, for the first time in his rule, he appointed a vice-president, Omar Suleiman⁹ (Al Jazeera(a), 2011). Between the 31st of January, 2011 and the 1st February, 2011, Mubarak announced many changes, including his new cabinet, a reforming of the constitution¹⁰ and to not run for the next election, in addition, Mubarak promised to improve the economy and provide jobs (Al Jazeera(a), 2011).

⁶ This is according to some sources, others indicate that there were several reasons, including police brutality, shocking living standards and lack of human rights (See Rifai, 2011).

⁷ In this, there was the pledge for more freedoms in society, the institution of widespread reforms as well as the investigation into the killings of protesters, and finally, some websites that were blocked or banned became accessible (Rifai, 2011).

⁸ As with Tunisia, there were various reasons used to explain the causes of the revolts within Egypt (see fn. 5)

⁹ Suleiman was Egypt’s former spy chief (Al Jazeera(a), 2011).

¹⁰ Especially Article 76 of the Egyptian Constitution, which made it virtually impossible for independent candidates to run for office (Al Jazeera(a), 2011).

Goldstone (1982: 190; Goldstone, 2003: 3; emphasis in text) goes on to explain the third stage, where

[3] *The actual fall of the regime begins with an acute political crisis brought on by the government's inability to deal with some economic, military, or political problem rather than by the action of a revolutionary opposition.*

As Goldstone (1982: 190) suggests, this crisis could come in many forms, with some being state bankruptcy, major military defeat or paralysis in the command of the armed forces of a given state. The revolutionaries find themselves as having the upper hand (Goldstone, 1982: 190), and that is when the revolution begins and the old regime is toppled. However, this then results in the fourth stage, in which “[4] *Even where the revolutionary opposition to the old regime was once united, the collapse of the old regime eventually reveals the conflicts within the revolutionary opposition*” (Goldstone, 1982: 190; Goldstone, 2003: 3; emphasis in text). The unity of revolutionary forces is of great importance for a movement. Although not considered a revolution, it is argued by some of the rioters that took part in the London Riots of 2011, that even rival street gangs were united in the effort against the government (Bennett, et al, 2011). In a similar way, Christians and Muslims in Egypt seemed to work together against Mubarak. However, the differences between the various groups banding together to topple the regime very often come to the fore once the common foe is defeated. This split in the revolutionary forces is very often as simple as to the degree of changes in the old regime. Some groups are more conservative and wish to make only minimal changes, others are quite moderate in their desires for change while still others wish rapid and sweeping changes (Goldstone, 1982: 190-191). If parties having fundamentally different principles and ideas unite, the split between them can end up as particularly violent conflicts. Some of the examples of this would be the Muslim-Christian clashes on the 8th of May, 2011, that left 12 dead, or where around the 15th of May, 2011, at least 78 Christians were injured allegedly by Muslims in Egypt (Blight, Pulham and Torpey, 2012).

It is often as a result of this conflict, then, that “[5] *The first group to seize the reins of state are moderate reformers*” (Goldstone, 1982: 191; Goldstone, 2003: 3; emphasis in text). This

stage can be seen as a sort of bridge between the conservatives and the radicals. The elections after the revolution in Tunisia took place near the end of 2011, and it appears that the moderates do appear to be in control, with the An-Nahda party, an apparently Islamic moderate party, taking power (APF, 2011). This often results in the sixth stage, where

[6] *While the moderates seek to reconstruct rule on the basis of moderate reform, often employing organizational forms left over from the old regime, alternative, more radical centers of mass mobilization spring up with new forms of organization* (Goldstone, 1982: 191; Goldstone, 2003: 4; emphasis in text).

Often this leads to a situation in which the radicals have the notion that everything connected to the old regime has to be wrong. In other words, it seems necessary to the radicals to “reinvent the wheel”. Although it is too early to tell if the same is happening in Tunisia, there have been some stirrings of protests against similar factors that led to Ben Ali’s removal. Egypt took a slightly different path, where power was given to the military after Mubarak was ousted. There have however been new forms of resistance against this new regime shortly afterwards – such as the “Day of Rage” on 25th of February, 2011, the 8th – 9th of February, where 2 protesters are killed or the 29th of June, 2011, where over 1 000 people were injured in clashes (See Blight, Pulham and Torpey, 2012). According to the ‘Natural History of Revolutions’, it is possible for a few more stages to follow, the most common being the seventh stage in Goldstone’s list in which

[7] *The great changes in the organization and ruling ideology of a society that follow successful revolutions occur not when the old regime first falls, but when the radical, alternative, mass-mobilizing organizations succeed in supplanting the moderates* (Goldstone, 1982: 191; Goldstone, 2003: 4; emphasis in text).

This is a result of the moderates seeking continuity and therefore inheriting the same liabilities and limits as the previous regime, thus making them unable to effectively handle

economic and military problems (Goldstone, 1982: 191)¹¹. This is only a possible stage however, as it is ultimately dependant on whether the radicals are willing to take extreme measures, as well as the ability of the moderates to disassociate themselves with the old regime (Goldstone, 1982: 191).

Goldstone (1982: 191; Goldstone, 2003: 4; emphasis in text) then points to an eighth stage, where “[8] *The disorder brought by the revolution and the implementation of radicals’ control usually results in the forced imposition of order by coercive rule*”. Examples of this would be the “Terror” after the French Revolution, or Joseph Stalin’s “*gulag*” or Mao’s “cultural revolution” (Goldstone, 1982: 191). While these struggles occur, and possibly with the creation of new struggles, the ninth stage in the process can sometimes take hold, where “[9] *The struggles between radicals and moderates, and between defenders of the revolution and external enemies, frequently allow military leaders to move from obscurity to commanding, even absolute, leadership*” (Goldstone, 1982: 192; Goldstone, 2003: 4; emphasis in text) often takes hold. Finally, “[10] *The radical phase of the revolution eventually gives way to a phase of pragmatism and moderate pursuit within the new status quo*” (Goldstone, 1982: 192; Goldstone, 2003: 4; emphasis in text) emerges. In this last stage, the radicals are removed from power – be it by force, through legitimate methods or through the natural deaths of the radical leaders – and power returns to the moderates (Goldstone, 1982: 192). Although it is still too early to tell if the Arab Spring, or rather the states that had uprisings that made up the Arab Spring, will follow along the same patterns as the “Great” Revolutions, it is extremely interesting to note that there are some similarities already.

Goldstone, (1980: 426-427) argues however, that the analyses of revolutions from this perspective “lacked solid theoretical underpinnings” as these theories were often largely descriptive. This is not to say that these theories were not useful. Indeed, Goldstone (1982: 189)

¹¹ It must be noted that Goldstone (1982: 191) does argue that this is not an inevitable step, pointing to the American Revolution as an example.

They ["First Generation" theories] succeeded in identifying a remarkable correspondence among the major events that comprised each of these [English, American, French and Russian] revolutions. Several of their observations on the sequence of events in great revolutions have been so commonly borne out that they appear to be law-like empirical generalizations

John Foran (1993: 2) agrees, and also argues that some of the descriptive processes presented by the "First Generation" follow quite accurately with later revolutions. However, these theories lacked answers as to why revolutions occur? Who was against the old regime? (Goldstone, 1982: 192). In addition, these revolutions only considered what were (and sometimes still are) referred to as the "great" revolutions, and as a result, revolution was defined very narrowly (Goldstone, 1982: 189). What was necessary was a new outlook on revolutions that, although using some if not all of the foundations laid down by the "First Generation" theories, took into consideration some of the questions raised.

During the mid-1900s, a new series of theories on revolution emerged. During this period, there was much turmoil in the world, with the relinquishing of colonial territories and the emergence of many new states (Goldstone, 1982: 192). This "Generation" of theories – furthermore referred to as "Second Generation" or general theories of revolution - attempted to move away from the descriptive theories of the "First Generation" and attempted to answer some of the questions that were still left. Goldstone (1982: 192-193; Goldstone, 1980: 427-429) splits these "Second Generation" theories into three broad categories, being psychological, system-disequilibrium and thirdly group conflict theories, the order of which will remain the same in the brief description of them below.

The first group of theories presented by Goldstone (1980: 427; emphasis in text), is what he refers to as "[1] *Analyses based on cognitive psychology and frustration-aggression theory*". In this group, he places theorists such as James C. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr – both of which will be considered in more depth in the following chapter, but also includes theorists such as Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend, David Schwartz, James Geschwender¹², and Denton E.

¹² Geschwender (1968) expands on Davies' "J-curve", breaking different interpretations and additions up into "Rise and Drop Hypothesis" – which is his name for the "J-curve", the "Rising Expectations Hypothesis" (see ff. 41 below for further explanation, the "Relative Deprivation Hypothesis" (see pp. 39 below for further

Morrison (Goldstone, 1980: 427). The view of these theorists attempted to improve on the notion that “misery breeds revolution” (Goldstone, 1982: 192). Theorists tend to have diverse ideas as to what the triggers for revolution in the category are. These triggers range from long term through to short term causes, or the closure of space for certain groups (Goldstone, 1980: 427-428). Indeed, some of the theorists pay sole attention to the short term economic reversal of a society (Davies) while others open it up to the deprivation of economic and/or political and/or social deprivation (Gurr, also see Samuel Huntington, 1968 on deprivation of political participation). The common factor for this group of theories is that the root of revolution rests in the mindset of the masses, and in particular, is based on the psychological theory of Frustration-Aggression. This theory will also be considered in more depth in the following chapter. While these theories do hold some value when trying to interpret revolution, they are also wrought with difficulties and newly created questions, such as does frustration necessarily cause aggression? Or can there be aggression without frustration? Indeed, there are several other flaws; which will be dealt with in more detail in the following chapter.

The second group of theories Goldstone (1980: 428; emphasis in text) refers to are “[2] *Analyses based on sociological (structural-functionalist) theory*”. He places theorists such as Chalmers Johnson, Neil Smelser, Bob Jessop, Mark Hart, Edward Tiryakian and Mark Hagopian under this general category (Goldstone, 1980: 428). These theories can be summed up as follows:

These authors ... approach societies as *systems* whose smooth functioning depends on maintaining an equilibrium both in total flow of demands and resources between the system and its environment, and between the various subsystems-polity, economy, status, and culture (or value system)-that make up the social system. Thus, any disturbance that severely impairs the equilibrium of demand and resource flows in society leaves that society in a state of

explanation), the “Downward Mobility Hypothesis” – (see ff. 55 below for further explanation) and the “Status Inconsistency Hypothesis” which argues “[i]f a group’s mobility were strictly determined by the abilities and initiatives of its members, it would be expected to move up in all status hierarchies at corresponding rates. If their mobility in one dimensions lags behind others it indicates the existence of impediments to free mobility. These impediments tend to create tensions which could produce protest activity” (Geschwender, 1968: 131). One area where the “Status Inconsistency Hypothesis” is good, is in explaining why some groups that vary in class position, and the like can unify, such as “groups that are high occupationally but low racially or ethnically, or high on the racial-ethnic dimension but low in the economic status, as well as other combinations” (Geschwender, 1968: 131).

“disequilibrium” (Hagopian), or “dysfunction” (Johnson), in which it is unstable, or prone to revolution (Goldstone, 1980: 428).

As with the social-psychological theories, the sociological theories have several main points. These points are emphasised to a greater or lesser degree by the various theorists. The end result is always the same however, where revolution is created when there is disequilibrium in society (Goldstone, 1980: 428).

The third group of new second generation of theories presented by Goldstone (1980: 429), is “[3] *Analyses based on political science (pluralist, interest-group conflict theory)*”. In this group he places notable theorists such as Charles Tilly, Samuel Huntington, Peter Amman and Arthur Stinchcombe (Goldstone, 1980: 429). The basis of this group’s theory is that revolution is conflict between competing interest groups, and as such revolution is

Treated as the “ultimate” political conflict, in which the normal struggle between interest groups in escalated-both by the intensity of the conflict and the magnitude of resources that interest groups bring to bear-to the point where normal political processes for conflict mediation and resolution fail, and the political system is violently split apart (Goldstone, 1980: 429)

(Goldstone, 1980: 429) continues

Thus, the defining concept in this approach is the notion of “multiple sovereignty”; that is, a situation in which (1) competing interest groups are so violently opposed on highly salient issues that their differences cannot be reconciled with the current political system, and (2) two or more competing groups have sufficient resources-political, financial, organizational, military-to establish “sovereignty” over a substantial political or military base, and thus seek to achieve their goals by force.

Thus, with various groups that have limited sovereignty, they use their sovereignty in a way to wage war against other group in an effort to gain greater sovereignty.

When considering the states involved in the Arab Spring, it becomes very interesting to examine the causes of the revolutions within the states. While in Tunisia it was argued that Mohamed Bouazizi set himself alight in protest at unemployment, there were other factors noted, such as appalling living standards, police violence and a lack of human rights (Rifai, 2011). In Egypt, very similar concerns were raised. Indeed, it appears that on the national holiday to commemorate the police forces, many protesters took to the streets to protest against poverty, unemployment, government corruption and the rule of president Hosni Mubarak” (Al Jazeera (a), 2011).

These second generation theories faced several difficulties in their formulation however. Indeed, as Rod Aya (1979: 52) argues, using Leon Trotsky’s metaphor of the “piston-cylinder” and “steam”, where “steam” would dissipate when not enclosed in a “piston-cylinder” and the “piston-cylinder” would not move without the “steam”, he argues that many of these theories attend to the “steam” but not the “piston-cylinder”. As a result, especially when considering the theories presented by the first group, they lack a proper explanation as to how the unhappiness in a society is turned into political and militant action (Aya, 1979: 52). It is merely assumed that once society reaches a certain point, revolution will happen. They therefore were largely tautological (Aya, 1979: 58; Foran, 1993: 2). As Foran (1993: 2) presents it

The general theories of the 1960s used social psychology and functionalist models to address the “why” question, but were subject to the criticism that their causal variables (relative deprivation, subsystems disequilibria, and the like) were vague, difficult to observe, or hard to measure, or were inferred tautologically from a retrospective vantage point.

Goldstone (1982: 193) sums up that the “Second Generation” theories saw revolutions as purposive movements to “wrest control” from the state, and as a result mainly concentrated on the opposition to the state and how they became active. It was therefore necessary to consider other factors of revolution, again, building on a foundation laid out by the first two “Generations” of revolutionary theory.

Although the second generation of theories made some interesting and important headwork in the field of understanding revolutions, they fell short in several areas, as mentioned above, and new perspectives opened up further possibilities for analysis in the studies of revolution. As a result, the studies of revolution went into their third generation. Authors such as Barrington Moore, Jr. and Eric Wolf, amongst others, raised important issues and insights into the field of understanding revolutions that indeed added to the growing analytical tools in studying revolutions. Goldstone (1980: 434-435) sums up what he considers the five important contributions to the analytical tools for understanding revolution by these third generation theorists, being

- (1) The variable goals and structures of states; (2) the systematic intrusion, over time, of international political and economic pressures on the domestic political and economic organization of societies; (3) the structure of peasant communities; (4) the coherence of weakness of the armed forces; and (5) the variables affecting elite behaviour.

These five contributions will be discussed in more detail below. Although not necessarily advancing the study of revolutions *per se* (Goldstone, 1980: 434), these tools are important in considering the Arab Spring, and the possibility of a revolution in South Africa.

Firstly, “the *variable goals and structures of the states*” (Goldstone, 1980: 435; emphasis in text) were seen. The state was no longer ignored or simply seen as “the arena for the expression and resolution of conflict” (Goldstone, 1980: 435). Instead,

The state is not merely an arena for conflict or a means of coercion, but an autonomous entity, and that there exists among states a diversity of goals as well as structures, which affect the possibilities for revolutionary change (Goldstone, 1980: 435).

Therefore, revolutionary possibilities emerged when the state's goals clashed with the structures of society (Goldstone, 1980: 435).

The second analytic tool was “*the intrusion of international political and economic pressures*” (Goldstone, 1980: 435; emphasis in text). Previously, this had been a relatively ignored area of study. However, the “Third Generation” theorists placed this as an important aspect of the revolutionary process. Their argument is summarised by Goldstone (1980: 436) as

In short, the intrusion of international political and economic pressures may introduce incentives- or imperative needs-that bring states and landlords into opposition with basic aspects of the agrarian, economic, and political organization of their society, thus creating an impetus to revolutionary change.

In addition to the previous two analytical tools, the third tool “*the structure of peasant communities*” (Goldstone, 1980: 436; emphasis in text) was also seen as important. It is argued that peasants often play a decisive role in revolutions, and as a result, attempting to decipher the variable that affect the nature of their participation is important, especially to the “Third Generation” theorists (Goldstone, 1980: 436). Goldstone (1980: 436) summarises

The nature of peasant revolutionary activity depends on the relation of peasants to landlords and to the state, on the type of crops and agricultural techniques used, on the mode of village organization, on the degree of landholding or landlessness, whether production is for local or for market sale, and whether taxes and other obligations are paid in cash, in labor, or in kind.

The fourth analytical tool mentioned by (Goldstone, 1980: 435; emphasis in text) is “*the coherence of the armed forces*”. It must be noted however, that this is not an entirely new concept added by the “Third Generation” theorists. It was already being considered – although to a much lesser extent by the major theorists of the day – as early as the 1940s, if not earlier. Katharine Chorley (cited in Johnson, 1966: 99) argued

[a]rmed insurrection in some form or another, is the classic method of making revolution, and ... it is bound to imply a clash with professionally trained troops equipped with all the gear of scientific warfare. History shows that, in the last resort, success or failure hinges on the attitude which those armed forces of the *status quo* government will take toward the insurrection. ... Whatever government or party has the full allegiance of a country's armed forces is to all intents and purposes politically impregnable (emphasis in text).

Goldstone (1980: 436) agrees, claiming “revolution is impossible where the armed forces of a state are intact and effectively used”.

Finally, the fifth analytical tool “*Variable affecting elite behaviour*” (Goldstone, 1980: 436; emphasis in text) is considered by these theorists of the third generation to be one of the more important ones. In this point, a more in depth look at elite actions and factors influencing elite actions is taken than the broad-stroke second generation theories (Goldstone, 1980: 437).

Although the third generation of theorists found themselves adding interesting and valuable levels of analysis to the further study of revolution, they – in more recent years – have become rather criticised (Foran, 1993: 6). John Foran (1993: 6) points out that

The 1980s and early 1990s also have witnessed a resurgence of interest that the third-generation theorists had neglected. These include the somewhat interrelated areas of agency, social structural considerations, and the roles played by culture and ideology in revolutions.

Indeed, while Michael Kimmel (1990: 188) does not reject the work of the third generation of revolutionary theory in its entirety, he does point to the limitations. He feels these third generation theories consider

that men's (sic) motives are unimportant; they indeed make events, including revolutions. But the purposes of men, especially in revolution, are so numerous, so varied, and so contradictory that their complex interaction produces results that no one intended or could even foresee. It is this interaction and these results that recent historians are referring to when they speak so disparagingly of these "underlying determinants" and "impersonal and inexorable forces" bringing on the Revolution. Historical explanation which does not account for these "forces," which, in other words, relies simply on understanding the conscious intentions of the actors, will thus be limited (Wood, 1973: 129 cited in Kimmel, 1990: 188-189).

This acknowledgement of the role the human factor plays in revolutions allows an understanding of the difficulty in creating a single unifying theory of revolutions. However, Kimmel (1990: 189) suggests, following from Marx before him that "people may not make history exactly as they please, but people do make history".

This is where the beginnings of the fourth and by appearance the most "current" generation of revolutionary theory begins to take form. Without rejecting the structural explanation, fourth generation theorists strove to consider the roles that ideology, culture¹³, leadership and networks, and even gender relations played in revolution (Goldstone, 2001: 152-160). If one considers for example, if one considers say, ideological and cultural factors, Goldstone suggests that

Material deprivation and threats need to be seen not merely as miserable conditions but as a direct result of the injustice and the moral and political failings of the state, in sharp contrast to the virtue and justice of the opposition ... acts of state repression against protesters may be seen as necessary peacekeeping or conversely as unjustified repression¹⁴.

In addition, networks are extremely important in the role of mobilising a society into a revolutionary state. These networks can be formal, such as trade unions and similar

¹³ This is interesting when considering James C. Davies explanation as to why there was no revolution in America during the Great Depression (Davies, 1962: 16).

¹⁴ This could indeed be the case, and may explain why the deaths of protesters such as Andries Tatane failed to spark revolt in South Africa, as opposed to events such Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia.

organisations or informal networks found in friendships, neighbourhoods, communities and other groups of people (Goldstone, 2001: 150-151)¹⁵.

The role of leadership has also taken on new importance in the fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Indeed, Goldstone (2001: 156) argues “[s]uccessful leaders excel at taking advantage of favourable political and economic circumstances. Poor leaders generally act when circumstances are highly unfavourable to success”. In the past, leaders are often treated with little importance as they are seen to be ultimately at the mercy of the other conditions, a kind of “right place, right time” scenario. What is often forgotten however is that leaders are often very effective in motivating, inspiring and sometimes helping to direct the revolutionary force (Goldstone, 2001: 157). The danger however, of attributing too great importance to the leaders is that it often leads to theorists taking an apparently conservative outlook on the revolutionary situation. With this, it is important to consider the potential debate that is often raised when considering the spontaneity or the conspiracy views of revolution.

Spontaneous – Conspiracy

Timur Kuran (1989: 41) begins his *Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution* stating that

Certain political revolutions in modern history, including the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of February 1917, and the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, took the world by surprise.

¹⁵ What is fascinating about this, is the role attributed to social networking during the Arab Spring. Indeed, many have attributed great importance to the social networking and the internet, allowing individuals to vent their grief at the current regime and develop groups with similar standings in a relatively secure manner – although the death of Khaled Said in Egypt shows that it is not completely secure.

Indeed, the eruption of mass protest in Tunisia, followed by Egypt and more, did appear to take the world by surprise, and the world watched as the crowds in these nations successfully – or unsuccessfully – rose against their ruling regimes. In Tunisia, the masses took to the streets in what appeared to be a spontaneous uprising sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi. The question as to whether this uprising was purely spontaneous or the work of some conspirators is an intriguing and important question, which extends to all revolutionary scenarios and is often determined by how the crowd is seen and stereotyped¹⁶? Eckstein (1965: 141) explains that

[t]o be sure, conspiracy seems to play an essential role in certain types of internal war [of which revolutions are a part], particularly those previously referred to as *coups* and palace revolutions. As well, one undoubtedly finds conspirational organizations in every internal war of any consequence – in one case Jacobins, in others fascists, in still others communists (emphasis in text).

However, Eckstein (1965: 141) warns that there is a very real danger of a misinterpretation of this, stating that

[t]his is precisely what tempts so many to attribute internal wars solely or mainly to conspirators, and thus to regard them ... essentially as matters of technique – plotting on one hand and intelligence and suppression on the other.

In addition to the hardships presented when considering a revolution, it is also shown that

[i]nternal wars [and this author would argue many other forms of civil unrest] do not always have a clear aim, a tight organization, a distinct shape and tendency from the outset. Many seem to be characterized in their early stages by nothing so much as amorphousness (Eckstein, 1965: 141).

¹⁶ George Rudé (1964; especially 7-10) also presents the stereotypes presented in a following section.

As a result of these factors, one can see where the divided interpretations are created. In the one view, a more sympathetic perspective on the masses is taken where the masses are seen to be rising up against a regime that has allowed one or more factors that cause revolution to last for too long. Hagopian (1974: 177) points out, some individuals who are

sympathetic to the revolutionary cause tend to see the revolution as a spontaneous grass-roots movement welling up from the vast masses of oppressed humanity. This tendency is reinforced by the strong legitimating force of the democratic idea: action done by the “people” must be right.

This follows “the explosion hypothesis”¹⁷ as presented by Hagopian (1974: 178-179) which simply argues that “revolutions are not *made*, they *happen*” (emphasis in text). In this perspective, it is argued that the direction that the revolutionary movement takes is chosen by the “people” and will correspond with correcting those issues perceived not to have been sufficiently dealt with by the previous regime. These issues can be as diverse as political freedom, economic improvement and many other factors. Indeed, Rod Aya (1979: 51) argues

Subsumed in the volcanic model ... is a standard scenario relating social transformation to the rise of popular protest: rapid structural change (formerly associated with the coming of urban industrial capitalism to Europe and North America, more recently with hothouse “modernization” in the Third World) produces widespread dislocation, alientation, and hardship, as well as a quantum leap in the level of expectations. As social and economic horizons broaden, privation and dependence cease to appear to be the inescapable fate of the lower class ... Acquiring new wants much faster than means to satisfy them, people harbor a sharpening sense of bitterness and frustration ... [and] thus the volcanic model pictures the etiology of revolt and revolution like this: the onrush of uncontrolled changes in the structure of society begets multiplex tensions which, if unrelieved, erupt into mass violence where and when social controls relax or weaken.

In this scenario, especially if there is more than one factor, the masses will rebel but it can easily be seen that there will not necessarily be a single, well thought out planned rebellion, as there will most likely be different groups with different aims, and it would take time for

¹⁷ Rod Aya (1979: 49) refers to this model as “the volcanic model”.

these groups to reach an agreement as to which of their issues is most important and to focus all their attention on this issue becoming a more unified front that is difficult to separate.

On the other hand however, there is the view that can be considered rather unsympathetic to the masses revolting against a regime, and this employs a more cynical view of revolutions. In this, the movements of the masses are simplified to such an extent that they are merely seen as pawns in the conspirators' arsenal. The masses are either placed in a box where they can do no wrong – e.g. rebel (Hagopian, 1974: 178), or they are seen as too simple minded to actually rise up against their oppressors. This type of view, especially the masses being too simple minded for actual political action, comes across from many of the more conservative persuasion, such as David Cameron when speaking to parliament about the London riots that rocked Britain in 2011, where he forcefully declared “This was not political protest, or a riot about protest or about politics, it was common ... thieving, robbing and looting” (Bennett, et al, 2011; also see Badiou, 2012: 16)¹⁸. Cameron went on to argue that the violence was initiated and organised by street gangs (Bennett, et al, 2011; also see Badiou, 2012: 16). This side tends “to see revolutions as the fruit of the machinations of an insidious clique of plotters” and “this clique of plotters [are] the ‘unmoved movers’ which manipulates the masses at its own discretion” (Hagopian, 1974: 178). This mode of thinking often leads to what Hagopian (1974: 179-180) refers to as “simplistic conspiracy theories” that in their most simplistic form, fall to arguments such as relying on

clear facts that large numbers of Jacobins and other revolutionarists had been Masons before the French Revolution or that the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary groupings contained ‘disproportionate’ numbers of Jews, ... [to] infer that the French Revolution was a ‘Masonic plot’ and the Russian, a Jewish one.

Indeed, Eckstein (1965: 138) argues that even the Chinese Revolution has at times been blamed on pure conspiracy, being “a plot by a small number of Kremlin agents or power-

¹⁸ Jacques Rancière sheds some interesting light on this interpretation (Lemmey, 2013)

hungry Chinese intellectuals”. However, as Hagopian (1974: 180) correctly states, this hypothesis all too easily falls to the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*¹⁹.

As one can see in the discussion above, there are clearly two extreme perspectives. Hagopian (1974: 181-184) presents a third perspective that uses parts from both “the explosion hypothesis” and “simplistic conspiracy theories” which he calls “a catalytic theory of revolutionary leadership”. Hagopian (1974: 181) explains

[a] catalyst is something that, added in small quantities to a mixture of ingredients, promotes a rapid and decisive reaction. The catalyst analogy is applied to revolutionary leadership to emphasise that utter mass spontaneity has not produced nor could it produce the revolutions history records. Most spontaneous collective behaviour falls into subrevolutionary categories (e.g. revolts). Spontaneity in revolution can destroy things and even produce makeshift localized institutions, but it requires leadership to organize the apparatus of the state to further the aims of the revolution. Both dimensions are intimately associated with revolution.

If one considers both the previously mentioned theories – “the explosion hypothesis” and the “simplistic conspiracy theories” – then one can see that they both have their validities and their flaws. When considering the “simplistic conspiracy theories” for example, it is extremely difficult to believe that there is a Professor James Moriarty (played by Jared Harris in *Sherlocke Holmes: A Game of Shadows*, 2011) type character that carefully plans long-term and medium-term grievances such as economic growth or economic depression for their own devious purposes (Hagopian, 1974: 181). In addition, it would become extremely difficult for a Pied Piper type figure to just walk into a meeting hall of a society where there are no problems, and spin the masses in that meeting hall into a revolutionary frenzy²⁰. On the other hand however, when considering “the explosion hypothesis”, it becomes very difficult to explain when the masses will just rise up. Indeed, according to many of the theories presented – as will be considered below – especially theories such as Relative

¹⁹ A group with revolutionary goals in a given society was created, and then there was a revolution in said society. The assumption would be that this group caused the revolution, whether true or not.

²⁰ This author uses the term “extremely difficult” rather than “impossible”, because one of the major features of the Pied Piper – being a Pied Piper figure and not the fictional character based in the German legend – is that he offers false enticement, thus securing support through the “trance” that is thus created.

Deprivation, it appears that the masses may well rise up, but in most cases need anything from a gentle nudge to a firm push in a given direction, else these theories fail to explain why some societies revolt while other societies with similar conditions fail to revolt. It can be seen therefore, that, as considered in the above Hagopian quote, both “the explosion hypothesis” and the “simplistic conspiracy theories” can be bonded into a workable “catalytic theory of revolutionary theory”. This theory is not entirely without its own flaws. Indeed, to take a line from the above Hagopian quote, he suggests “[t]he catalyst analogy is applied to revolutionary leadership to emphasize that utter spontaneity has not produced nor could it produce the revolution history records”. However, theorists such as Peter Lupsha (1971) would strongly disagree with this, for in his theory of righteous indignation – which will be properly explored in the following chapter – he would argue that an act such as the assassination of Martin Luther King jnr. was enough to spark revolt throughout the United States of America (USA). Indeed, Ekaterina Stepanova (2011) argues social networking and communications were what catalysed the revolutions during the Arab Spring. If one considers the role of these two factors in revolutions perhaps it would be true to say that while leadership can be important in spurring on what are seen as revolutions by many, and it may be important in the process of revolution as well as the aftermath, if it were not for the spontaneous outburst of the masses revolutions would not occur.

When considering the Arab Spring, it can be seen how making the distinctions between conspiracy and spontaneity are important. Even if one looks at the two different views, we can see that different factors caused these revolutions. In some cases, there was total spontaneity with the masses rising up against economic deprivation or political repression, in other cases it was a spark, such as the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, and still in others there was evidence of groups relying on with religious vigor and the like. It is important to distinguish between these different views because one’s outlook on the revolutions themselves is relative to one’s broader political outlook. For example, one that is more concerned with the spontaneity of revolutions may be more focused on more broad based factors such as economic or structural deficiencies of the old regime, and as a result, may ignore or lessen the importance of some of the other factors that contributed to the revolution that is being considered.

The Role of Rationality

Before continuing onto further chapters where we shall take an in-depth look at several theories, we must briefly consider the role of rationality in the formation of a revolution, particularly because of the role social networking played in the Arab Spring. The collective action issue is a factor that needs to be considered in revolutions. This issue can be either beneficial or problematic to a revolution, depending on the side on which one stands. Norman Frolich and Joe Oppenheimer (1970: 104) make the observation – although it must be taken into account that they are writing in America during the 1970's, and so some of the problems they are considering have come and gone, while other dilemmas that were perhaps not prevalent or non-existent then have emerged – that

[Ending] the war in Vietnam, preventing similar conflicts elsewhere, solving the problems associated with the pollution of our environment, and securing a just domestic social order are among the most important political issues of our time. These issues have one characteristic in common: the securing (or non-securing) of these objectives will be shared by all citizens ...

As they further suggest, “revolutionary movements could be analyzed from the standpoint of collective goods”²¹ (Frolich and Oppenheimer, 1970: 105). In many of the theories that have been presented to answer the question of why revolutions take place, many rest on the assumption that revolutions will inevitably happen once the relative grievances are there, although in some cases, only once they are known about. Indeed, Joseph Heath (2000: 367-368) discusses how perplexed many Marxists were when they were not joined by the masses at the barricades after it was decided that communism was better than capitalism²². Indeed, if one was to simplify the causes of revolution to theories such as Relative Deprivation, then

²¹ To define “public goods”, it can be said that they are “goods that, if consumed by one member of a group, cannot be withheld from the other members” (Frolich and Oppenheimer, 1970: 104). It must be said, that Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970: 104 ff. 1) explain – for the purposes of their paper: “‘Goods’ will be used here in the ‘economic’ sense: as a combination of scarce resources. The word is not meant to connote positive valuation. A ‘good’ may not be good. Indeed, ‘goods’ may have negative valuations placed upon them. Thus some individuals may be willing to pay to get rid of some ‘goods’ (e.g. pollution). Similarly, ‘benefits’ should not be viewed as necessarily carrying a positive valuation. One of the ‘benefits’ of residing on the eastern coast of the United States of America is breathing in industrial wastes.

²² According to Heath (2000: 367-368), the best candidate referred to when this failed to happen was ideology, being in the forms of commodity fetishism and then consumerism.

one has to wonder why revolutions have not been more common. What is often seen as missing in these theories is the rationality of the individuals taking part in the collective action. Mark Lichbach (1994: 386) sums this argument, suggesting

On the benefit side (1) a successful outcome of a revolt is a low-probability event and hence rebellion is a risky undertaking; (2) a successful outcome is almost independent of any one peasant's participation; (3) the benefits of a successful outcome are also independent of any one peasant's participation. On the cost side (1) rebels face many social causes with which to become involved; (2) rebels have many personal demands on their time that have priority-their opportunity costs included, for example, forgone wages; (3) participation is often quite costly and dangerous, since governments [maim] and murder their enemies. In short, rebels confront possibly dangerous private costs and uncertain public benefits.

If one considers the individual as a rational being, then one needs to identify that there is quite possibly a calculation of cost-benefit / risk-benefit within the individuals own mind. An argument which could then naturally follow is – to use Lichbach's (1994: 386) own words when describing the rational peasant with the choice of revolt – “if others protest, they do not need me and I will get the benefits anyway” and on the other side, “if others fail to protest, I am not enough and will get no benefits anyway”. There is a simple conclusion when considering both of these sides, the individual “always gains by not protesting” and that “benefits provide no incentive to act, and the costs provide every incentive not to act” (Lichbach, 1994: 386-387). Following this, it becomes quite clear that more is required than just something such as Relative Deprivation, for if something as simple as Relative Deprivation was powerful enough to begin a revolution, then the poor would be in a constant stage of revolt. However, history has also shown us that as opposed to this idea of rationality that would hinder revolt, there have been revolts, and so there must clearly be one – or more – things that can tip the cost/benefit scale in favour in favour of popular actions as a result of possible benefits.

Conclusion

The complexity of this subject is mindboggling, with theorists being largely unable to identify what it is that makes a revolution. What we have seen in this past chapter is that the very definition of the word differs between various theorists and is contested. In addition, we have seen that the four generations of revolutionary theory, have often vastly different analytical tools to consider revolutions with and there are often even various generations, and sometimes vastly different approaches to analysing revolutions within a given generation of revolutionary theory. As a result of this, it is difficult to give an exact answer as to what a revolution is. However, we also cannot use a term through this thesis without giving it some form of definition. Keeping this in mind, for the purpose of this thesis, we shall borrow the definition presented below by Goldstone (2001: 142), being

Revolution: an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine the existing authorities.

However, as this definition appears to look solely at political institutions we would like to amend it slightly, to encompass social and economic institutions, thus allowing for change based on economic and social factor as well as political factors.

While there will most likely be some disagreement over the use of this definition on revolution, it appears to separate revolution from other forms of civil unrest, such as revolt – in that, as opposed to revolts that “is involved with men and measures, not with fundamental institutions” (Hagopian, 1974: 11)²³, revolutions are aimed at altering the institutions of a given society – as well as from coup d’etat – which Mark Hagopian (1974: 4) argues “are generally power as an end in itself coupled in certain cases with shifts in the day-to-day pattern of policy and administration”. As a result of this, it gives us some idea of the scale and scope of what we are considering. That being said, Zagorin (1973: 28) is probably correct in the analysis that “perhaps it is impossible to establish a completely satisfactory

²³ One will notice later, that despite the differences in opinion as to whether there will be a revolution in South Africa or not, both sides of the debate consider the need to change the institutions as the main goals of the revolutions in the Arab Spring.

definition of the term [revolution], so complex are the phenomena and variables to be included.”

When we began this chapter, our initial aim was give us some more background on the theoretical definition of the term revolution and to define the term revolution for use in this thesis. We have seen that the term “revolution” has become rather diluted, and that as a result of the variety of theories and analytical tools, the term has tended to have multiple definitions. It has been shown that there is a long history of revolutionary theory and that these theories are not often complimentary to each other. We have also explored briefly the history of revolutionary theory over the twentieth century, and how it has gone through four generations, with analytical tools being different in each generation, and sometimes within the very generations themselves. In addition, we have briefly explored the debate around the spontaneity arguments and the conspiracy theories of revolution. The resulting theory of the catalytic hypothesis appears to be the best solution as the middle ground, and is useful when we consider the South Africa debate in the fourth chapter. Finally, the role that rationality may play in preventing – or creating if factors are altered – a revolution has been considered. The idea that one may stand more to lose than one does because they are unsure whether others will revolt with them is a tricky problem. Ultimately we have left this chapter with a greater understanding of revolutions and the revolutionary theory history, as well as briefly considering a single theory.

Chapter Two:

Social-Psychological Revolutionary Theories

Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are relative by nature.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,

Wage Labor and Capital

When considering the economic and political factors that lead to revolution – or at least those that seemed to trigger the Arab Spring and that were more specifically the major factors in the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt – one needs to attempt to understand why these revolutions occurred. In this chapter, I will consider some theories that seek to account for revolution. These theories will be dealt with under the general umbrella category of “social-psychological theories” (Gurr, 1973: 364; See also Hagopian, 1974: 168-177), as previously mentioned in the second generation of revolutionary theory in the previous chapter. Some of the theories I will consider in this chapter are Frustration-Aggression (FA), Relative Deprivation (RD) and the Davies “J-Curve” theories. The reason these theories have been placed together under the umbrella category, is that the majority of these theories share a common hypothesis, which is, as explained by Mark Hagopian²⁴ (1974: 168)

The core hypothesis of most social psychological approaches to revolution is a deceptively simple one: *men (sic) have basic needs, wishes, or instincts, which if frustrated give rise to feelings of*

²⁴ It must be noted here that Mark Hagopian is not a supporter of the social-psychological theories of revolution. He does however, provide quite a useful explanation of these theories.

aggression that sometimes take the form of revolutionary behaviour and violence (emphasis in text).

This can take the very basic form of the FA theory, or it takes a slightly more complex form, as Ted Robert Gurr (1968: 1104) states when explaining the basic idea behind RD:

The basic theoretical proposition is that a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater the magnitude of strife in one or another form.

The theories of FA and RD – as well as the Davies “J-Curve” theories are useful in our exploration of how the events in the Arab Spring were received both in South Africa and around the world. They focus on two main factors - economics and politics. With the South African debate being roughly split into economic and political factors, these theories can have some use in our analysis.

Social-psychological theories of revolution ascribe revolution to the growth of inequality. This can take the form of one group getting more than another group, another group feeling that their wants and needs are being thwarted or just the expectations of a group outgrowing what they actually have. For example, in a world of growing democracy – or at least, a growth in rhetoric about democracy, a dictator such as Hosni Mubarak might find that the people of Egypt took to the streets because they expected a growth of democracy in Egypt, whereas the reality was that it was in fact shrinking. Steven Friedman (2011), for example, argues that South Africa has a constitutional democracy, as opposed to Tunisia and Egypt and that the cause of the revolutions in these countries was the desire for political freedom. He argues that in South Africa this is not a problem as we have political freedom and can choose our leaders. The aim of this chapter is to explore several of the theories that fall into the broad social-psychological category and to attempt to establish whether these theories are indeed useful in our exploration of the debate. We will be unable to proceed without considering both the theory of FA and RD from which most of these theories are born.

It will be shown that RD is effective when considering a variety of positions, being political (Gurr), social (Gurr) and economic (Gurr and James C. Davies) and not purely the psychological theory of FA. Considering our debate is focused on political and economic factors, such as unemployment and corruption, it will be shown that the social-psychological theories used here are indeed useful in our analysis of the South African debate in cases where these factors are perceived not to be improving. Indeed, Moeletsi Mbeki (2011) argues that in South Africa the population is being kept in check through false promises and welfare. He feels that South Africa has several economic factors in common with Tunisia. One of these factors is the unemployment level, which is extremely high in South Africa, particularly amongst the youth. A high unemployment level may lead to increases in crime, poverty and desperation. Another factor is whether the government is delivering on its promises. If we consider these issues and the points raised by Mbeki and his followers, the theories of FA and RD may play an important role in explaining the different views of prominent South African thinkers. It seems that although RD and FA both focus on society as a whole they are not without their flaws. However, it is still important to explore both of these theories as they can cater for both sides of the debate and may shed light on why these individuals felt as they did when considering the Arab Spring.

When considering theories such as RD, as put forward by authors such as Gurr and Davies, one has to initially delve into the primary theory that influenced its rise, the psychological theory of FA. FA is important for us to consider as it is the platform on which RD rests, as RD is “a generalization of the frustration-anger-aggression [FA] principle from the individual to the social level” (Gurr, 1973: 364). The basis of FA is the idea that there is a collection or more generally, a hierarchy of needs²⁵ that require satisfaction for a human being to reach and maintain a happy and fulfilled state. If the individual is blocked from achieving these needs, the individual will become frustrated and this will lead to aggression if the obstacle is still in the way. In the case of a need hierarchy – as presented by Abraham Maslow (1943), the lowest needs need to be satisfied before one can move onto the more advanced needs. To use two examples, Maslow, presents his “needs hierarchy”, where he presented five levels,

²⁵ In the case of a hierarchy of needs, an individual must satisfy the more “primordial” (Hagopian, 1974: 170) needs before moving onto the more advanced needs.

“includ[ing] (1) physical [Maslow (1943: 372) uses the term ‘physiological’ instead] needs (water, food, sex, etc.); (2) safety needs (order, predictability, dependability); (3) need for love, affection, belongingness; (4) need for self-esteem; (5) need for self-actualization” (Maslow, 1943: 372-383; Hagopian, 1974: 170)²⁶. Although Maslow was not researching revolution, his “needs hierarchy”, or similar ideas, have been used by many of the theorists exploring revolution and violence. Pitirim Sorokin (cited in Hagopian, 1974: 168) for example, argues

The immediate cause of revolution is always the growth of ‘repression’ of the main instincts of the majority of society, and the impossibility of obtaining for those instincts the necessary minimum satisfaction.²⁷

Sorokin gives a series of “instincts” and “reflexes” that are important in revolution, being the “desire for food, clothing, shelter, reflexes or individual and collective self-preservation, sexual desire, instincts of ownership and self-expression, impulse of ‘fighting and rivalry, creative work, of variety experience and adventure,’ and so on” (Hagopian, 1974: 169)²⁸. In a similar way, George Pettee sets five categories, being institutional, economic, social, ideological, and political, arguing that individuals who don’t have these categories fulfilled will feel “cramped²⁹” (Odegard, 1939: 693; Hagopian, 1974: 169). Pettee (cited in Hagopian, 1974: 169) argues that

²⁶ Maslow (1943: 386-388) does make the point that although the need hierarchy does appear quite rigid there are exceptions. He ordered the hierarchy according to the research he did on the subject.

²⁷ Hagopian (1974: 169) states Sorokin argues this idea of repression as a function of “comparing what we enjoy now with what we once enjoyed or comparing what we enjoy with what others enjoy”

²⁸ These “instincts” have been simplified by Lyford Edwards - using the “four elemental types of wishes” categories presented by W. I. Thomas – into “(1) the wish for new experience, (2) the wish for security, (3) the wish for public recognition, and (4) the wish for response in personal intimacy” (Hagopian, 1974: 169). In a similar way, George Pettee sets four categories, being economic, social, ideological, and political, arguing that individuals who don’t have these categories fulfilled will feel “cramped” (Hagopian, 1974: 169). Pettee argues that “[t]he cramped individual is one who not only finds that his basic impulses are interfered with, or that he is threatened by various ills, but who also feels that his repression is unnecessary and avoidable, and therefore unjustified”

²⁹ Peter Odegard (1939: 693) sums up: “These cramps may be *institutional*, when existing institutions are no longer able to cope with the insistent problems of the day; *economical*, when the potential production and distribution of goods are hampered by outmoded property relations; *ideological*, when old social myths in terms of which a society is held together are impoverished by lack of any correspondence with social realities. In addition to these, there may be *social* and *political* cramps resulting from changes in the size and composition of social classes, the development of revolutionary ideologies, and from a badly designed state machinery unable peacefully to adjust itself to social change (emphasis in text)”

The cramped individual is one who not only finds that his basic impulses are interfered with, or that he is threatened by various ills, but who also feels that his repression is unnecessary and avoidable, and therefore unjustified.

As can be seen, this body of theory takes the view that when an individual or collection of individuals feels that they cannot achieve their needs, they will get frustrated and will strike out against those that they perceive to be denying them the ability to meet the said needs.

That being said, FA is not without criticisms. Peter Lupsha (1971: 98; also see Marx, 1972: 129) - despite admitting that these theories do provide a link between the individual and violence, and that these theories do provide a plausible trigger for “[p]eople would not engage in violence if nothing was wrong” - argues, “frustration does not necessarily lead to aggression, and ... that aggression can occur without the accompanying necessity of a frustrating situation”. Rod Aya (1979: 70) agrees, and argues

[P]eople may be socialized to accept frustration as inevitable, legitimate, even deserved; they may be trained to regard aggressive behavior as socially improper; or, conversely, by role-model imitation³⁰ or on command, they may become aggressive without being frustrated at all.

Although, as is even suggested by some of its critics like Lupsha, while the theory of FA does have some positive ideas it cannot stand alone as a theory. It is necessary rather, that other factors such as those considered in the discussions be present to create the perfect revolutionary cocktail.

In order to deal with some of the criticism of FA, the theory of RD attempts to explain civil strife in a similar manner yet acknowledging the complexity of society. It is perhaps more useful than FA, for it is specifically designed to consider society as a whole, it is more reliant

³⁰ What Aya is referring to here is a study that Lupsha (1971: 96) considers which concludes that “children will often model or imitate aggressive behaviors without undergoing a frustrating experience”.

on expectations as well as actual values and can be used quite effectively to explain many different forms of civil strife, from vigilantism (Rosenbaum and Sederberg, 1974) to riots, such as the Black Urban Riots of the 1960s (Miller, Bolce and Halligan, 1977) through to all out revolution (Davies, 1962; 1974). A definition of RD, as presented by Gurr (1970: 24; Also see Gurr, 1968: 1104), is

Relative Deprivation is defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value³¹ expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.

Geschwender (1968: 129) however, has a "Relative Deprivation Hypothesis" that argues, in a similar vein to Karl Marx (see quote at the beginning of this chapter), that

[People] develop the standards for their desired and expected level that they see prevailing throughout society. Their desired level of need satisfaction rises at a pace equivalent to the rate of improved living standards for the rest of society so that, despite an improvement in the objective level of need satisfactions, there is an increasing gap between what the [people] feel they should get and what they actually receive ... In this case, the level of expected need satisfaction derives from the perception of the level of need satisfaction experienced by a reference group.

Considering this, RD does not need to be reliant solely on the perceptions of one group on "the level of need satisfaction experienced by a reference group", as it could be the difference between what one group expects and what that same group actually receives. With this in mind, we can now look at the theories put forward by theorists such as Gurr and Davies. These theorists' main differences are in what they consider important when considering the factors that cause civil strife, while basing their ideas on RD. Davies (1962) for example, appears to concentrate exclusively on the economic factors at certain points³², using need

³¹ Gurr (1970: 25) defines values as "the desired events, objects, and conditions for which men strive".

³² It is for this reason that Isaac Kramnick in his 'Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship' (1972: 43; also see Edward P. Thompson's (1991: 186-187) *Customs in Common* for a

satisfaction as his marker, with expected and actual need satisfaction³³. Gurr (1970) on the other hand, expands, using the categorisation of “*welfare values, power values, and interpersonal values*”³⁴ known as value opportunities (Gurr, 1970: 25, emphasis in text; Gurr, 1973: 365). He continues and puts forward three separate ways available to individuals to attain these value opportunities. Firstly he suggests ‘personal opportunities’ – being the individuals’ inherited and acquired capabilities for value-enhancing action, which, although not necessarily important to a theory of collective violence, through “technical skills and general knowledge acquired through education”, can greatly improve (Gurr, 1970: 28). Secondly there are ‘societal opportunities’ – being the normal courses of action available to members of a collectivity for direct value-enhancement (Gurr, 1970: 28). Finally, there are political opportunities – being the normal courses of action available to members of a collectivity for inducing others to provide them with value satisfaction (Gurr, 1970: 28-29). As can be expected, what a collective of individuals want is the maintenance or an increase in their current welfare, power and interpersonal values, which will be achieved through the opening of the personal opportunities, societal and political opportunities. If this is denied to the collective of individuals, they will become frustrated and this will possibly result in

further criticism on economic reductionism) argues that it is economic determinism, as it is based on “the assumption that psychic states of frustration and aggression are determined solely by material economic conditions”, which often does seem as a supported view, following some of the cases presented by Davies (1962; 1974).

³³ In some later articles, Davies (1967: 255; also see Davies, 1969; Gurr, 1973: 366) gives four different classifications, being “the physical [needs], the social-affectional [needs], self-esteem [needs] (including the recognition of equality), and self-actualization”. It is also argued that in a similar way to Maslow’s “need hierarchy”, there is a hierarchy: “once physical needs are satisfied, social-affectional needs become dominant; when they [social-affectional needs] are satisfied the need for dignity predominates; and so forth” (Gurr, 1973: 366).

³⁴ Gurr (1970: 25) defines welfare values as “those that contribute directly to physical well-being and self-realization. They include the physical goods of life – food, shelter, health services, and physical comforts – and development and use of physical and mental abilities”. Using this, he further splits welfare values into “*economic [values]*” and “*self-actualization values*”, arguing that these might be mutually dependant on each other: “Self-actualization values may be instrumental to attainment of other welfare values and vice versa” (Gurr, 1970: 25). Gurr (1970: 25-26) defines power values as “those that determine the extent to which men can influence the actions of others and avoid unwanted interference by others in their own actions. Power values especially salient for political violence include the desire to participate in collective decision-making – to vote, to take part in political competition, to become a member of the political elite – and related desires for self-determination and security, for example freedom from oppressive political regulation or from disorder.” He then further splits power values into “*participation [values]*” and “*security [values]*” (Gurr, 1970: 26). Gurr (1970: 26) defines interpersonal values as “the psychological satisfactions we seek in nonauthoritative interaction with other individuals and groups. These values include the desire for status, i.e., occupancy of a generally recognized role by virtue of which we are granted some measure of prestige by those with whom we interact; the related need to participate in stable, supportive groups – family, community, associations – that provide companionship and affection; and the sense of certainty that derives from shared adherence to beliefs about the nature of society and one’s place in it, and to norms governing social interaction” This interpersonal value is made up of “*status, communality, and ideational coherence*” (Gurr, 1970: 26).

conflict³⁵, with the scope of the action taken by them depending on the “prevalence with respect to each class of values among the members of [the] collectivity” and the intensity depending on the “negative affect that is associated with its [the deprived value] perception, or in other words the sharpness of discontent or anger to which it gives rise” (Gurr, 1970: 29). There is also the affect that the lack of these values will have on the individual state of mind. Having laid out the units put forward by both Davies and Gurr for their RD theories, we now need to consider very basically the different models they put forward.

Firstly, Gurr (1970: 46-50) presents his model of “decremental deprivation”. In this, the value expectations – expected welfare, power and interpersonal values, not necessarily all three at once – remains at a relatively stable level, or only varies a very small amount, however, the value capabilities – actual welfare, power and interpersonal values, again, not necessarily all at once – declines substantially (1970: 46). This can vary from an entire society suffering “decremental deprivation” through a decline in material production or the inability of the political elite to provide political stability, provide order or resolve crises, or it can fall amongst one or more segments of society whose members feel they are losing out in terms of conflict to other groups (Gurr, 1970: 46). More simply, individuals are angered by the loss of what they either had or expected to have; the deprivation is experienced with reference to their past conditions (Gurr, 1970: 46). His second model, being “aspirational deprivation” is almost the opposite of “decremental deprivation” (Gurr, 1970: 50-52; also see Figure 2 in Appendix A). How this differs, is that the value expectations rises substantially, however, value capabilities remains at a relatively stable level, or only varies a very small amount (1970: 50). Unlike “decremental deprivation”, individuals are angered because they feel that they have hit a ceiling and cannot attain “new or intensified expectations” (1970: 50). These new expectations may

reflect demands for a greater amount of a value already held in some degree, for example for more material goods and a greater degree of political order and justice. It may be a demand for new values never previously held, such as political participation for colonial peoples and personal equality for members of lower class and caste groups. Third, it may represent intensification of

³⁵ Which Gurr (1970: 44) argues is “a special case of RD in which the source of the discrepancy between value expectations and capabilities is another group competing for the same values” and “as a process refers to the interaction between groups in their respective attempts to alleviate RD”.

the commitment to (salience of) a value position that was earlier weakly sought, for example intensifying demands for welfare goods amongst those who experience breakdown of communal life during the early stages of modernization, and intensified demands for access to political elite positions among the upwardly mobile bourgeoisie of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe (Gurr, 1970: 50-51).

A third and the final model presented by Gurr (1970: 52-56) strikes clear resemblance to James C. Davies "J-Curve", also known as the "Rise and Drop Hypothesis" by James Geschwender (1968: 128)³⁶. Davies (1962: 5) points to what he claims to be the most famed thesis of Marx and Engels, being that "progressive degradation of the industrial working class would finally reach the point of despair and inevitable revolt"³⁷. He then further uses de Tocqueville's (cited in Davies, 1962: 5-6) conclusion – based on his study of the French revolution

³⁶ It is extremely interesting looking at where Davies' "J-curve" theory of revolution fits into the broader categories of theories of revolution. Jack Goldstone (1980: 427; also see Goldstone, 2003: 5) places Davies' theory under psychological reasons in his introductory chapter 'Introduction: The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions' of *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*. However, when one considers Kramnick's article 'Reflection on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship' (1972; especially pp 41-45), he places Davies theory under economic explanations of revolution as Kramnick (1972: 43) argues "[the J-curve thesis] should be recognized for what it is – economic determinism, the assumption that psychic states of frustration and aggression are determined solely by material economic conditions". It appears that there is some confusion in the interpretation of his theory. Although he is using a variation of RD or FA – being a psychological theory; he does appear to exclusively use economic factors, with many of his examples being quite reliant of economic factors, such as the Dorr's Rebellion of 1842 – where the textile industry enjoyed growth and then decline (Davies, 1962: 8-9) or the Paris Commune of 1871 – where "three economic measures affecting rents, bills, and guard pay were efficient in J-curve terms" (Davies, 1974: 608). It must be noted however, when considering the examples presented by Davies (1962; 1974), however that although he stresses the economic factors, he does mention socio-political factors as well. Davies (1962: 6) also argues that "[p]olitical stability and instability are ultimately dependant on a state of mind, a mood, in society" and he further states "[i]t is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces revolution" as well as "The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue on the future". In later papers, Davies (1967; 1971; 1974) reiterates that his theory is not economic determinism. If one therefore accepts Davies' claim that the theory is not economic determinism and that he is using the principles of FA, his theory then shows striking similarity to other psychological theories presented by theorists such as Gurr, Tanter and Midlarsky (1967), and others. With this in mind, this author disagrees with the placement of Davies in Kramnick's paper and has therefore placed Davies under the psychological factors in this paper even while it is understandable that when one considers the theory in total there are many economic factors raised which could lead to the confusion as to where this theory fits in..

³⁷ Davies does point that this thesis was not the only thesis that was fathered by these theorists, and points to another theory by Marx and Engels (cited in Davies, 1962: 5) claiming "A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. The rapid growth of productive capital brings about equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, and social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the workers have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general. Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serves for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature."

So it would appear that the French found their condition the more unsupportable in proportion to its [improvement] Revolutions are not always brought about by gradual decline from bad to worse. Nations that have endured patiently and almost unconsciously the most overwhelming oppression often burst into rebellion against the yoke the moment it begins to grow lighter. The regime which is destroyed by the revolution is almost always an improvement on its predecessor Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from them is suggested³⁸.

Being influenced by both of these theorists (Davies, 1962: 6), and placing de Tocqueville before Marx but without abandoning either theory (Davies, 1962: 17), his “J-curve” argues

Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs-which continue to rise-and, during the latter, the mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from the anticipated reality (Davies, 1962: 6).

Davies does however, argue that revolutions will not necessarily occur the moment a situation – being the gradual increase of both actual and expected needs satisfaction followed by the continued gradual increase of expected need satisfaction and the rapid decrease of actual needs satisfaction – happens, as:

³⁸ When talking about anomic suicide – granted in different contexts, often with very different ends, although both versions do involve one sort or another of voluntary self-destruction, with suicide being fairly obvious, but revolutionaries exposing themselves to the horrors that state action and repression can bestow upon them can be argued to represent a form of voluntary self-destruction, Durkheim (1952: 247-248; emphasis added) appears to agree with this line of thinking and after arguing “[i]t is not human nature which can assign the variable limits necessary to our needs [which he argues separates us from animals as “when the void created by existence in its own resources is filled, the animal, satisfied, asks nothing further” (Durkheim, 1952: 246)]. They [human needs] are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss But if nothing external can restrain this capacity, it can only be a source of torment to itself Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness. Of course, man may hope contrary to all reason, and hope has its pleasures even when unreasonable. It may sustain him for a time; but it cannot survive the repeated disappointments of experience indefinitely *Thus, the more one has, the more one wants, since satisfaction received only stimulate instead of filling needs.*”

When it is a choice between losing their chains or their lives, people will mostly choose to keep their chains, a fact which Marx seems to have overlooked ... It is when the chains have been loosened somewhat, so they can be cast off without a high probability of losing life, that people are put in a condition of proto-rebelliousness³⁹ (Davies, 1962: 7).

In a similar fashion to Davies “J-curve”, Gurr’s (1970: 52-53) presents his “progressive deprivation” where he argues that

It can be regarded as a special case of aspirational [Relative Deprivation], one in which long-run, more-or-less-steady improvement in peoples’ value position generates expectations about continued improvement. If value capabilities stabilize or decline after such a period of improvement, progressive [Relative Deprivation] is the result.

These models obviously have their value when considering economic changes – say, economic depression in a growing economy - as shown by Davies, but the main difference between Davies and Gurr’s models, is that Gurr (1970: 53) expands it to incorporate other factors, such as the “an ideology of modernization in a society that has structural inflexibilities that prevent expansion of value output beyond a certain point”. This theory can generally be used to show “that political violence is a consequence of decreasing responsiveness of social structures, beliefs, norms, or all three to objective change” (Gurr, 1970: 53). Finally, Hagopian (1974: 174-175) presents a fourth model to add to Gurr’s list, the idea being “accelerated deprivation” pattern⁴⁰. This model acts in a similar way to

³⁹ Davies (1962: 7) uses the term “proto-rebelliousness” as “the mood of discontent may be dissipated before the violent outbreak”.

⁴⁰ This model almost mimics the “Rising Expectations Hypothesis” presented by Geschwender (1968: 128-129), who, in looking at the example of the Dorr’s Rebellion of 1842 in Davies ‘Toward A Theory of Revolution’ (1962; see pp. 8-10, especially the graph on pp. 9), was more interested in “slower rate” increases in actual need satisfaction between 1812 and 1835 when compared to the previous actual need satisfaction increases between 1790 and 1810 than the actual sharp reversal from 1835 until 1842 – where the graph in Davies paper ends. Geschwender (1968: 128) points out that Davies (1962: 9) might have been incorrect with his conclusion as to where the perception of the intolerable gap developed, arguing that “[t]he perception of an intolerable gap did not result from the curve of economic development [1835 to 1842] proposed by Davies but rather from a simple decline in the rate of social and economic progress [between 1812 and 1835]”. Geschwender (1968: 128-129) uses some theorists such as Crane Brinton to support this, suggesting “[t]hey stated that the experiencing of a period of improvement yields the expectation of, and the desire for, further improvements. When these come too slowly, rebellion follows”

Gurr's "progressive deprivation", where there are both an increase in an individual's value expectations as well as the individual's value capabilities. How it differs though, is that instead of both the value expectations and value capabilities rising at an equal pace – thus requiring a fall in the value capabilities to create the crisis – in the "accelerated deprivation" model the value expectations rise at an even faster rate than the value capabilities, thus increasing the gap between the two and creating the scenario for deprivation to be felt⁴¹.

The usefulness in considering these theories can almost immediately be seen when considering the economic factors. In a society, especially one such as South Africa where – according to theorists such as Moeleetsi Mbeki (2011) – the individuals within the society are placated through false promises and welfare, a level of expectations are created. In this, it can very quickly be seen that there is a creation of expected values – to use Gurr's measurement – that is now compared to the actual values that individuals now have. Indeed, an opinion piece in *The Citizen* states exactly this, arguing "Millions now believe it is their right to have free housing, electricity and water. When these things do not happen, they go on [the] rampage" (*The Citizen*, 2012). However, the theories of FA and RD – especially when considering Gurr – is not exclusively based on the psychological effects of economic deprivation, and bring in other factors like the psychological effects of political deprivation. Indeed, as Steven Friedman (2011) points out, South Africa is a constitutional democracy where individuals have the right to choose who governs them, unlike the regimes in countries affected by the Arab Spring such as Tunisia and Egypt, so whereas there was political deprivation in the latter countries, there is little political deprivation in South Africa – or so he argues. Gurr's theory in particular, opens up the possibility that there might be economic deprivation while there is no political deprivation, and *vice versa*. In addition, there could quite possibly be both political and economic deprivation. When considering the categories that have been roughly created through this debate, being economic and political, it can quickly be seen why this theory is important as it can cater for both.

The theory of RD has been subject to several criticisms, one of the main being that cultural backgrounds and ideology are ignored for the sake of the theories, thus eliminating some of

⁴¹ This view appears to be shared by some, such as South African Institute of Race Relations CEO Frans Cronje with some South African protest (SAIRR, 2012).

the theories effectiveness, as Davies (1962: 16) himself describes the Great Depression – during the 1930s - in the United States of America (USA), where it was “severe enough, at least on economic grounds, to have produced a revolution”, however, united elite intervention and the “belief in individual hard work, self-reliance, and the promise of success” held revolution at bay. Indeed, it does appear that there was a sense of positivity, as Chomsky (2012: 25) adds that there was a feeling of “we’re gonna get out of it” and “it will get better”, even amongst those that were unemployed, which leads one to think that quite possibly ideological factors are just as important as economic deprivation. In addition, Lupsha (as summarised by Aya, 1979: 70) gives several other problems that these theories will run into, the first being the timing of the violence – why does it occur when it occurs and not before?⁴² – the second being “the identity of those whose aggressive behaviour precipitated collective violence” (See page 56) – and thirdly, the selectivity of violence. Finally, a fourth is the “broad-brush” stroke to determine who is frustrated, as Lupsha (1971: 98)

By using such a broad-brush conceptualization of frustration, students of political violence can label all those persons who do not have enough of the social and material rewards of the society as frustrated and thus prone to acts of aggression and civil violence, regardless of whether they have demonstrated interest in obtaining those rewards⁴³.

It becomes blatantly clear, as will be seen in the chapter on the South African debate below, that this theory can be applied to almost any case, be it used to explain revolution or to argue against revolution. Despite some of the flaws in these theories however, they do lead into possibly important factors when considering the rough split between the social inequality and political liberation categories that we laid out previously.

As can be seen above, these theories of FA and RD are certainly not flawless and have some severe limitations. These theories also have problems in defining groups and acknowledging

⁴² The example used by Lupsha (1971: 100) is the Watts riot where he raises the question of if these riots were for redress of three hundred years of frustration and oppression, as argued by several of the black leaders, then why was it at three hundred years? Why was it not at two hundred years? RD and FA gives the reason for why the strife would be caused, but fails to answer when the strife will occur. So analysts are left to wait until the strife occurs and only then will be able to say “That’s when it happens”.

⁴³ Lupsha (1971: 97-98) argues: “Thus, a person who is unemployed – deprived of money and status – is labelled as frustrated, regardless of whether he is seeking or is interested in obtaining work”

groups as more than just animalistic entities that are victim to the next urge being economic satisfaction, etc. They are however, rather important when considering the debate in South Africa. Patel (2011) for example specifically talks about the frustration that has led to individuals protesting in her article supporting the idea that there already is a “rebellion of the poor” taking place. The various models can also be seen in various opinions and articles, such as South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) CEO Frans Cronje, who, in a press release on service delivery, stated

There is no contradiction between the successes we identify [in service delivery] and the protests that are now commonplace around the country. These protests are not a function of the failure of delivery but rather the success in that this success has raised expectations that cannot be met because of shortcomings in the school system and the labour market (SAIRR, 2012).

One can notice the RD model almost immediately in this quote, the raise expectations and the lack of actual values being delivered; however we shall consider it in more depth in the fourth chapter. In addition, Mbeki’s (2011) argument that social grants are being used to placate the poor and that the moment the Chinese mineral intensive economic strategy ends, the South African government will not have the money to keep placating the poor. In addition, despite its limits in group and cultural identity, these theories do appear to have a rather decent method of considering the mood of a society, perhaps lending some aid to the theories that will follow in the next chapter.

In this chapter, we set out to gain a greater understanding of several of the theories that fell under the category of social-psychological revolutionary theories. We have seen that the base theory appears to be the psychological theory of FA. In this theory, there is the base assumption that there are needs, or rather a needs hierarchy, and that an individual will rebel if this individual feels that they are unable to achieve these some of these needs, especially if the individual feels that the block is unnecessary and unjust. This theory has its own flaws – for instance it is not clear that frustration always causes aggression and some people argue that aggression isn’t always rooted in frustration. Although FA is useful, we have seen that social-psychological theorists have come up with a variety of different models and theories.

These however, are all largely based on the theory of RD. We have considered the four different models that have been presented by Gurr, as well as the model presented by Davies. The models have all been based on the same hypothesis, just in varying forms. The hypothesis being, that if the gap between expected values and actual values increases, the chance for rebellion increases. When considering the variety of factors that have been presented while looking at both the Arab Spring and the South African debate, one can clearly see that, say, the expectation created by promises of job creation and rising unemployment will have an effect and create a revolutionary mood in society. These theories have shown themselves to be unsuited to predicting when a revolution will happen. However, they do provide useful information as to the creation of a revolutionary mood and provide the gasoline container that needs little more than a spark, as say, the catalytic theory in the first chapter argued.

Chapter Three:

Moral Economy and Moral Indignation Revolutionary Theories

At the very centre of revolution lies an emotional upheaval of moral indignation, revulsion and fury with powers-that-be, such that one cannot demur or remain silent, whatever the cost. Within its glow, for a while, men [sic] surpass themselves, breaking the shackles of intuitive preservation, convention, day-to-day convenience, and routine.

Teodor Shanin

*The Roots of Otherness: Russia's
Turn of the Century. Vol 2:
Russia, 1905-07: Revolution as a
Moment of Truth*

The main purpose of this chapter is to give us a greater understanding of theories of moral indignation and moral economy. These theories will be useful in our analysis of the South African debate which will be covered in the next chapter. In this chapter, we will bring together the ideas from Edward Thompson, George Rudé and Peter A. Lupsha, all who have a similar understanding on what makes crowds revolt. The key issue to this understanding is moral indignation / moral economy.

Initially, we shall need to discuss what it is that the “mob” means in this chapter, as the term often carries with it some negative connotations. Interestingly, one can pick up similar ideas from the section of spontaneity in revolution and conspiracy theories that were presented in the first chapter. We will consider the different ways in which the term has been used, and how the term has been conflated with riotous ability together with criminal motives. As one can guess, this carries with it a rather conservative connotation, which we will consider as well.

Once we have finished our discussion of the term “mob”, we will move onto some of the ideas that Rudé has on the motives of the mob, which is mainly that although one must not ignore the overt actions taken by the mob in their riotous acts, one must not be limited to just seeing this overt act. We will see that he separates his idea of motives into forward looking or dominant, which will be the more overt actions taken by the mob, such as worrying about increasing machinery, although it must not be forgotten that these are not purely economic, and often go hand in hand with political wants as well. Secondly, we shall see that there is something deeper than the overt actions, under what he calls generalised beliefs. This consists of traditional levelling, the pristine purity to uphold a birthright as well as millenarianism. Once we have considered Rudé’s view, we will move to the theory put forward by Thompson, that of the moral economy.

In Thompson’s work, we will see that the idea behind the moral economy is rather simple, where he argues that individuals will not revolt as a result of soaring prices, however they may revolt when they feel that the soaring prices are unjustly caused.

The final theory we will consider in this chapter is that of righteous indignation, presented by Lupsha. In this, it will be shown that he argues that the sheer horror of an unjust act can spur people into revolt, as he would argue is what happened with the deaths of Mohamed Bouazizi and Khaled Said. Finally, we will consider the fiction situation created by the novel *The Hunger Games*, where we will see an example of the moral indignation in the form of the situation the characters are in as well as – together with a sort of reverse rationality argument – the unifying effect moral indignation may have on the oppressed.

When discussing the ‘mob’ or the crowd, it becomes important to understand what one is talking about, especially when considering the theories put forward by George Rudé, Edward P. Thomson, Eric J. Hobsbawm and Peter A. Lupsha. In his essay ‘The London ‘Mob’ of the Eighteenth Century’, Rudé (1959:1-2) gives a quick rundown of several different ways in

which the term ‘mob’⁴⁴ has been used⁴⁵. He argues there are three main ways in which it is used, with the first being an umbrella term for the “‘lower orders’, common people, ‘inferior set of people’ ... ‘fourth estate’, or what the French later called ‘sans-culottes’- in brief, the lower strata of society in the pre-industrial age” (Rudé, 1959: 1; also see Rudé, 1964: 7). The second way in which the term is used is when referring to a hired gang acting in the interest of a political group (Rudé, 1959: 1). He gives the example of Sir William Beauchamp Proctor’s hired ‘mob’ – paid to attack his rivals in 1768 (Rudé, 1959: 1). Finally, and the more importantly for use in this thesis, the term has been used to describe “crowds engaged in riots, strikes or political demonstrations”. It is the second and third use of ‘mob’ that are often clumped into the same idea thus creating an awful amount of confusion and an incorrect, passive instrument that has gladly been picked up by many theorists (Rudé, 1959: 1-2). What can happen is that crowds acting in a way that causes civil strife are seen as a ‘mob’, that have been influenced or bought off by an outside party and are out fulfilling the outside party’s motives, having no motives of their own aside from “loot, lucre, free drinks or the satisfaction of some lurking criminal instinct” (Rudé, 1959: 2; also see Rudé, 1964: 214). This grouping of assumptions can be extremely dangerous when exploring the crowd, for, as seen above, it treats the crowd as a passive instrument. In addition, it creates the scenario where individuals are seen to have – to paraphrase Charles Tilly (1965: 604) – “lawless wild-beast nature”, which brings up a very negative idea that they will follow only their base instincts – for example, the crowd being hungry will lead to them rebelling. When one considers the theory of RD as presented above, this is exactly what appears to have befallen it. Individuals and the crowd in general are seen in alternating lights, often depending on one’s philosophical outlook.

In the opening section of his book, *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848*, George Rudé (1964) makes the argument that the term “mob” has been thrown around quite carelessly. Rudé (1964: 6-8) puts forward two separate stereotypes that have been used to describe the ‘mob’. The first of these is very uncomplimentary to the ‘mob’ and the second, although complimentary to the ‘mob’, still fails – in Rudé’s view – to add to understanding of the mob. When considering the initial

⁴⁴ Ultimately and for the sake of simplicity in this section, ‘mob’ and ‘crowd’ will be used interchangeably.

⁴⁵ Although it must be noted that he does not argue that the uses of the term ‘mob’ that will be presented here are exclusive, indeed there are usually overlaps which will be explored later.

stereotype – which according to Rudé (1959: 1) is more fashionable amongst the more conservative theorists, the term ‘mob’ usually has an extremely elitist, generalised connotation, being used to describe the lower classes. An example being Edmund Burke, who’s view on the ‘mob’ was far from complimentary to it, could not refrain from seeing only undesirable elements of society making up the French revolutionary crowd of 1789 (Rudé, 1964: 8). Another theorist used a very similar view when describing the revolutionary crowd in France, arguing that the crowd tended to be composed of “criminal elements, degenerates, and person’s with destructive elements, who blindly responded to the siren voices of ‘leaders’ or ‘demagogues’” (Rudé, 1964: 9).

Having given some consideration to the idea of the ‘mob’, we must now explore the reasons put forward by Rudé as to why the ‘mob’ gathers together and what their motives are. Initially, Rudé (1964: 217), after pointing out that many theories on crowd activity are grossly simplified, justifies this arguing that:

The crowd may riot because it is hungry or fears to be so, because it has some deep social grievance, because it seeks an immediate reform or the millennium, or because it wants to destroy an enemy or acclaim a “hero”; but it is seldom for any single one of these reasons.

That being said, one must not ignore the primary intention, for

if food rioters threaten bakers, invade markets, and rip open sacks of flour or grain, we may assume that the real purpose is not so much to intimidate or destroy as to bring down the food price. Again, when Parisians assault and capture the Bastille and Londoners “pull down” Catholic houses and chapels, we must suppose that they intended to do precisely this (Rudé, 1964: 217).

For Rudé, there is usually something much deeper than the overt actions or causes that provide the energy for crowd to gather. Although he does add that one cannot take away from the fact that economic motives are “presumed to be dominant in strikes and food riots”,

and “political issues play a part of varying importance in both radical reform movements and movements directed against radical reform” (Rudé, 1964: 217).

In addition, he argues “Motives will ... vary not only between one action and the next but between different groups participating in the same disturbance”, so one must explore whether the possibly several different groups have a single or multiple motives (Rudé, 1964: 224). Following this, we need to consider what Rudé looks at as being important for the motivation. Rudé splits the types of motives he discusses into two categories – although he only does this to avoid confusion, as they are often interlinked. The motives are the dominant or “forward-looking” aspects of the crowds motives, encompassing political and economic factors, and the underlying or ‘fundamental’ / ‘generalized’ beliefs” motives of the crowd (Rudé, 1964: 224). When one considers the dominant motives, they are ultimately what are often considered when theorists consider a revolution. In his discussion of economic factors on the pre-industrial crowd in England and France⁴⁶, Rudé (1964: 218) argues

That the common people of town and countryside were impelled by the urge to maintain or improve living standards, to raise or prevent reductions in wages, to resist encroachments on their holdings in land and their right of common pasture, to protect their means of livelihood against the threat of new mechanical devices, and, above all, to ensure a constant supply of cheap and plentiful food.

However, he makes mention that economic factors are often not alone. As he suggests, “strikes, food riots, and peasant movements, even when prevailing issues were purely economic, might take place against a political background that gave them greater intensity or a new direction” (Rudé, 1964: 218). Using service delivery in South Africa as an example, one can see how this echoes for although one cannot discount the overt motive – that service delivery is poor and therefore people take to the streets in protest, one cannot ignore the

⁴⁶ Interestingly, Rudé (1964: 218) appears to follow a similar pattern of thought as Davies in the previous chapter in terms of economic factors, suggesting “Yet bad, even abysmal, economic conditions [are] not an automatic ‘trigger’ to disturbance”. This appears to have a similar tone to Davies’ idea that individual will only rebel when the “chains” have been released a little, which appears to have cooperative support of Rudé’s (1964: 218-219) notion that there must be an upward economic boom before individual start revolting.

political elements that come to the fore, such as a lack of appropriate avenues to solve the problem and as a result having little option but to protest. In the period of his studies, Rudé (1964: 219) also argues that

economic motives often impinge on movements that were, in their essence, political. City riots, upon which political issues usually obtruded, frequently took place against a background of rising prices or food shortage ...

In this, one can consider that there is very often a hand in hand relationship between political and economic motives. When one considers the pieces that were written about the Arab Spring, both internationally and in South Africa, they appear to rest on this divide, with Jacob Dlamini (2011), Stephen Friedman (2011), Jacob Zuma (Steenkamp and du Toit, 2011) appearing to largely concentrate on political factors, while Moeletsi Mbeki (2011), Tim Cohen (2011), amongst others largely concentrate on the economic factors. This debate will be further analysed in the fourth chapter.

In returning to Rudé's suggestion on the motives and beliefs, we have – to borrow from Rudé (1964: 219) – considered the “forward-looking” aspects, and must now turn to the underlying motives that could perhaps contribute to the revolutionary mood of a people. Firstly, there is the idea of traditional levelling, which is an elementary form of social justice at the expense of those that are materially wealthier (Rudé, 1964: 224). This is extremely similar to Hobsbawn's (1959: 13-29) “social bandit” – a Robin Hood type bandit⁴⁷ - who is protected and often supported by the protecting community, as long as they remain legitimate. One must not begin to think that there is necessarily a quest for complete theft from the rich, for, as Hobsbawn (1959: 24) argues, “[social banditry] protests not against the fact that peasants are poor and oppressed, but against the fact that they are sometimes excessively poor and oppressed”, but can be considered that the rich may often be seen as too rich. Rudé (1964: 225) cites a rioter in Bermondsey who told his victim “Protestant or not, no gentleman need

⁴⁷ Hobsbawn (1959: 19) defines this type of character as: “a man who took from the rich to give to the poor and never killed but in self-defence or just revenge”. Hobsbawn (1959: 19-20) does however indicate that in the case of a social bandit such as this, he/she is not necessarily political, and is “virtually obliged to [take this position], for there is more to take from the rich than from the poor, and if he takes from the poor or becomes an ‘illegitimate’ killer, he forfeits his most powerful asset, public aid and sympathy”.

be possessed of more than £1,000 a year; that is sufficient for a gentleman to live upon". A further underlying motive that could potentially contribute to the revolutionary mood of a society that is pointed to by Rudé (1964: 229) is that of the ideology of birthright. He – using the English as an example – argues that there was a belief that Englishmen were “freeborn” and not “slaves”, and as such, Englishmen did not starve (Rudé, 1964: 224). This splits into two paths, the first being the need to protect these birthrights from foreigners⁴⁸. The second path becomes very interesting, as Rudé (1964: 230) argues that it is the civic duty of the citizen to hold up the “pristine purity” of their birthright at home. He uses the example of Englishmen and the “Glorious Constitution” of 1689, a reminder of the tyranny that constantly had to be fought within. South Africa perhaps presents an interesting case of this, for while the Freedom Charter was agreed upon in 1955 by the African National congress and other liberation movements, and yet many of the concessions in the 1994 transition did not follow the Freedom Charter. This could perhaps be seen as the betrayal of the revolution through Fanonian eyes⁴⁹. Finally⁵⁰, and perhaps with an element of importance, there is the millenarian and religious ideas that play a role in the revolutionary mood (Rudé, 1964: 231). Hobsbawn argues that “the essence of millenarianism, the hope of a complete and radical change in the world shall be reflected in the millennium⁵¹, a world shorn of all its deficiencies”. A rejection of the present world (Hobsbawn, 1959: 57) is important in the eyes of revolution, and the belief in a better utopian world as a result of the action is of great importance to a revolutionary. Indeed, if one is in an imperfect world that drives that individual into a state of revolt, one can assume that one of the main motives behind this individual’s revolt will be to change the current world into a millennial charge. Religious fervor can also play a role in this, although one specific factor of millenarianism is it is to be realised on earth rather than in a prospective afterlife (Rudé, 1964: 231). This can be seen in the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, where the political leaders were removed from power – although the system that was in place was not removed, a fact that appears to have left the Egyptian people in a rather precarious position, with the new Egyptian president

⁴⁸ Although unlikely the sole cause, this may be an interesting factor to consider when looking at xenophobia in Southern Africa. Rudé (1964: 229-230) suggests that it did cause xenophobia in the crowds in England.

⁴⁹ Frantz Fanon was a revolutionary theorist and an activist during the Algerian war of Independence.

⁵⁰ Rudé (1964: 228-229) also adds the “belief in the King as the protector or ‘father’ of his people”. However, this does not have much relevance in the constitutional democracy, unless one was to consider the constitution in the way one considered a “king”, and those running the government as the “advisors”. It would then appear to be justified to protest in the name of the constitution. Perhaps the protection of information Bill that is currently in the works, and the protest against it, could be considered in this light? However, this is for another paper.

⁵¹ Millennium in this case can be defined – as according to the Oxford English Dictionary - as a utopian period of peace, justice and prosperity; often related to the religious idea of the Second coming.

Mohammed Morsi who, “issues a number of presidential decrees that put him above judicial oversight”, amongst other things (Patel, 2012). Considering these various motives and beliefs, one can see that there are a variety of motives that may be at play to get individuals to revolt. In the time period that Rudé (1964) considers, where it appears that food riots were the most common form of protest, he suggests that

[When] men and women were drawn into such activities [riot and rebellion], it was either because they were hungry, because they wanted to end a real or imaginary oppression, or to assure themselves of a richer and happier future; or for a mixture of similar reasons (Rudé, 1964: 224).

Following the reasons and motives he presents, one can see why he would argue this.

In a rather similar method, Thompson (1991) argues that in the eighteenth century, there was what he termed a moral economy. In his research on the protests, and food riots in particular, he argued – like Rudé - that there was more to protest and revolt action than what met the eye. Thompson (1991: 188) argues

It is of course true that the riots were triggered off by soaring prices, by malpractices among dealers, or by hunger. But these grievances operated within a popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices in marketing, milling, baking, etc. This in its turn was grounded upon a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor. An outrage to these moral assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation, was the usual occasion for direct action.

Again, as with Rudé and Hobsbawn, these are not only the overt factors that need to be considered when looking at these forms of protests, but there are indeed other factors, based on the legitimacy and the crowd's moral position. The jobs of millers and bakers were closely monitored by the crowd, in their own way, where

Millers and – to a greater degree – bakers were considered as servants of the community, working not for profit but for a fair allowance ... In London and those large towns where this [the poor using] had long ceased to be the rule, the baker's allowance or profit was calculated strictly according to the Assize of Bread, whereby either the price or the weight of the loaf was ordered in relation to the ruling price of wheat (Thompson, 1991: 194).

Rudé (1964: 226) speaks of “just” prices and wages as opposed to “natural” prices and wages in a freely competitive market. The freely competitive market may reap havoc on the prices of a community, especially where there are apparent devious plans in the minds of those selling the food. In a situation where the crowd thought they were being cheated, they would often rise up.

Furthermore, being partly influenced by the ideas of Rudé, as well as Hobsbawn and Thompson, Peter A. Lupsha, in his article ‘Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence’ (1971), critiqued the commonly held idea of urban violence and revolution⁵² being completely psychological. Indeed, when the paper was released, his claim was that many of the most commonly accepted theories of political violence and revolution was based on the psychological FA theory, or other variants of this theory, being RD and Rising Expectations⁵³ (Lupsha, 1971: 89). In the theory that he presents, he hypothesises that instead of rising expectations out growing actual expectations, thus causing frustration which will then lead to aggression, that the violence is often “of a more symbolic kind” (Lupsha, 1971: 101). In this section, I will consider and critique this theory that was presented by Lupsha.

Lupsha, using an idea noted by Morris Janowitz when discussing the Chicago riot of 1919, begins

⁵² It must be noted that in his article, Lupsha defines violence as “a collective or mass outburst, characterised by excitement, rage, and acts of destruction and disrupting the stability and tranquillity of the polity” (Lupsha, 1971: 89, ff. 1). In addition, he states that “[i]n this conceptualisation political, civil, and collective violence are used interchangeably” (Lupsha, 1971: 89, ff. 1). This definition of violence will be continued in this section of the paper for simplicity sake.

⁵³ The criticisms for these theories have been briefly considered in the previous section titled “Frustration-Aggression and Relative Deprivation” and will therefore not be repeated in this section.

Whites invaded the Negro areas, and often spread to the central business districts where the white population outnumbered the Negroes. Much of the violence took place on main thoroughfares and transfer points as Negroes sought to return to their homes or sought places of refuge. Symbolically, the riot was an expression of elements of the white community's impulse to "kick the Negro back into his place" (Janowitz, 1969 cited in Lupsha, 1971: 99)⁵⁴.

Further on, Lupsha considers the case of the assassination of Martin Luther King. Rioting broke out in 237 cities, caused 43 deaths and approximately \$58 million worth of damage (Lupsha, 1971: 100-101). Lupsha (1971: 99-101) makes the claim that in both these cases, unless the boundaries of the psychological - FA and the like – theories are shifted so far away from their traditional boundaries, these theories cannot account for the results of these cases. He further argues that – especially when considering the riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King – the acts of the mob fall more into the tradition of 'Righteous Indignation'⁵⁵ as opposed to 'Frustration-Aggression' or 'Relative Deprivation'. In both of these cases, it was not necessarily the economic or political deprivation that got people to revolt – although it is these factors that may have actually created the perfectly ripe scenario for a revolt to take place – but it was the sheer horror of the act of such a righteous man being assassinated. Indeed, there are many different examples of people rallying to a cause behind the sheer horror of an act.

During the Arab Spring, countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were, or still are in the case of Syria⁵⁶ brisling with examples of this moral indignation. However, there are separate acts that do need to be considered when looking at the contemporary Arab Spring countries. For example, it is argued that the act that triggered the Tunisian revolutions was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, which was followed by the self-immolation of Houcine Falhi a few days later, which is similar to the self-immolation of an unknown

⁵⁴ However, this could be explained in relative deprivation terms as well if one makes the argument that this example does appear to follow Geschwender's "Downward Mobility Hypothesis", who, after adapting Emile Durkheim's anomic suicide, argues "relative downward mobility refers to the felt loss of status experience by a group which observes a previously inferior group closing the gap between them" (Geschwender, 1968: 131).

⁵⁵ Lupsha (1971: 101) argues that by 'Righteous Indignation', he means "indignation at the wrongfulness of the act and partly at the wrongfulness of its going unpunished".

⁵⁶ This sentence was written midway through 2012, were there is still quite severe conflict in Syria.

Egyptian man on the 17th of January, together with at least four Algerians who apparently set themselves on fire as well as Mohammed Abdul-Karim on the 7th of April in Jordan (Bennett, et al, 2011; Jones, 2011; Rifai, 2012;). This is some sketchy territory when considering the role of righteous indignation, but it played an incredibly large role in the revolutions that took place in North Africa. If one takes the example of Mohamed Bouazizi, his self-immolation appears to have been in protest to the way he was treated when his cart was confiscated by some policemen. As a result, the act that ended with his death was by his own hand; however, there definitely appears to be an element of moral indignation as his self-immolation was caused by the state's treatment of him.

Other acts that may spur a mob into similar action are a perceived unjust attack on the members of society, exposing shortcomings in those in authority or an overreaction to protestors. A very recent example in South Africa is the death of Andries Tatane at the hands of the police during a protest⁵⁷ - although it must be noted that this did not spark any revolt, but we shall return to this in the fourth chapter. Some other examples include the Egyptian, Khaled Said, who was beaten to death in 2010 by two policemen for releasing a video exposing police corruption⁵⁸ (Logan, 2011) and the deaths of Mohamed Ammari and later Chawki Belhoussine El Hadri⁵⁹ by police violence against protestors were noted in the beginning stages of the Tunisian revolution, or later on the 9th January massacres in Tunisia (Bennett, et al, 2011; Rifai, 2012) or the mutilated corpse of the thirteen year old Hamza al-Khatib in Syria (Bennett, et al, 2011). The role of the state, or individuals tied to the state, in an act that is perceived as unjust to a crowd fits precisely into the argument above by Lupsha. Events, especially ones like the torture and mutilation of Hamza al-Khatib, may shock individuals into acting against the powers that be. All of these have the chance of spurring individuals up because of the horrific act or cause that led to their deaths⁶⁰.

⁵⁷ It must be noted that the death of Andries Tatane did not spark revolt, which does illuminate some limitations in this argument and suggests that other factors may well have to be present, such as a revolutionary mood perhaps created by RD?

⁵⁸ It is extremely interesting watching the interview that is placed on this website, for the interviewee, when asked if he felt it was the death of Khalid Said was the greatest catalyst to the revolution, his response was immediate and sure, stating "definitely, definitely". This is interesting as it does give some credit to Lupsha's theory of "righteous indignation"

⁵⁹ El Hadri was shot in the same protest as Ammari but perished a few days later from his wounds (Rifai, 2012).

⁶⁰ It is acknowledged by this author that in some of these cases, the protests had already started before these acts of moral indignation had occurred, but that does not necessarily lessen the impact that they might have had on the mood of those protesting.

In the recent trilogy of novels by Suzanne Collins, and now a film of the first book, there is a fascinating example of moral indignation, although it could possibly indicate something more. In this fictional book, a sixteen year old girl “Katniss Everdeen” (Jennifer Lawrence in *The Hunger Games*, 2012) lives in post-apocalyptic North America. She is from a place known as district 12. District 12 is one of 13 districts around the country, districts that fall under the control of a place called the Capitol. The Capitol is in charge and has maintained its dominance since before Katniss’ time, after winning a conflict – known as the Rebellion - against all the other districts. The Capitol rules with an iron fist, and through “peacekeepers” and by keeping contact between districts to an absolute minimum (to prevent communication that could cause the suppressed districts to gather together) they successfully maintain order. Resources are largely transported to the Capitol, while those in the districts are often left to starve. Every year since the Rebellion, the Capitol hosts games known as the Hunger Games. Each district – aside from the Capitol and district 13, which was supposedly destroyed during the Rebellion – must give a mandatory “tribute” of a male and a female⁶¹. These 24 “tributes” are then put in a televised survival/death match that the entire country is forced to watch and required to fight to the death so that only one “tribute” remains. The winner of the Hunger Games receives wealth and fame, and their district receives some extra resources. As a result, most contact between districts is through the Hunger Games, where the other districts are the enemy. Our story begins during the 74th annual Hunger Games, where Katniss is one of the “tributes” fighting in the arena. She forms an alliance with “Rue” (Amandla Stenberg] in *The Hunger Games*, 2012), a twelve year old girl from district 11 until ultimately Rue is stabbed with a spear thrown from another “tribute” and as a result dies in Katniss’ arms.

Katniss places flowers around the corpse of Rue, and when walking away, turns back to Rue’s corpse, places three fingers against her lips and then into the air (Collins, 2008: 237; *The Hunger Games*, 2012). This is “an old and rarely used gesture of our [district 12]

⁶¹ In the Hunger Games, each district would be forced to offer up - although one could volunteer, most were “volunteered” via a sort of lottery system, picking the names out of a bowl – “tributes”, a boy and a girl between the ages of 12 and 18. These 24 “tributes” (2 from each of the 12 districts, the Hunger Games were for the Capitol’s pleasure and to show the Capitol’s dominance, so there are no “tributes” from the Capitol). These “tributes” would then be placed in an arena, and would have to fight to the death, with the last “tribute” standing being declared the winner and winning his/her district extra resources.

district, occasionally seen at funerals. It means thanks, it means admiration, it means good-bye to someone you love” (Collins, 2008: 24). The result of this act varies, where in the film, the population of district 11 rises up against the Capitol’s domination (*The Hunger Games*, 2012), and in the book, where district 11 sends Katniss food (Collins, 2008: 238-239), and later, the other district 11 “tribute” allows her to live when he has the opportunity to kill her⁶² (Collins, 2008: 288). What we want to consider here is the result presented in the movie as opposed to the book. One could argue that it is the act of moral indignation that spurs the population of district 11 into revolt. However, then one would have to account for why it only occurs now and not in the 73 games preceding it⁶³. What one may then need to consider, is not the argument of moral indignation for this scenario, but perhaps it’s opposite. It is the moral standing of Katniss, even though she is placed in a situation where the deaths of the 23 “tributes” will result in her victory – in which case the death of Rue actually puts her one step closer to victory - she lays the flowers around Rue and then makes this gesture of respect, admiration and love. Before this simple act of rebellion, one can clearly see the moral indignation that is involved; however, it is the act of rebellion against the moral indignation that appears to drive district 11 to revolt. It perhaps creates a sense of unity in district 11 with district 12, because Katniss “feels the pain” of this loss of Rue. Suddenly they are no longer enemies unwillingly competing, suddenly they are groups under the same yoke as each other, respectful of each other, pained by the loss of one, as if it were one of their own, admiring the humanity of each other in this barbarous game. In addition, perhaps the act by Katniss, this act of humanity, lets those of district 11 realise how they have allowed themselves to become mere objects in the Capitol’s sick game of dominance, and seeing the humanity from Katniss reminds them of their own humanity, and the injustice that has occurred to make them lose it. Regardless, this scenario presents an interesting idea on the role of moral indignation.

These theories however, do have their limitations. It was mentioned above that recently in South Africa; Andries Tatane was killed at the hands of the police. The reaction that this

⁶² Although it isn’t really explained how these two districts know the meaning of this gesture, when Katniss volunteers to fight in the Hunger Games to save her sister, most of the individuals in her district make the gesture as opposed to applauding her act of volunteering, and with this being televised around the country – as the others were also televised in district 12 – perhaps it is this that presents the meaning of this gesture which is then understood by the population of district 11.

⁶³ One could perhaps argue that it has to do with the horribly violence death of a twelve year old, however, this ignores that it is only after the gesture from Katniss that this uprising takes place.

event created was not the explosion that say, Lupsha's example of the assassination of Martin Luther King jr. caused throughout America. One must not be mistaken, there was a rather large outcry at the horror of this act, but, much like the deaths of the 34 miners at the Marikana mine in August, 2012 (Marinovich, 2012), there were very few and sporadic outbursts. This is rather arbitrary, as according to the above theories, there are political and economic factors that should have been at play as well as this act of righteous indignation. According to the theory presented by Lupsha, this should have caused an explosion in the form of mass protests. Working on a different example however, that of corruption, there are definite effects that show the success of these theories when considering corruption. There have indeed been protests and outcries over the corruption levels in South Africa. This definitely fits in with the idea of moral indignation, and lends support to the arguments presented by Tim Cohen (2011) and Khadija Patel (2011), both of whom are supporters of the idea that South Africa is at a high risk of having a revolution, much like Mbeki (2011) argues. It appears that Rudé's idea that there are multiple motives at play stands more ground than say, Lupsha's argument. However, one cannot discount Lupsha's argument as it does appear to have some merit when considering the Arab Spring, with the deaths of Khaled Said at the hands of the police and Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation, amongst others.

The importance of the theories looked at in this chapter can quite clearly be seen in the study of revolution. Instead of treating the mob as an object, and instead of treating the individuals making up this mob as objects, it adds a human value to them. Indeed, the main premise of all of these theories is that there is more to a protest or revolt than a simplistic economic or political factor. These theories differ from the previous chapter's theories as there is an element of moral disgust in the eyes of the crowd. This is useful when considering arguments of corruption and growing inequality in the South African debate, as well as repression. We have also discussed the use of "mob" when one considers it, and how and why the word often has a negative tinge to it. We have considered Rudé's recommendation that we focus motives of the crowd, being the forward looking and the generalised beliefs of the people that make up the crowd, and have seen that there is more than meets the eye with civil unrest. In addition, we have seen what the role of traditional levelling and the like can play in motivating individuals into taking to the streets. We have also discussed Thompson's idea of the moral economy, looking at the role that the moral disgust in the malpractice can cause individuals to rise up. We have also critically assessed Lupsha's argument of

righteous indignation and how the sheer horror of an act can create a civil unrest situation. Finally, the unifying effect of moral indignation amongst those that are oppressed has been shown through the example of the fictional novel *The Hunger Games*. Despite their flaws, the theories of moral indignation do present us with an intriguing lens consider when looking at the South Africa debate.

Chapter Four:

The Debate in South Africa

I can tell you there will never be a Tunisia in South Africa. We have a constitutional democracy here. No-one is being repressed; everyone has the right to say what he wants and to vote.

Jacob Zuma

‘SA won’t be a 2nd Tunisia - Zuma’

In this democracy the poor are only used for voting. Once we have voted we are only lied to and undermined and ignored. ... If we are not given what a human being needs to survive while the city builds casinos and stadiums and theme parks we will have no choice but to take it.

S’bu Zikode

‘Sekwanel! Sekwanele! (Enough is Enough)

Although predictions are always to be taken with a pinch of salt, every so often they do take on an eerily correct form. In 2008, *The Economist* (cited in Marfleet, 2009: 16-17) asked a prophetic question

The fact is that most of Egypt’s 75 m[illion] people struggle to get by, their ambitions thwarted by rising prices, appalling state schools, capricious judges, a plodding and corrupt bureaucracy and a cronyist regime that pretends democracy but in fact crushes all challengers and excludes all participation. The visitor might well conclude that by damming up the normal flow of politics, Egypt’s rulers risk bringing on a deluge. ... Will the dam burst?

As the world saw, by the end of the first quarter of 2011, the dam had indeed burst and Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian president, had been removed from power. He was not the only leader to suffer the fate of being overthrown during what became known as the “Arab Spring”. These revolutions surprised the world, and many nations were shocked into considering the causes of the revolutions and the likelihood of their countries facing similar revolutions. In South Africa, it was no different. On the 12th of February, 2011, Moeletsi Mbeki published an article in *Business Day* where he predicted that there would be a revolution⁶⁴ in South Africa in 2020. This created an enormous debate in South Africa - that despite shifting times continues to reappear - on a topic that very soon the South African president Jacob Zuma could not even avoid answering (Patel, 2011). Those individuals supporting the idea that South Africa was at risk of a revolution felt that social inequality was the factor that would tip the scales towards revolution. The opposing side, however, felt South Africa had political freedom and the rule of law – both of which were to a larger degree lacking in Egypt and Tunisia – so the chances of a revolution in South Africa would not be particularly high.

This chapter considers the debate that was sparked in South Africa as to whether there will be a revolution in South Africa in much the same way as there were revolutions in the Arab Spring and more particularly Tunisia and Egypt. It aims to bring the theories that have been considered thus far into the dialogue on this debate on the possibility of a revolution that took place in the South African press. What we shall see is that a variety of factors have been presented by the various authors on this debate and that many of these factors can be considered in terms of RD and moral indignation, such as repression and unemployment. In this chapter follows, I will briefly describe the positions on both sides of this debate, and why the supporters of each side take their particular stand. In this, we shall very briefly consider the factors that make up each side of the debate. These factors are unemployment, especially amongst the youth, social grants, poor service delivery and an economic system that promotes inequality, corruption and rising food prices amongst others for the “social inequality” side of the debate. Other factors considered are that South Africa is a constitutional democracy, there is supposed to be no repression and the rule of law reigns

⁶⁴ Mbeki (2011) argued South Africa would have its “Tunisia Day”, which he defined as “when the masses rise up against the powers that be”, as happened in Tunisia.

supreme. We will briefly explain why these are important for each side of this debate. We will also briefly consider an article from Jacob Dlamini. He appears to take a relative middle ground in this debate, arguing that revolution is unlikely but that South Africa isn't as secure as those supporting the "political liberation" side of the debate maintain. He feels that apathy may do more to destroy the South African political sphere than revolutionary action. We will consider the impact that several factors presented by Mbeki and Friedman and others may have on the revolutionary mood of society according to these theories. Although both sides of the debate present rather convincing arguments supporting their views on what the likelihood of revolution in South Africa is, a worrying trend appears to have begun in South Africa that lends more credit to the "social inequality" side of the debate. There does appear to be rising levels of repression and political decay – although it must be noted that this thesis has the luxury of hindsight, unlike those who wrote the articles that are to be considered. As a result, we shall evaluate in more depth the main factors – sadly because of space restraints we shall not be able to consider each and every factor presented – of the arguments presented on the "social inequality" side of the debate. We will consider the role that unemployment – as well as social grants to placate the poor, which has been placed in this thesis with unemployment – along with service delivery and corruption could play in creating a revolution in South Africa. These factors do require attention if one considers the theories that have been presented in the previous chapters. Before continuing however, it must be mentioned that, much like this thesis, this chapter will not offer a definite answer. We can only take different scenarios, evaluate them in the light of the theories discussed, the history of previous revolutions and draw a possible outcome not a known conclusion.

Political Liberation Argument

After Mbeki's piece claiming that South Africa would experience its "Tunisia day" in 2020 made such an impact, it even managed to evoke a response from the South African president himself. A number of individuals concentrated on the political factors when considering the revolutions that were taking place in the Middle Eastern and North African (Mena) region. They argue that South Africa differed to these countries because it has a constitutional democracy where the rule of law reigns and where no one is repressed (Steenkamp and du Toit, 2011; Worrall, 2012). They also felt that since the apartheid regime was removed in

1994, South Africans have the chance to choose their leaders in elections that are considered free and fair (Friedman, 2011; Steenkamp and du Toit, 2011), amongst other factors. To explain this in RD terms, the consideration is that the expectations and the actual delivery of political abilities leaves the gap quite small, thus lessening the chance of an uprising. In addition, apparent freedom from arbitrary arrest as a result of the rule of law, and free and fair elections, appear to point to the just treatment of South Africans, lessening the chance of indignation upsets. In considering these views on the political freedom in South Africa as opposed to the lack of political freedom in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, it is argued that the people of South Africa will consider voting out the ineffective government before taking to the streets in revolt (Friedman, 2011). In addition, it will be argued that although repression is getting worse, it is not at the formalized levels that Tunisia and Egypt were seeing. In the following section, we shall explore the various ideas presented that argue against South Africa being at extreme risk of a revolution.

Steven Friedman⁶⁵ (2011) claims that there will be no revolution in South Africa as the people have political freedom, which was sorely lacking in Tunisia and Egypt. Friedman (2011) argues that

Warnings that we will face our own Tunisia or Egypt are based on the prediction that the poor here will suffer so severely at the hands of the government or the market or both that they will rise up and overthrow the government. But the protests in the Middle East are not an uprising of the poor demanding bread. While economic hardships may have played a role, they are driven by the people for the right to choose their leaders – the middle class played an important role.

Zuma⁶⁶ (Steenkamp and du Toit, 2011) agrees, arguing that comparing South African and Tunisian governing styles is not relevant as there are no parallels in the history, politics and social conditions of the two countries. He further emphasised this, stating

⁶⁵ One must note that Friedman (2011) repeatedly suggests that although it is highly unlikely that there will be a revolution in South Africa, and provides several reasons as to why there would be no revolution in South Africa, he doesn't outright object that there will not be a revolution, suggesting that economic factors are a concern, but not to the extreme position that authors such as Mbeki (2011) and Cohen (2011) take.

⁶⁶ Although it is pointed to by Khadija Patel (2011) that "Bound by duty, if not principle Zuma, had to offer some reassurance about the countries future".

How and on what basis [do] you compare apples and guavas? That is how it is with analysts: They analyse and criticize without doing the work or giving alternatives. Really, we don't have to spend much time on this (Steenkamp and du Toit, 2011).

If one considers the political climate, South Africa appears to be different to Tunisia and Egypt. Marfleet (2009: 15) considers Egypt as a “low-intensity democracy”, where “systematic fraud and ballot-rigging, combined with more or less open violence vis-à-vis opposition groups and the media, ensure power remains within a network of privilege, often closely linked to the armed forces”. Indeed, there are elements in South Africa that are rather different when comparing it to Egypt. Even some of those supporting Mbeki's prediction of a “Tunisia day” admit that Zuma is correct in some of his claims, with Patel (2011) stating “As Zuma rightly pointed out, this is not a Middle Eastern kleptocracy with a geriatric sitting on a blood-soaked throne”. However there is still the perception of the government not listening to the people, corruption, and some other deep-rooted problems which are not being addressed. The mere fact that the people are free to choose their leaders does not mean the leaders are putting in place all the wants and needs of the people.

Furthermore, the main basis of this argument – as is also shown in the above Friedman quote - is that the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were based on political factors. Although economic factors may have contributed, it was largely the desire by the Egyptians and the Tunisians to have a choice in who their leaders are to be that led to the revolution⁶⁷. This is echoed by Zuma (Steenkamp and du Toit, 2011) and a similar approach is used by Jacob Dlamini (2011) – although this will be considered below. This argument is based on the premise that in Tunisia and Egypt, there was no choice in who governed the people, while in South Africa, the people have a choice in who governs then. Zuma (Steenkamp and du Toit, 2011) states that “everyone has the right to say what he wants and to vote”, and Friedman (2011) argues

⁶⁷ Interestingly, Friedman (2011) – after pointing that people who demonstrate against the ANC often still vote for them, he then states “it is ... true that disaffected ANC voters do not have an alternative and so usually feel that their choice is between voting for it or staying home. And those grassroots voters do not form new political parties: politicians do, and it is therefore likely that most voters will not have an alternative until the ANC splits again, something that is in the hands of the politicians rather than the people”.

First, voter disaffection with the ANC [African National Congress] would show itself in a consistent fall- off in the ANC vote. Second, if voters became so desperate that they were willing to overthrow the government, they would presumably be desperate enough to vote for the opposition rather than making sacrifices to do something that could be achieved simply [by] visiting a polling booth.

On the other hand, Friedman (2011) appears to be correct in his analysis that the ANC is not necessarily losing votes⁶⁸, although there has been a decrease in the overall percentage of overall parliamentary control. ANC support according to the IEC (2012) – and the temporary electoral commission for the 1994 election – began at roughly 63% in 1994, rose to around 66% in 1999, again rose to 70% in the 2004 elections and then declined to 66% again in the most recent elections of 2009⁶⁹. Despite the decrease in the overall percentage in the 2009 election and the plummeting voter turnout, the ANC enjoyed the largest number of votes it has ever enjoyed, although this does not necessarily mean that the proportional percentage of the vote has increased as well⁷⁰. Despite the increase in the number of votes, David Everatt (2011: 78) argues that the ANC took a pounding at the polls in that election, losing “ground in seven of nine provinces”. In addition, as Dlamini suggests below, the increasing level of voter apathy has become astronomical, and so although the ANC is increasing its number of votes, a possible increasing loss of faith in the overall political system is perhaps also on the rise. This is important to note, because lack of faith in the overall political system may indicate failing legitimacy of the state and its processes, as perhaps the gap between what people want from the state and what the state delivers is broadening.

⁶⁸ It must be noted that since 1994, post-apartheid South Africa has elections every five years – 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 to be exact – and so between every election there is a constant influx of new voters, and so although Friedman (2011) may be correctly in pointing out that disgruntled individuals are still voting for the ANC, however, it may just appear this way because the influx of voting age individuals lessens the impact of these lost votes.

⁶⁹ David Everatt (2011: 78) argues that this might be because this was the first year where voters “born-free” – being born in a world where Mandela was free – would have voted. He argues that the ANC might be hitting its generational ceiling (Everatt, 2011: 72).

⁷⁰ They could be gaining votes in numbers, but losing their overall percent of the vote, largely due to apathy.

In addition, if one looks back at the service delivery protests, the election years do appear to have significantly less service delivery protests. This could indicate, as Susan Booysen (2007) suggested, that voting as well as service delivery protests are complimentary political acts. While our electoral system seems to have been relatively effective and the votes for the ANC appear to have been obtained in a free and fair manner, one wonders if the votes obtained and decrease in protests are as a result of some appeasement politics during election years with service delivery improving in certain areas to “buy” votes. Additionally, even if it appears then that people have not lost faith in the electoral system or the ANC; one could use Rudé’s idea – mentioned in the third chapter - of there being an overt factor and a hidden factor to explain the lack of protest action during the election years. People may feel in election years they are able to vote. There is a potential solution to their problems. During non-election years however, they feel trapped and hamstrung.

In addition to people having the right to vote, many of those that support this idea that there is little chance of there being a revolution in South Africa are correct in saying that the role of overt repression is not nearly as great as it was in Tunisia and in Egypt at the time of their revolutions. In Tunisia, Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest to his goods being confiscated by the police (Gibson, 2011), and in Egypt the blogger Khaled Said was beaten to death by policemen for trying to expose corruption (Logan, 2011). Aida Seif El-Dawla (2009: 120-121 citing Amnesty International, 2002) points out that “In Egypt everyone taken into detention is at risk of torture”, and that – at the time *Egypt: The Moment of Change* was released - increasing numbers of people were testifying to increasingly brutal treatment at the hands of the police. He also mentions that the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights recorded 532 cases of torture between April 1993 and April 2004, with 120 deaths as a result (El-Dawla, 2009: 122). In his study of police violence in South Africa, David Bruce (2010: 12) records that between 2001 and 2009, the Independent Complaints Directory (IDC) recorded two deaths by torture, which obviously falls well below what was experienced in Egypt in a similar timeframe. However, if one considers the deaths due to police shootings, one can easily see the gradual increase in numbers killed from 282 in the 2005-2006 period – including 10 innocent bystanders, to 568 deaths in the 2008-2009 period – including 32

innocent bystanders⁷¹. One must remember that these are deaths in police action against criminals. However, while there may be varying reasons for these deaths, it is however a good indicator of the increasing use of force by the police. In addition, there have been a string of deaths at the hands of the police during protests, with individuals such as Andries Tatane being killed. This violence appears to have escalated dramatically with the deaths of 34 miners in a single protest action in 2012 (Marinovich, 2012). As a result, although South Africa is not very close to the formalised overt repression seen in say, Egypt, the increasing use of police force is of concern. This use of force is not only represented by unjust acts that may cause reaction according to moral indignation, but also indicates a growing discrepancy between what is expected and what is actually happening, a growth of this gap thus possibly thwarts an individual's political freedom.

While Jacob Dlamini (2011), does not believe that a revolution will take place in South Africa, his analysis of the political situation differs from that of Friedman and Zuma and some other analysts as he argues that although there will be a political death of the ANC and current South African politics in general, it will be at the hands of political apathy rather than at the hands of a revolution. He argues that rather than the disillusioned ANC supporters voting for opposition parties, South Africa will experience a fall in the government – and especially the ANC - through “gatvol voters” as they will stay away and not vote. This is an interesting approach, and appears to fit quite nicely into Friedman's (2011) argument that “usually [disillusioned ANC supporters] feel that their choice is between voting for it [ANC] or staying home”.

In considering South African election statistics since 1994, there does appear to be some evidence supporting both of these arguments. According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the turnout of voters of voting age – that is overall, and not just the registered voters - has faced a constant decrease from around 86% in the 1994 election to around 57% in the 2009 election (IDEA, 2011)⁷². This is a staggering decrease in the number of South Africans who can vote that are not voting. Despite it being

⁷¹ Newham (2011) adds, arguing: “ICD statistics reveal that complaints of police assault with intention to commit grievous bodily harm (GBH) increased from 825 incidents in 2008/[09] to 920 in 2009/2010”.

⁷² It must be noted that according to IDEA (2011), the percentage of registered voters that voted was about 87% in 1994 and about 77% in 2009; a decrease of 10% in those who registered to vote.

possible that there are several more reasons as to why there is a decrease in the turnout of voters of voting age, one can't help but wonder if Dlamini is not correct is his argument that in South Africa, apathy will be a greater problem than an actual widespread revolution as suggested by Mbeki. Indeed, perhaps – to corrupt the Relative Deprivation ideas presented in the second chapter – the declining political expected values as well as the declining actual political values are declining at such a rate that the gap between them is not actually increasing. As such, South Africa is slowly becoming more a-political in terms of the parliamentary elections. According to the social-psychological theories of revolution, the gap between the expected and actual political values isn't large enough and so the explosion will not happen. As a result, Dlamini's title of 'ANC will go out not with a bang but a whimper' seems awfully fitting. This may be relevant when considering Tim Cohen's (2011) argument that there is a level of political stagnation growing in South Africa⁷³.

There is another possible element to this rise in apathy however. If we consider the Independent Electoral Commission's (IEC) and IDEA's cover of the election results, especially the number of individuals that registered to vote compared to the increase in individuals eligible to vote. It is interesting to note that according to the statistics presented by IDEA (2011), roughly 98% of the eligible voting age population being registered to vote in 1994, as opposed to only about 73% of the eligible voting age population being registered to vote in 2009. These statistics fit into Dlamini's argument of apathy. If individuals are not going to vote, then why register? However, another reason for the drop in the percentage of voting age individuals registered to vote may possibly be explained by a decrease in accessibility to election posts? Still another abstention may be equality is decreasing because of several other factors – some mentioned below in the “social inequality” argument – and as a result, there is more of a concentration on mere survival than in voting – as is seen in Mbeki's retort to those who argued against his “Tunisia day” article, arguing that one “cannot eat democracy”.

This idea is intriguing, for if one suggests that individuals are becoming more frustrated with the political system and as a result, they lose interest in being political, it appears to counter

⁷³ In this, political stagnation is the lack of change in the political situation, and possible lack of faith in the ability to change the political situation.

the very premise of the social psychological theory. In this theory, the argument is that the more frustrated individuals get with the gap between their value expectations and actual value increasing, the greater the chance that they will rise up against the object blocking their path – for example, an ineffective governmental system where the individuals feel that they have little to no choice on the ruling party. However, in Dlamini's argument, the action taken by the people is the complete opposite, where they remove themselves from the political sphere.

Social Inequality

As mentioned above, Mbeki triggered the South African debate with his February article. In his argument, he – like many others - concentrated on the social inequality side as to why individuals in these countries were revolting, with the most famous being Mohammad Bouazizi. He was echoed by other authors and even political big shots such as Zwelinzima Vavi and Mathews Phosa. Indeed, many considered the role of social inequality and economic factors in the revolutions, such as the level of unemployment, poor service delivery and declining standards of living. These factors can play an enormous role if one considers the previous mentioned social-psychological theories. Promises of jobs without the actual delivery of more jobs may initially increase expectations and increase the RD gap leading to problems if there is no delivery of jobs. In addition, economic factors can often be clearly seen by society, such as smart cars and other status symbols. This opens the door to comparisons between groups and if it is perceived these items are attained through dubious means, an element of moral indignation arises especially if, bearing in mind the factors forming part of RD, society is facing declining standards of living and they find that their leaders are pocketing their money through corruption. In this side of the debate, there was a concentration on the economic problems of the modern South Africa, however it was not economics alone, and there were certain political elements to it as well, such as corruption.

Although various reasons were presented by the “social inequality” side of this debate, several factors stood out quite dramatically. The most common of these factors was the level of unemployment in the Mena region and the level of unemployment in South Africa, especially unemployment amongst the youth. Unemployment was not the main focus of

Mbeki's article – although his view on does add to the unemployment debate – but it was echoed by Vavi (2011), Phosa (2012) and Tim Cohen (2011) amongst others. For these authors, the revolutions in the Mena region were hugely influenced by rising unemployment. Without hope for a living wage and – in the case of Bouazizi for example – with active repression on those that tried to create a living for themselves, there may have been very little choice but to rebel. We will consider the factor of unemployment at a later stage in this chapter.

In addition, a life expectancy decline can be devastating to the morale of a nation, especially when it appears to have occurred because of unjust reasons and could have been avoided. In his article on the high chance of a revolution in 2020 in South Africa, Mbeki (2011) looks at the life expectancy of South Africans. According to his article, life expectancy “has declined from 65 years to 53 years since the ANC came to power” (Mbeki, 2012). One may beg the question as to the effect this has on the mood of a society and its contribution to the revolutionary mood of a population. Mbeki (2011) sadly does not explain further in what way this could play a devastating role. However, one of the possible implications of a declining life expectancy could be a sign of declining standards of living – possibly through rising living costs and rising food prices (Gumede, 2011; also see Cohen, 2011). Indeed, it appears that higher standards of living have a positive effect on the life expectancy of a population, and of course, the converse is also true. Indeed, a declining life expectancy can be related to a declining standard of living. In an article, *Mail and Guardian* (2009) noted that there has been a decline in South Africa's life expectancy from the 1990s to the 2000s. It was also noted that the provinces which had the lower life expectancy were also the provinces with the highest HIV/AIDS deaths (*Mail and Guardian*, 2009). This raises an important issue on the declining life expectancy theory and that is that disease can play a role. Following the theories that we have considered, if this decline is view in an unjust manner, people may take the streets as a result of moral indignation. These issues support the arguments put forward by Mbeki and his supporters and show the effects these situations may have on the social-psychological mood of a society.

The idea of relative deprivation, as explained in chapter two, may well be an important idea to keep in mind when considering the impact declining life expectancy has on people's

morale. The population's diminished ability to handle disease, malnutrition and thirst could point to a decline in standard of living brought about by the lack of governmental/non-governmental response to emergency situations in areas. While disease is obviously a factor as seen in HIV/AIDS levels, having the lowest life expectancy cannot divorce this from apparent declining economic factors. Indeed, if a population can no longer afford medical treatment, or even food, they may well start to resent those in the fortunate position of being able to afford better food and healthcare, particularly if they look at the people they have voted into power falling into this group and may well rise against the regime and its laws. This follows Gurr's model of "Decremental deprivation" quite effectively, where what's actually there is decreasing from a stable expectation level. Indeed, there may even be an element of moral indignation, in which people may feel the lack of these qualities in life unjustified, and it is unacceptable that they cannot afford or are blocked from accessing them while others can have more than their share. An example is the South African mother who shoplifted a R20 bottle of cough syrup for her sick child (Venter, 2012). She went against societal norms and took the matter into her own hands. There has also been an enormous increase in the number of protests demanding these basic services, protests that sometimes lead to clashes with authorities. Indeed, the declining living standard appears to fit Gurr's "decremental deprivation" model quite well. The expectations remain quite stable while the actual values decline. It therefore is possible to conclude looking at the social-psychological theories presented in the second chapter of this paper, that there is a heightened possibility of revolution in South Africa.

Another element in the decline of life expectancy that may play an important role in spurring individuals into acts of revolt is the response by the masses to the unjustified acts on the parts of those that can provide. HIV/AIDS is quite a problem in South Africa, a problem that can be potentially lessened through the use of Anti-Retroviral medicine. There was however, an enormous fight over supplying this medicine. If one considers the theory of moral indignation – is it not possible to speculate that the act of denying this medicine to those in need may be perceived as unjustified and may spur individuals into revolt? There are those that are totally disgusted at the fact that help is available for HIV/AIDS but it is not being provided, leading to a compromise in the standard of living. One could use a similar argument when considering the lack of monetary wealth, or – to use the broad term appropriated and stamped on almost every form of protest in South Africa by the media,

“service delivery” – that one may consider inequality and the gap it represents as being unjustified and therefore wrong? This leads into one of the others reasons presented by authors as to why a revolution similar to those of the Arab Spring may be possible in the modern South Africa, that of the rising food prices.

Some of the factors possibly contributing to the rising food prices may be South Africa becoming a food importer in 2007 (Mbeki, 2011). This may be exacerbated by the economic problems effecting Europe and America (Gumede, 2011). The elimination of agricultural subsidies for example have, according to Mbeki (2011), led to the loss of “600 000 farm workers’ jobs and the eviction from the commercial farming sector of about 2,4-million people between 1997 and 2007”. The end result of the increase in food prices mean an individual is no longer able to afford the same amount of food on their same salary. If the population considers this food increase justified they will accept it and carry on with their lives. Most reasonable people understand that food price increases are necessary at times. However, individuals do not enjoy feeling that they are being taken advantage of and that the rise in prices is unjustified. Examples have been presented in the third chapter on unjustified price increases, such as price hikes in bakeries. These objections to food price increases fall under Thompson’s (1991) treatise, which considers the idea of moral economy.

Unemployment and Social Grants

Unemployment is seen to be one of the most likely issues that would contribute to an uprising in South Africa by those supporting revolution in South Africa (Cohen, 2011; Mbeki, 2011; Mkokeli, 2011; Patel, 2011; Anonymous, 2012; Ngalwa, 2012). The unemployed youths are seen to be those most likely to rise up. Tim Cohen (2011) suggests that the “Mena” region had an average unemployment estimated at being more than ten percent, “but amongst the youth that percentage could be almost four times as much”. Cohen (2011) then goes on to say

SA's unemployment rate (the Statistics SA "narrow" definition) is about 24%, roughly 13-million people out of a labour force of about 17-million⁷⁴. Out of the 4-million unemployed, about 35%, are under 25. That looks very much like Mena.

This does indeed seem supported by Statistics South Africa's (2011: vi) *Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter 1, 2011*⁷⁵. If these figures are correct and that nearly a quarter of the South African workforce unemployed, as opposed to the rough 10 percent average per country in the Mena region, thus the problem of unemployment would seem far greater in South Africa. However, Cohen is not the only individual to pick up on the high levels of unemployment. The lack of unemployment has been used in many of the opinion pieces presented supporting Mbeki's "Tunisia Day". It has been mentioned by high profile political figures such as Zwelinzima Vavi (Mkokeli, 2011) and Mathews Phosa (Ngalwa, 2012), as well as other individuals, such as William Gumede (2011)⁷⁶ and Khadija Patel (2011). The views held by various parties that unemployment could be the trigger to a revolution are not unique as it is a common view amongst many that the unemployed played an enormous role in the overthrow of the dictators in Tunisia and Egypt.

It may be useful to consider the Fanonian perspective on revolution when considering the unemployed, which would fall under the *lumpenproletariat* in Frantz Fanon's (2004) view. Fanon (2004: 81-82), more so than other Marxists, almost places the *lumpenproletariat* as a poetic forerunner of the revolution, suggestion

⁷⁴ It must be noted that there is most likely a mistake in Tim Cohen's statistical analysis. Using a mathematical equation to find the percentage, being: $((13\,000\,000 / 17\,000\,000) * 100)$, one gets the answer 76.47 (rounded to two decimal places), which can be rounded to a percentage of 76, leaving 24 percent employed. What this author thinks Cohen meant was that there were roughly 4 million unemployed, and roughly 13 million employed, to make the total of a labour force of 17 million. Following from this, his jump from "13 million unemployed" to the "4-million unemployed", realising that the "13 million unemployed" was meant to be 4 million unemployed; suddenly begins to make a lot more sense.

⁷⁵ The unemployment percentage, according to Statistics South Africa (2011(a): vi; 2011(b): vi; 2011(c): vi; 2011(d): vi; 2012(a): vi; 2012(b): v), has remained around roughly 24% and 26% from quarter one of 2010 to quarter two of 2012, and has had an overall drop of 0.3% in this period. Unemployment being 25.2% in quarter one of 2010, 25.3% in quarter two of 2010, 25.3% in quarter three of 2010, 24% in quarter four of 2010, 25% in quarter one of 2011, 25.7% in quarter two of 2011, 25% in quarter three of 2011, 23.9% in quarter four of 2011, 25.2% in quarter one of 2012, and 24.9% in quarter two of 2012. Quarter one includes January to March, quarter two includes April to June, quarter three includes July to September, and quarter four includes October to December.

⁷⁶ It must be noted that William Gumede (2011) is considering Southern Saharan Africa as a whole.

the *lumpenproletariat* constitutes a serious threat to the “security” of the town and signifies the irreversible rot and gangrene eating into the heart of colonial domination ... [These individuals,] when approached, give the liberation struggle all they have got, devoting themselves to the cause like valiant workers.

This is extremely interesting as according to those individuals that consider the unemployment as a major factor in the revolution, they constantly point to Mohamed Bouazizi, an unemployed individual (Rifai, 2011), as engendering the revolution, being the spark that ignited the revolt – at least in Tunisia – which then appeared to spread to the other Mena nations. It would appear then that – as Fanon suggested, the unemployed played an important role in the revolution. Indeed, the start of the revolution in Tunisia was with the self-immolation of this unemployed individual⁷⁷. In this scenario, an individual that would be considered to be part of the *lumpenproletariat* was instrumental in sparking the revolutions in the Mena region. Indeed, through what may be perceived as moral indignation, Bouazizi managed to spur many differing groups into revolting against the regime which ultimately led to the overthrow of the Tunisian regime as well as spurred some groups in other Mena nations into taking action against their governments.

Unemployment may also have a detrimental effect on the mood in society. One of the defences used by the South African president Jacob Zuma in his attempt to dismantle Mbeki’s argument was

Your [the unemployed, especially the unemployed youths] impatience is justified, but your frustration with unemployment will be solved, because the president has declared that this is the year of job creation (Steenkamp and du Toit, 2011).⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Being part of the lumpenproletariat, and having his goods confiscated may have led to Bouazizi’s actions (see Rifai, 2011). The repressive structure of the state would not let him move out of the space he was in. He was being unjustly – at least perhaps, in his perception, blocked from his goals and dreams.

⁷⁸ This was also an intriguing response, the idea of a “superior being” understanding the plights of the suffering, and appearing to have the ability to will it / make it go away. This is similar to the response by the collapsing Egyptian regime towards their people (Soueif, 2012: 11).

Indeed, when referring to the unemployment statistics presented by Statistics South Africa, there was apparently an overall decrease in the unemployment of roughly 1.1% - although it must be noted that the second quarter of 2012 ended with South Africa's unemployment being at about 24.9%, however, we have the luxury of hindsight which Zuma obviously did not have at the time (StatsSA, 2012(b)). If one considers Cohen's (2011) suggested average of about ten percent, one quickly identifies that South Africa is well over the apparent "limit" of unemployment. This raises the question as to why there hasn't already been a revolution in South Africa as a result of unemployment? If one follows the argument that unemployment was the cause of the Arab Spring (see Rifai, 2011; Al Jazeera(b), 2011), it is strange that South Africa has not experienced a revolution with the unemployment rates present in the country. There could be several reasons as to why there has not been an uprising. One could argue that South Africa has already experienced its "revolution" which resulted in the change of regime in 1994 – although it must be noted that some authors, such as Fanon, would argue that South Africa has not actually had its revolution, as the political events that occurred in 1994 ended in a negotiated settlement and not a revolution, where the elite betrayed the revolution and as a result was a failed revolution. Following from the idea that South Africa experienced a revolution a short while ago, one may begin to conclude that the energy required for large scale revolt in South Africa has been spent and is in need of recovery⁷⁹. However, a more likely position is that more than just the problem of unemployment is required to spark a mass revolt.

Following from this, if we consider the social-psychological theories presented in the second chapter, we can get an idea of how unemployment may affect the mood of a society and make it more willing to revolt against its current regime. Promises made – such as the previous one by Zuma, can build up expectation and the lack of job creation (at least for those who were unfortunate enough not to land a job), and the failure to get a job, may add to the frustration felt by these individuals. As the gap grows between what is expected and what is actually being delivered, the chance is heightened for civil unrest. As a result of the failure to deliver jobs – seeing as the unemployment level has largely remained the same over the period that we have considered – the revolutionary mood of society may in fact be increasing. In addition, unemployment effects the creation of a better life, as one is often unable to

⁷⁹ However, one must not forget that the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and the two revolutions of 1917 may indeed counter this idea.

receive much, if any, income thus potentially depriving unemployed individual of other needs, such as shelter and the like. Indeed, this lack of some of the most basic needs may be one of the biggest factors playing part in spurring these individuals on in their struggle against the regime for a better life.

Another problem is created by unemployment is the marginalisation of the unemployed. If we consider Fanon's argument on the *lumpenproletariat*, and especially when considering the Marxist perspective, they are often marginalised for unlike the workers and the business owners, they are perceived as having limited value in the struggle. As William Gumede (2011) argues, using the words of South African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan

The first parallel is that both the Maghreb countries and those South of the Sahara have allowed – in the words of South African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, 'inequality to grow, allow(ed) joblessness to accelerate (and is) about state(s) that doesn't actually perform (and is) about a minority that accumulates things for itself'.

Even though the statistics show that in South Africa there has actually been an, albeit minimal, decline in unemployment since 2010. The constant promises of job creation has created huge expectations and frustration grows as these promises are not met and the improvement in living conditions does not happen (see footnote 76).

Finally, the main argument for the rather specific year given by Mbeki, is the termination of the Chinese mineral intensive phase. This appears to follow the theory of RD very well. Mbeki (2011) makes the argument that the ANC has been appeasing the poor and the unemployed through the use of social grants, and that when the Chinese mineral intensive phase is completed, there will be a lack of income and as such the ANC will be unable to afford these social grants. As a result of this, there will be a decrease in the actual values of what these beneficiaries of the social grants are getting, without a decrease in the expectation of what they were getting, fitting Gurr's "Decremental Deprivation" model of RD. Mbeki appears partly correct in his analysis, that if this situation were to happen in this way, there is

a chance, according to the theory of RD that a revolutionary mood could arise. This is however, looking into the future which we know is not an exact science. There may be changes in that the ANC government possibly finds alternative means of increasing the income and so the effect of the decrease in income derived from the Chinese minerals intensive stage is lessened.

Service Delivery Protests

When considering the possibility of revolt in South Africa, one cannot escape the increase in what is referred to generally as “service delivery”⁸⁰ protests. Indeed, Municipal IQ (2012) released their “Hotspots” press release in August of this year which shows the incredible rise in service delivery protests – or at least, major service delivery protests (Alexander, 2010: 28). Peter Alexander (2010: 26) attempts to define the idea that is “service delivery” protests, saying they are

locally-organised protests that place demands on people who hold or benefit from political power (which includes, but is not limited to, local politicians). These have emanated from poorer neighbourhoods (shack settlements and townships rather than suburbs). Perhaps this is best captured by defining the phenomenon as one of local political protests or local protests for short. The form of these actions relates to the kind of people involved and the issues they have raised. They have included mass meetings, drafting of memoranda, petitions, toyi-toying, processions, stay-aways, election boycotts, blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tyres, looting, destruction of buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships, confrontations with the police, and forced resignations of elected officials.

⁸⁰ The term “service delivery” has been placed in inverted commas as it has become so widespread in the media that just about every form of dissent is now called “service delivery” dissent, taking away from much of the meaning of what the protestors are trying to achieve – explained by Richard Pithouse (2007). Indeed, these protests are often incorrectly dumbed down to economic factors when, as is pointed to by Richard Pithouse (2007; cited in Alexander, 2010: 25), they are about “citizenship, understood as ‘the material benefits of full social inclusion ... as well as the right to be taken seriously when thinking and speaking through community organisations’”. One can see the similarity pointed to by Friere’s models in the fourth chapter of this paper. Unfortunately, we have little choice than to follow the broad category of “service delivery” as that has become so engrained in articles on the matter, and we do not have time to separate the protests out, as well as how perplexing it would become to attempt to decipher what sort of protests – if there was any different “kind” of protest - the authors (Cohen, 2011; Mbeki, 2011; Mkokeli, 2011; Anonymous, 2012; Ngalwa, 2012) were trying to put across as their form of “service delivery” protests, and indeed, one may find that some of them may have received their statistics from other sources using the broad category.

Regardless of what “service delivery” protests are about, one cannot ignore the fact that the “poorer neighbourhoods” – to borrow from Alexander above - are finding their feet and raising their voices. The Municipal IQ press release in August 2012 had already declared that South Africa has breached its previous peak in service delivery protests⁸¹. In this release, the number of major service delivery protests had reached 113, going above the previous high of 111 in 2010 (Municipal IQ, 2012). Indeed, in the four years since the massive jump from 27 protests in 2008 to 105 in 2009, the number of protests has only declined to below 100 in 2011 (Municipal IQ, 2012)⁸².

One might wonder why it is important to consider the increase in “service delivery” protests taking place in South Africa – besides the fact that this is one of the reasons presented by several authors supporting Mbeki’s position. The increase is important; especially if one considers Susan Booysen’s explanation as to why communities mobilise and how it may – and has – effected the mobilisation of other communities. She argues

Either way, the actions were firmly anchored in the fertile basis of dissatisfaction with social conditions and in alienation from the institutions of local democracy ... In addition, the turn to protest was facilitated through the snowballing effect, with communities in many cases following examples that were observed in the mass-media’s coverage of preceding protests (Booyesen, 2007: 24)⁸³.

⁸¹ Coincidentally, ten days later, post-Apartheid South Africa faced what was quickly referred to as its worst case of police barbarity towards protesters at the Marikana mine. One can speculate as to whether the increase in protests has also led to an increase in police intervention.

⁸² There are several possibilities for why this has occurred, such as the harshness of Thabo Mbeki’s reaction to dissent and Jacob Zuma’s apparent toleration of dissent – at least in rhetoric (see Patel, 2011: “Yes, every person does indeed have ‘the right to say what he wants’, but is anybody listening ... at all?”). Jane Duncan (2010: 105-127; 2010) for example suggests that under Mbeki, protest was hemmed in and often administratively suppressed, however, she argues that although under Zuma there seem to have been improvements in certain areas such as ‘anti-incorporation protests’, there have been declines in other areas, such as blanket bans on protest, and the like. Interestingly, Duncan (2010: 22) also argues that “[w]hile the Zuma administration is listening to the protesters, there is little evidence that they are hearing.”

⁸³ The “snowballing” effect that Booysen mentions is very intriguing, as it appear to hand some validity to the theory of rationality in revolt. For further reading on this, see Joseph Heath (2000) ‘Ideology, Irrationality and Collective Self-Defeating Behaviour’ and Michael Rosen *On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology* (especially pp. 260-262). Although they mention how rationality can halt revolt through the coordination problem, one can bypass their, especially Rosen’s “gunman” theory ideas, for the element of the

Indeed, what South Africa is experiencing is not one united protest as could be seen in Egypt when Mubarak was overthrown, and there is a clear difference in the local protests as opposed to the “million man march” or Tahrir Square in Egypt (Al Jazeera(a), 2011). However, the revolution that toppled the Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was also not an entirely united protest, but appeared to be a collection of local protests that ultimately forced his resignation (Al Jazeera(b), 2011).

One can identify the role that social-psychological ideas play in the possible creation of a revolution here. An example of how this theory could work is made by some of the theorists. If one group of individuals – group A - is perceived to be receiving goods that another group of individuals – group B - is not receiving and group B is being blocked by receiving for whatever reason, the theory argues group B would become frustrated and become more prone to revolt. If one returns to the previous statement shown in the second chapter by Frans Cronje (See page 46) an understanding of the argument presented in that statement is that improvement of actual overall service delivery cannot match the rising expectations which have been created by the improvement in overall service delivery and as a result of this, people are taking to the streets in protest. The response by the people as discussed in this quote brings to mind the extra model presented in the second chapter by Hagopian, that of “accelerated deprivation”. One can therefore – in keeping with this example - use the Relative Deprivation theory as an explanation as to why service delivery may indeed have an ill effect on the stability in South Africa.

While “service delivery” protests often appear to be solely based on economic deprivation⁸⁴ (much like Davies’ social-psychological reasoning as to why individuals in these communities revolt) they are in fact quite deeply political, as Richard Pithouse (2007) suggests. The individuals wish more and more to have a say in how their lives are run, they wish to be treated as equal human beings in a society that respects their thoughts and ideas. They do not wish to be humoured, and fed false promises. As a result of this, protests from

unknown has now vanished, individuals and communities are now actually seeing others standing up to the “gunman”.

⁸⁴ Indeed, this is one criticism Pithouse (2007) has with Booysen (2007; also see Alexander, 2010: 25).

some of the poorer communities are almost certainly on the rise, a “rebellion of the poor” (see Alexander, 2010; especially pp. 37; Patel, 2011) in the works. According to Pithouse (2007) – especially in regarding the housing project in South Africa – there is an active effort to remove shack dwellers from the cities. He argues

It is clear that in many instances the housing projects, while presented as ‘delivery’ to the poor, are in fact aimed at delivering the poor both out of the city (as one expels a tumour from a body) and out of potentially autonomous spaces into regulated and commodified contemporary versions of the apartheid township – a space separate in every way from the fantasy of the world class cities but far enough out of town for this fact to be tolerable.

He further argues that

In South Africa, as elsewhere, exclusion from the city often results in a dramatic decline in economic well-being, access to education and health care and public spaces like libraries, parks, sport fields and so on. The sweetener in the relocation deal is that life saving basic services – toilets, electricity and adequate water in particular – are withheld from the shack settlements but provided for (on a commodified basis) in the relocation settlements. The justification for withholding services that would free people from constant diarrhea and fires is that it has been announced that the shack settlements are ‘temporary’.

It is interesting to bring attention to Frantz Fanon’s (2004: 3) idea of the compartmentalized world, “a world divided in two”. We have those that are included in the cities, and as Pithouse suggests, those who are actively removed from the cities. Booysen’s (2007: 23) claim that the general statistics “gloss over the realities of uneven and insufficient delivery to the most needy in society” in a very scary light. What adds to the fright factor created by this scare is an article released a year later by the president of the South Africa movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, S’bu Zikode (2008: 119), in which he argues “In this democracy the poor are only used for voting. Once we have voted we are only lied to and undermined and ignored”. In this compartmentalised world, there is more concern on the part of the city dweller and the politician on the exploitation of those excluded from the cities than there is

on bridging the gap⁸⁵. In this simple example, the poor are exploited precisely for their right to vote. This brings to mind Fanon's (2004: 76) who in the *Wretched of the Earth* argues that

the peasants shrug their shoulders for they realize that both parties treat them as a makeshift force. The unions, the parties and the government, in a kind of immoral Machiavellianism, use the peasant masses as a blind, inert force of intervention. As a kind of brute force.

The poor in South Africa, exploited for their votes, are these peasants. They are merely serving the purpose of making up numbers, of taking up space. Pithouse (cited in Alexander, 2010: 29) further argues

there is a pervasive sense that the state disrespects people by lying to people at election times and by failing to listen to them at other times. ... [Where councilors are present, they] most often function as a means of top-down social control aiming to subordinate popular politics to the party.⁸⁶

This perception is interesting, as the Zuma regime has prided itself on its ability to listen. Jane Duncan (2010: 22) argues that

⁸⁵ It might be worth considering Aimé Césaire's (2000: 41; emphasis in text) 'boomerang effect', where he argues "that colonization ... dehumanizes even the most civilized man; that colonial activity, colonial enterprise, colonial conquest, which is based on contempt for the native and justified by that contempt, inevitably tends to change him who undertakes it; that the colonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing other man (sic) as *an animal*, accustoms himself to treating him like an animal, and tends objectively to transform *himself* into an animal".

⁸⁶ For more on the government failing to listen, see S'bu Zikode (2008). It might be worth noting the banking model presented by Paulo Freire – in terms of education, however still relevant to our understanding of a top-down approach. In this banking model, he argues that "[t]he outstanding characteristic of this narrative education ... is the sonority of words, not their transforming power. 'Four times four is sixteen; the capital of Pará is Belém.' The Student records, memorizes, and repeats these phrases without perceiving what four times four really means, or realizing the true significance of 'capital' in the affirmation 'the capital of Pará is Belém,' that is, what Belém means for Pará and what Pará means for Brazil" (Freire, 2005: 71). As a result, "a person is merely *in* the world, not *with* the world or with others; the individual is spectator, not a re-creator" (Freire, 2005: 75-76).

[a]ctivists are starting to suspect that the newly created points of access to the decision making system [“improved” under the Zuma regime] may be designed to deflect oppositional voices rather than to entertain their demands seriously.

Even Friedman, an individual strongly believing that South Africa has political freedom and as such is highly unlikely to go the revolution route, makes the observation that the rising protests are an attempt to get the government to listen⁸⁷.

Furthermore, in looking at some other factors that could contribute to a revolution in South Africa, one can also consider some of the theories of moral indignation. The government is blatantly lying to individuals (Pithouse, 2007; Zikode, 2008), which would most certainly be a breach of the perceived justice felt by the people. If one looks back at the theory of righteous indignation in the third chapter, it is surprising to note that events such as the death of Andries Tatane (Newham, 2011) and the like⁸⁸ did not spark a revolution in the same way as the death of Bouazizi – although we shall look at this in more depth below - however, the act of “using and abusing” the poor and not listening to the wants and needs of the voters is becoming more and more verbalised. These complaints are a clear indication that there are issues that people feel very strongly about that could, in time, lead to a regime change. These acts undermine the authority the government has, and delegitimises the government as a whole.

Corruption

Some of those authors supporting the possibility of a revolution in South Africa feel that political stagnation and corruption ingrained at all levels of the South African political regime, including some of those individuals right at the top, could lead to the disillusionment

⁸⁷ Although, he uses this to argue that they are not aimed at taking power from the government, only getting the government to listen. This does appear to be rather ironic however, for it appears – and this appears to be a problem not unique to South Africa - that the individual is considered to be politically free if they have the right to vote, which appears rather simplistic

⁸⁸ Indeed, the Marikana mine shootings did not even manage to spark revolution in South Africa. This presents a rather interesting case, as there have been many instances of youthful individuals being slain

in the voters and increase the possibility of a revolution (Mbeki, 2011; Cohen, 2011; Patel, 2011). There are several examples of political stagnation and corruption. In the more recent South African history, some government officials and civil servants appear to be pocketing more money than they should be, to be benefitting when they shouldn't be, and the people appear to be suffering as a result of this. Cohen (2011) presents several examples in his piece, stating that "the head of the Special Investigating Unit, Willie Hofmeyr, said last year [2010] that 400 000 public servants were getting welfare grants to which they were not entitled". He also pointed out that Human Settlements Minister, Tokyo Sexwale, had "complained that just less than 1 000 officials in his department have been involved in various scams" (Cohen, 2011). According to the World Banks Governance Chart (2011), South Africa is increasingly unable to control corruption, falling from 78.5 percent control in 1996 to 59.7 percent in 2011⁸⁹. As a result, while the government says the right rhetoric about dealing with these issues, there is a real perception that nothing is done and that the government is neither serious nor capable of dealing with the problems.

The first theory that will immediately jump to mind when considering corruption is the theory of moral indignation. Indeed, the government and individuals that are involved in the corruption are benefitting from the trust and exploitation of those who are putting the money in the coffers in the first place. With the privilege of being in control of a society comes responsibility. The incumbent government needs to spend public funds wisely and in a manner that benefits the public. The government needs to be transparent. If individuals perceive that the funding is being used to feed the extravagant lifestyles of leaders, then individuals will feel as though they are being exploited and taken for a ride. According to the idea of moral indignation, the sheer disgust of an act and resentment of being taken for a fool is enough to spur people into action. Indeed, Thompson (1991) speaks of how the "mob" would riot if they felt that the food prices were artificially high and that they were being exploited. In much the same way, if society perceives that leaders are lining their pockets rather than making sure the people they serve get their perceived due, may spur people into taking action against the very people they voted into power. Following from this, one may also find that other forms of indignation may follow on from this act of

⁸⁹ It must be noted, that in a similar period Egypt's control of corruption fell from 56.6 percent in 1996 to 40.2 percent in 2009 – and has continued to decline to 28 percent in 2011. Tunisia increased dramatically from 49.3 percent in 1996 to 72.2 percent in 2002, but then fell again to 56.9 percent by 2009 (World Bank, 2011).

corruption. Khaled Said in Egypt was beaten to death by policemen for trying to expose corruption. Moral indignation therefore becomes an important factor one must consider if one is speaking of corruption.

In considering this, one can again use the theory of RD to explain how this can turn into a revolutionary factor. If the gap between expectations and the actual delivery is too large and the difference is seen to be as a result of corruption individuals can become frustrated and an atmosphere may be created that is conducive to revolutionary action. Also, in a similar way to the theory of moral indignation, the way a state should act and the way corruption is being controlled should influence the expected values, while the level of corruption – say, rising – will increase the gap between the expectations and the actual values. If we take South Africa as an example, using the World Bank statistics and other factors mentioned above, the control of corruption was reasonably good in 1996 being above 75%. This control has declined to below 50% at the present. As a result of this, the gap between what is expected and what is actually happening is increasing.

Failure of Righteous Indignation

It has been constantly mentioned throughout this thesis that the deaths of Mohamed Bouazizi and Khaled Said had a huge impact on the creation of a revolutionary mass protest in both of their countries. Indeed, the acts of brutality against these young men were considered so severe that they appeared to catapult the masses into taking to the streets. Although these examples are from the Arab Spring, they are most certainly not the sole examples⁹⁰. In the previous chapter, when considering Lupsha, he pointed to the assassination of Martin Luther King jr., and the resulting riots. In the dying days of October 2005 in France, two youths that were running from what appeared to be excessive police action died. The result of this was mass revolts in the city of Clichy-Sous-Bois against what was seen as murder at the hands of the police (Quadrelli, 2007). In August of 2011, the death of the teenager Mark Duggan at the hands of the police in what people believed was an assassination led to people

⁹⁰ Alain Badiou's *The Rebirth of History* (2012; especially 17-19) talks quite a bit about this type of scenario.

taking to the streets not only in London, but across England (Bennett, Christian, et al., 2011; Badiou, 2012: 17-19)⁹¹. In Athens, Greece, the death of the Alexandros Grigoropoulos sparked mass protests in 2008 (The Economist, 2008). While not all of these cases resulted in regime changes, they did lead to civil unrest triggered by righteous/moral indignation.

However, the reaction in South Africa after the death of Andries Tatane, or the reaction when 34 miners were gunned down and killed at the Marikana mines (Marinovich, 2012) was far more muted. Indeed, after the Marikana mine shootings, when it emerge that many of the protesting miners that had died or been wounded, had been shot in the back or had been hunted down (Marinovich, 2012), while there was an outcry, it was not at the level that one would expect when considering a theory such as moral indignation. In fact, it would appear that the outcry over rhino poaching appears to have greater resonance in South Africa than the deaths of these miners (see Fogel, 2012). If one even considers the arguments presented by either side of the South African debate, the deaths of Said and Bouazizi – which played such a large role in most international discourse – barely featured, if at all, in each side. None of the authors made reference to the death of Andries Tatane⁹², or any of the other protesters that have been killed at the hands of the police.

Although one cannot offer concrete conclusions as to why these authors did not mention these deaths – or only mentioned them in passing in an over-arching “there is no repression” approach such as Zuma (Steenkamp, Lizel and du Toit, Peter, 2011), it is important to note. There may be a variety of reasons as to why moral indignation has taken hold in so many different protests around the world and not in South Africa. Some people have even argued that the life of a rhino appears to be more important than that of poor black individual in South Africa, considering the different levels of disgust when one of each is killed⁹³ (Fogel, 2012). However, and more importantly, this may show that regardless of the complaints that have been lodged against the South African government, it is still seen as legitimate. Perhaps there has been no trigger event when individuals such as Andries Tatane have been

⁹¹ Interesting, some of those that were interviewed spoke of being unable to break out of the area in which they were based because the police and the government blocked them. They spoke of daily interactions with the authorities. This again supports the idea that by itself, righteous indignation was a spark, a trigger.

⁹² At this stage, the Marikana incident had yet to happen, so one can understand why no reference was made to that.

⁹³ This will have to be explored properly in a later paper however.

killed, because the people of South Africa appear to still deem this level of repression a necessary and acceptable evil.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we firstly considered the South Africa debate around whether there would be a revolution or not. We began by separating the different sides into what we termed political liberation arguments and social inequality arguments. Looking at the political liberation arguments, we saw that their main point was that South Africa is not a dictatorship and that people are free to choose their leaders and that there is limited repression. RD explains this in terms of a small gap between what is expected and what is delivered, lessening the chance of civil unrest. In addition, the limited thwarting of individuals would cancel out moral indignation – although create a level that society expects, making it more stringent. We also explored the fact that voting was in fact taking place in South Africa, and that although voter apathy is on the rise, more people voted in the last election than ever before. Apathy has been shown – correctly by Dlamini – to be a great threat to South African politics. This could indicate a loss of faith in the current political regime. We also found that South Africa was not at the levels of repression that Egypt and Tunisia were facing, however, repression was on the rise. This would increase the gap between what is expected and what is actually happening and indeed is an issue when one considers moral indignation. We also then looked at the social inequality argument and saw that the arguments on this side of the debate presented many differing variables as to why there would be a revolution in South Africa. Some of these factors included declining life expectancy, which may indicate declining standards of living and rising food prices. In this, we found that declining standards of living may indeed help create a revolutionary mood in South Africa in terms of RD as it fits quite neatly into Gurr’s “Decremental” deprivation. It also indicated moral indignation as some were watching as others were getting more than they were perceived to deserve while one was unable to get medicine. There was also consideration of the HIV/AIDS situation in South Africa, and the rolling out of medicine that could help. The factor of rising food prices is also rather important. We saw how the moral economy may be effected if individuals perceive this rise as an unjust act.

When we had explored the different debates, we saw that the political liberation arguments were ignoring some factors, such as rising repression, and we found that the social inequality arguments seemed to be more sound. As a result of this, the major factors that made up this argument were explored, being unemployment and social grants, service delivery protests and corruption. We also considered the fact that despite the deaths at the hands of the state organs, moral indignation did not seem to be playing a forefront role in South Africa currently. It was seen that unemployment was one of the major factors in the debate arguing that there would be a revolution in South Africa. We explored the importance of the *lumpenproletariat* in the revolutionary process according to the Fanonian perspective, and saw that the unemployed were seen as an important factor in the Arab Spring. This is interesting, as the unemployed are often marginalized and forgotten about. It was also shown by Cohen that the unemployment rate in South Africa is much higher than the average unemployment rate in the Mena region. This affects RD, especially with high profile officials promising jobs, and creates the “aspirational” graph presented in the second chapter. In addition, Mbeki argued that the ANC was placating the poor through social grants, and we saw that, as seen in Gurr’s “Decremental” deprivation model, that the South Africa would be open to risk if Mbeki is correct in his theory that the Chinese mineral intensive phase would finish and the GDP would dry up as a result.

We also considered the role that service delivery may play in the creation of a revolutionary situation in South Africa. When all protests are automatically labelled as ‘service delivery protests’ they are often dumbed down to purely economic factors, thus lessening their political impact. We saw how popular protest shows that individuals are dissatisfied with the current social conditions and are finding it difficult or even impossible to vent themselves through the local political institutions. It was shown how this could be seen in terms of RD, with the perception that some groups are receiving more than others. In addition, if one listens to what Frans Cronje had to say, one can directly relate the model of civil unrest to Gurr’s “Accelerated” deprivation. We also considered Fanon’s idea of the compartmentalised world, a world divided in two, and how it was still relevant in South Africa today. This often led to acts of moral indignation that could aid in inflaming a situation that already has civil unrest. It was shown how people are lied to in an attempt to

get their votes, and that afterwards they are often denied resources. This creates a sense that the government that is meant to be working for the people disrespects that people. In addition, it was argued – even by theorists on the side of the debate declaring that there would be no revolution – that the government doesn’t listen.

A further factor that was considered was that of corruption. It was shown that corruption is increasing in South Africa – or rather, it was shown that the government is failing to address corruption in South Africa. Similar trends were seen in Egypt, and this was shown to violate individual’s ideas of the morality. Indeed, individuals do not like it when others take advantage of them, and may perceive the South Africa government as being unwilling or unable to deal with corruption. The result is that individuals watch as money that should be used for the public good is used to fund someone else’s life, and people feel exploited. One could clearly see how Thompson would be relevant in his idea that people will rebel when they feel there is malpractice afoot. In addition, it was shown that corruption can lead to other forms of moral indignation, such as the death of Khaled Said. However, it was also shown that RD plays a role in this, as people have an expected idea of what a state is supposed to do, and as the state moves away from that, the gap increases, opening the door to a higher possibility of revolt.

Finally, we considered the failing of Lupsha’s “righteous indignation” when considering the South African debate. It was shown that the death of individuals has played an enormous role in the sparking of protest, such as the London riots of 2012. South Africa however, has experienced several events that one would consider events that could start civil unrest as a result of righteous indignation, however there has been very little unrest – if anything at all. It was shown that there almost appeared to be a greater outcry over rhino poaching than there is over the Marikana mine shooting. What we found is that this may show that the state is still seen as legitimate and that perhaps the repression is still seen as a necessary act.

Ultimately, we set out in this chapter with the goal to consider the debate on the possibility of a revolution occurring in South Africa. We have looked at both the social inequality and political liberation ideas in depth. We have seen that while neither argument is perfect and

that while there are discrepancies in both arguments the social inequality side of the argument seems to be more realistic than the political liberation argument. The one factor that may undermine the social inequality argument is the apathy of the people. This does seem to be increasing and is a real cause of concern in the South African climate. It does appear though, if only as one factor in the theories that we have seen, that South Africa may indeed be setting itself up for an explosion through increasing economic RD as well as increasing political RD – increasing repression and the like – and may be at risk of a trigger event setting it off.

Conclusion

The revolutions that took place during the Arab Spring will most likely go down in history amongst the great waves of transnational revolutions, such as the wave throughout Europe in 1848. The Mena region has been altered quite considerably and the world has yet to see the end results of these movements. Some countries might find themselves under greater repression as the movements which caused the world to lose hold of its breath in anticipation failed to affect change. Other movements have successfully removed their previous regimes, and can move in any direction. What is definite is that there is renewed interest in the consideration of revolutions and that revolutionary theory will endure for a while longer. In South Africa, the themes that triggered the debate about whether or not an Arab Spring is likely to happen here will continuously reoccur - much as the debate has done – throughout the years, and we can only wait and see where we will be taken. Rising levels of apathy and repression, along with high unemployment and corruption may be the undoing of the young democracy. However, we may also find that being a democracy, albeit one in which repression is escalating, people still feel that there is an avenue in which they can move within the current system. Regardless, the debate in South Africa has given us valuable insight into the views of some of the great minds in the South African public sphere, and what they deem important and problematic within the country.

We have seen that attempting to understand revolutions is a rather complex task. In the first chapter, we found that there were varying definitions of what revolution meant and that in some cases the concept of revolution is diluted rather dramatically. We also explored the changing nature of revolutions and revolutionary theory. We saw how Goldstone divided revolutionary theory in the twentieth century into the four generations, and how these generations were sometimes broken up into various groups, such as the three groups from the second generation of revolutionary theory. It soon became apparent why the term “revolution” itself is viewed in a rather different light when looking at the thoughts of previous theorists and generations, as the focus of the analytical tools changed. We found that as a result of the varying definitions, the problem of conceptual clarity was further complicated by the differences between revolts, coups, and revolutions. We did, however,

gain a greater understanding in the history of revolutionary theory in the twentieth century. In addition, we looked briefly at the debate between theories rooted in ideas of spontaneity and those rooted in conspiracy theories. We saw that this debate split into two sides, one that appeared more sympathetic to the people and placed revolutions at the feet of the people, while the other appears less sympathetic and placed revolutions at the cunning hand of conspirators. We also found a middle ground theory, however, that was the catalytic theory presented by Hagopian. In this theory, one finds that the mood is set and with the addition of a catalyst, explodes. Finally, we found that the role that rationality may play in a society may be more useful in describing why individuals do not engage in revolutionary action. However, throughout the thesis we saw that this may be turned around with the subtraction of the “unknown” value – i.e. when people witness others rising up they are no longer uncertain about others joining their rebellion.

In the second chapter, we considered several of the theories that fall under the broader category of social-psychological theories. The theories that we considered were the frustration-Aggression theory and Gurr’s Relative Deprivation theory, although we also considered the model presented by Davies. In these theories, individuals have wants and needs, and if anything is seen to be blocking the path to fulfilling these wants and needs, and that block is seen as unjust, people will become frustrated and may take to the streets. The wants and needs could be biological, and they can also be what individuals see others receiving in society. In the case of Relative Deprivation theory however, the theorists talk in terms of a gap between expected values and actual values. As this gap increases, so does the chance of people rebelling against the state or the perceived blocking force. We found that these theories were useful in considering the South African debate, as despite the age of these theories, their terms – such as frustration leading to unrest – are still widely used. Indeed, many of the arguments that were used by the side of the debate that considered social inequality had a basis on what some were getting and what others were not, or that what some are getting now may disappear at a later stage.

The third chapter in this thesis concentrated on the role indignation and injustice had in creating civil unrest. For this, we considered the theories put forward by Rudé, Thompson and Lupsha. Throughout these theories it could be seen that – to borrow from Rudé – there

were generalised beliefs that the people wanted a return to. If the state killed an individual or an individual died as a result of state action, people, may rise up against the state in order to, as they see it, restore justice. These theories concentrated on the role on injustice and malpractice, and how that may spur the masses into action. We saw how Lupsha pointed to the acts of such disgust that spurred people into action, and how the malpractice of food sales in Thompson's view caused a similar response. This has some relevance when considering the South African debate as there were several factors that were presented that may play a role in the creation of unrest in South Africa. Corruption is one of the main factors, in that the people feel like the state is taking them for a ride as they are seeing public money being used to fund the lavish lifestyles of others. We saw how this set of theories largely separated itself from the previous set of theories in that it appears to give a human face to the people who are rising up against that which they find unjust.

In the fourth chapter, we explored the debate that happened in South Africa as a result of the Arab Spring. We saw that this debate was split into two broad categories, being the political liberation arguments and the social inequality arguments. In the political liberation arguments, it was shown that South Africa is indeed different from Egypt and Tunisia, in that unlike the dictatorships in those countries, we have a constitutional democracy. Indeed, in South Africa we perceive ourselves as having the right to choose our leaders. We also found that repression is far below the levels that it is in Egypt. However, it was discovered that apathy is becoming increasingly prevalent in the South Africa voting system and that repression is on the increase. The social inequality argument focused on precisely that, the social inequality of South Africa. It had a variety of factors, such as unemployment, corruption, service delivery protests, and the like. We initially considered the role that a declining life expectancy and the role that rising food prices could play in the creation of a revolutionary situation. We found that declining life expectancy often meant declining standards of living, and that these – according to Relative Deprivation and moral indignation theories– could play a role in triggering a revolutionary situation in South Africa. In addition, considering the theory of moral economy, we found that if people perceive that the rising food prices are unjustified, they may take to the streets. As we continued, we considered unemployment and social grants, service delivery protests and corruption in more depth. We saw that unemployment may indeed play a role in creating a revolutionary situation according to both Relative Deprivation and moral indignation. We also found that

if Mbeki is correct in his analysis, and China does finish its mineral intensive phase, that the results may lead to a revolutionary situation. Service delivery also shed light onto whether there would be a revolutionary mood in South Africa according to the theories presented beforehand. It was seen that politicians are openly lying to the people in an effort to get votes and restricting resources, among other things. We then considered the role that corruption would play and found that it is indeed possible that – according to the theories presented – that corruption can help create a revolutionary situation. However, we also found that moral indignation about events such as the death of Andries Tatane did not spark revolt, and may still indicate an enduring state legitimacy in South Africa.

What we discovered in this thesis is not, as mentioned in the introduction, what we had originally set out to do. We were unable to provide a definitive answer as to whether or not there would be a revolution in South Africa. As we have seen throughout this thesis – and especially in chapter one – the subject of revolutions is wrought with complexities. We found that an attempt to find a theoretically informed definition of revolutions was complicated by the variety of definitions that have been put forward throughout the various generations of revolutionary theory. We also found that in addition to the complexity of the definition that, throughout the generations, there have been a variety of analytical tools that have been put forward in an attempt to analyse revolutions, with no analytical tool having more power over another. As such, it is impossible for one to say exactly what a revolution is and what will cause a revolution in a given society. We have seen that trigger events such as the death of Mohamed Bouazizi managed to spark unrest in Tunisia, while the death of protesters in South Africa was scarcely, if even, mentioned in the South Africa views on South Africa. As a result of the discrepancies between the various theorists and theories of revolution, and although Mbeki might have some credibility in his prediction according to the theory of Relative Deprivation - working on the idea that people receiving social grants will no longer be receiving them and will revolt, there are factors that indeed need to be addressed, state as the maintenance of the state monopoly over violence. The lack of mention of protester deaths appears to show that the state still seems to have legitimacy and that these deaths are seen as a necessary evil or accidental tragedies. However, we also found that Friedman's argument that there is political freedom in South Africa is quite limited, as there is growing apathy in the electoral system and he himself suggested that

people are taking to the streets in an attempt to get the government to listen – which appears to simply reduce the exercise of political freedom to a tick on a ballot.

One cannot deny that South Africa has some interesting times ahead of it, with high levels of social inequality and what appears to be rising levels of oppression as well as diminishing faith in the electoral system. Using this information to offer a prediction as to whether or not a revolution will occur is not the answer. Revolutions do not have a check list where one can say that if factors A, B and C are fulfilled then, therefore, there will be a revolution. We can certainly see that there are increasing levels of mobilisation amongst the poorer section of the South African society in the mounting service delivery protests. We are also seeing many of these protests happening in a way that undermines the existing institutions that have been put in place by the existing authorities. We have seen that there does appear to still be some state legitimacy with the deaths of Andries Tatane and the like going unchallenged in some of the leading minds in the South African public sphere. South Africa appears to be facing immediate and localised acts of civil unrest, and several factors are present that - in using the philosophical framework of revolutionary theories such as Relative Deprivation and moral indignation that have been used in this thesis - give one cause for concern about the stability of the country. However a lot more work is required before one can think of making an informed predication about the likelihood of revolution in South Africa. My own conclusion, after reading the debate in the South African public sphere in the light of academic theory about revolutions, is that our debate, while providing an interesting insight into how leading public intellectuals think, simply lacked the depth and sophistication for us to really get to grips with the full complexity of the issue. It would appear that the human factor is a big unknown in determining whether revolutions occur or not, and would require further research.

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