SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN POST APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this research is to bring the literature on political agency and economics together in an analysis of whether social movements can play an important role in economic development in post-apartheid South Africa. The entrenched discourse of sluggish growth and high inequality in post-apartheid South Africa can largely be attributed to the political decision to implement a neoliberal economic development orthodoxy. On the one hand, there is an urgent need to shift the economic development model to an alternate developmentalist model. However, no clearly articulated alternative developmental model has emerged. As a result, economically, South Africa is seemingly stuck. On the other hand, the selection of an economic development model and change in macroeconomic policies requires a political shift. Politically, formal politics has assumed the form of neoliberal democracy, characterised by a largely centralised state and the usurpation of the state and institutions by a national bourgeoisie. Social movements have emerged in response to the failure of neoliberalism to fulfil the promises of early post independent periods. They have been largely successful at highlighting the injustices and the inequalities in the country. However their ability to influence structural economic development has come into question. Firstly, social movements and their "politically destabilising distributive demands" have faced repression from the state as the state and institutions are aligned behind the interests of capital under a neoliberal democracy. Secondly, social movements in South Africa have been largely ideologically under-developed. They have been largely fragmented and tended to contest specific single issues rather than aiming to shift the deeper underlying systemic drivers behind the symptomatic immediate discomforts. The economic dimensions of such a shift are particularly unclear. This fragmentation and apparent lack of economic pragmatism make management or suppression of disruptive movements by the state relatively easy. The research uses a contrast between the Latin American social movements against a South African background in order to see what lessons South Africa can draw from social movements in Latin America. The Latin American case is cautiously more positive and provides comparably more sanguine lessons. In this way, this research seeks to construct a more comprehensive framework for the further study of social movements in South Africa and their potential impact on economic development in South Africa.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ANUC	National Farmworkers Association, *Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos*,
APF	Anti-Privatization Forum
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CEOIC	State Council of Indigenous and Peasant Organizations, *Consejo Estatal de Organizaciones Indıˊgenas y Campesina*
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
EZLN	*Zapatista* Army of National Liberation
FFC	Financial and Fiscal Commission
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy
GNP	Gross National Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import-Substituting Industrialisation
LPM	Landless People's Movement
LRAD	Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development
MAS	Movement Towards Socialism, *Movimiento al Socialismo*
MERG	Macro-Economic Research Group
MST	Landless Workers Movement, *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NDA	National Development Agency

NDP   National Development Plan

NDR   National Democratic Revolution

NEDLAC   National Economic Development and Labour Council

NEP   New Economic Policy

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organisations

NSFAS   National Student Financial Aid Service

PDS   Social Democratic Party, *Partido Democrático Social*

PRI   Institutional Revolutionary Party

PT   The Worker's Party, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*

RDP   Reconstruction and Development Programme

SACP   South African Communist Party

SANCO   South African National Civic Organisation

SECC   Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee

SLAG   Settlement Land Acquisition Grant

TAC   Treatment Action Campaign

UDF   United Democratic Front

VAT   Value Added Tax

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope of the Research

This project analyses social movements and the potential impact they may have on economic development in South Africa using lessons from the history of social movements in Latin America. The history of social movements not only in Latin America but worldwide has revealed that social movements are powerful social justice tools capable of conveying real change on many levels including the macroeconomic level. By carefully studying social movement groups in Latin America and comparing these to the South African case this research aims to elaborate on the nature of social movements in South Africa in an attempt to broaden the understanding of the relationship between social movements and economic development policy implementation. In this way, this project contributes to the larger discourse on social movements in South Africa.

1.2. Synopsis of the thesis

No single definition of social movements enjoys scholarly consensus. This can be attributed to the fact that definitions inevitably reflect the theoretical assumptions of the theorist and differ according to the theoretical framework of each scholar (Morris and Herring, 1984: 528). A few of the key definitions include defining social movements as "forms of collective action that emerge in response to situations of inequality, oppression and/or unmet social, political, economic or cultural demands." They comprise "an organised set of elements pursuing a common political agenda of change over time" (Batliwala, 2012: 3). In essence, social movements are dynamic human systems that contest and react to any unfavourable political or social changes and seek to bring about lasting and permanent change as well as reform (Fuchs, 2006: 101). Social movements can also be defined as non-routine forms of collective action geared towards social change (Morris and Herring, 1984: 532). They are emergent forms of non-institutionalised 'preference structures' directed towards social change (Morris and Herring, 1984: 537).

These definitions point towards some common underlying notions. Social movements are therefore conclusively and in summary any sustained coming together of a group of people who share a common grievance (collective action) making use of a large repertoire of institutionalised and non-institutionalised tactics in order to effect a positive outcome (socio-economic change). For the purposes of this research, this seemingly very broad and umbrella definition of social movements will be adopted. The reasoning behind this large scope is that this research seeks to consider a very panoramic view of social movements.

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This also allows the encompassing of a large repertoire and wide variety of non-institutionalised and institutionalised (organised and unorganised) tactics and forms of collective action such as strikes, demonstrations and protests (violent and non-violent), marches, toyi-toying, picketing, assemblies, disruptions, using the judicial system, mass meetings, drafting of memoranda, petitions, processions, stay-aways, election boycotts, blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tyres, looting, destruction of buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships, confrontations with police and forced resignation of elected officials (Mottiar and Bond, 2013: 290) among others.

Defining social movements broadly in this context, is also useful because it insists from the outset that a distinction must be made between social movements and organisations. If movements were single organisations then they would have been easy to identify, catalogue and categorise (Bebbington, 2010: 1). Social movements in this context are to be understood not as organisations but as a sort of subaltern discourse, a process that makes an argument for the legitimacy of identities and claims that are typically marginalised or excluded within the current social order. However, such a process might be carried forward by a composite of leaders, organisations and technologies (Bebbington, 2010: 1).

There are two broad theoretical frameworks for conceptualising social movements. The first of these is the neoclassical model. Bretton and Bretton (1969: 198) developed a theory of public choice that forms the main premise of the neoclassical analysis of social movements. They proposed that social movements emerge through the rational maximising behaviour of people. Where welfare deviates from expectations, people become frustrated and subsequently demand social change to offset the feelings of deficit and adjust back to their 'equilibrium state' hence the emergence of social movements (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 200). Following this, Bretton and Bretton postulate that the 'supply of social movements' follows demand. They propose that the demand for social change creates opportunities for social profits that entrepreneurs would want to reap and therefore social entrepreneurs will supply or provide social movements for those who want them (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 201).

The neoclassical model is important because it offers an understanding of the emergence of social movements in economic terms and helps in clarifying the role of social movements in economic development. It provides the economic rationality of social movements and is useful in answering the question of the relevance of social movements in economics. The essence of the neoclassical model is that political activity including social movements is at

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least in part motivated by 'rational' economic motives. It provides a useful starting point in the discussion of social movements, however it does seem to ask more questions of interest than it answers which brings in the importance of the second framework to complete the analysis. This will become more apparent in the discussion of this framework to follow in chapter two.

The second broad conceptual framework discussed in this research is the Political Economy Framework. Similar to the neoclassical model, it is essentially a consideration of the interplay between economics and politics vis-a-vis the political basis of economic actions. The idea here is to contribute to reshaping and re-evaluating how social movements shape and get shaped by their political-economic context. What is key is that it is not just economic rationality that determines economic development. Politics has a profound influence both on distribution as well as the economic development path.

The 'big debate' that emerges is between 'developmentalism' and 'neoliberalism'. The Political Economy framework warrants a meaningful place in the progression of the research as it provides a descriptive analysis of the argument that in developing countries, social movements develop and emerge as important as a result of the failure of the economic development model to fulfil the promises of early post-independence periods, on the one hand, and the inability of conventional political mechanisms to respond to persistent crises, on the other (Escobar, 1992:426). These ideas will again be further elaborated in the following chapter which discusses the conceptual frameworks in greater detail.

Escobar (1992: 412) argues that social movements are of interest because they offer an alternative form of development and politics to the 'conventional' or mainstream political discourse. This is important because one of the questions one may raise against the background of the structural problems in the South African economy is whether the conventional political discourse of democracy and the hegemonic economic models have failed to achieve the desired growth path and redistribution. For example, Jain (2014) attributes the subdued economic growth in the country in recent years to insufficiencies on the part of South Africa's government to address crucial structural issues coupled with the unfavourable global economic conditions. It would therefore not be a far-fetched inference to interpret social movements as possible alternative channels to policy reform and potential vehicles to deliver new, bottom-up perspectives outside the hegemony for much needed economic development.

The argument raised by Campbell *et al* (2010: 964) is that policy makers who hold the political and economic power generally require a 'kick' before they act. Thus, the overarching idea is that social movements are key elements in providing the said kick (Campbell *et al*, 2010: 964) and therefore it is worth paying more attention to their potential effectiveness especially within South Africa.

However this raises questions on the role of social movements. Are they just there to give a 'kick' and keep the more formal political actors honest? Or do they take a more active role in reform? Is giving a kick enough? Does it get things moving? Or do things tend to revert when the pressure is eased? This is particularly important when deeper structural issues are the problem. That is, it is relatively easy to force the government to change on a single issues, like fee free education. It is harder to achieve deep structural change on systemic issues such as the neoliberal hegemony that underlies financial exclusion. South Africa's experience, as is discussed in chapter three, suggests that so far post-apartheid social movements have tended to do the former. For example, #FeesMustFall was very clear about not wanting fees, but a) it was quite vague about what alternative model it wanted and b) it largely failed to participate in processes of reform (for example the Fees Commission) and tended to be characterised as 'unreasonable'.

The post-apartheid South African case ostensibly provides a narrative of low quality and seemingly fragmented and weak social movements (especially the new social movements) despite the irrefutable socio-economic issues plaguing the South African economy that compel the need for relief for the majority in South Africa (Aliber and Cousins, 2013: 140).

According to Rosa (2012:3), there has historically been a strong social movement group presence in South Africa; however, South African pressure groups have not been as successful or influential on the ground especially in the post-apartheid era. Waves of social movement action such as protests have become a constant feature of life in the areas in which the poor 'masses' live (Friedman, 2012: 89). Despite this considerable upsurge of social movement action, for the most part, social movements have not achieved many concrete changes to law, policy and practice for their participants (Friedman, 2012: 92). The state and effectiveness of social movements will be analysed in greater detail in chapter three to follow.

The idea that if a particular group or class of people feels marginalised or disadvantaged in some way then automatically there will be some either organised or spontaneous collective

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effort to try bring about change echoes in the Latin American case (Vergara-Camus, 2013: 597). This resonates quite closely with the arguments put forward by Bretton and Bretton (1969) that social movements emerge as part of a heightening sense of grievance around issues of identity and adverse social relationships.

A comparison of social movements in countries where they played a major role in political and social change (Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and Bolivia) and movements in countries where they were marginalised (Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, Chile, Uruguay) reveals several fundamental differences. Wherever they had marginal or limited significance, the organisations were fragmented, dispersed and without significant national leadership or structure and without any political leverage on the institutions of national power (Petras, 2009) which is reminiscent of the South African case.

There are other interesting resonances between the South African and Latin American cases. Therefore using a 'comparative' perspective, this study will be useful in highlighting the gaps between the South African case and the Latin American case and the potential lessons that can be drawn to reconcile social movements and economic development in South Africa. Given the generally uncontested socio-economic problems plaguing South Africa, it is important to critically investigate whether these problems such as the widening inequality gaps and persistently high poverty and sluggish growth can be addressed through activities of social movement groups and the potential economic development that may arise.

1.3 Goals of the Research

The overarching goal is to bring the literature on political agency (especially social movements) and the economic developmental model together to answer the key research question: Are social movements a solution to South Africa's structural and developmental economic problems? Therefore, it follows that the sub goals of the research are to:

i). investigate whether socio-economic problems can be addressed and improved through social movements in post-apartheid South Africa.

ii). investigate whether social movements can be useful proponents in economic development in post-apartheid South Africa.

iii). compare the social movement cases in Latin America to the South African cases and identify and interpret any gaps.

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1.4 Research Methodology

In order to address the research questions adequately, the research is an exploratory, descriptive and qualitative study with a Post-Positivist Paradigm as the underlying epistemology (Aliyu *et al*, 2014: 81). Qualitative research refers to a systematic subjective approach used to describe world views and life experiences and give them meaning (Burns and Grove, 2003: 356). It involves the systematic collection and analysis of subjective narrative information in an intuitive manner in order to identify broad perspectives. This was the most relevant method since this is a broad study that draws on perceptions on social movements and current affairs pertaining to social movements and is predominantly a reflection of current practice connected to the deeper theme. The idea is that future research might expand on the findings of this research.

In order to tackle the research's sub goal of comparing the social movement cases in Latin America to the South African cases in order to identify and interpret any gaps the research used a comparative research method (Collier, 1993: 106). According to Collier (1993: 106), the comparative method is the analysis of a small number of cases by bringing into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts amongst the cases. This may be adopted where there exist cases in which the phenomena under consideration are similar and exhibit attributes that are of interest to the researcher (Collier, 1993: 105). In this case, Latin America was used as the comparative case since it exhibits similar economic development and economic structure to South Africa. The World Bank Classification (according to Income Group and Lending Categories) (World Bank, 2016), classifies South Africa as well as the bulk of Latin American countries as Upper-Middle Income economies and therefore may be considered comparable economically.

The overarching goal of the research is to bring the literature on political agency (especially social movements) and the developmental model (neoliberalism and developmentalism) together. Therefore, the data collection tool that was used was a Systematic Literature Review (Cronin *et al*, 2008: 40). According to Cronin *et al* (2008: 39), a systematic literature review is a more rigorous and well-defined approach to reviewing the literature in a specific subject area. This study benefited most from a Systematic Literature Review because in conducting the research, the main aim was to understand social meanings, look at, describe and understand experiences, the political economy, beliefs and values, and draw recommendations based on such intangible variables whilst minimising bias. This

systematic approach was beneficial because information was gathered from several different sources thus using a standardised search method aided in avoiding personal biases.

Because it followed a set method, the systematic approach avoided the bias of beginning with an idea and then selecting appropriate studies selectively (Creswell, 1998: 75). The research followed an evidence-based non-statistical approach used to analyse, evaluate and interpret the findings of multiple existing researches (Cronin *et al*, 2008: 40) known as the PQRS system (Cohen, 1990). Using this method, the key was to, from each literature, Preview, Question, Read and finally Summarise key elements with the aim of transforming individual findings into one wholesome interpretation. The process was as follows:

i). Preview – this involved identifying, in a structured way, the appropriate and related information (Cronin *et al*, 2008: 40). In this study, electronic searches were done using standardised keywords or search filters on a number of economic, social and political databases and websites. The references of full-text papers were also searched to establish the necessary depth and breadth. To supplement the electronic searches, journals and books were also hand-searched using the same standardised keywords.

ii). Question – this involved assessing applicability, relevance and quality of material (Cronin *et al*, 2008: 40). For an unbiased assessment, the search sought to cover all the literature however there was an overwhelming volume of literature available. Therefore in this study, the criteria for selecting sources followed a standardised protocol in order to ensure the quality and relevancy of the literature included in the literature review. Namely, considering number of citations of each literature, establishing whether the literature has been peer-reviewed as well as the number of peer-reviews and assessing the source of the literature (date and author availability). Further, grey literature material that is not formally published, such as institutional or technical reports, working papers, conference proceedings, or other documents not normally subject to editorial control or peer review were tested using the inclusion criteria.

iii). Read – this involved assimilating the information contained in the literature (Cronin *et al*, 2008: 40). In this study, this was done throughout the research process and a table was constructed highlighting each author, main arguments, and any criticisms, points of convergence or disagreement with other literature for ease of recording findings.

iv). Summarise – this involved an analysis and interpretation of the findings (Cronin *et al*, 2008: 40). Given the subjective nature of this study, the 'bottom-line' of the key elements

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in each literature were established with the aim of transforming the individual findings into a new interpretation.

1.5 Organisation of the Thesis

Following this introductory first chapter, the second chapter elucidates the important conceptual framework surrounding social movements. Here, the theories surrounding social movements are explored in great detail with the major focus being on two main frameworks namely the Neoclassical Model and the Political Economy Theory. The main aim of this chapter is to set up the theoretical component of social movements and the theory will provide more clarity on the constructed role of social movements in economic development.

The third chapter will highlight the South African case engaging deeply with the narrative of social movements historically and to date. The main focus of this chapter is to elaborate on the discourse of neoliberalism in post-apartheid South Africa and how this has influenced the South African political economy. The state of social movements in South Africa will also be reflected upon making inferences based on the discussions on the political economy. The analysis reveals that the landscape of social movements in South Africa is complex with social movements often being met with disdain and violent opposition from political and economic elites as a result of the dominant neoliberal democracy. As a contrasting chapter, chapter four will focus on the Latin American case expanding on the history of social movements in Latin America and the subsequent impact on economic development in Latin America. The Latin American case presents a cautiously more positive outlook with social movements forming more influential alliances and being at the centre of several socio-economic as well as political changes.

Chapter five will focus on two case studies from South Africa in an attempt to focus the discussion and hone in on the broad inferences in chapter three and four. Making use of the reflections from preceding chapters as tools for analysis, chapter five will take a closer look at social movements in South Africa. The idea is to use the case studies to bring the research to a focus as well as to highlight the differences between the South African case and the Latin American case in a practical manner. The final chapter will conclude.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

One of the tenets of neoclassical economics is that economic choices are often made based on the likelihood than an economic option will turn out to be lucrative or valuable in the future. This is useful in thinking about the motivation for human behaviour, and in this particular context, participation in social movements. Part of the attraction of economic theory is that it attempts to describe policies that will improve people's lives. In this way the neoclassical model warrants its place in the narrative of a phenomena which has, in the past, piqued the interest of scholars in its potential to improve people's welfare; namely social movements. The Neoclassical Framework that is discussed in this chapter is centred on neoclassical economic theory. It forms a starting point in the discussion of social movements and provides insight on the emergence and development of social movements.

Another important consideration is the political economy. Bebbington (2010: 9) contends that there is a political relationship between democracy, the state and markets. These domains are inherently related to one another as well as to society and largely cannot exist separately. The ways in which markets work depends on how they are regulated by the state as well as dominant ideas on how markets should work (Bebbington, 2010: 9).

There has been an increasing nostalgia for the developmental state in the South African political economy (Edigheji, 2010). Edigheji states that South Africa revealed this through the expressed commitment of the ANC-led alliance and government to build such a state. The New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010 has been a policy framework that has attempted to solidify the developmental state in South Africa. However, questions have been raised in as far as whether adopting state-led development is the best development model in South Africa. As such the big debate between neoliberalism and developmentalism warrants its place in this research as it theorises on the political economy in South Africa and assists in solidifying the relevance and role social movements may play in the economic development process.

The main aim of this chapter is to better understand the function of social movements through setting up the theoretical arguments surrounding social movements. This theoretical basis will set up the background and provide a descriptive analysis of the research questions at hand. This chapter will also reflect on the theory and attempt to provide clarity on the role and relevance of social movements as well as the potential effectiveness of social movements in the development project.

The next section (2.2) will introduce the discussion on the Neoclassical Framework which deals with explaining the emergence of social movements and draws mainly on the work of Bretton and Bretton. This section will help present the economic rationality behind social movements through analysing the demand and supply of social movements. While the third section (2.3) deals with the Political Economy Framework in which the big debate on the effect of the developmentalist state versus neoliberalism on economic development emerges. Section 2.4 reflects on the two frameworks and makes broad inferences on the theory. The idea is to explore the more common premises underlying each model and try to link these with the broader issues (big debates) of social movements in this context.

2.2. Neoclassical Model

The neoclassical model helps explain the origins, development and outcomes of social movements. The rationality behind this framework is guided by a general definition of neoclassical economics which, according to Dequech (2007: 280), is characterised by a combination of the following features:

i) the importance of rationality with utility maximisation as the criterion for rationality,

ii) the emphasis on equilibrium as the default state of stability and

iii) the disregard of uncertainty.

The relevance of these characteristics will become more apparent with the following further unpacking of the emergence and progression of social movements. These central variables in the neoclassical model constitute, among other things, an explanation of the structural composition of social movements and the role of shared beliefs in guiding social movements (Morris and Herring, 1984: 538).

Bretton and Bretton (1969: 198) postulated that social movements emerge in relatively well-defined circumstances and tend to be associated with specific socio-economic factors. Thus the development of their 'theory of public choice' which attempts to theorise the progression and emergence of social movements by using the neoclassical framework of market clearing forces of supply and demand.

They argued that people hold a more or less defined opinion about the size and timing of their income streams based on the state of the world (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 200). A key assumption of this theory is the rationality of human behaviour which is testament to the first feature given by Dequech (2007: 280). They argued that people rationalise and

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compare in order to come up with what they expect to be their level of income and quality of life based on some factor such as level of education or years of experience. They then compare their quality of life with other people falling in similar 'brackets'. Any changes in their income and quality of life deviating from their expected trajectories that cannot be explained by changes in personal factors will lead to people looking to changes in their environment for an explanation. For example, a reduction in welfare may be attributed to a personal change such as illness or infirmity which would lead to the individual in question adjusting their expected income prospects. However, if it is not explained by any personal attributes then individuals will blame the 'environment' for any changes in economic welfare (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 200) and attempt to adjust back to the expected trajectory. This is testament to the second feature of neoclassical economic behavior as described by Dequech (2007: 280) namely the emphasis on equilibrium as the default state of stability. The higher the need for adjustment the higher the need to change the environment and therefore creating a 'demand for social change' (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 201).

Morris and Herring (1984: 552) also argue the Frustration-Anger-Aggression explanation that is closely linked to the argument raised by Bretton and Bretton. They put forward that when people identify marked differences between the privileges they enjoy and what they feel they ought to enjoy they become frustrated and angered and consequently participate in social movement action such as protests to compensate the feelings of deprivation (Morris and Herring 1984: 552).

Social movements provide their participants with a vehicle to demand the social change they desire. They allow participants the opportunity to collectively demand change on issues that were otherwise individual in nature. If there is a general sense of incongruences between what people expect and what society delivers the response is the emergence of social movements in an attempt to reverse the adverse circumstances (Morris and Herring, 1984: 552). Essentially socioeconomic changes such as economic downturns or depressions lead to politicised anger which finds expression through participation in movements and protests (Morris and Herring, 1984: 552).

Adding to Bretton and Bretton's (1969) argument, Frank and Fuentes (1987) take it a step further and explain that social movements decline in number and strength during economic upturns and revive during economic downturns (Frank and Fuentes, 1987: 1504). This is consistent with Bretton and Bretton's theory that when there is a deviation from expected

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welfare and income not attributable to personal factors individuals will blame their environment and demand social change. In this case a slowdown in economic growth would be the triggering factor. When the economic downturn most detrimentally affects people's livelihood and identity, the social movements become more invasive and robust (Frank and Fuentes, 1987: 1505). So the demand for social movements varies as frustration varies and is cyclical in nature.

The supply of social movements is based on the premise of economic theory of the firm and markets that asserts that demand for products creates opportunities for profits and therefore supply. In this way, Bretton and Bretton (1969: 201) propose that the demand for social change creates opportunities for social profits which entrepreneurs would want to reap and therefore will supply or provide social movements for those who want them. In this way supply follows demand and social movements emerge that actively seek to adjust the environment back to the perceived stable or satisfactory state (equilibrium).

An important point that Frank and Fuentes (1987: 1505) describe is that as the demands of a particular social movement are met, it tends to lose force or it becomes an organisation and ceases to be a social movement according to the broad definition adopted in this study. More often than not, however, the negative circumstances themselves eventually change and movements lose their appeal and force through irrelevance or it is transformed or its members move to another movement with new demands (Frank and Fuentes, 1987: 1505). Supply of social movements essentially dwindles where people get tired or issues go away. The question then becomes how can social movements ensure longevity of supply?

In order to be continuous, supply requires at least some form of structure or organisation (Ballard *et al*, 2005: 627; Bebbington, 2010: 3). Here the argument is that social movement actions and processes require financial, human, informational, social and other resources that are more localised and that informal social networks are unable to mobilise. Such resources can almost only be channelled through some form of formal organisation and plays an important role in keeping movements "moving" by maintaining debates, supporting events, nurturing leaders during ebbs in movement activity (Ballard *et al*, 2005:627).

The essence of the Neoclassical Model is that individuals are rational beings who seek to maximise their welfare and utility. Where individuals find themselves in disequilibrium they blame their environment which in this context includes the political actors, the government and the policies in place. Thus the need to challenge these and demand change in order to

return to equilibrium. This consolidates the neoclassical stance on the role of social movements. Social movements provide the vehicle to demand the social change. They act as vessels to make otherwise individual problems into collective problems and provide individuals with a collective means to achieve their socio-economic goals. They give individuals an opportunity to achieve economies of scale in social justice. The role of social movements in economic development therefore is to facilitate change and facilitate the return to equilibrium.

Consolidating this, Campbell *et al* (2010: 963), assert that the role of social movements is to create an environment in which the demands of marginalised people are heard and acted upon. Social movements facilitate the empowerment of the poor and marginalised in society and facilitate economic development through challenging power relations. Social movements essentially give a voice to the poor people and allow collective engagement in what may have been individual issues.

The Neoclassical Model is a useful starting point but begs more questions than it answers. Demand exists because of frustration and then supply emerges in response to this demand. But what then? Once social movements come into being how do they function? How do they organise themselves internally? How broad a set of issues should they focus on? Should they ally themselves with other social movements, business, and political parties or should they emphasise autonomy? Should they aspire to be a permanent part of the political landscape or should they exist 'for purpose'? Finally, what is it that determines the success or failure of social movements?

In the discussions that follow, it is argued that what the neoclassical framework lacks is specificity. Economically, the neoclassical framework tends to argue that the economy is a zero sum game, that is, social movements (and political interference in markets more generally) distribute resources to their constituents at the expense of others. As will be argued in the following section, this is a crucial shortcoming. The neoclassical model is implicit in that there already is a "right" development model in place and it does not deeply consider the interaction between politics and economics. Politics profoundly influence both distribution and the development path. There is need to look at the specific political and economic contexts in which social movements are located in order to answer these questions.

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2.3 Political Economy Framework

Several strategies have been designed and implemented in developing countries in order to promote development. Many have contributed to increased growth in some countries but they have largely failed due to several factors such as ineffective leadership, poor implementation, policy discontinuation and in some cases an environment that is not conducive for private sector growth. The failure of these strategies has led to the continued search for the appropriate strategy to address the economic development problem in developing countries once and for all. The relationship between the state and organised interests has been at the centre of this discourse. Chibber (2012: 168) asserts that the discussion has been mainly centred on two forms of politics namely the neoliberal state and the developmental state in developing middle income countries.

In the context of this research, the term developmental state is being used to discuss alternatives to neoliberalism more generally, including those forms that existed in Latin America before neoliberalism (and which worked fairly well albeit with the problems that Chibber predicts), and so-called social democracy (with its very interesting political model) and economically the social investment state. The point about all these is that economic development is not left to market forces alone.

The developmental state represents an emerging social and economic policy paradigm with one main policy logic namely social investment (Morel *et al*, 2012: 8). Social investments policies such as investing in human capital, labour market policies, social protection institutions, are seen to have a positive economic role and are seen as essential to economic growth and development under the developmental state paradigm. This represents a break from the neoliberal view of social policy which is seen largely as a wasteful cost and hindrance to economic development (Morel *et al*, 2010: 8). The developmental state paradigm emerges as a critique of the neoliberal policy stance but is also above all based on an understanding that there is a need to reconcile social and economic goals.

Chibber (2005) argues that though early 20th century developmentalism went wrong, the neoliberalism that replaced it is, if anything, worse (Chibber, 2005: 227). Neoliberalism gained popularity globally in the 1970's and was initially championed in the industrially developed global north (Habib and Padayachee, 2000: 247). The rise of neoliberalism was connected to the globalisation of markets and the internationalisation of funds and through this a general international consensus on neoliberalism was formed and was spread across

the globe aided by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Habib and Padayachee, 2000: 247).

Neoliberalism, according to Harvey (2005: 3), is "the intensification of the influence and dominance of capital". Basically the elevation of capital from being just a mode of production to being a set of political imperatives. So perhaps the best way of defining neoliberalism is political where neoliberalism is a realignment of the state behind the interest of capital. According to Harvey (2005: 3), neoliberalism can be seen as a project to strengthen and/or restore the power of economic elites whilst weakening the role of the state. Neoliberalism is precisely a partnership between the state and globalised capital, with capital dominant—the state in effect is the servant of capital. Neoliberalism is a political ideology that has been conceptualised and implemented through macroeconomic policies (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 539). It is based on neoclassical policies such as deregulation and privatisation but it should not be confused with them (Bresser-Pereira, 2009:15). Neoliberalism is more about the idea that giving power to capital is the best way to achieve development—not deregulation and liberalisation per se.

In Streeck's terms (2015: 12) it is the dominance of 'markets' over 'people' (where 'markets' means the financial elites and 'people' is the democratic force from below). The neoliberal state according to Streeck (2015:7) is not committed to anything ideological such as free markets or deregulations per se and it is prepared to compromise on these if it is in its interest. For example a certain amount of regulation stabilises capitalism and is therefore good for capital while some welfare policies are also good for capital. This is corroborated by Cammack's (2002) critique of the World Bank's anti-poverty policies. Cammack (2002: 132) argues that the World Bank's outwardly progressive anti-poverty strategy such as advocating for provision of education and good healthcare does not represent a shift from neoliberalism towards a welfare state, it is actually a programme for the establishment and consolidation of capitalism on a global scale. What Cammack (2002: 132) argues is that some social policies such as improving basic education and providing health care for workers are in fact an 'attack on the poor' and are simply a means of exploiting poor people and a way to provide capital with numbers of people with sufficient health and education to be exploited as workers while simultaneously reducing the risk of investments.

Increasing polarisation, increased poverty rates, growing problems of inequality and the costs of social exclusion gave rise to the critique of neoliberal politics (Morel *et al*, 2012: 8). These issues qualified that unfettered markets are not necessarily the most appropriate

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and efficient organising principle in all cases (Morel *et al*, 2012: 10). The issue of the potential of market failures reinforced the need for some government intervention and direction of market forces (Morel *et al*, 2012: 10). The rise of China, East Asia and some Latin American countries as newly industrialised countries (attributed to their developmentalist stance) has also further renewed the interest in the role of the state in the development process.

However interestingly, despite deepening social inequality under neoliberalism, many governments exhibit some inertia towards shifting the development model. The wider neoliberal view is that the social inequality that may arise due to market operations is in fact necessary to motivate economic actors (Morel *et al*, 2012: 13). So what emerges is what Watkins (2010: 13) terms a moderated 'regulatory liberalism'. What Watkins argues is that a convergence in thinking that neoliberalism is the best economic model precludes thinking about other varieties of economic models including the purely developmental state (Watkins, 2010: 13). Thus rendering the economics stuck despite serious structural problems.

Generous social policy is actually held responsible for a culture of dependency amongst citizens under neoliberalism (Morel *et al,* 2012: 7). As a result under neoliberalism political actions such as service delivery protests are shunned. This idea is developed in chapter three where the notion that protestors in South Africa for example are understood as having a dependency syndrome where they simply want the government to give them things without working for them is used as a justification for the contempt for social movements. So the state's role in distribution of wealth is rolled back as its intervention is seen to be too costly and resulting in market inefficiency. Social responsibility is shifted towards the market with less emphasis on security and more emphasis on incentives. This notion resonates in chapter five when considering land reform in South Africa. Farmers are offered incentives to enter markets instead of simply giving away land. Too much support in the form of being given land is seen as a work disincentive. As a result the land reform agenda has failed to take off as the neoliberal stance stifles it.

As a critique, the developmental state paradigm emphasises state led development. Under developmentalism, the state intervenes more directly in the economy through a variety of means to effect social and economic development. Productive social policy is seen as a precondition for economic growth. The idea is that social outlays can yield long run surpluses for both individuals and society as a whole (Morel *el al*, 2012: 5). Chibber asserts

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that in countries where free market or neoliberal polices have little credibility due to their failure to address structural problems such as inequality, it seems logical in principle to revert to developmentalism and implement a statist agenda.

Early developmentalist states were successful in reconciling the dual goals of equality and efficiency which are seen as conflicting goals under neoliberalism (Morel *et al,* 2012: 5). In the 19th century the more an economy lacked the conditions for spontaneous industrialisation, the more the earlier states were able to substitute the state for the market as the leading agent of economic development (Austin, 2010: 54). There was an increasing emphasis on the state as a strategic regulator and playing the role of governor of the market. But Austin (2010) notes that this was not as effective in the 20th century. The later 20th century states faced different circumstances than their predecessors due to several changes such as technology which allowed for spontaneous industrialisation (Austin, 2010: 55).

Chibber (2005) contends that the early developmental state is even less likely to work in the 21st century because of further changes in technology and trade rules amongst other things. The 2008 global crisis and the growth of the East as newly industrialised economies for example have given the developmental state a chance to rise as the new economic paradigm. But in order for it to be successful there is need to refine the developmental state ideas. The success of implementing the developmentalist state today depends on it being broad enough to not only match the successes of past approaches but to supersede them. The developmental state has gained steam as an alternative model primarily out of disenchantment with neoliberalism but its relevance depends on its ability to be adapted. New current developmental challenges demand a new and improved socio-economic policy.

Chibber (2005) warns that before reverting back to the developmentalist state paradigm there is need to look deeply into the reasons why the early developmentalist state failed. Chibber blames the failure of early 20th century developmentalism on its reliance on a working political alliance between the state and national capitalists or 'national bourgeoisie'- the so called developmental alliance. According to Chibber (2005: 227), since national capitalists derived profits from the domestic market, the state assumed that they therefore naturally had an interest in domestic development. So the state saw national capitalists as natural allies collaborating in the shared project of national development. Chibber (2005) argues that it is precisely this assumption that led to the demise of the developmentalist state and needs to be challenged going forward.

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One of the early political assumptions was that within the developmental alliance, the state would take the lead but in reality the state struggled to direct, for example, the flow of private domestic investment into public sectors with high social benefits and away from private sectors. The state thought that given the bourgeoisie's own declaration in favour of rapid economic development that they would cede to state the autonomy it needed to build policy instruments that targeted welfare and thus improve livelihoods.

However through state protection, the inadvertent consequence was that national capitalists grew to be dominant monopolists. They accepted help (protectionist policies such as import protection and subsidies) from the state that allowed them to make large profits but resisted any discipline (industrial policy) from the state in terms of what they did with the profits. When it came to the state's power to demand compliance from local firms in as far as directing profits towards constructive investment patterns or to punish speculative profit making activities, it lost the support of the business class.

Firms resisted discipline and were not eager to 'do the hard stuff' because they were able to make large profits despite operating inefficiently through subsidies and import protection. State intervention was seen as an "unacceptable encumbrance in exploiting profits fully" (Chibber, 2005: 233). As a result state power was more ceremonial than anything else and the state had very little to no power to influence private investment (Chibber, 2005: 235). The state could funnel resources to firms with attached stipulations and conditions regarding their use but had little influence to ensure enforcement. Capitalists were thus able to divert funds away from targeted public sectors into their own preferred lines (Chibber, 2005: 237). So developementalism essentially led to massive transfer of national resources to local capitalists. There was development and industrial growth but at an enormous cost to the public. So the trajectory that the early developmental state produced was initial rapid economic growth followed by stagnation and rent seeking.

This is a crucial point. The progression described by Chibber highlights the natural tendency of the developmentalist state to deliver a particular trajectory characterised by rapid growth at first, followed by stagnation and rent seeking activities. The resisted discipline idea explains why the early developmental state eventually failed to provide sustained economic growth. This set the stage for neoliberalism to replace the early developmentalist state.

So the crisp question that then arises is how can a new developmental state avoid this tendency? The key idea is political. Evans (1995) argues that what governs a healthy

relationship between the state and the markets is not how much state intervention but what kind of state intervention. Evans (1995) argues that states can foster a consistent trajectory of economic development through an 'embedded autonomy'. This outlines the conditions under which the developmental state can encourage private enterprise to pursue public interests.

Firstly there is need for mature rationalised bureaucratic institutions (characterised by discipline, corporate coherence and professionalism) that cannot be manipulated. This is to ensure that political actors have the autonomy to resist corruption and capture by actors whose rent-seeking behavior would derail the state's agenda of economic development (Evans, 1995). Evans highlights however that this is not enough and that this should be coupled with an embeddedness in social networks that places political actors in close contact with civil society and labour (Evans, 1995). This combination of embedded autonomy ensures that the state has genuine capacity to pursue economic development but at the same time is sufficiently constrained by outside forces so that its actions do not simply foster the interests of state elites (Evans, 1995).

Chibber (2005) also blames another problematic feature of the alliance between state and national capitalists for the failure of the early developmental state. Namely that it required undesirable concessions from labour. Labour became completely marginalised by the state in the hopes of getting favour from the national bourgeoisie. The state narrowed the political space with the goal of allaying any fears that business had and maintaining business confidence. Further the state believed that national development could not be trusted to the labouring poor and policy was limited to the state and political elites as well the national capitalists (Chibber, 2005: 236). Since unions were too confident in the state's ability to protect their interests, labour allowed itself to be demobilised. There was a tendency for labour to be seduced by all the talk about rapid development. Labour fell into the false hope of corporatism and hoped that by getting formally incorporated into the state and its planning bodies this would make up for its lack of power but this proved to be a misjudgment. Once demobilised, the balance of power shifted even more decidedly towards the business class further narrowing the political space and increasing the ability of capital to set the terms for policy and state building (Chibber, 2005: 237).

The question that arises is how can the political space be broadened under a developmentalist state paradigm? This is where new forms of politics come in. It sharpens the need to think about the possible role social movements can play. If the early

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developmental state failed to produce the expected results of economic development this reflects the need for some other form of politics or political pressure in the new developmental state paradigm hence the justification of social movements. Social movements would open up the political space to challenge the usurpation of the state by national capitalists given the incapacity of institutions such as labour unions to do so through their incorporation into the state. What this highlights is the need for some different political arrangement than the one that characterised the early developmental state. The key idea here is that it is important to get both the economic model right as well as the political coalitions to back it up.

Bebbington (2011: 1) argues that "just as a swallow a spring does not make" social movements should also aim to be more than just once off mobilisations in order to be effective. This inflection also reveals one of the shortcomings of the neoclassical analysis. Social movements should evolve beyond just mobilisation. A short term campaign or a week of street protests might be dramatic and attract interest and attention but are ultimately short lived events (Bebbington, 2011: 1). Bebbington (2011: 1) argues that when protests are linked to a series of other issues and other activities sustained over time all ultimately oriented towards making a similar set of arguments then they are of quality and likely to achieve real change. This has important implications about the operation of social movements in this context. Once social movements have emerged then they should shy away from identity politics and over emphasizing single issues and form meaningful alliances in order to consolidate their causes.

Bebbington (2011: 3) also argues that there should be an overlap between goals amongst social movements in order for them to have sustenance and coherence. That is though they are composed of different ideas and identities but when linked together they become one larger identity. Social movements should essentially be a larger identity composed of organisations, ideas social networks and a repertoire of actors and actions. As opposed to being focused on single issues and assuming that individual successes on singe issues will eventually cascade and result in a larger success overall. What Bebbington (2011: 1) argues for is a sense of aligned social movements instead of fragmented isolated movements. In this way social movements can be of quality in the sense that they are not just actors or individuals in a zero sum game (as implied by the neoclassical analysis) but rather are a process sustained by a set of actors and actions motivated by shared grievances.

Another important implication of Bebbington's (2011: 3) argument is that social movements should not emerge around issues or immediate sources of discomfort and should go deeper than this simple neoclassical emergence (arising due to frustration). Social movements should contest the processes that are linked to the production of the immediate sources of discomfort. Movements should emerge round drivers rather than symptoms an address these issues through protest and political action. Social movements should contest the existing distributional arrangements, economic and social policies on the ground that cause the surface problems. For example, landless people should not protest their lack of land per se but they should challenge tenure agreements, poor people should not protest their poverty but should challenge the development model in place that is increasing poverty, students should not protest the lack of access to education but should instead challenge the economic policies in place that make education financially exclusionary and inaccessible to poor families. The idea should be to aim to shift the system within which the injustices and exclusions are embedded.

There is an important implication of Bebbington's argument. The neoclassical justification for participation in social movements is a mobilisation of people who individually feel that they have been denied or excluded from something or are being treated unjustly and inequitably either by particular actions or by institutions and policies that in their view discriminate against them. The nominal neoclassical view is that social movements look for something "different" for their participants. However Bebbington challenges this view. Though what Bebbington describes does take social movements to be reflections of discomfort and disagreement with the status quo it understands their demands as being something "better" rather than just something different. This means that when dealing with issues of injustice it brings the two themes together. It requires a particular framing of issues as more than just the surface symptom but a framing in terms of the cause of the issue as being rooted ultimately in relationships of power and of policy as determined by political processes. Social movements should make visible alternative ideas and concepts about the forms development should take and not just end at highlighting injustices and unfairness (Bebbington, 2011: 4). This diffuses the risk that social movements may be viewed as simply a phenomenon that serves only to reflect weaknesses in political parties and therefore seen as transitional and of secondary importance (Bebbington, 2011: 31).

This brings in the political relationship between democracy, the state and markets. The state in this context encompasses the judicial and legal institutions, public bureaucracy, legislative

institutions and political parties (Bebbington, 2010: 9). While markets refers to institutions and arrangements through which commercial and economic transactions occur (Bebbington, 2010: 9). These domains are inherently related to one another as well as to society and largely cannot exist separately. The ways in which markets work depends on how they are regulated by the state as well as dominant ideas on how markets should work (Bebbington, 2010: 9). An adequate analysis of neoliberalism entails joining understandings of it as a class project (and/or economic policy) with conceptions of neoliberalism as governmentality and as hegemony of democracy (Hart, 2008: 687). In the narrative of neoliberalism and governability, the focus is on the effect of neoliberal economics on governability and democracy and narratives on 'neoliberal democracy' as a political hegemony emerge.

Looking at the interaction between economic development models and democracy, Mans-Gorse and Nitcher (2008: 1400) contend that much of the disagreement over the impact of market reforms on democracy results from the different emphasis that scholars place on the consequences of economic liberalisation (the implementation of reform) versus the effects of increased economic liberalism (the outcome of reforms). By contrast, three primary scenarios underlie the arguments that market reforms foster or reinforce democracy. All three pertain to economic liberalism (the degree of economic liberty in a given country). First, there is dispersion of power. Freer markets disperse economic resources, allowing those with economic power to offset the influence of those with political power. Secondly, higher levels of trade and capital flows increase international constraints on domestic politics, facilitating enforcement of democratic norms. And finally, market reforms demobilise labour and peasant movements, reducing their capacity to make politically destabilising redistributive demands (Mans-Gorse and Nitcher, 2008: 1400).

But this is precisely the issue. What this argument fails to consider is the quality of the democracy under given economic development models. Where there is social demobilisation it represents low quality democracy. The scenarios provided by Mans-Gorse and Nitcher that argue for neoliberalism promoting democracy may be true in the promotion of nominal democracy but not *real* democracy. Liberal democracy involves a balance between the rule of law, electoral politics and free markets (Streeck, 2015: 24). However, where this balance becomes uneven this shifts into neoliberal democracy and a consolidated state develops where the needs of business become more important than the needs of society and there is no real democracy on the ground (Streeck, 2015: 24). Citizen participation in politics becomes largely diminished by the state.

Mans-Gorse and Nitcher (2008: 1400) also provide that on the other hand the perception of the destabilising effects of market reforms on democracy often focuses on two scenarios. Both refer to economic liberalisation (the process of implementing reforms). Firstly, the introduction of market reforms entails short-term social costs, which produce a politically destabilising popular backlash. And secondly the implementation of reforms requires the concentration of political power, risking the usurpation of democratic institutions by overzealous reformers.

If the institutions through which citizens are able to access the political processes are democratic only in form rather than in content then what this essentially means is that a restrictive limited democracy is handed down from above in a reflection of some elite or dominant interests and reflects political impotence to challenge them (Cammack, 1991: 544). In that case, Cammack (1991: 544) contends that co-optation and repression are used to maintain this restricted democracy through stripping of formally democratic institutions of any accountable or representative character and rendering them channels for the maintenance of dominant class hegemony. Secondly, this also entails the repression of the voice of the citizens through social demobilisation. The state would seek to destabilise social movement action in order to reduce their capacity to make politically destabilising demands (Weyland, 2014: 145).

The larger point here is that the ideas that govern how society perceives socio-economic issues (for example poverty, inequality) are causally related to the specific institutions that are put in place to act on these issues. However, the ideas that are dominant at any given time are not necessarily the ones that are true but the ones that are most powerful. Conventionally, citizens or society select political representatives through voting and convey their preferences over policy. There are also unconventional ways by which citizens participate in democracy namely protests and demonstrations (which range from marches, blockades and at times violence as has been explained in chapter one).

In that way democracy is not just about open institutionalised elections that give citizens access to participation in political processes (Bebbington, 2010: 9). These minimal conditions do not assure democratic quality and the opening up of political spaces for full participation (Valdivieso, 2009: 88). Generally, a democratic system requires a level of commitment that exceeds the mere election of a parliament or a government (Welp, 2017: 3). This increases the level of institutional trust that citizens place in the politics (Welp, 2017: 3). Machado *et al* (2011: 343) argue that the strength and relevance of formal political
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institutions are key determinants of the choice of political participation from citizens. When institutions are strong and institutional trust in them is high, citizens are more likely to participate in conventional methods such as voting and using courts and other formal insititutions in order to air out their views. Where institutions are weak and have low institutional trust then citizens are more likely to participate in unconventional methods such as protests (Machado *et al*, 2011: 343).

Strong institutions represent a strong state which is not easily coerced by external actors who may derail it from pursuing its goals of economic development. This is testament to Evans (1995) ideas on the state maintaining its autonomy and resisting usurpation in order to be strong. A strong state is also characterised by timely representation, transparency, accessibility to citizens and is not authoritarian or centralised. These factors improve institutional trust and represent real and quality democracy (Machado *et al*, 2011: 347). While a weak state is influenced by external groups pursuing their own interests at the expense of the state's larger welfare goals.

This elitist model of democracy represents a restricted democracy where citizens only participate in electoral politics. State and institutions align themselves behind dominant interests. Institutions are not easily accessible, courts may be too costly, biased or take too long and political representatives are unable or unwilling to listen to citizens. Therefore in this case there is a higher payoff from participating in protests for example (Machado *et al*, 2011: 347). The more institutions lack the means to perform their duties well, the higher the incentives for citizens and groups to try to affect the policymaking process through more direct (and less institutionalized) channels, such as protests and demonstrations. (Machado *et al*, 2011: 343). When institutions are strong and capable, citizens expect decisions to be well thought of, to have longer term horizons, and to follow more transparent negotiation processes. They expect their input, conveyed through traditional institutional channels, to matter.

Citizens in developed democracies know that by appealing to a court, for example, the constitutionality of a law will be considered (in cases where judicial review is present) and that their rights, if affected by a certain policy, will be safeguarded. Moreover, they know that if they bring their plights to their representatives there are good chances that these delegates, if willing, are able to do something about their concerns. When we move to an environment where institutions are weak, however, the prospects are bleaker. Complaints brought to the judiciary might drag for years and biases might arise. Representatives in the

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legislature will often lack the expertise and the ability to make good decisions and to effectively advocate for their constituencies. Under such circumstances, people's expectations of influencing policy through institutional venues decline. Moreover, systems characterised by such weaknesses tend to be more vulnerable to independent influences on the decision process. This, in turn, increases the expected payoff of protests and other group actions that can impose costs on decision makers if they fail to comply with the demands being made (Machado *et al*, 2011: 347).

2.4 Reflections on the theory

What the theory has done is to consolidate the place of social movements in the development project. The two theories both view political activity including social movements as at least in part motivated by 'rational' economic motives. Social movements are inherently economic in nature in the sense that they are centred on asking deeply economic questions about economic development and welfare improvement. Where the two theories differ is their conceptualisation of the underlying economy. The Neoclassical Model essentially views the economy as a zero sum game. Political activity is at best competition over scarce resources and at worst rent seeking. The role of social movements therefore is to help its participants gain at others' expense or more positively defend its members against other powerful actors trying to gain at others' expense. People rationally join groups to achieve ends that they feel they cannot achieve individually. So essentially social movements help people achieve economies of scale on social issues. However, to end here would be an incomplete analysis.

The Political Economy approach sees the economy as characterised by structural problems, inequality and other impediments to growth that are ultimately caused by power imbalances. So politics is not a zero sum game under this approach. The neoclassical approach talks about how pressure for social movements is strong when frustration is strong but it does not talk about structural issues. The political economy brings the dynamic that there are incentives for social movements not only cyclically but whenever there are power imbalances.

From the theory two issues emerge. The first is has the current development model or processes failed or got stuck? And secondly can social movements get things started up again? On the first issue, Campbell *et al* (2010) assert that poor people are seldom able to make effective political demands or cause social change without the support of actors holding the political and economic power. Escobar (1992: 412) argues that social

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movements are of interest because they offer an alternative form of development and politics to the 'conventional' or mainstream dominant discourse.

Morel *et al* (2012: 372) argue that to try and implement neoliberal recipes to cure a crisis caused by the application of neoliberal policies would not only be counterproductive but also creates an even deeper crisis economically. Economically, there needs to be a paradigm shift away from neoliberalism but Morel *et al* (2012: 368) bemoan the lack of a clear fully fledged economic alternative model and the lack of political coalitions to back it up. The developmental state presents itself as an alternate model however Chibber (2005) and Austin (2010) point out that the early developmental state had major internal problems and that it is unlikely to succeed if implemented in the 21st century.

Evans (1995) and Chibber (2005) argue that this issue is political. It is not just economic reasoning that determines the economic model. It is also political. There is a need to ensure that the politics does not prevent the shift to a new economic development model coupled with not having a lever to move the economy from neoliberalism to a new developmental state. This is where social movements have a potential role in the economic development model. They provide a new form of politics that can help shift the politics towards the development of a new developmental state paradigm.

In relation to the second issue, the effectiveness of social movements in this regard depends however on the quality of democracy in the political economy. Where democracy only exists in its form of electoral politics only and not in a real sense, then the political space is too narrow for social movements to be effective. Under a neoliberal hegemony of restricted democracy the state and institutions are aligned behind the interest of capital and social movements are often repressed and face demobilisation.

Bebbington's (2010) point is that issues are *structural* and have a common root. This underlies both why social movements tend to fail to make the broader shift (from issues of immediate discomfort to broader underlying issues) and the possibilities for transcending this failure. Clearly, the formula for transcending failure is obvious, even banal. Economically, social movements need to manage to deal with their 'issue' and articulate how this is part of a more system process.

Social movements tend to fail because they face a structure rather which is more than a collection of 'issues'. Social movements addressing individual issues may make local progress or win victories on 'issues', but this progress can be fleeting (for example,

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removing a corrupt local politician without addressing the problems that breed corruption; or getting housing delivered to poor people who do not have the means to maintain houses). More generally localised successes do not necessarily add up to fundamental change. On the contrary, localised successes can be distortionary (or government funding free education by taking money from other critical area) and increase fragmentation of social movements.

Finally, these issues interact with the state's ability to manage and suppress social movements. The state can become adept at managing protest. It contains protest to 'issues' (like 'service delivery') and geographically ('townships'). The fire of protest can be damped down by selective 'delivery' and selective welfare—all part of the repertoire of the neoliberal state—as much as by state oppression.

Furthermore, neoliberal democracy, while superficially liberal and democratic, makes considerable use of state violence and oppression, where protest proves difficult to 'manage' and especially where social movements' "politically destabilising distributive demands" threatens the social order (for example, when it spill out of the township onto campuses). In fact, neoliberal democracy dramatically limits the space for effective opposition against dominant elites. 'Politics as usual' is captured, and 'politics unusual' is delegitimised and oppressed.

The pertinent question that emerges is how can social movements overcome the oppression of neoliberal democracy? King and Soule (2007: 414) contend that social movements can play an important role as extra-institutional proxies of change that try to reconstruct the institutional rationalities on which an overriding system of authority is based (King and Soule, 2007: 414). Reflecting on this, it is important to unpack the underlying socio-economic conditions, the internal political organisation of social movements (flat versus hierarchical) and how they relate to power (do they participate in processes or are they outside them or do they try to be inside without losing autonomy).

There is a lack of consensus on what the best strategic approach is. Politically, they need to find a way of making *inside and against* practical. How do they engage, not only 'vertically' with the state and other establishment stakeholders (landowners, business, etc.) but also 'horizontally' with other social movements? There is room in the following chapters to further unpack how the need to be 'outside' and be oppositional can be reconciled with the need to also somehow be 'inside' and cooperative without losing effectiveness – what Tronti describes as being "inside and against" (Tronti, 2012: 122).

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Under the neoclassical approach, the supply of social movements is spontaneous and flares up whenever demand for social movements flares up. As soon as the demand falls, so does the supply. As a result, social movements seem to blow up quickly and die down just as quickly. Arguably one way of establishing continuity is through some form of formalisation through institution or structure. Social movements need to somehow achieve formal structure within themselves and not necessarily through being part of some other structure for increased continuity. These and other issues will be dealt with in detail in the chapters to follow.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter set up the theoretical framework of the thesis in order to provide clarity on the emergence, role as well as relevance of social movements. This was important as a starting point in the understanding of social movements in this context. Based on the reflections on the theory in this chapter, the following chapters (especially chapter three the South African case and chapter four the Latin American case) will move from this theorised view of social movements to an applied view and make use of the reflections drawn in this chapter.

CHAPTER THREE: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE
3.1 Introduction

The theory established that in order to have sustained economic growth there are two aspects involved. Firstly, there needs to be an appropriate economic model in place that yields a desirable growth path. There is no universally clear model that is fool proof however what is clear is that the neoliberal economic growth model has not yielded the expected growth path. Many countries including South Africa have seen a need to develop a new economic model. The developmental state emerges as an alternative economic model. However as discussed in chapter two, it is important to shift to a developmental state paradigm that is refined and modernised to fit the 21st century economic environment and needs.

Secondly, however, whether a shift can occur from one economic model to a new alternative depends on politics. In neoliberal democracy, formal political processes are incapable of making such a shift. This is where social movements emerge as important. They have the role of being the lever that can pry the politics out of its inertia to shift the development project.

However, social movement face considerable barriers in fulfilling this role. As discussed in chapter two, neoliberal democracy provides a formidable opponent. It has the ability to project itself as legitimate and its opponents as 'violent' or 'populist', and it has the tools at its disposal (the law, police action, selective delivery) to contain and fragment opposition. This exacerbates the organisational and ideological problems that social movements themselves face. Nevertheless, these obstacles are not, in principle, insuperable. As established in chapter two, social movements should centre on contesting systemic problems in order to effect systemic structural changes rather than the symptomatic effects of the underlying systemic problem. The next chapters explore the specific of these problems and how they have been faced.

Using inflections on the theory on social movements, the main aim of this chapter is to highlight the South African case engaging deeply with the narrative of social movements historically and to date. The main focus of this chapter is to elaborate on the discourse of social movements in South Africa. The analysis reveals the landscape of social movements in South Africa is complex with social movements often being met with disdain and violent opposition from political and economic elites. South Africa is characterised by generally fragmented social movement action especially in the post- apartheid era. The next section of the chapter (3.2) will discuss the different development models adapted in post-apartheid

South Africa. Section 3.3 will focus on the history of social movements in South Africa describing briefly the evolution of social movements in South Africa from the apartheid era to date. These two sections are closely linked and aim to reveal how the underlying political economy (section 3.2) helps shape the emergence, role and effectiveness of social movements in South Africa. Section 3.4 will comment on and reflect on the state of social movements in South Africa based on the discussions in the preceding sections. Finally section 3.5 will conclude.

3.2 The hegemony of neoliberalism in post-apartheid South Africa

One distinctive and important feature of the South African case to note is that the globalisation process was simultaneously accompanied by a political transition from apartheid to a democratic order. The goal of toppling oppressive white rule was no longer relevant in the new South Africa, but at the same time the local black masses' socio-economic problems and concerns that fueled the struggle remained very much alive and kicking (Greenstein, 2003: 12). Von Holdt (2013: 589) argues that South Africa was torn between the persistence of an exclusionary socio-economic structure marked by deep poverty and extreme inequality on the one hand, and on the other the symbolic and institutional rupture presented by the transition to democracy. This is similar to the Latin American case (as will be discussed in section 4.2) where governments faced a similar set of circumstances in the 1980s with the advent of democratisation and the fall of military rule (Cammack, 1991: 537; Ocampo *et al*, 2011).

The major challenge that faced the newly elected ANC government was how to forge a process of accelerated growth whilst easing the socio-economic imbalances acquired from the apartheid regime (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2003: 13). Pre-independence, the ANC's ideological orientation appeared to be firmly on the side of socio-economic socialist transformation. This is evidenced by the 1955 Freedom Charter and Nelson Mandela's declaration after his release from prison in 1990 where he stressed the necessity of nationalisation and redistribution (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 538). Its key features were an acceptance that the state would have to take a lead role in ensuring the level and direction of investment was 'developmental' by directly addressing social backlogs and racial disparities, and that the political model would emphasize social dialogue and democratic corporatism (Fryer, 2016: 128).

Initially, the ANC enacted a socially democratic approach combined with free markets; in essence, capitalism with a social face (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 542). The

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developmental vision was arguably most developed in MERG, the ANC commissioned policy platform which was abruptly dropped in 1993 and therefore never implemented. The RDP, which formed the ANCs 1994 election manifesto at the insistence of COSATU, was a much vaguer platform and was itself abruptly dismantled in 1996 (Fryer, 2016: 128). Vestiges of this policy process remain in the name RDP (used to denote government 'delivery' of housing and other social infrastructure) and in the form of NEDLAC (Fryer, 2016: 128).

Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013: 542) argue that there was no sudden conversion of the ANC government from socialism to neoliberalism at the attainment of independence. The ANCs overall strategy was rapid growth first with compromise then socialism and socio-economic transformation later. This however inevitably provided a convenient way to postpone the redistributive stage indefinitely (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 538). Byrne *et al* (2017: 259) also validate this argument saying that there was a 'suspicion that once the ANC achieved the first stage they may never get to the second stage'. Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013: 538) argue that this has led to South Africa state transforming into a cost controlling state rather than a developmental sate. This is an important point.

Critics (and indeed social movements) are able to say what is wrong (politically, socially and economically) but it is harder to say what must be done and how. This is clear in the two case studies in chapter five. For example, the students were certain of what they were against (fees, colonially tinged and exclusionary universities) and how they did not want to organise themselves. However this proved to be a fatal flaw because when they were asked the detailed economic questions, they had no answers; and because they were unable to develop political organisation beyond the leaderless structures that were so useful at mobilisation, they were delegitimised.

The full adoption of a neoliberal orthodoxy became official in 1996 with the implementation of GEAR (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 542). Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013) argue that this displacement was a matter of ideological conversion rather than economic or even political necessity. Habib and Padayachee (2000: 246) contend the neoliberal stance was the result of the ANC's particular perception and interpretation of the balance of economic and political power, at both the global and local level. This understanding gave priority and prominence to the international financial and investor community rather than to the country's post-apartheid growth and development needs. The ANC placed unusually great stress on the importance of foreign capital inflows and on the supposed lower costs of raising capital

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in international markets that would derive from strict adherence to principles of the Washington Consensus (Habib and Padayachee, 2000: 246).

It is also the case that IMF and World Bank emissaries along with South African capitalists moved quickly in the early 1990s to try to purge the ANC leadership of socialist ambitions and understandings, and instill neoliberal ideologies (Hart, 2008: 687). Economic neoliberalism was offered as the preferred, if not the only, economic development model and was held up as the model to follow globally. The government announced unequivocally that GEAR was non-negotiable (Hart, 2008: 681). This is similar to some Latin American countries where the argument that there was no other alternative prevailed, and some governments in Latin America assumed that the orthodoxy of neoliberalism was in some ways inevitable and that there was no other way to have proceeded (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012:3; Figueredo, 2006: 113).

GEAR as a structural adjustment model, was successful on its own terms. There was some progress in certain areas such as constitutional democracy, improved housing and electrification (Hart, 2008: 687). However, at the same time, the collapse of formal employment that accompanied the opening up of the economy devastated the livelihoods of millions of South Africans (Hart, 2008: 687).

Barchiesi (2004: 11) argues that the adoption of neoliberal macroeconomic policies by the ANC imposed social costs on the South African working class. In the afterglow of independence, GEAR promised huge increases in employment but the 1990s saw the sharp contraction of jobs especially in the labour intensive sectors (government dismantled tariffs more rapidly than required by GATT and cheap goods from China flooded the South African market) (Hart, 2008: 681). Without protective tariffs, major industries such as the textile and footwear industries witnessed many closures, dismissals, lay-offs and relocations to areas with even lower wages. And for the working and non-working poor, few new opportunities have opened up, apart from backyard informal jobs where people invest and work long hours without any protection from labour legislation or trade unions (Desai, 2002: 156).

In other words, poverty, landlessness, unemployment are products of the neoliberal capitalist processes of accumulation. Substantively, the outcome of the transition to democracy was a sharp transformation at the political level but a great deal of continuity at the socio-economic level. The result was a tension between the democratic promise inherent in the political

break to empower the newly enfranchised citizenry which had previously been excluded and the continuing reality of socio-economic exclusion.

Cottle (2017: 159) argues that before 1994, capitalism in South Africa had already reached a turning point. The economy could no longer develop in the same form and began to decay. A resumption of sustained economic growth required the emergence of a new economic model. So the imposition of a largely neoliberal GEAR in 1996 was shocking. This is similar to the shock at the imposition of neoliberal policies by some Latin American governments in the 1980s following democratisation (Cammack, 1991: 538; Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2004: 564).

Morel *et al* (2012: 13) attest that to implement neoliberal policies in an attempt to cure economic problems caused by neoliberalism is both counterproductive and deepens the economic crisis. Further, the adoption of neoliberal policies especially in countries already plagued by inequality inherited from colonial regimes also deepens those inequalities (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 544). In both cases neoliberalism was presented as the only choice (Hart, 2008: 687; Grugel and Rigirozzi, 2012: 3; Figueredo, 2006: 113). Other alternatives were suggested but were rapidly sidelined during the period between 1993 and 1996 (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 547). This highlights Watkins's (2010: 10) point that the neoliberal hegemony precludes the consideration of other economic development models as discussed in section 2.3.

Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013) contend that South Africa serves as a textbook example of how globalisation plays itself out in the semi-industrialised world. Plenty of evidence suggests that the post-apartheid neoliberal development model has not yielded the corruption free efficient state as promised. This echoes the poor results of donor driven state reforms in developing countries. The idea that pro market institutions will ensure efficiency and development entails a deep misunderstanding of how policies work (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013 539).

North *et al* (2007: 2) argue that most development policy today is based on models of the developed world and attempts to make developing countries look more like developed ones. However, the social dynamics of developed countries fundamentally differ from those of developing countries. Development practitioners therefore face a mismatch between the development problems they seek to address and the available tools. Development tools

based on industrial country experiences are ill-suited to the development goals in developing countries (North *et al*, 2007: 2).

Substantively, the fundamental compromise of this transition was the incoming regime's support for neoliberal economic policies in exchange for capital's general acceptance of black economic empowerment and some affirmative action. An elite middle class has since developed and the poor (who are mostly black) have remained poor. A new black elite has joined the old white elite, the black middle class is enjoying more opportunities in life, but the poor are becoming even poorer (Desai, 2002: 156).The advent of GEAR in 1996, and the negotiated end to apartheid made major concessions to corporate white-owned capital. National capitalists have become the primary beneficiaries of neoliberalism in South Africa largely at the expense of the poor black masses. Some authors such as Gibson (2006: 3) argue that this is a result of the 'elite' transition 'pact' between the ANC, multinational capital and local elites which has had the effect of blindsiding the very social movements that brought about the end of the apartheid regime (Gibson, 2006: 3). The ANC found a more durable and lucrative alliance with white corporate capital in order to create a black bourgeoisie than with the civics and promises that social movements and community based programmes would play important roles in post-apartheid South Africa were soon replaced with directives from government (Gibson, 2006: 20). This strengthened the hand of white corporate capital and reinvigorated black bourgeoisie in South Africa (Hart, 2008: 689).

In 2002, following deep tensions arising from unhappiness with the neoliberal outcomes, the ANC government fiercely denied that it is neoliberal. It increased "pro poor" spending on the Child Support Grant, and funding going to local governments to finance Municipal Indigence. It also dismissed the idea of a modest Basic Income Grant in favour of Extended Public Works Programme. These strategies to identify and 'treat' the poor segment of society were essentially strategies of containment (Hart, 2008, 686). There was talk of state intervention in markets but the ANC was careful to make clear that the interventions were not meant to reduce official commitment to rapid capital accumulation. Also these seemingly welfare policies do not represent a shift towards developmentalism. Cammack (2002) argues that these may actually serve to strengthen capital by stabilising the political environment (provide lip service to quell protests) in order to reduce the risk of investment in South Africa as elaborated in section 2.3.

Since the political transition in 1994, South Africa has been plagued by high unemployment. The official unemployment rate in South Africa rose from 22% in 1994 to 27.7% in 2017

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and this figure is expected to rise (Trading Economics, 2017; Bangane, 2012) High income inequality and high levels of poverty remain pressing and persistent challenges in South African society. Since 1994 the already high levels of income inequality have actually increased slightly and divisions along racial, cultural, linguistic and rural-urban lines continue to deepen despite some erosion in the post-apartheid era. To such an extent that such inequalities and divisions have become a defining feature of South African society. A simple analysis of the GINI coefficient demonstrates that South Africa has one of the highest GINI coefficients in the world (Bosch *et al*, 2010: 1). The GINI index in South Africa in 1992 was just over 59 and in 2011 the GINI coefficient was reported at 63.4 according to the World Bank collection of development indicators (Trading Economics, 2017). This demonstrates the dire situation in terms of the intensifying levels of poverty and inequality in the country since independence in 1994.

After the 2008 global economic crisis the economic conditions in South Africa continued to deteriorate. There is an important shift here, namely an increasing recognition that it is not just distributional questions that are the issue economically but that the growth path itself is a problem (Jain, 2014). South Africa experienced a relatively weak recovery from the Global Recession of 2008 to 2009. Growth continued to be sluggish and below expectation. By the end of the fourth quarter in 2015, growth had slowed down to 0.7% from 4.2% in 2014 and continued to fall with South Africa experiencing a recession in the first half of 2017 (Trading Economics, 2017). Despite an increase in growth since then, it has been quite low with the growth rate only at 2% in the last quarter of 2017 (Trading Economics, 2017).

It is clear that economically South Africa is 'stuck in stabilisation' (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013:538). The economic growth has stalled, and the socio-economic environment features high unemployment, high poverty rates and deep inequality. There is a sense of failure of the prevailing economic model. Naturally, South Africa should be shifting away from the current model to an alternative sustainable model that may provide the consistent goals of increasing economic development. However this shift has been slow and sticky and this can be attributed to the politics in the country. Much of the concern with transformation of the state in the post-1994 period has focused on the need to change policy frameworks and the racial complexion of the public service, by formulating new policies and implementing affirmative action. Important as these are, little attention has been paid to the need to transform the ways in which state power is organised, distributed and exercised

internally, and the ways in which it interacts with civil society. Only by attending to these issues can meaningful political transformation be effected (Greenstein, 2002: 8).

3.3. The hegemony of neoliberal democracy in post-apartheid South Africa

This inability to shift the development project in South Africa despite the sense of unhappiness with the current status quo raises questions on the political landscape in the country. As was established in chapter two, neoliberal reforms create a restrictive neoliberal democracy where the state displays an inertia to shift away from neoliberal economic policies. The elitist neoliberal democracy enshrines a centralised state as best practice. Under neoliberal democracy, citizen participation in policy choice and decision making is limited to formal institutions and electoral policies alone. Thus a neoliberal democracy hegemony features repression of social movements from the state (Cammack, 1991: 544; Weyland, 2014: 145; Machado *et al*, 2011: 7).

South Africa has shifted from liberal democracy to a more neoliberal democracy (Ngwane, 2012: 11). What is particularly problematic is that the notion of centralisation that comes with neoliberalisation subverts the logic of participatory democracy. It replaces it with a logic that is based on the nature of the state which structurally serves to exclude popular participation, regardless of the intentions of politicians (Greenstein, 2002: 9). According to Greenstein (2002: 9), it tends to shift power upwards, away from people and structures closer to the ground.

Liberalisation and democratisation brought an opening up of the state since the end of the apartheid regime through the electoral democracy and the legitimising of rights under a new constitution and a democratic judicial system and institutions. This is also true in the Latin American case (which will be discussed in chapter four) where when the Cold War ended in the 1980s, a new wave of democratisation swept through the region (Ocampo *et al*, 2011; Cammack, 1991: 537). Arguably it can be contested that it is not always necessary to operate outside of the legal framework in order to achieve results. Neither is it necessarily the case that an adversarial stance is required to deflect the state from its intentions. The poor and marginalised are capable of influencing elites to take directions they might otherwise not have taken through the legal system.

NEDLAC, the media, the courts, the constitution, formalised attempts to have public input into policies, local governments' Integrated Development Plans, and even discoursal support

for mass demonstrations provide a significant repertoire of 'in-system' mechanisms for influencing policy and challenging the government.

Rights can be an opportunity afforded by official processes to demand that the state put its money where its mouth is (Ballard, 2006: 11). The new political, economic and social order is underwritten by a constitution that enshrines first and second generation rights, clauses that have been used by a number of social movements to either defend themselves or advance their campaigns instead of stifling them (Ballard *et al*, 2006: 16). For example the Homeless Peoples Alliance preferred a 'politics of patience' with a high degree of 'bureaucratic intimacy' in order to achieve the delivery of housing (Ballard, 2006: 11).

But how effective are these legal tactics in reality? Catchpowle and Cooper (2003: 18) argue that institutions such as NEDLAC represent an attempt by the ANC to incorporate labour into decision making processes as a way of eliminating any large scale opposition to its policies. The state has for example chosen not to approve some applications for protest action in the past and consequently attempted to silence and subdue opposition. For example, in March 2004 during the Anti-Privatisation Forum 52 arrests were made, in April 2004 on Election Day 62 members of the LPM were arrested (Ballard, 2006: 11) and in November 2016 during the #FeesMustFall movement countless arrests were made (Kamanzi, 2016). In addition to the apartheid-era laws such as Regulation of Gatherings Act, which gave the security and intelligence agencies additional powers to regulate citizen participation, a series of similar Bills are in the making. These include the Interception and Monitoring Bill, Intelligence Services Bill, the Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Bill, the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill and the Anti-Terrorism Bill (Ballard *et al*, 2006: 16). The perception by some, therefore, is that the political freedoms anticipated for post-apartheid South Africa may not always be available in practice.

As discussed in chapter two, where citizens perceive the institutions as well as the democracy to be unable or unwilling to heed their calls, they resort to more unconventional means of citizen participation such as protests. And this has been the case in South Africa. An analysis conducted by Ortiz *et al* (2013: 6) of main protests in 84 countries including South Africa in the period 2006-2013 shows that demonstrators mostly address their grievances to national governments, as they are the legitimate policy-making institutions that should respond to citizens. Protestors demand that policy-makers take public responsibility for economic, social and environmental policies that should benefit all, instead of just the few.

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This is true of South Africa where residents of the Limpopo town of Vuwani, where the schools were vandalised in 2016, are quoted as saying that violence is the only way to ensure that politicians listen. This view is widespread and points to a major problem with the participatory aspects of South Africa's democracy (Bilchitz and Cachalia, 2016). This is corroborated by a survey of the Gauteng adult population conducted by the South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law at the University of Johannesburg, which reveals a growing sense of alienation and dissatisfaction with the functioning of representative and participatory democracy in South Africa (Bilchitz and Cachalia, 2016).

Of the random representative sample of 608 adults, the survey revealed that only 40% of people believe Parliament represents them, with less than half agreeing that their politicians were responsive to their needs. Alarmingly, more than 60% of the sample perceived participation in, and access to, democratic institutions as a problem. For instance, 71% found contacting their political representatives difficult; 61% said the same about challenging a violation of their rights in court and 68% expressed difficulty in lodging a complaint at the Human Rights Commission. One may argue that protestors simply do not value the democratic processes put in place but statistics from the same study reveal that this is not necessarily true. This can be gleaned from the high levels of voter participation in elections among Gauteng residents (82% in national elections and 78% in local elections); the fact that a majority regularly discusses politics with friends and family (57%) and that more than three-quarters follow the news daily (78%) all of which suggests a strong commitment to democratic values (Bilchitz and Cachalia, 2016). These findings however do reveal a need to enhance participation in South Africa's democracy and to render its institutions more accessible to the people (Bilchitz and Cachalia, 2016) further reflecting significant discontent with the working of current democracies and demand for real democracy (Ortiz *et al*, 2013: 6).

As evidenced by this, South Africa has shifted from a liberal democracy to a neoliberal democracy and there is a sense of the 'meaninglessness of democracy in South Africa'. One would expect that numerous protests should be indicative of healthy, civic minded and democratic societies (one were people are free to voice out their opinions and have the freedom of expression) but the difference in South Africa is that the growing number of protests is actually a symptom indicative of the opposite. The protests underline the freedom of expression people enjoy in post-apartheid society, but they also corroborate the accusation

that all is not well with the post-apartheid order (Ngwane, 2012: 11). It is widely accepted that protests in South Africa are a tell-tale sign of the insidious feeling of underlying disenchantment, disenfranchisement and disillusionment from the masses aimed at the government and democratic values as a whole.

The South African political field has largely been marked by a competition over the right to be the legitimate representative of poor people's struggles. Counter-hegemonic activists feel that the revolutionary economic change that was anticipated with democracy has yet to materialise, and this remains the major project. Some explicitly describe themselves as true custodians of the liberation tradition; a title, of course, also claimed by the ruling ANC party (Ballard, 2006: 3). Relations between state and civil society have taken three distinct forms in post-apartheid South Africa - marginalisation, engagement and adversarialism (Habib, 2005: 671).

In South Africa, the ANC believes in a single party state with the state at the centre of development policies and strategies (Ballard, 2006: 3). The present state is led by a liberation movement which continues to drive a nationalist project that it still embodies national aspirations (Ballard, 2006: 15). And as such the ANC has a paternalistic view that it has a mandate from the majority of the population to proceed the way they see best. Strengthening social movements to the one party state is synonymous with reducing the role of the state (Rucht, 2000: 4). The ANC has become increasingly enmeshed in the institutions of the state. The state constitutes the primary agency for redistribution and class formation, not only in the sense that it makes and implements policy for society, but also that it controls the biggest revenues, budgets, assets and payroll in the country, as well as access to broadcast rights and other lucrative opportunities (von Holdt, 2013: 594).

During apartheid there was ostensibly a single unified goal of removing the oppressive apartheid system. This sense of unity of purpose however papered over the different organisations differing views and ideologies. Following independence, the ANC expected all the organisations it has fought against apartheid to simply fall in line with them and carry on with a national development programme. Any organisation not falling in line was seen as anti-developmental and anti-nationalism and the ANC tried to discredit and effectively silence it (Barchiesi, 2000: 27).

It goes without saying that due to the past association of civil society with the ANC in the anti-apartheid struggle, autonomy would become a contentious issue post-1994 as the ANC

expected all formations that were opposed to apartheid to fold up and be incorporated into its structures. This assumption is still dogging the current relationship between the ANC and progressive social formations in civil society; those that are seen as not toeing the line are treated with distrust by the ruling party (Noyoo, 2006: 22). Supporters of the government like to see themselves as a vanguard representing the black population (elite and masses alike), who had been denied political rights by the apartheid regime, and are now moving to assume their full role in the new political dispensation (Greenstein, 2003: 2).

Social movements have hit a nerve with the South African government. The ANC dislikes how social movements have been able to upstage it and the ANC has shown considerable intolerance for dissent (Barchiesi, 2004: 4). Protests are the fly in the ointment of the "new" democratic South Africa. Frequent confrontational and sometimes violent social outbursts sit oddly with the image of the idyllic rainbow nation that many imagine emerged with the demise of apartheid and the transition to a free, non-racial society (Ngwane, 2012: 11). Social movements are plural and diversified and unpredictable. This makes them radicalised and militant in completely new ways, which threaten not only state control but also the established left's understanding of struggle and politics (Greenstein, 2003: 14).

The state's response to the new social movements in South Africa has largely been to marginalise them at best and at worst to criminalise them (Madlingozi, 2007: 81). The state makes use of a large repertoire of tactics to marginalise social movements in post-apartheid South Africa. These include but are not limited to co-optation of movement groups through corporatism among other things, threats, violent oppression, scare tactics such as arresting social movements' participants and later dropping charges, making social movements action illegal and arresting any members, banning social movements, using informants and agents provocateur, censoring newspapers and arresting dissidents, torture, disappearances and mass killings (Davenport, 2009: 378). Social movements have been met with intolerance and stigmatisation. As another marker of increasing authoritarianism, policing of protests and strikes has become more violent (von Holdt, 2013: 601).

Social movements are seen as impertinent, not showing sufficient respect for government (Ballard, 2006: 11). To justify this, the state mentions that though "illegal tactics" such as protests and demonstrations were justified under apartheid now they are insurrectionist against a legitimate democratic state (Ballard, 2006: 11). The techniques of violent resistance to authority that became widespread during the pre-independence era were encouraged by the ANC and its allies as part of the strategy of making the country

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"ungovernable" (Bruce, 2014). Social movements have since triggered the post-apartheid reinterpretation of ungovernability. Separate from the liberation struggle's once applauded success in putting an end to the apartheid government of the 1980s, the notion of ungovernability today carries predominantly negative connotations (Selmeczi, 2015: 53).

Popular mobilisation has been delegitimised and, losing its emancipatory legacy, ungovernability has been reconfigured as opposing democracy (Selmeczi, 2015: 74). The transition from ungovernability during apartheid to ungovernability during democracy is captured in the massive show of force towards protestors. There is no understanding of protests or sympathy because the 'poor' have supposedly already been accommodated now that the apartheid regime is over (Desai, 2003).

Some, particularly in government, see these social movements as a threat to stable democracy. Hence 'state security' discourses and responses. This is an overreaction inspired by the state's oversensitivity to political criticism. Social movements contribute to the plurality of civil society, which is one of the essential elements in a system of checks and balances indispensable to all mature democracies (Habib 2005: 672). Just as important to note is the fact that most of the contemporary social movements operate within the parameters of the new status quo. There is no immediate challenge to the legitimacy of the government, and there is still much loyalty to the constitution. These movements are thus not, as yet, about overthrowing the existing order. Instead, they are about holding this government accountable for the delivery of promises it made, and prizing the political and socio-economic order open so that more constituencies can be included in its list of beneficiaries (Ballard *et al*, 2006:18).

Although bonds of solidarity were forged more easily in the common struggle against apartheid, poor people nevertheless are beginning to form new movements to defend themselves against insensitive bureaucrats and self-serving politicians. Democracy is usually considered to be the direct opposite of violent contestation. To the extent that violence persists, it is regarded as symptomatic of the failure of democracy (von Holdt, 2013: 590). It may be objected that a democracy marred with violence is not a democracy at all. Von Holdt (2013: 590) argues that this is not a helpful stance if we want to understand the dynamics of the kind of actually existing democracy emerging in South Africa. Rather than democracy and violence being mutually exclusive, democracy may configure power relations in such a way that violent practices are integral to them producing a social system that Von Holdt (2013: 590) calls a violent democracy.

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Democracy and its institutions structure and distribute power in particular ways and, in an unequal society such as South Africa's, tend to distribute power in highly unequal ways. Violence is deployed to defend this distribution and to challenge or reconfigure it (von Holdt, 2013: 591). The state in South Africa is increasingly willing to use violent oppression against social protests as they become more and more robust.

Protestors no longer seem interested in amicable solutions, having seemingly lost faith in such likelihoods, but rather seem bent on physically expressing deep seated angers towards a system that they feel has failed them. According to study by Ortiz *et al* (2013: 6), the overwhelming demand for protests in South Africa, is at the core of it, not for economic justice per se, but for what prevents economic issues from being addressed: a lack of "real democracy". This, according to Ortiz *et al* (2013: 6), is a result of people's growing awareness that policy-making has not prioritised them, even when it has claimed to, as well as frustration with politics and a lack of trust in the existing political actors who are failing to listen to the needs and views of ordinary people.

Essentially the root of the problem lies in the perceived and real growing discrepancies between ANC leaders and their electorate. In a nutshell, the ANC government is not delivering on its promises, or at least not enough. Post-apartheid South Africa has been characterised by promises of more democratic governance and better life for all citizens. However, the economic transformation following the first democratic elections in 1994 have witnessed increased economic empowerment for a selected few black elite, while the majority of black people still live in abject poverty (Langa and Kiguwa, 2013: 21). Government attempts to improve service delivery have not been sufficient to lessen the frustration and anger of poor people in South Africa (Alexander, 2012). One may argue then that protests are just but a mere reflection of local entanglements with the governing ANC, sometimes referred to as 'patronage politics from below' but what cuts across the various so-called service delivery protests is the acute critique of the failure of a representative democracy to provide socio-economic equality for the masses (Runciman, 2017).

For most, the quality of post-apartheid democracy is linked closely to the provision of basic services. This is unsurprising considering that the apartheid government systemically denied the majority these basic rights. Community protests are therefore inevitably fundamentally about the forcible exclusion from democracy experienced by many black working class citizens since the end of apartheid in 1994 largely due to their inability to afford socio-

economic goods and not some rebellion (Runciman, 2017). Community protests can be interpreted as a form of dissatisfied citizenship in which citizens who feel excluded in the new democratic dispensation are forcefully demanding to enjoy full rights of citizenship to have access to work opportunities and to all basic services as enshrined in the Constitution (Langa and Kiguwa, 2013: 20). They are realistic and quite logical responses to everyday hardships. However, as will be discussed further, protests have largely taken on the persona of being rebellions due to their unfortunate political positioning in the South African political arena.

What this section has done is problematized the neoliberal democracy hegemony in South Africa. As a result of it politically South Africa is stuck hence the inability to shift to a new economic development path. Further, though social movements have emerged as important in trying to force the state to make economic changes, they have largely been ineffective and suffered repression. Essentially, protests are simply a symptom of the failure of the democratic processes which is the core problem and not just some act of rebellion from the masses. The state has great inertia to change, the state is alienated from the interests of the masses and is inaccessible.

3.4. A commentary on the state of Social Movements from apartheid to post-apartheid South Africa

In addition to the repression of social movements in post-apartheid South Africa consequently affecting their effectiveness in economic development, the organisation and structure of the social movements themselves also comes into question. As theorised in chapter two, social movements need to be organised, and structured, and also need to contest underlying systemic problems in order to produce meaningful radical reform (Bebbington, 2011: 1- 3). This section will consider broadly the state of social movements in post-apartheid South Africa (what they contest and how they go about it) and problematise the state of social movements in South Africa. This task will be carried on in chapter five as well, where using the inferences made in this chapter as a lens, the focus will be on two specific cases of social movements in South Africa.

Three phases emerge in the discourse of social movements in South Africa:

1. 1970s to 1980s: Anti-apartheid phase

The struggle for independence was arguably the quintessential social movement during this phase. Pre independence the mandate was clear: a united front against the oppressive

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apartheid state in order to dismantle it (Ballard, 2006: 1). This common grievance brought together political parties, unions, civics, religious organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) across the board who all focused on an adversarial attack on apartheid. The significance of the organs of people's power that had emerged by the mid-1980s was their potential to begin and remedy decades (and centuries) of exploitation and oppression through allowing everyone to actively shape their lives.

By definition of the apartheid regime, legislatorial processes in themselves could not guarantee the continuation of that process. The legislative models that existed at the time (generally without considering "existing organisations, practices and traditions of political struggle") where exclusionary. Therefore the ANC, United Development Front (UDF), Congress Of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) all banded together to form a strong oppositional force against the white minority government (Ballard *et al,* 2006: 16) outside of the protocol and processes that existed at the time making use of 'illegal' extra institutional tactics such as toyi-toying, marching and protesting publicly against the state in order to make the country "ungovernable". For the social movements at the time, democracy meant mass participation; the opportunity for people to gain control "over every aspect of their lives." In this way the original idea of ungovernability carried a positive association. It was "a political weapon in the hands of people with no access to political power," (Selmeczi, 2015: 60).

However, the surface unity of the anti-apartheid movements (especially in the late 1980s) papered over the differences about the nature of the state, democracy and economic policy. The liberals (especially the white liberal parties in government) thought that the economic system could be reformed from within apartheid regime (Lipton, 2007: 34). The Alliance of civic organisations with its ideology of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) and 'colonialism of a special type' emphasised unity of struggle (and 'internal democracy' within the alliance rather than open contestation) and the need for the Alliance to lead the struggle (Ngwane, 2003: 42). Groups, particularly on the Left were critical of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) ideology, and emphasised grass roots democracy. They predicted the transition would go wrong (Plaut and Holden, 2012).

2. Post 1990s: Immediate Post-apartheid phase

This was a political honeymoon phase so to speak. A transitional society emerged where state-social movement relations changed from the adversarial opposition that characterised apartheid politics, to a more collaborative and development-oriented focus (Habib, 2005: 671). Government's attempt to create an enabling political and fiscal environment entailed trying to create collaborative relations between the state, unions and civic groups (Ballard *et al*, 2006: 1). In a sense, this phase entailed the inadvertent creation of an economic system of neoliberal corporatism.

The basic idea of corporatism is that the "society and economy of a country should be organised into major interest groups and representatives of those interest groups should settle any disputes through negotiation and agreement" with the state (Watkins, 2008). According to Watkins (2008), it is a system that emphasises the positive role of the state in guaranteeing social justice and supresses the opportunities for the population to pursue their own interests outside of the state.

The neoliberal package employed a corporatist programme of the accommodation between labour and capital – what Catchpowle and Cooper (2003: 13) term neoliberal corporatism. For instance in South Africa government organised society into 'corporations' subordinate to the state with the formation of corporatist institutions such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), the National Development Agency (NDA) and the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) which some scholars have described as "moribund allies" and "empty shells" with little capacity for opposition (Ballard *et al*, 2006: 16). Perhaps this analysis manifests itself more clearly within the so called ruling tripartite alliance of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, along with the de facto membership of SANCO. Their attempts to oppose the state's chosen economic path from within this ruling tripartite alliance has limited the extent to which they can block this path and in this way the civic movement can be said to have been effectively neutralised (Ballard, 2006: 2). The alliance requires a disciplined labour movement whose leadership is willing to accommodate the free market in return for a 'voice' in the political structures (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2013: 18).

What existed became organs of political representation which reflected the will of the politics of the time rather than adjusting the interests of the economic and political groups (Ballard *et al*, 2006: 1). Catchpowle and Cooper (2013: 14) argue that neoliberal corporatism is the voluntary subordination of class interests to the requirements of the interests of capital. Organised labour was repressed or allowed itself to be demobilised. The

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problem is exactly that facing social movements. Should workers remain largely automomous and self-organising, or should they form a strong alliance with the political party (the ANC)? This ties in with Chibber's argument in chapter two. If the developmental state is implemented in South Africa with the same political alliance (for example ANC and supposedly deracialised business class with a corporatised labour) we are doomed to repeat the same mistakes of the failed early developmental sate.

The SACP is able to justify its position in the alliance in Marxist-Leninist (actually Stalinist) terms. SACP claimed that South Africa's objective conditions required postponing socialism in favour of a stage of 'national democracy' (Byrne *et al*, 2017: 259). Hence its support of the dominance of the ANC (a vanguard party) and even GEAR (Byrne *et al,* 2017: 259). SACPs recent opposition of the ANC is against state capture rather than deeper structural issues. COSATU on the other hand has been in an ambiguous position since its formation in 1985, and this reflected an unresolved debate that went much further back (between 'workerism' and the 'national democratic revolution') (Byrne *et al,* 2017).

COSATU was wary of the centralisation of power and the dominance of the ANC, and the shift to neoliberal policy. There was strong contestation between 'workerism' (with an emphasis on autonomous unions, based at the point of production) and outside of party instruction (Byrne *et al*, 2017: 255). COSATU remained in the alliance but tried to be a critical ally. However, this means it is effectively sniping from the side lines and defending its workers. It has very little effect on policy about the deeper structural issues and has been losing significance throughout the post-apartheid period (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2013: 24). There has been polarisation between leaders and its members over its weakened ability to mobilise (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2013: 24). COSATU, and even some branches of the ANC (as reflected at the policy conferences) have been noisy critics but have had little effect on the overall structural trajectory.

Interpretations of this phase could best be described as a hiatus in popular and radical activity during which proponents of social justice attempted to align their agendas with the state through the drafting of the new constitution and the apparent implementation of policy to redress the inequalities inherited from apartheid (Ballard, 2006: 17). The primary objective of gaining independence from the oppressive apartheid regime had been accomplished and seemingly there was no longer any need to oppose the state. The new mandate was clear: redress the inequalities brought on by apartheid and work towards building the new 'rainbow nation'.

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The newly democratically elected government seemed to be working on the residual problems of inequality, poverty and deprivation amongst the black majority. Though social conditions remained difficult for the poor masses, communities were not inclined to mobilise against the government or to protest against it (Ballard *et al*, 2006: 16). And even if they had wanted to they had no voice as the civic organisations that had historically provided the enabling platform were now integrated into government or were in close collaboration with the government.

There were some mild uprisings in the mid- and late-1990s related to discontent over municipal services, housing and the lack of infrastructure. These protests included the one day anti-privatisation strikes by COSATU after only a brief honeymoon (Bond, 2000: 217-223). Researchers identify a period of "lull" in protest action between 1994 and 1999 (Ballard, *et al.* 2006), with some saying the lull might actually have been shorter in duration, and others suggesting that there was no such lull (Bond, 2000).

But a political lull should be understood as much more than just the absence of mass action; it also involves the level of confidence of the working class, its clarity of purpose and its social weight. From this point of view, despite the continued occurrence of protests when the new order was ushered in, the political lull was deeper and longer because, as will be argued further in this chapter, the transition from apartheid to democracy entailed a process of demobilisation of the working class movement as other classes (and politics) wrested leadership of the mass movement from the proletariat.

Key activists from the pre independence era had taken up key positions in government. The call from government was now to move from 'resistance to reconstruction' and therefore social movements' oppositional role to the state was at this point deemed inappropriate. According to the African National Congress (ANC) in the mid-1990s, any mass oppositional action involved "a process of tearing down rather than building up" and almost inevitably leads to "ungovernability and instability" (Selmeczi, 2015: 61). So now the concept of ungovernability was becoming difficult to relate to the liberation social movements in as far as it was understood to mean localised and destructive or instigated by outside agitators (Scelmezci, 2015: 59). A new definition of ungovernabilty emerged at this point authored by the ANC. Where this phenomenon of ungovernability fell from grace and acquired a negative denotation.

 3.   Late 1990s to date: "The Rebellion of the poor in South Africa"

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Table 1 shows a summary of the periodisation of post-apartheid movements which is discussed in detail below.

This phase of social movements took hold in the early 2000s and is linked with the rise of the new social movements such as the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF), the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). In this phase, divergent opinions, both within the state and within civil society, on the best development path began to emerge and become more prominent. Social movements began challenging the hegemony of the ANC and the state, and in so doing creating a new political landscape (Anciano, 2012: 143). The growth of social movements was seen to redefine the terrain of political identity and solidarity. The advent of opposition to government's neoliberal macroeconomic strategies from government, sparked a reinvigoration of a new generation of social movements with the new mandate of challenging government's growth policies (Ballard, 2006: 17). Thus emphasising the connection established in chapter two between protest, social movements and economics.

Table 1: The Periodisation of post-apartheid social movements

1994-1997	1997-1999	1999-2000	2000-2004	2004-2008	2008-present
Low level of strike activity	Ideological contestation over GEAR in Alliance; some strikes	Trade union anti privatisation strikes	Miscellaneous strikes	Strike wave: Public sector national strike (2007); massive private sector strikes	Strike wave: Public sector national strike (2010); massive private sector strikes
"Lull" or reduced level of protests	Protests by "concerned residents" and "crisis committees"	Community and student protests in support of the unions; increase in community protests	Massive protests organised by the new social movements	Massive "spontaneous" and often disruptive service delivery protests; demarcation struggles	Xenophobic violence (2008); proliferation of community protests

(Source: Ngwane, 2011: 16)

New localised movements and organisations emerged in ways that revealed a growing distance from both ANC-aligned civic structures and trade union organisations which were

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historically strong but increasingly coming under pressure from the left (Barchiesi, 2004: 11). Socioeconomic realities were increasingly highlighting the need for policy debates. Moreover the structure of governance makes matters worse. The ANC's policy of 'deployment' (an attempt to increase ANC control of all centres of power through the deployment of cadres particularly into positions of authority within the institutions of policing, justice and law (von Holdt, 2013:601)) is an element of this. Combined with the ANC's political hegemony and the neoliberal democracy, this meant that elected representatives became more concerned about the support of an elite capitalist class than that of their electorate (Alexander, 2010: 38).

As noted in the preceding section, the ANC government at independence preferred an alliance between white corporate capital and created a new class of black elites. Far from stabilising a new dominant coalition between white capital and new black elite classes, the democratic breakthrough has stimulated intense and violent conflict between different black factions over access to rents (von Holdt, 2013: 602). This may be a viable explanation for the increasing number of violent protests over time. Because cash connection is the judge of civility in a neoliberal economic environment, the local poor people and their activism and protests are considered uncivil.

In post-apartheid South Africa poor people are no longer discriminated on the basis of race, but continue to be discriminated on the basis of class. Nowadays, people are no longer relocated, evicted from their house, or cut off from water and electricity because they happen to be black or brown, but because they cannot afford to pay rents and rates (Desai, 2002: 156). This relationship produces a highly unstable social order in which intra-elite conflict and violence are growing, characterised by new forms of violence and the reproduction of older patterns of violence, a social order that can be characterised as violent democracy (von Holdt, 2013: 589). The result has been a considerable degree of insulation of the economic sphere from large-scale political intervention.

Mottiar and Bond (2012: 309) attempt to identify a common thread across the protests, and suggest that social protests reflect the distorted character of 'growth' that South Africa witnessed after adopting neoliberal macroeconomic and micro development policies following the demise of apartheid in 1994. Such policies date, after all, to the late 1980s and informed many of the early 1990s community protests of SANCO, for example (Mottiar and Bond, 2012: 309).

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One of the global issues that Burawoy (2015) argues unites different struggles across the world is the generalised critique that 'electoral democracy has been hijacked by capitalism'. It is also worth considering in the South African case as well, that perhaps this critique, that 'democracy is only for the rich', is what also unites all the thousands of fragmented protests happening across South Africa (Runciman, 2017). The protests reflect a deepening disappointment with the fruits of democracy. While some people have gained, the majority are still poor. Privatisation of local services has opened up new opportunities for private accumulation by a few elites (Medeiros, 2009: 111). It can be argued that protests represent resistance to the commodification of life for example the commercialisation of municipal services and to rising poverty and inequality in the country's slums (Mottiar and Bond, 2013: 285).

Findings from Runciman (2015), show that community protests had been declining between 1997 and 2004 and then increasing from 2005 onwards, with a peak in 2012. The vast majority (80%) of protests are orderly in nature, but there has been an increasing trend towards disruptive and violent protest action since 2008. Alexander (2010) describes protest in South Africa since 2004 a 'rebellion of the poor,' although all such community unrest since the end of apartheid can be readily characterised in class terms.

A key point to note here is the 'newness' of the social movements. In South African writing, the term 'new' refers to movements surfacing post-1999, which is different to European 'new social movement' theory (Anciano, 2002: 156). The new social movements are characterised as a diverse set of organizations with the objective of organising and mobilising the poor and marginalised to contest and engage the state around the failure or lack of policy that would effect social change (Habib, 2005: 672). The old avenues of opposition were absorbed into government leaving opponents of the government without a mechanism to organise opposition hence the term 'new social movements' which, in many regards, are very different from their traditional counterparts (Ballard, 2006: 17). The context of the rise of the new social movements was the rapid shift from the ideology of a state driven developmentalism and a shift from the corporate arrangement between unions and government (Gibson, 2000: 20). The new social movements are in no way unitary and uniform and no longer affiliated to one political agenda and were often times disjointed and fragmented (Ballard *et al*, 2006: 18).

They come in all shapes and sizes with varying agendas (Madlingozi, 2007: 86) and are more fragmented on what it is they oppose (Ballard, 2006: 1). A quick scan of the issues

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they represent indicates a massive diversity of concerns: land equity, gender, sexuality, racism, environment, education, formal labour, informal labour, access to infrastructure, housing, eviction, HIV/AIDS treatment, crime and safety, and geo-politics among several other agendas (Ballard *et al*, 2006: 18). Some also speak to legal rights, social and environmental justice, and stigmas and discrimination of certain categories of people rooted in everyday society and culture. In addition to issues, social movements also vary according to geographic scale, size, institutional form and tactics (Ballard *et al,* 2006: 19). Further, the new social movements are fragmented in the sense that they are often generally located within the 'militant particularisms' of a specific geographical community, most frequently disconnected to other nearby struggles and despite the similarities in demands have not cohered around a central target or demand (Runciman, 2015).

Also in this phase of social movements are the current ongoing protest actions, which according to Ngwane (2011), "include local community uprisings and confrontational national strikes but which do not exhibit sustained ideological tendencies of either the 1990s Mass Democratic Movement or the 2000s new social movements". From about 2004 to date, South Africa has seen a surge in massive "spontaneous" and often disruptive service delivery protests. It is a type of protest in SA: it is often cast as being about people wanting government to deliver *to* people—so quite limited in scope and localized (Bianco, 2013; Runciman, 2017). However, the participants often deny this and claim they are responding to deeper structural issues and do not want 'stuff' but want dignity (Ngwane, 2011). However, most are dismissed as 'popcorn protests' and dissolve into the normalcy of just another protest in the protest capital of the world. This is deeply problematic as it dismisses the political content of these protests, with all their fragmentations, simply because they have not, as yet, coalesced into a movement. At the same time, it fails to critically unpack and engage with the political and structural issues that shape the protest wave and arguably inhibit the emergence of a new movement. It also neglects an appreciation of the disruptive power and the political impact protests have had.

The wide-ranging nature of such protests makes them difficult to enumerate (Alexander, 2010: 26). Comparing protests per capita figures, South Africa is the 11th highest per capita protester in the world (GDELT, 2017). Some 410 major service delivery protests have been recorded by monitoring agency Municipal IQ between 2009 and 2012. An average of 2.9 unrests occurred a day during this time frame (Alexander, 2012). Based on estimates from the South African Police Service data, between 1997 and 2013 there were, on average, 900

community protests a year. In recent years the number has reportedly risen to a possible 2000 protests a year (Runciman, 2017). As discussed in section 1.2, social movements have a wide range of tactics and methods of collective action (Mottiar and Bond, 2013: 290). One thing that resonates however, according to analyses circulated around the internationalist left, is that South Africa has one of highest per capita number of uprisings of developing countries of its size, and as a result branded the nation the "protest capital of the world." (Levenson, 2012).

According to Bilchitz and Cachalia (2016), in general, black South Africans have the highest levels of political participation, followed by coloureds, and then by Indians whilst the lowest participating racial group is white South Africans. This is in line with the neoclassical theorisation of social movements. Social movements vary as frustration varies and in this case the levels of social movement participation seems to track frustration. The implication also reflected in other studies is that these 'service delivery protests' are mainly a movement within urban areas, but within those areas most participants can be regarded as poor and a high proportion come from informal settlements where services are especially weak (Alexander, 2012).

Though these statistics are important to build a comprehensive picture of protest activity, such figures tell us little about the politics of such protests. The main focus of this chapter is to go beyond the impressionistic media accounts that often dominant the public arena and delve deeper into the core issues of protests in South Africa in order to figure out where they fit in development and economics.

3.5 Reflections on the state of social movements post-apartheid in post-apartheid South Africa

Can social movements in South Africa then help push the state out of its inertia? Undoubtedly, the new social movements and protests have had an impact. "The most obvious tangible effect of social movements on the political landscape of this country is that they represent the interests of the poor and marginalised and apply pressure on the government to pay greater attention to the welfare of these groups," Ballard *et al.* (2006: 413). Social movement formations have played the role of "watchdogs", by keeping the government accountable to its various commitments and by making sure that government honours its promises during elections or follows through its election manifesto (Noyoo, 2006: 25).

One distinguishing feature of new social movements in post-apartheid South Africa and especially the multiple service delivery protests is their ideology. Social movements in South Africa evolved over time to what Hart (2008) calls 'movements beyond movements' and what Alexander (2012) calls a 'rebellion of the poor'. New social movements in South Africa manifest as protest action that occurs in waves (Cottle, 2017:150).

They are usually contesting very singular issues and emerge in direct response to some immediate discomfort. This is testament to the neoclassical model's analysis where social movements arise out of frustration and dissatisfaction. The emergence of these as has been established in the preceding sections is the idea of injustice. The new social movements frame their contestation as pivoting essentially on the defence of their rights from other actors (the neoclassical approach of seeing social movements as a zero sum game).

Whether or not this is explicitly expressed, the idea behind the 'service delivery protests' is that single issue causes become vehicles for achieving broader ideological objectives and particular campaigns on narrow issues should be taken to be a means to an end. This is a crucial theoretical point. For example, in the student protest #FeesMustFall: force the state to provide free higher education. The idea was that this could cascade into the state being forced to rethink its public finances; into rethinking the demands for fixing basic education as well rethinking the demands to fix the economy to ensure graduates can get jobs. This will be explored further in chapter five to follow.

This rights based approach has several difficulties in engaging effectively with transformation. Taking this approach is good for mobilisation as elaborated in chapter two. Under the neoclassical approach, the supply of social movements is spontaneous and flares up whenever demand for social movements flares up. As soon as the demand falls, so does the supply. As a result, social movements seem to blow up quickly and die down just as quickly. A short term campaign or a week of street protests might be dramatic and attract interest and attention but are ultimately short lived events (Bebbington, 2011: 1). Bebbington (2011: 1) argues that when protest are linked to a series of other issues and other activities sustained over time all ultimately oriented towards making a similar set of arguments then they are of quality and likely to achieve real change. Focusing on single issues or identity politics (Hudson, 2013) leads to a narrowing of the scope of concern. Social movements become involved or pertinent only when a violation occurs. It involves concern with apparent violations while failing to problematize the exploitative social relations and impoverishing underlying practices and systems that constitute the normal

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operations of capitalist economies. Purely rights based approaches have little traction and can all too easily be marginalized or appropriated by liberal politics (du Toit, 2013: 20). And this is precisely the case of post-apartheid social movements in South Africa.

Ballard (2006: 3) notes that struggles in post-apartheid South Africa respond in the first instance to particular manifestations of exclusion, poverty and marginalisation usually in a very local and immediate manner. Despite the fact that such activists operate to achieve direct relief for marginalised groups on particular issues rather than primarily opposing the state's economic path, this is not to say that they necessarily agree with current national programmes because in most cases in pursuing particular gains activists end up opposing the state by default. In other words, these so called 'service delivery' protests, have simply emerged as one of the primary and more popular methods through which this disillusionment manifests itself (Bruce, 2014). While the material improvement of poor people's lives is at the core of many of these movements, they are not limited to demands for delivery or to the concerns of the poor. At the very core of the social unrest in South Africa are the socio-economic issues that plague the country's masses and the growing disillusionment of the masses with the policies and the existing hegemony of neoliberalism in South African democracy today.

But however, politicians and media have coined the term 'service delivery protests' (Bianco, 2013) to describe these uprisings. A dismissive term that does not fully encompass the core issues at hand and part of the process of delegitimising social movements in South Africa. While protests have earned the name 'service delivery' protests it has been pointed out that protest often has more to do with citizens attempting to exert their rights to participate and have their voices heard rather than simply demanding 'service delivery' as passive recipients (Mottiar and Bond, 2013: 290). This plays into a 'dependency' narrative as discussed in section 2.4 (Bebbington, 2010). That is, people want the state to give them stuff and the state giving them stuff makes them lazy and ungrateful. Service delivery protestors have been accused of having a dependency syndrome where they simply want handouts from the government which under neoliberalism is seen as inefficient and a costly hindrance to growth.

Further, due to their 'pop up' nature, new social movements in the form of protests are largely flat in structure often leaderless and spontaneous. Social movements' engagements with the state fall on a continuum between in system collaborative interactions on the one extreme, and out-of-system adversarial relations on the other (Ballard *et al*, 2006: 16). It is

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important to highlight immediately that there is a lack of consensus within movements over the best strategic approach. Some fear co-optation by the government and therefore wish to avoid collaboration, while others favour reformism and constructive engagement.

This is to avoid capture form the state, to increase honesty and transparency and authenticity. Also they usually do not want to be a part of the system they are opposing. They associate institutionalism with 'selling out'. Looking at the history of social movements, there is a sense of corporatism with the forming of alliances such as the tripartite alliance between COSATU, SACP and ANC. But critiques have stated that this effectively represented a capture of social movements by the state as they became largely demobilised (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2003; Watkins, 2008; Ballard *et al*, 2006: 16).

However, the alternative (flat, leaderless structures) affects their continuity. Also it is easy to discredit protests that way as illegitimate and illegal. They idea is to have structure within themselves and find a way to be 'inside yet against'. How can they effectively engage with the state if they do not have some form of organisation? Bebbington (2011: 1) argues that when protest are linked to a series of other issues and other activities sustained over time all ultimately oriented towards making a similar set of arguments then they are of quality and likely to achieve real change. This has important implications about the operation of social movements in this context. Given this, movements need to recognise that the most belligerent tactics may not be the most expedient way of achieving material goals and it is often useful to apply both 'friendly' and 'unfriendly' pressure. Further, once social movements have emerged then they should form meaningful alliances in order to consolidate their causes.

Bebbington (2011: 3) argues that there should be an overlap between goals amongst social movements in order for them to have sustenance and coherence. The idea is that though they are composed of different ideas and identities but when linked together they become one larger identity. Social movements should essentially be a larger identity composed of organisations, ideas social networks and a repertoire of actors and actions. Bebbington (2011: 1) argues for a sense of aligned social movements instead of fragmented isolated movements. In this way social movements can be of quality in the sense that they are not just actors or individuals in a zero sum game (as implied by the neoclassical analysis) but rather are a process sustained by a set of actors and actions motivated by shared grievances. The value of the coming together of different movements consists in posing a unified challenge to state power, countering state power with the power of the masses. In this

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process, the incoherent and untidy diversity and multiplicity of social movements becomes the source of strength of social movements (Greenstein, 2003: 15).

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the implementation of neoliberalist economic policies in the South African developmentalist state among other things has had immense social costs as highlighted in chapter two such as the growing inequality, poverty and unemployment in the country. There is a clear need for transformation. Social movements in South Africa have historically been shown to have been responsible for addressing issues for example during the apartheid era, however in the post –apartheid South Africa they have increasingly become fragmented and marginalised by the state, testament to the repression under neoliberal democracy. Reasons for this marginalisation include the fact that the definition of 'ungovernabiltiy' over the years has evolved from apartheid days to the post-apartheid era. Social movements were hailed during apartheid as being at the forefront of pushing a just cause. Since gaining independence however the neoliberal democracy in South Africa has since been skewed towards benefitting the national capitalists at a great economic cost to the general public. Therefore the state's response to social movements has largely been to marginalise and silence them in order to maintain good relations with the national capitalists. The 'kick' that policy makers and political elites require in order to effect changes that benefit general masses has effectively been weakened. The natural conclusion one can infer therefore is that the room for equal economic development for all walks of life in South Africa is greatly narrowed given the prevailing stance towards social movements. The following chapter will zero in on two specific post-apartheid social movements using these and other deductions as a lens to create a sharper picture of social movements in post-apartheid South Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE

4.1 Introduction

The Latin American case offers an interesting comparison to the South African case in many ways. The larger majority of Latin American countries are economically comparable to South Africa (both South Africa and the bulk of Latin American countries classified as "upper middle income economies" using the World Bank Classification according to Income and Lending Categories (World Bank, 2016)) coupled with Latin America also experiencing a similar neoliberal economic development model. It is therefore interesting to compare social movements in the two cases in order to identify any gaps and lessons.

The idea that if a particular group or class of people feels marginalised or disadvantaged in some way then automatically there will be some either organised or spontaneous collective effort to try and bring about change resonates. Whether it be "the *Zapatista* movement in Chiapas, the Landless movement in Brazil, the *Piquetero* movement and the occupied factories in Argentina, or the peasant indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador" (Vergara-Camus, 2013: 597). The deep economic crisis and refutation of neoliberalism marked the emergence of the social movements as major players in shaping the contours of Latin American politics and economics (Siotos, 2011: 52). What emerges is that there are some lessons from Latin America that can be useful in the South African case. Generally the Latin American case presents a more cautiously optimistic reality in some regards however some subtle and nuanced lessons emerge which are in some ways hard lessons.

Having justified the interest in the Latin American case and continuing with the key investigation (bringing the literatures on social movements and political agency together), the aim of this chapter is to apply the broader theories of social movements as outlined in chapter two to the Latin American case. In this chapter, the idea is to examine the broad sense of the Latin American social movements. How they interact with the overall macro-economic environment and the political economy. The idea is to come up with a broader view of the general state of social movements in Latin America and compare this with the broad South African case.

Following this introductory section, section 4.2 will consider the rise and crisis of the neoliberal hegemony in Latin America, section 4.3 will consider the underlying political economy in Latin America, section 4.4 will give an account of the state of social movements in Latin America, section 4.5 will give reflections and comparisons on Latin American social

movements and draw some considerations based on the discussions in sections 4.2 and 4.3. Section 4.6 will conclude.

4.2 The rise and crisis of the neoliberal hegemony in Latin America

Neoliberalism and the mechanisms of the free market are often claimed to lead to greater prosperity for all, including those in the poorer countries who had been marginalised traditionally. However, neoliberalism was largely unsuccessful in dealing with the severe historical economic problems of Latin America (Ronchi, 2007: 6).

As a result, neoliberalism was replaced from the 1930s to the 1950s by a period of a more state led model characterised by an inward based economic development. The strategy of "development towards the internal market" or "import-substituting industrialisation" (ISI model) was applied in order to deal with the crisis of the 1930s. (Ronchi, 2007: 6). The major ISI achievements were higher GDP growth rates in Latin America during the periods 1945-1972 and 1972-1981 than it had achieved before or since and faster growth of GDP per capita (Valdivieso, 2009: 6). ISI was successful in increasing industrialisation in Latin America but the model had internal problems. ISI reinforced structural problems for development (protective barriers, lack of effectiveness, high-cost production, more dependence) (Valdiviesto, 2009: 6) and ISI also lacked efficiency. Various authors have however contested that it was the ineptitude of ISI per se that led to inefficiency and rent seeking. For example Chibber (2005) gives a more nuanced perspective. And Astorga *et al* (2005). Ocampo *et al (*2011) argue that the debt crisis of the 1980s were not caused by ISI but by reckless borrowing during the period of low interest rates in the 1970s. Latin American countries were otherwise doing fairly well in the post-war period

What followed was an economic model known as "*desarollista*" also characterised by increasing state intervention over certain areas as a model of development. State control of the financial system was considered a necessary measure to promote economic development (Ronchi, 2007: 7). Astorga *et al* (2005) establish that Latin America developed understated levels of success under this social democratic economy model and that there was "outstanding progress made by nearly every country in the region" (Astorga *et al*, 2005: 784). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that greater reliance on the domestic market was a major source of growth during the so-called 'import substitution' phase of state-led industrialisation. Urbanisation, associated with industrial employment, and public expenditure on health and education were key drivers of improved standards of living. This period also saw the greatest structural change in the Latin American economy, and was

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marked by sustained and relatively stable growth and social improvement (Astorga *et al,* 2005: 784). Here it is interesting to note that Latin America, unlike the South African case where there has largely been failed attempts, was able to shift its development model to a more developmental state and achieved some success.

However neoliberal critiques blamed the state intervention for hyperinflation in this period. Neoliberalists stated that the state was an inefficient entrepreneur and slowed down growth through its participation and in the 1980s there was shift back to more neoliberal policies (Ronchi, 2007: 5-7).

From the 1980s on, economic neoliberalism was offered as the preferred, if not the only, economic development model. Neoliberalism based on western liberalism was endorsed by international financial institutions like the IMF as prerequisites for a first-class democracy and economic development and was held up as the model to follow globally (Ronchi, 2007: 6). Starting from the second half of the 1980s, the agenda of Latin American governments was dominated by a wave of structural reform policies aimed at the radical transformation of the economic institutions established after World War II (Ronchi, 2007: 6). As far as political proposals are concerned, there was growing consensus for the neoliberal position that permeated the dominant economic thought of the international financial institutions and governmental circles of the creditor countries. Neoliberal policies were based on a set of principles such as market supremacy as the main, if not exclusive, means to redistribute resources, reduce the state's role in the economy and deregulate the markets of goods and services, labour and capitals (Ronchi, 2007: 6).

Aggressively neoliberal government policies were implemented that involved privatisation of state-owned companies, privatisation of natural resources including mines, which were the most dynamic sector of the economy, and a cutting of government services (public services) (Siotos, 2011: 51). For example, this first wave of neoliberal adjustments hit Latin America in countries such as Bolivia in 1985 under the New Economic Policy (NEP) adjustment program which was promoted by the IMF and the World Bank. Foreign capital and transnational corporations infiltrated economies in the following years as trade barriers were removed in order to make the region friendly to foreign investments (Siotos, 2011: 51).

A second round of neoliberal reforms were implemented under conditions of democratisation. This round of reforms allowed for and induced the widespread transfer of property, productive resources and incomes from the working class and the majority of

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direct producers to an emerging capitalist class of investors and entrepreneurs (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 86).

The return to neoliberalism shocked many in the '80s. The state was expected to take a more redistributional approach to economic growth following the end of World War II (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2004: 564). Especially as the social costs of the neoliberal reforms were borne by low income groups; for example they saw decreased salaries and increased unemployment (Ronchi, 2007: 11). In some cases governments embraced neoliberalism in office in direct contradiction with their electoral promises such as in Argentina in 1989. In others the argument that there was no other alternative prevailed, such as with Chile's centre-left coalition, *Concertacion Democratica* (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012:3). Figueredo (2006: 113) also contends that some governments assumed that the orthodoxy of neoliberalism was in some ways inevitable and that there was no other way to have proceeded. This follows quite closely with the South African discourse as elaborated in chapter three once South Africa established GEAR as its development model after apartheid.

An international debt crisis dominated the decade, and was accompanied in country after country across the region by either severe recession, or rampant inflation, or both (Cammack, 1991: 538). By the end of the 1980s levels of per capita income across the region had fallen back to those of the late 1970s, while worsening patterns of distribution brought about even sharper falls in the living standards of many. In this sense the 1980s represented 'a lost decade' (Cammack, 1991: 538).

In the 1990s the neoliberal stance was further established through the effect of the Washington Consensus (Ronchi, 2007: 20) which was to be implemented worldwide through the policies of the World Bank and the IMF (just as in South Africa during this period). The key ideas were reduced government spending and downsizing, privatisation of state run utilities and industries, and trade liberalisation carried out through regional trade agreements. There was continued withdrawal of the state from the process of economic and social development and its replacement with the free market. The IMF and the World Bank focused on political stabilisation and prioritised the institutionalisation of Latin American politics. The goal for successive governments throughout the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s was to create an investment-friendly environment and the macroeconomic stability needed in order to attract foreign investments (Siotos, 2011:51). A structure that was theoretically free from the constraints of government regulation and other interferences in its allocation

of society's productive resources to determine "who gets what" materialised (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 86).

In the early 1990s these ideas resonated well with the political elites in Latin America as well as all of the region's governments, with the exception of Cuba. This even included the traditionally nationalistic government of Argentina, which also embraced the neoliberal Washington Consensus model (Prevost *et al*, 2012:4). There was a sense of optimism in the 1990s because there was a transition to democracy following the end of the Cold War and the end of military dictatorship (Figueredo, 2006: 107). This is reminiscent of the South African case were with the end of the apartheid regime there was great optimism for neoliberal policies to correct the severe inequalities of the apartheid regime. In the same way there were high expectations for neoliberalism to redistribute resources and result in increased economic growth.

However similar to the South African case, neoliberalism did not provide the wild success promised by its instigators in Latin America. Based on the annual GNP growth rate, the results were not the ones expected. The region's GNP grew by 4.9% per year in the '50s, it rose to 5.5% in the following decade and it continued growing by 5.1% in the 1973-1980 period. The "lost decade" of the '80s, that opened the doors to the debt crisis, meant a meagre 1.6% growth rate for Latin America. Although the outcome was better than that of the '80s in the 1990-2004 period with a 0.9% growth per capita, it remained unsatisfactory (Ronchi, 2007: 25).

Neoliberal policies generally did succeed at cutting inflation and stimulating some macroeconomic growth. However, beyond this these policies did little to improve the lives of the majority poor and the consequent higher unemployment rates and cuts in government subsidies actually worsened the situation of growing numbers of poor Latin Americans. They also did not improve the huge disparity in wealth and income that was a long standing problem in Latin America (Prevost *et al*, 2012:6).

The starting point for the breakdown of the Washington Consensus occurred when the promises that these policies would lead to better social and economic indicators for the region's poor majority were not realised, especially in Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil. For example, Brazil saw an increase in the GINI coefficient from 53.2 in 1992 to 59 by the end of the '90s (1999). Other countries such as Bolivia and Argentina also experienced similar trajectories (GINI coefficient of 42 in 1992 rising to 58.1 in 1999 in Bolivia and 45.3 in

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1987 rising to 49.8 in 1999 in Argentina (World Bank, 2017)). Labour organisations were weakened and the social costs were immense for the poorest parts of the population, especially the indigenous peasants. Poverty rose more than 20% under neoliberalism and large parts of the working class (ex miners, peasants, the unemployed) found occupation in the informal sector or in small-scale agricultural production (Siotos, 2011: 51).

In Argentina, for example, in the period of rapid expansion between 1991 and mid-1994, the unemployment rate increased from 6.5% to 12%. In 1995, with ongoing recession, the urban unemployment rate rose to 18.6%. In Bolivia, unemployment increased from 6% in 1993 to 10.9% in 1997. While in Brazil, unemployment rose from 6.4% in 1992 to 9.6% in 1999 (CEDLAS and World Bank, 2017). Poverty persisted throughout the region and increased in many countries. In Argentina for example, poverty headcount increased from 16.7% in 1980 to 21.6% in 1988. Bolivia had a high poverty headcount of 30.3% in 1999. Brazil's poverty headcount was at 25.3% in 1992 (CEDLAS and World Bank, 2017). As evidenced by these indicators, the early neoliberal form of capitalist development was not only economically dysfunctional but profoundly exclusionary in social terms and politically unsustainable (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 87).

Neoliberal policies yielded results in terms of economic growth and social development that were a far cry from the prosperity and economic growth promised by the World Bank and the ideologies of neoliberal capitalist development. Others previously supportive of this economic model were constrained to recognize the fundamental dysfunctionality of the neoliberal model and the need for fundamental reform of the development model (ultimately to move beyond the Washington Consensus) (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 86). As discussed above, state-led industrialisation drive in the middle of the 19th century was associated with rapidly rising living standards for a large part of the Latin American population, while the liberalisation strategy of the closing period has not had that effect (Astorga *et al*, 2005: 787). It is not difficult to understand therefore why there was nostalgia and political support for the former model and continued political doubts about the latter.

This conclusion fueled a widespread search for "another form of development". The result has been a veritable flood of proposals and alternative models for bringing about development. There is some resonance with the South African case here. The failure of neoliberalism to bring promised economic development is reminiscent of the post-apartheid South African case. And similar to the South African case, there is also a sense of the need

for a shift from the prevailing neoliberal economic development model to a new and better one.

Astorga *et al* (2005: 787) argue that there is little serious popular or intellectual support in the region for return to the previous economic model namely the more developmental ISI paradigm (perhaps with the exception of Venezuela). They argue that this is because it is not possible to repeat the early gains from import-substitution, urbanisation, and public sanitation in any case. However, they contend that in order to significantly raise living standards in Latin America there is not only need for several decades of sustained economic growth, but also radical fiscal reform in order to prevent further increase in inequality (Astorga *et al,* 2005: 787). .

In Latin America the consequences of the failure of neoliberalism included a loss of faith in governing elites, culminating in the election of 'new Left' or 'post-neoliberal' governments in Venezuela (1998), Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Ecuador (2006), Nicaragua (2007) and, for shorter periods, in Paraguay (2008), El Salvador (2009) and Peru (2011). These governments all promised to begin the task of neoliberal roll-back, focusing in particular in building more effective and more 'national' states, immediate relief for those citizens worse affected by neoliberal attrition and a new approach to social spending (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 3).

Unlike most critics of neoliberalism, the Latin American Lefts were able to propose alternatives and to win office. That era is now gradually drawing to a close. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of an enthusiastic embrace of markets once again on the part of voters. Undoubtedly, some of the issues that have led to the Left's loss of office reflect the typical cycles of electoral governance, which at some point will always favour alternation in office. There is not, in other words, a consensus or a new neoliberal project as yet articulated in Latin America – merely an exhaustion with the limitations and venalities associated with political figures who have perhaps been in office too long (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 3).

What happened was that the Left won office and set about undoing the neoliberal legacy with the massive and vocal support of those who were paying the highest price for economic liberalisation and state roll-back. But, and almost inevitably, the Left failed to win the argument over the long term in that it could not persuade those who thought differently of the rightness of its views and it was, as a result, unable to pioneer a genuinely national or consensual shift to a more moderate form of capitalism. In short, the Left was unable to

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articulate an entirely convincing critique of a model that prioritised economic growth based on the global market and the exports of natural resources, or as some would say, of neoliberalism itself. There is some shift to a new economic model but fundamentally the precepts of neoliberalism have not been completely abolished. The hegemony of neoliberalism is deeply entrenched so what has seemingly emerged is a 'reformed neoliberalism' (Watkins, 2010: 13).

The outcome was the construction of a new policy regime namely a neoliberal programme of macroeconomic policies combined with a new anti-poverty social policy and the institutionality of a "new economic model" (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 86). For much of Latin America, from the early 2000's onwards the new economic model can be defined as "post-neoliberal." This means two things: the neoliberal period left its structural imprint and at the same time, many of its core principles were cast aside. Despite some inevitable historical continuity, there has been noteworthy divergence, as evidenced by changes not just in the content of public policy but also in its formulation (Lewkowicz, 2015).

Bresser–Pereira (2009: 12), describes the post neoliberal economic model as a new developmentalism in Latin America. The neoliberal orthodoxy sought to strengthen markets through weakening the state. It viewed the two as a zero sum game, that is, markets can coordinate production optimally but only if they are free of interference. However new developmentalism requires a strong state as well as strong markets. There is no contradiction between them. Markets are seen as coordinators of production but it recognises the need for limitations and regulation (Bresser-Pereira, 2009: 17). Governments initiated important social assistance and employment protection programs. Political change led to greater state intervention in the economy. The emerging model was a decentralised and participatory form of local development based on more sustainable forms of "democratic" or "good" governance (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 87). The idea was to bring about development on the basis of social capital, i.e., though the agency of "self-help" and community-based or grassroots organisations, with the assistance and support of partner institutions and "international cooperation" for development (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 87).

The state, according to Bresser-Pereira (2009: 13), plays a more nominal, enabling role rather than a direct role in production. The state is not an investor but rather a defender of competition. The state is responsible ensuring proper operation of markets and providing the general social conditions for capital accumulation such as good health and education

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(Bresser-Pereira, 2009: 13). How far this moderate shift towards welfare, in the context of capitalist economies, represents a break with neoliberalism or simply neoliberalism with a human face is the subject of fierce debate. These state-led reforms to the model have not fundamentally changed the Washington Consensus on macroeconomic policy. Nor has it effectively changed the character of capitalist development in Latin America (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 90).

'Post-neoliberal' governments have not offered a turn to socialism. Only Venezuela constitutes an exception to this combination of welfare, state activism (including nationalisation) in the economy, in particular in the lucrative natural resource sector and, in some cases, the introduction of more equitable tax systems (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 3). Almost all post-neoliberal governments (again Venezuela here is exceptional) have maintained some core aspects of the Washington Consensus, including fiscal prudence and foreign investment (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 3). What Latin American post-neoliberalism rejected is the inevitability of inequality and challenged the neoliberal consensus that inequality is functional for growth. Instead it offered a vision of improving equity, social justice and citizenship. Its appeal to voters lay precisely in the promise to tackle the rising levels of poverty and inequality following decades of neoliberal governance (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 4).

The Left in Latin America has succeeded in establishing a precedent for successfully putting together electoral coalitions in support of an alternative political economy and it has set out some concrete ways in which the terms of neoliberalism can be redefined through policies for social inclusion, citizenship and new approaches to welfare. As such, Left governments have offered an alternative to the dominant global development agenda by focusing discussion on inequalities of income, class, place, ethnicity, and (dis)ability rather than simply poverty. These are significant achievements and they should be recognised (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 24).

Recent data for the largest economies in Latin America are lacklustre but are improving. The recovery is uneven with countries such as Brazil and Argentina pulling out of recessions while countries like Peru, Colombia and Chile have slowed growth (World Bank, 2017). However contrastingly with South Africa, growth is expected to rise in 2018 (World Bank, 2017; Khumalo, 2017). Though the economic outlook for Latin America is less than perfect, it is still much more positive compared to South Africa.

4.3 The underlying political economy in Latin America

As has been established from the theory in chapter two as well as in chapter three, the political economy of a country greatly impacts the development model that prevails. Where the political economy is sticky then there will be greater inertia to shifting the developmental project in line with desired economic growth and development paths. Where the politics is stuck then social movements emerge as having an important role in being the lever that forces the politics to shift towards a new and better development model. However, the prevailing political landscape also determines whether social movements will be effective in this regard or not.

Most countries in Latin America democratised in the 1980s after the Cold War ended and massive human rights abuses and state-sponsored violence almost ceased to exist (Ocampo *et al*, 2011). For example a regional process of democratic reform launched in 1979 when the military stepped down in Ecuador and the Sandinista-led revolution overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. This trend continued unabated into 1990, culminating in the replacement of General Pinochet in Chile by a Christian Democrat, Patricio Aylwin (Ocampo *et al*, 2011).

Over the period, liberal democracy was also restored in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay; the military withdrew from direct executive control to give way to formally democratic regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras; dictators fell in Haiti and Paraguay; the US replaced a client-dictator with a client-democrat in Panama; Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela maintained semi democratic or democratic regimes; and civilian Mexico, for 60 years under the control of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), showed signs under Salinas of gradual movement towards genuinely competitive politics. No country in the region was left unaffected, except perhaps for Cuba; and, singularly, no military intervention succeeded in reversing a democratic opening once under way (Cammack, 1991: 537).

The process of seeking redress for past human rights abuses spread across the region. This was similar to the South African case after the end of the oppressive apartheid regime as discussed in chapter three. The very fact of having transitioned to democracy produced an enormous challenge: how to fortify an authentic and modern rule of law in societies whose political culture and customs were for centuries distant and unconnected to the practice and mindset of liberal democracy (Ocampo *et al*, 2011). There were concerns that neoliberalism would destroy democracy and these fears reflected the experience of the 1980s, when many

new democratic regimes in the region postponed economic stabilisation and structural adjustment. Governments in fragile, unconsolidated democracies feared that neoliberal reforms, which impose high short-term costs on important, powerful sectors and large segments of the population, would trigger social turmoil and political conflict and thus endanger the survival of democracy (Weyland, 2004: 136).

In Latin America, the transition to democracy prompted the opening of the political system to new forms of citizen participation. Over the last 30 years, most Latin American countries have adopted strong, vibrant liberal democracies. One of Latin America's top priority is to continue building institutions that reinforce the rule of law, tolerance and democratic culture (Ocampo *et al*, 2011). Latin America, for the most part, has embraced freedom of the press and transparency, which reinforce democratic practices and principles. Governments are more transparent, there is greater respect for human rights, and democratic values have been strengthened

As has been discussed in section 2.3, generally speaking, participatory approaches agree that: a democratic system requires a level of commitment that exceeds the mere election of a parliament and/or a government (Welp, 2017: 3). The elitist model of democracy namely neoliberal democracy, which shaped the political system along the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, gave citizens an active role only in electoral processes in which they had to choose a party or leader, allowing them to exercise power over a given period of time. Elections were seen as the only necessary mechanism for exercising accountability and inducing responsiveness through the confirmation or replacement of those who held power. As a result, social movements emerged as an important new form of politics. Since the 1960s this model, which was labelled instrumental, elitist or restricted democracy, has been increasingly challenged by new visions which gave an outstanding role to non-electoral political participation through social movements (Welp, 2017: 3).

The first initiatives, developed in the late 1980s, were promoted by the arrival of new social movements and/or leftist parties to the local government with the objective to renovate democracy from the inside. The protests that developed against austerity since the 1990s were path breaking not only from the perspective of the emergence of new collective identities but from an organisational point of view. While unions and other historical institutions of the developmental state were targeted by neoliberal reforms as jeopardizing the free market, new organisational forms gradually developed promoting and practicing alternative forms of democracy (della Porta, 2015: 15).

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Since the 1990s a new realm has been promoted through constituent assemblies which have 'constitutionalised' citizen participation by including a wide range of mechanisms in new constitutions. This model incorporates and regulates both institutions for direct decision-making and for deliberation as well as other institutions of transparency, accountability and control (Welp, 2017: 2). While at first glance it appears as a novel and promising experience of democratisation, what participation is and the role it plays leaves room for debate, indicating that there is a conflicted view of what democracy should be and how it could be realised (Welp, 2017: 2). Similar to the South African case, social movements were constitutionalised with the Constitution recognising the 'right to protest' but this level of nominal democracy as was highlighted in preceding chapters is not enough and there is need to consider the quality of democracy.

Vanden (2007) argues that the traditional forms of conformist democracy and limited citizen participation have not served the people. Valdivieso (2009: 4) argues that there are still some contradictions and tensions in Latin America as a consequence of legacies of some specific patterns and experiences of development since the time of colonisation in the 16th century. Marginalisation and social exclusion, restricted autonomy, lack of stability, and lack of consolidated democracies are some of the current conditions in Latin America that are a result of long historical precedents (Valdivieso, 2009: 4). The mechanisms that were presumably designed to communicate the general public's sentiments to the decision makers so that they could govern in accordance with popular desires and needs have historically been weak at best (Vanden, 2007: 19).

This is consolidated by Streeck (2015)'s argument that there has been an unravelling of liberal democracy in favour of capital, representing an increased shift from a liberal democracy to a neoliberal democracy. The free-market system, by contrast, is an elitist project that is often associated with support for or acquiescence to authoritarian political rule. Neoliberal democracy therefore involves the forceful dismantling of the established development model, and therefore requires a significant concentration of political power (Weyland, 2004: 136). As a result citizen participation has in some cases been weakened by the neoliberal democracy in Latin America.

The available evidence suggests that since then the record has been mixed, but overall more favourable than many observers feared. In some countries, the public institutions' processes do not work as indicated by expanding corruption in most Latin American countries. Two of the world's ten most corrupt countries (Venezuela and Haiti) are in Latin America, and

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fourteen of the region's countries are ranked in the bottom half of the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2016). This affects the trust of the population resulting in citizens who tend to then opt for more unconventional methods of expression (Validivieso, 2009: 4). As described in section 2.3, the weaker the state, the lower the trust in the state's capabilities in selecting good policies and therefore the higher the incidence of protests.

Although 'all is not well with democracy in Latin America', there are signs that there is no deadlock. Citizen's protests have indicted and sometimes toppled presidents and parliaments that were considered corrupt, have contributed to legal and constitutional reform, and have participated in participatory planning and budgeting (Salman, 2008: 91). In Latin America, protests and other contentious strategies were common and played an important role during democratisation, declining somewhat afterwards. Examples range from the broad, community organized *"piqueteros"* of Argentina that brought down three governments in the space of one month in 2001 to the indigenous-based movements of Ecuador and Bolivia that have been instrumental in toppling five governments in the two countries within the last decade, the Landless Movement in Brazil (MST), Afro-Colombians resisting displacement in a region coveted by investors, the *cocalaros* and the mobilisations against water privatisations and gas pipeline investments in Bolivia, to the *Zapatistas* in Mexico, who burst on the scene to challenge the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the marginalisation of the mostly indigenous peasants in Chiapas (Prevost *et al,* 2012 :1).

Weyland argues that neoliberalism helped to secure the survival of democracy, as defined in minimal procedural terms. As is supported by Mans-Gorse and Nitcher's arguments in section 2.3 that neoliberalism can strengthen democracy in form rather in quality. Mans-Gorse and Nitcher (2008: 1411) also argue that there is a J-Curve in Latin American democracy. There is initial short term deterioration in democracy reversed by a long run positive association with neoliberalism. In crisis situations, people do not dig in their heels and strenuously defend their immediate material well-being; instead, they are willing to make sacrifices and trust their leaders' plans for straightening out the economy (Weyland, 2004: 138). They are willing to accept substantial risks by supporting adjustment plans that promise to turn the country around but that, for economic and political reasons, have uncertain prospects of success (Weyland, 2004: 138). Weyland does qualify further that

drastic market reform, however, seems, on balance, to have limited and weakened the quality of democracy in Latin America (Weyland, 2004: 137).

The most important changes in the Americas revolve around the widespread acceptance of market-based economies with representative democratic politics. Latin America has developed premier social programs. Those programs target the poorest segments of the populations and reward families for sending children to school and ensuring medical care breaking the cycles of intergenerational poverty that have historically dogged the region (Ocampo *et al*, 2011). The ultimate outcome of these changes has been the improvement in human dignity through freedom and democracy. However the study of policymaking in contemporary Latin America reveals important variations across countries and over time in the strength and relevance of specific institutions such as the congress, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy (Machado *et al,* 2011: 2). It is no accident that countries that have established strong, representative democracies, such as Chile, have progressed.

4.4 A commentary on the state of social movements in Latin America

Social movements in Latin America have a rich history which cannot be developed here in great detail but what is observed is that they arose out of the social and economic condition of the continent (Cammack, 1991: 541). As highlighted in the preceding section, Latin America went through several political and economic changes. Economically, neoliberal policies were fairly successful in some ways but undoubtedly entrenched inequality and poverty in the region. Thus social movements in their different forms are inherently economic as they arise to act in direct response to the economic circumstances and demand change economically in order to restore social consistency. Even when, as in some cases, movements lack radical political edge, their focus on issues such as defending living standards and civil rights co-exist with the broader questions of social and economic transformation (Petras, 1989: 187).

In countries where social movements have been more successful such as Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia social movements formed horizontal alliances and garnered the support of similar social movements. For example Bolivia's social and union movements were highly organised and politically powerful. Labour organisations built their strength in opposition to the dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s but were then weakened when neoliberal reforms were implemented in the 1980s and 1990s (Bottazzi and Rist, 2012: 529). This led the peasant unions from the highlands in the west of the country and peasant and indigenous movements from the east to come to the fore, often defending territorial interests.

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These trade union and social movements, together with 'neighbourhood organisations' and unions of informal workers are now represented in government by the Movement Toward Socialism (*Movimiento al Socialismo*) (MAS) party (Bottazzi and Rist, 2012: 531).

By its election in 2005, the MAS party had formed a pact between the most powerful social movements in the country: the peasant unions, indigenous organisations and the landless movement. Allied with these organisations were the cooperative miners, the neighbourhood organisations, the union of manufacturing workers, unions of informal workers, and the teachers', pensioners' and miners' unions (Bottazzi and Rist, 2012: 533). One of the central demands of the social movements had been for the convening of a Constituent Assembly to re-write the Bolivian constitution. This would be a way to 're-found' the Bolivian state, to include Bolivia's diverse ethnic and cultural groups and to enhance the rights of all Bolivians. Once in power, a final constitutional text was approved and ratified into law. The new constitution recognises the 36 indigenous groups in the country, and guarantees many important rights, including those relating to trade unions, workers and the right to organise (Bottazzi and Rist, 2012:544).

Another example is the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), an indigenous armed organization which declared war on the Mexican Government, demanding work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice and peace. Throughout Mexican history, Chiapas's indigenous people had been excluded from the governmental decision-making process as well as from enjoying basic human rights and services such as education and healthcare (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1135). Consequently, the EZLN was formed, to represent the rights and aspirations of Chiapas's indigenous peoples. EZLN demanded that the Mexican Government put an end to indigenous segregation and oppression. This oppression was exacerbated by the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was viewed as a threat to indigenous interests. The EZLN and indigenous agricultural workers in Chiapas feared that international competition would wipe them out of the local markets (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1134).

In 2001 the Mexican Congress passed an indigenous law recognising the multi-cultural nature of the Mexican state. Consequently, autonomy was granted to indigenous communities, as well as political participation (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1142). As a consequence of the Zapatista insurgency in Chiapas, the indigenous peoples in Mexico were granted the constitutional right of self-determination. The incorporation of this right into the Mexican constitution was essential for the development of Mexican indigenous

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communities as well as for the Mexican democracy as a whole, because it encouraged the respect of indigenous traditions and practices within the country.

During these years the movement also received the support of other independent peasant organisations of the state that created the *Consejo Estatal de Organizaciones Indı́genas y Campesina* (State Council of Indigenous and Peasant Organizations, CEOIC) to support the Zapatista struggle and jointly address the land question.. The EZLN was indeed building a national alliance with other indigenous movements in order to negotiate the constitutional recognition of indigenous autonomy that could inter alia serve as an alternative legal framework that would protect indigenous peasant right to land and control over resources (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1151).

Another instance is the Landless Workers Movement, *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (MST) in Brazil. The MST had significant impact on Brazil's contemporary struggle for agrarian reform. MST developed a new pattern of struggle for agrarian reform in Brazil grounded on the formation of grassroots movements and the use of direct action tactics such as occupying of rural estates and public buildings and long distance marches (Rosa, 2015: 375). The MST was able to form alliances and get the support of the Homeless Movement, the Catholic Pastoral Rural (Rural Pastoral Agency) and sectors of the trade union movement, as well as the left-wing of the Workers Party (PT) (Vergara-Camus 2012: 1149). MST developed a discourse of productivity and intensive use of land for productivity and was therefore able to incorporate some of the state's agenda into their own agenda. That enabled the state to act in the name of development allowing the state to tolerate MST's presence and actions (Rosa, 2015: 51-53). The MST and other rural organisations also successfully obliged the state to help settler families with a start-up credit that allow them to buy the minimal equipment for a farm and buy a few heads of cattle to secure a monthly monetary income (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1150). The movement has also tried to organise cooperatives to provide families with technical assistance, cheaper inputs and better commercialization mechanisms.

Bebbington (2010: 10) argues that overt direct action can disrupt thinking about issues. The massive marches and mobilisations for territory and land that have occurred since 1990 in Bolivia, Ecuador and even Peru more recently have the effect of challenging dominant notions about the ways in which land should be titled if the goal is national development with both inclusion and well-being. However, these techniques do relatively little to

elaborate clear alternative ideas, and far less ideas that have the potential to translate into policy (Bebbington, 2010: 10).

Engaging politicians and political parties is a thornier and debated issue within movements. In some cases, political parties have been created by or emerged from movement processes—examples here might be the *Movimiento al Socialismo* in Bolivia. In these instances, the projection of movement ideas to a far wider terrain with policy impact is more likely (Bebbington, 2010: 10).

The last decade, however, has witnessed a resurgence of new social movements in the form of protest activity but to varying degrees of intensity and political relevance across countries. Institutional systems differ significantly in their capacity to absorb and process conflict. In some countries, for example Argentina, almost every contentious issue finds thousands of people on the Plaza de Mayo, tractors blocking roads, and pickets cutting a bridge in Neuque´n (Przeworski, 2009: 2). In Argentina, decisions are made as often in Congress as in the streets. Routinely, the main arteries of Buenos Aires and some of the main highways connecting strategic locations in the countryside are shut down by protestors as well as in countries like Ecuador and Peru, street protests have also become a very salient and meaningful way to achieve certain political objectives and to express policy demands (Machado *et al*, 2011: 3). Yet in other countries, say Costa Rica, almost all conflicts are disciplined by political parties and processed through the Congress, the Presidency, or the Courts (Przeworski, 2009: 2). Social movements also emerged in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, and (to a lesser extent) in Paraguay and Venezuela. In other cases, like Chile, protests are more sporadic and far less relevant to policymaking in general. The issues they raise range from the distribution of social benefits, to fiscal and trade policy, down to the country stance on foreign affairs. Protests and road blockades have also become a popular means of affecting public policy in Bolivia and other countries in the region (Machado *et al*, 2011: 3).

The tactics employed by the social movements and how they contest power include *cortar ruas* (closing streets) and other actions by the *piqueteros* in Argentina. The indigenous movements and their supporters in Bolivia and Ecuador utilized the tactic of blocking ground access to the capital city and transit on other major thoroughfares by barricading roads with material at hand and in the process stalling much of the transit and commercial activity of their countries (Prevost *et al*, 2012: 9). The new social movements in South Africa also employ a wide range of tactics in their operation.

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The social movements that have arisen in recent years in Latin America have tended to practice horizontal and participatory processes in decision making and to seek social justice based on race/ethnicity, gender and/or traditional marginalisation from the political process or economic benefits (Prevost *et al*, 2012: 8). For instance in Mexico (the Zapatista, who forced the state to provide them with a measure of autonomy), Bolivia (where there is an interesting dynamic of the peasant unions, who manage to 'free' themselves of the urban mining-dominated unions and Brazil where the state 'toleratates' land invasions by the MST. della Porta (2015: 28) proposes that organisational structures are, for social movements, instruments. General episodes of contention began with separate streams of protests which then linked as the common origin of highly varied grievances and demands facilitated the articulation of horizontal linkages amongst protest organisations (della Porta, 2015: 16). The mechanisms used included summit meetings, organisational networks, open assemblies and communal forms of social organisation (della Porta, 2015: 16).

4.5 Reflections and broad comparisons with the South African case

Some key broad lessons begin to emerge here. The neoclassical explanation of social movements seems to be applicable across both the South African and Latin American cases. The idea that when people become frustrated they rationally seek a vehicle to address their issues and mobilise to demand change is also true in Latin America. The hegemony of neoliberalism in Latin America resulted in unfavourable conditions of increased inequality for the poor masses such as the indigenous people and peasants in southern Mexico, Ecuador, and Bolivia, rural labourers and the poor in Brazil, those who live in the slums and have been left out of the oil wealth in Venezuela, and large segments of the lower and middle classes in Argentina and Uruguay (Vanden, 2007:20). Similarly, in South Africa, the new government adopted the neoliberal economic development model which deepened the inequality and poverty crisis for the historically underprivileged black masses in South Africa. This set the stage for the emergence of social movements in both cases where social movements' role was to act as a vehicle for change in challenging the political status quo.

The economics in Latin America also seemingly became stuck with the failure of neoliberalism and a failure to come up with a sustainable and effective alternative development model. The South African case present a similar narrative. The difference is the political space. In Latin America, although the picture is mixed, an alternative development model more receptive to social movements started to become apparent in the 'post-neoliberal' period. The new model proposed in Latin America following

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disillusionment with the Washington Consensus welcomed grassroots "do it yourself" politics of local development. This meant that the political space was wide enough for social movements to operate.

The modus operandi of social movements in Latin America is also another area of divergence. Social movements in Latin America were largely well organised and structured organisations. In this way through perhaps through effective leadership they have been able to penetrate the political structures directly and to be taken seriously by the establishment. Social movements in Latin America have also formed horizontal alliances with other social movements with similar agendas. However, in the South African case, social movements are generally dispersed and fragmented with no real alliances being formed. This is probably attributable to the dilemma of institutionalism. That is the risk of corporatism that comes with institutionalism under a neoliberal hegemony. Social movements would want to maintain their autonomy and act outside the hegemony. So somehow social movements have to find a way of being inside without losing their autonomy in order to gain more influence.

At a local level, movements created electoral instruments (where electoral law allows this) through which movement leaders contest mayoral or similar positions, and often on an electoral platform closely linked to their movement's agenda. For example in the Bolivian case with MAS. How far this legitimates the position and ideas of the movement is less clear, because such easy translations from movement to formal political process are just as likely to attract scepticism and criticism that movement leaders used the movement only to enter into formal politics. Whatever the case, such instances are relatively rare, and the more usual scenario is one in which movements have to decide whether to ally with a political party or figure whose social bases, moreover, might be quite distinct from those of the movement. Again this might happen at both national levels or more locally. Managing such relationships is, however, complex and there seem to be few examples where such conjectural alliances lead ultimately to longstanding relationships. Such alliances seem far more likely to lead ultimately to the political instrumentalisation of the movement. Perhaps for such reasons, some movements shy away from any clear allegiance with parties or politicians (Bebbington, 2010: 12).

Another key difference between the Latin American case and the South African case is the emphasis on the history of apartheid in South Africa. This has coloured almost every social movement that has emerged since abolishing apartheid. One prime example is the issue of land reform in South Africa. The Landless People's Movement (LPM) was formed by black

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people for black people. The land question is opposed by white landowners defending agrarian policy that safeguards the interests of the commercial sector while the LPM advocates for a land policy driven by a racially oriented past of loss and dispossession. Land reform is not only about a unit of production, the market and the economy but it also an issue of reparation and justice.

By contrast the Brazilian Landless Workers Movement, *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (MST) is built on an identity of rural workers who have the skill and work the land but do not own it. The main disputes are about monoculture and land being in the hands of the unproductive as well as labour exploitation (Rosa, 2014: 51-53). While there is nothing wrong with contesting historical injustice, the problem is a narrowing of the scope of concern and limiting it to a single issue. As discussed in chapter three, this rights based approach has several difficulties in engaging effectively with transformation (du Toit, 2013: 20). It is implicit with the LPM that in correcting social injustices this will also economically empower a largely marginalised group of people who were previously historically disadvantaged leading to overall economic development. And this is common to several other social movements in South Africa. This is a key point. There is a tendency towards 'single issue'/identity politics fragmentation but some very interesting organisation points emerge and there is an appreciation of the need to focus on structural change and solutions. Not just to 'look back at injustice.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has considered the broad Latin American case and also juxtaposed it against the broad South African case citing some of the major similarities and differences and drew inferences based on them. The idea was to contrast social movements in South Africa versus those in Latin America in order to draw the broader lessons from the contrast. The following chapter will hone in on these two cases and consider specific case studies in order to sharpen the focus and enhance the comparative results.

CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARATIVE LENS ON SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CASE STUDIES

5.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters two, three and four have served a mainly exploratory and descriptive purpose. The South African case chapter has reflected on the general state of social movements giving a broad perspective of social movements in South Africa. The Latin American case chapter has also attempted to do the same in the Latin American context. The major issues that come up are that economically things have gotten stuck. Essentially, the failure of the neoliberal economic development model to provide a sustainable growth path has highlighted the need to shift to a new economic model. However in both cases it has not been clear which is the best alternative hence becoming economically stuck. Social movements have in both cases emerged as a result and in an attempt to challenge and push the political actors to come up with a good sustainable economic model.

In chapter two and three there is an emphasis on the emergence of social movements in response to these frustrations. However, at this point there is need to account for the success and failures of social movements in South Africa. As noted in preceding chapters, these are not just a factor of the demand for social movements. Firstly, while they have been good at 'putting out fires' they have been less clear in articulating plausible systemic alternatives. As a result they tend to be successful at highlighting injustices while the deeper structural issues from which the injustice stem remain unaddressed and festering.

Secondly, social movements have also struggled for political cohesion and to find "the synthesis of inside and against". Clearly these two issues reinforce each other. A lack of ideological clarity about how specific and system struggles cohere means that struggles tend to be specific and hence fragmented. Fragmentation plays into ideological underdevelopment: social movements tend to be fighting specific issues and hence resort to formulae for the systemic issues (neo-colonialism, monopoly capitalism, corruption) rather than thinking about systemic alternatives clearly. Nevertheless, these are separable issues and the chapter treats them as such.

Using the theory and ideas from the preceding chapters as tools for analysis, the aim of this chapter is to hone in on social movements in South Africa and focus on specific case studies in order to refine the investigation and get more focused results. Carrying on with the

overarching goal of the thesis, the key construct is to bring the literature on political agency and economics together. This chapter looks at two iconic post-apartheid social movements, #FeesMustFall and the Landless People Movement (LPM). These movements reflect two axes of a deeper structural problem, namely the exclusion of black South Africans respectively from the land and from the educated classes (the middle classes). Although these issues (landlessness and lack of access to higher education) are separate issues at another level they are dimensions of the same structural problem. The problem is systemic and has to do with the way that the neoliberal system has evolved post-apartheid as described in chapter three. Participants of these movements exhibit varying degrees of awareness of the deeper structural issues (for example #FeesMustFall is couched in the language of decolonisation) but a critical gap seems to exist in linking these movements to the debate about economic viability of their causes.

Section 5.2 to follow will look at #FeesMustFall closely describing the movement, considering the goals of the movement and how the movement sought to achieve those goals. The section ends by reflecting on these discussions. Section 5.3 will consider the LPM in South Africa. Following a similar progression, the section begins by describing the LPM, its goals and how they aimed to achieve those goals and finally ends by reflecting on the discussions. Section 5.4 concludes and summarises the chapter.

5.2 #FeesMustFall: Overview

A 2016 study reviewing 40 developing countries over the period 1999 - 2007 found that education is the most significant contributor to poverty alleviation by increasing employability (Krugel and Viljoen, 2016: 4). Because of the role higher education can play in an economy with high levels of unemployment such as South Africa #FeesMustFall is of great interest and relevance. Some would argue that education in South Africa has been about elite transition within the framework of an ethic defined by the present market-driven neoliberal system. This has created an alienation of marginalised people and this has sparked the rise of the disillusionment with the state of higher education in the country.

Problems with historically black universities can be traced back to the politics of higher education funding post-1994 and the decision by the state to reduce higher education institutions from 36 to 23 through the mechanism of mergers (Jansen 2003: 4). Three new ones have been created since, taking the number to 26 (Davids and Waghid, 2016). One of the key reasons for the merger of institutions of higher learning was to facilitate transformation and improve (especially black) students' access to higher education and

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financial support (National Commission on Higher Education, 1996). The Ministry of Education's 2001 National Plan for Higher Education was designed to redress past inequalities. Its aims were to: transform the higher education system to serve a new social order, meet pressing national needs, and to respond to new realities and opportunities. The mergers, which were hotly debated and widely criticized, sought to unify the fragmented higher education system inherited from the apartheid government. It was hoped the process would address the system's profound inequalities (Davids and Waghid, 2016). However, it appears that many of these ideals were not achieved following the mergers because many universities are still marked by differences based on the material, cultural and social positions of their separate histories (Jansen 2003: 11). For example, Tshwane University of Technology (Soshanguve campus) appears to have been negatively affected by its merger with Technikon Pretoria, a historically white institution, while Cape Peninsula University of Technology, in its merger with Cape Technikon, a former white institution, has resulted in inequalities between campuses along class and racial lines (Ndelu, 2016: 16).

A clear pecking order of universities emerges. University of Cape Town, Wits and Stellenbosch for example are the high ranking more sought after universities and students want to get into these. Then followed by the likes of Rhodes and University of KwaZulu Natal then Fort Hare and at the bottom are the colleges (Rogan and Reynolds, 2015: 15). The lowest ranking institutions are the worst resourced, have the highest failure rates and the worst records in the labour market and are the blackest institutions (Rogan and Reynolds, 2015: 15). Student enrolments at historically disadvantaged black universities have dwindled as students have flocked to the better resourced, historically advantaged white institutions (Ndelu, 2016: 16). This was already happening in the decade immediately after apartheid, but was exacerbated by the mergers. Essentially a process that was supposed to redress past inequalities has had the effect of entrenching them, and in some cases widening them (Davids and Waghid, 2016). As such one could conclude that the driving force of protests was the unfulfilled promises of 1994 as is commonplace with most other recent protests. That is the failure to secure social equality between black and white, rich and poor (Suttner, 2015).

Student-led protests gained momentum in 2015 as well as in 2016 and spread across the country fairly quickly. Subsequently, the #FeesMustFall movement has sparked heated debates on fee increases in universities and the possible provision of fee-free tertiary education in South Africa. Over the past two years, universities have become increasingly

contested spaces. Student movements rejected the current status quo and worked to reorder not only the principles that govern universities, but ultimately the principles that govern the country (Spaull, 2017). Scholars of protest have identified a number of common themes: this generation of students is profoundly disillusioned with current processes. They are angry with neo-liberalism's perceived "capture" of higher education and the consequences for fees and increasing inequality (Shay, 2016). Further, according to Scott (2017), the persistently high and racially skewed failure rates in higher education are also a major but largely unacknowledged contributor to the anger and alienation underlying the student protests as well as being an obstacle to economic growth. The demands put forward by the students included the abolishment of university fees, the clearance of historical debt, decommodification of education, the decolonisation of the educational system, transformation of universities to address racial and gender inequalities in terms of staff composition, as well as insourcing of general workers. The main message of the protests was that the costs of higher education were too high and unaffordable for the majority of poor black students.

5.2.1 The economics of #FeesMustFall: the beginning of the end of neoliberalism? Or no such thing as a free lunch?

Arguably one of the key weaknesses of #FeesMustFall (the other is its structure) is its vagueness about economics, except at the most general level. Students were talking about very specific issues (scrapping fees) and very general issues (decolonisation and transformation) but were very vague about the details in between. There are two crucial points here. Firstly, students did not nail down *how* illegitimate the South African system is. For example, there were sporadic reports about how far behind other middle income countries South Africa has fallen in terms of higher education spending and enrolment (Fryer, 2016b; Vally *et al*, 2016). These however never managed to dislodge the 'official' discourse that South Africa had 'done as well as could be expected' in broadening access to higher education. Secondly, students were also unable to articulate what alternative they wanted: for example, a fully free education for all funded by general taxation (which would require a more radical change in economic policy), or some sort of 'free education for the poor', with means testing that could be accommodated in the existing fiscal space or a loans based education (NSFAS and the commercial system). The fact that the students themselves did not clearly articulate these issues, made it relatively easy for the establishment to say that the demands were unrealistic and issue warnings that free education would 'destroy' the

system and insert their own models into the debate. This is a clear exhibition of du Toit's (2013: 20) argument about the flawed nature of a rights based approach to social movements as discussed in chapter three.

The #FeesMustFall social movement generally has followed the patterns described in the preceding chapters. The emergence of the social movement was in response to the oppressive neoliberal model prevailing in the country which saw the gradual commodification of higher education since 1994. Most notably, student fees rose as state subsidies failed to keep up with the growth of student numbers (FFC, 2012). The movement gave students the voice to express their frustration at the fact that they felt that they faced 'structural violence' from universities and the state in the form of fees, exclusion and colonised spaces (Free Education Submission, 2016: 4-5). It can be argued that #FeesMustFall was successful in providing the kick that pushed government to reconsider higher education in South Africa however progress has been slow and in essence the movement was successful only in as far as to 'put out the fire' in higher education.

The 2015 #FeesMustFall protests put the state under pressure and in response Jacob Zuma announced a 0% fee increment for the 2016 academic year (Allison, 2015). The cost to the state of this ranged between R2.6billion and R4.2billion, depending on which methodology used (Spaull, 2017). Forcing the government to temporarily freeze fee hikes was by far not the only achievement of the student movement. In 2016, after the government announced an 8% hike in fees, protests garnered enough support essentially to force the government to allocate an additional R17 billion to higher education (Spaull, 2017) mainly to cover fee increases for students on NSFAS (Kamanzi, 2016). Since the protests, government has also committed to putting additional funding into NSFAS to financially support university students. It could be argued that some of these changes would not have happened if the students had not organised protests. However, the movement was vague about the economics of free fees and left this bit out in its demands.

The movement asked far more questions than they answered, at the political level but even more so at the economic level, about the kind of higher education system and more generally the kind of economic system South Africa aspires to. As noted in the previous section, one of the weaknesses of the movement was that it demanded free education without providing a clear convincing economically viable path (Free Fee Submission, 2016). There are at least three alternatives to "fix" the higher education problem. One is fully free education for all, another is free education for the poor (which would involve means testing) and a third option

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is a loan based approach through NSFAS and/or the commercial system. These options require the injection of additional funds to the tertiary education sector (Mabena, 2017). As a result it was easy for the establishment to delegitimise the movement and dismiss their demands as unrealistic and economically impossible.

There is resonance with the hard lesson from the Latin American case: the debate between classical reform and radical reform. Classical reform is changing one thing—for example fee free education *without changing the system as a whole*. Radical reform is trying to get away from 'single issues' (as explained by Bebbington, 2010 discussed in chapter two). Radical reform is that reforms such as free fee education must take place in the context of a systemic shift away from neoliberalism.

Revolutionary thinking is that if political pressure results in victory in fees reforms or land reform then this will lead to other pressures. If political force is applied to these single issues then one thing will lead to another. For example the assumption students made was that if they force the state to provide free higher education this will cascade into the state being forced to rethink it public finances; consider demands for fixing basic education; and look into demands to fix the economy so graduates can get jobs and thus effect economic development and improved welfare generally (Fryer, 2016b, Spaull, 2017). However, the problem is the inertia of the state and social movements will continue to be stuck in 'single issues' unless pressure is applied to these other things. The movement took this inertia for granted and assumed that redressing injustice would automatically lead to eventual economic development. They needed to strike a balance between asking the specific questions (symptomatic social issues) on transformation and higher education funding and addressing the general core underlying structural problems (structural economic problems) such as the funding crisis.

Looking at the developmentalist versus neoliberalism argument in some detail. Critics have argued that the reason South Africa is facing budget issues is not because of too much spending, but because of too little. South Africa has chronically underinvested in higher education, and this underinvestment is led by the states' underinvestment in key areas like infrastructure, education, and healthcare. The budget problems are 'political' because they reflect political choices that is the choice to implement neoliberal policies instead of more developmentalist policies (Forslund, 2015; Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013). South Africa spends approximately 0.7% of GDP on higher education (Burger, 2016). By contrast, successful developmental states invest heavily in higher education and charge fees with

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financial aid schemes for the poor. For example developmental states such as Malaysia spend 1.75%, and China almost 3%. Cuba spends 4.5% from a very small and stagnant economy (Vally *et al,* 2016).

What the movement did do was reveal the funding crisis in South Africa. The World Bank (2010) in its report on Higher Education in Africa noted that countries that have attained, or are on the verge of attaining, universal primary school enrolment such as South Africa would be expected to allocate a larger share of their education budget to higher education. Yet in South Africa where at least 70% of each age group completes primary school, higher education absorbs less than 20% of public education resources. In 2013, the committee on the review of university funding recommended that government increase spending levels on higher education (University Funding Report, 2013: 153). The committee noted that expenditure on higher education was too low.

The World Bank noted five years before the #FeesMustFall protests began that "at worst, inadequate funding may lead to student protests and strikes" (World Bank, 2010: 22). The World Bank's report was used as a basis for the conclusions of the Ministerial Committee for the Review of Funding of Universities in their 2013 University Funding Report. The recommendations arising from this Report were unequivocal: *"Government should increase spending on higher education. It is evident that expenditure on higher education is too low, especially in light of the desire to move towards a knowledge economy. If participation rates of, in particular, African and coloured students need to be improved, more funding will have to be allocated to the public university system"* (University Funding Report, 2013: 153).

This claim has appeared in critical reports such as in Chapter 9 of the 2012 NDP and the 2013 Ministerial Committee Review on funding of universities (Muller, 2016). In 2011, South Africa's state budget for universities as a percentage of GDP was 0.75%, which is more or less in line with Africa as a whole (0.78%). But when compared to OECD countries (1.21%) and the rest of the world (0.84%), South Africa lags behind in this regard. Within the G-20 group of countries, South Africa has the lowest levels of higher education funding (Universities Funding Report, 2013:150). Cloete (2016) argues for a greater proportion of the state budget to go to higher education, from 0.75% to 1%.

Vally *et al* (2016) also argue that the government must increase funding by at least an aggregate amount equal to the ratio achieved in OECD countries. However, Muller (2016) argues that this is a flawed logic. Muller (2016) contends that simplistic comparisons across

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countries fail to account for a variety of important local factors. In higher education these include the proportion of the population who are young, different structures of higher education funding systems, different forms of post-school education and the quality of basic education. Muller (2016) puts forward the point that because university fee income is not included in the total expenditure number due to the fact that it is not government expenditure it is not reflected in the percentage. If government scrapped fees, raised the same amount through taxes and gave this back to universities, "government expenditure on higher education" would rise significantly but the resources available to the system would be the same (Muller, 2016).

Further, pressing for a higher proportion of funds be allocated to higher education creates a high risk that a disproportionate share of new education funding will be allocated to student financial aid at the expense of resourcing the operation and development of the universities and other education-related sectors, which is equally important for student success (Scott, 2017). The danger is that a disproportionate share of resources will be shifted to student financial aid, at the expense of institutional funding which will negatively affect teaching quality and academic and psychosocial student support or of other key areas of social spending, including early childhood development.

The 2017 national budget indicates that this counterproductive situation is already coming about. On top of the R32 billion recently reprioritised to higher education for the current budget period, another R5 billion has been earmarked for 2019/20 (Budget Review, 2017: 54). It appears from the budget details that the bulk of these large sums is going to financial aid, which means that the critical backlogs in per capita university subsidy are not being adequately addressed. The downfall is that other critical programmes have had to face budget cuts. For example, the budget provides for considerable enrolment growth at the universities but none in Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), which is the education sector that most needs strengthening (Scott, 2017).

Some economists have put forward that the government would have to increase its budget to bypass the problem of potential budget cuts elsewhere to fund higher education. Either by increasing taxes or introducing additional taxes in order to raise the funds required to fund fee free higher education. Koch and Mabugu (2015) suggest that in addition to raising taxes, the government would also have to improve its tax revenue collection strategies and clamp down on tax evasion loopholes such as the use of transfer pricing by multinational companies for example. Other options put forward by Koch and Mabugu (2015) include an

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increase in value-added-tax (VAT), personal or corporate income taxes or the introduction of new taxes, such as a carbon tax, wealth tax or higher education tax. They proposed that VAT would have to go up by around 0.6 percentage points from 14% to 14.6% in order to raise revenue by R60 billion. For personal income tax, the feasible increase rate would lie, according to Koch and Mabugu, between 1 – 5 percentage points, depending on the degree of bracket creep and spread assumed (Koch and Mabugu, 2015). The Financial and Fiscal Commission also proposed levying an annual R167 tax on graduates (Mabena, 2017).

However there are many potential drawbacks associated with additional or increased taxes. The combination of the required tax increases and the sheer magnitude of the additional revenue required would substantially erode disposable income. It would also lead to significantly weaker growth (Koch and Mabugu, 2015). From a corporate point of view, any taxes levied upon businesses would drive up the cost of doing business in South Africa. This could potentially come at the cost of jobs as the additional taxes and levies may make other markets more appealing for businesses (lower cost markets). On the other hand, imposing higher taxes on individuals may be the breaking point for an already overburdened tax base (Morton and Blair, 2016).

Vally *et al* (2016) argue in favour of a structure of personal taxation that could be levied for the top 10% of income earners in the country and for high-net-worth individuals – people who earn an annual income of more than R7 million or have assets of more than R70 million. This could generate a substantial increase in available public revenue to fund higher education. This approach concentrates on the structural aspects of inequality. Vally *et al* (2016) maintain that this proposal supports the idea that those who earn the most pay for their children's education through taxation and the distribution of public funds rather than through an individually based "wealthy user pays" model (Vally *et al*, 2016). In this model, universities receive a subsidy per student from the public funds generated from the tax on the high earners which is sufficient for its recurrent operations.

However Cloete (2016) argues that this is not sustainable as nowhere in the world do the super-rich pay for free higher education (Cloete, 2016). Further, allocations to higher education where all students are equally subsidised are socially regressive and anti-poor according to Spaull (2017). This is largely because the children of the wealthy attend fee-charging schools that give them a much better prospect of qualifying for university than the children of the poor. Spaull (2017) highlights that fewer than one in ten children from the poorest 70% of households qualify to go to university compared with one in two or three

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children (40%) among the wealthiest 10% of households. And because of this, if one allocated an additional R10 billion for example to higher education in a blanket fashion, then about R6.8 billion (68%) would end up benefiting the wealthiest 10% of South African households because it is their children who are disproportionately at university (according to two fiscal incidence studies) (Spaull, 2017). Spaull's argument has some validity however saying that we should not fix higher education in South Africa because it is currently disproportionately benefiting the rich seems to be simply finding reasons not to do things.

South Africa's funding for higher education is low not just compared to other countries, but also funding has not kept pace with enrolment. The DHET regularly boasts about increasing enrolment numbers from 14% to 18% in 2010. Actually it has at times forced such increases upon universities. According to the Universities Funding Report (2013: 160), for example, "Various universities are also put under extreme pressure to enrol more students than planned for, especially in instances where the NSC results improve drastically for a particular year and where more students qualify for university entry." But such increases are of little value to society and are unsustainable especially if enrolment outstrips funding, and drop-out and failure rates continue at high levels. In 2010 the World Bank found that in a context of "inadequate public financing and resource diversification, admitting increasing numbers of students results in a deterioration in quality" (World Bank, 2010:22).

There is no contention that financial need should not be an obstacle to students who qualify to enter university at a suitable academic standard. However, in allocating public finances it is critical to recognise that even carefully designed changes in funding will not materially reduce inequality in society as a whole. Using the most recent Statistics South Africa Quarterly Labour Force Survey 30.5% of 15 to 34-year-olds are unemployed and only 3.5% are in university education. Muller (2016) argues that removing university fees is not necessarily the best way to help South Africa's young people who are poor.

The majority of young South Africans feel they are being failed by the government and society at large. This begins long before they reach university. Cloete (2016) argues that, in South Africa free higher education will widen, not reduce, inequality. According to his argument this is because the main problem for the poor in South Africa is that less than 5% qualify for entry into universities. The percentage of students in this 5% whose parents earn over R600 000 bracket is over 70%. The children of the new political and business elite who have the significant social, cultural and economic capital are the ones who are likely to

succeed in school and gain access to tertiary education. Installing a free university system on top of that will only serve to solidify and expand inequality. Essentially the argument is that the issue is not whether there is enough money for free tertiary education. So while the general discourse is money, the issue is in fact much deeper and is not only economic but also inherently political and systemic (Cloete, 2016). In other words, the demand is *not* for free fee education on top of the inherent inequality, rather it is or should be a wholly systemic shift away from neoliberalism which has entrenched that inequality. Social movements need to somehow shift to *social investment state* mentality and away from a cost cutting state. (Morel *et al*, 2012).

There is little to be achieved by making access to higher education more readily accessible unless systemic and other deficiencies in the basic education system are simultaneously addressed. But in a neoliberal democracy the state will not do things unless forced to. This is why political pressure from social movements such as #FeesMustFall is important but it needed to get past the single issue of fees and ask whether *free higher education* in the context of *wider systemic change* is feasible. Fixing 'one issue' like fees is not going to be radical if it happens in isolation. In fact it may make things worse in some ways (because the government will take money from elsewhere).

5.2.2 The politics of #FeesMustFall: A failure to be 'inside and against'

What is interesting to note is that protests at South Africa's universities did not suddenly 'erupt' in 2015 with the #FeesMustFall movement contrary to the narrative that has dominated the public record. Students from poorer predominantly black universities and universities of technology such as Cape Peninsula University of Technology, University of Limpopo, Fort Hare University and Tshwane University of Technology have been routinely waging battles against the infrastructural conditions at their universities, the effectiveness of the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) and the payment of university registration fees since 1994 (Godsell and Chikane, 2016: 60) often resulting in harsh consequences for both the protesting students and the university (Mama and Feni, 2012). But their protest action was largely ignored and often did not make headlines beyond regional newspapers (Davids and Waghid, 2016).

The most recent #FeesMustFall protests have involved students from both historically advantaged and historically disadvantaged universities and have as such attracted widespread media coverage nationally and internationally even sparking solidarity protests in London and New York. On some campuses students formed a sustainable alliance with

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campus workers and also foregrounded workers' demands alongside their own demands for example lobbying for insourcing and the provision of free education for workers' children (Suttner, 2015). When considering one of the lessons from Latin America, forming horizontal alliances improved the effectiveness of social movements and their ability to garner enough influence on government which echoes here.

The #FeesMustFall protest movement was in a sense democratic in its nature. In the case of most campuses, weight was placed on decisions made by the student body as opposed to made by representative bodies such as the SRC (Suttner, 2015). #FeesMustFall in many campuses strategically rejected the vertical hierarchies of student representative councils as the only "legitimate voice" of student demands (Kamanzi, 2016). The #FeesMustFall protests comprised a group of students without a political mandate, and not elected by anyone with almost no resources. The movement experimented with a flat structure and open, direct democracy during mass occupations. It also embodied the unionist slogan of "an injury to one is an injury to all" in the sense that those who could afford fees stood in solidarity with those who could not (Suttner, 2015). This lack of organisation and hierarchical structure may be argued to a have been another key weakness of the movement. A nuanced lesson from the Latin American case is the question of structured movements versus relatively unstructured leaderless movements without an organised hierarchy.

It is evident that the protests served as an effective tool of communication, but questions have been raised about the violent acts associated with the protests. The movement was also unsure about how to engage with the state or how to give the authorities a 'kick'. The lack of a clear hierarchical structure and effective organisation is arguably another flaw of the #FeesMustFall movement. The narratives around what happened were easily hijacked by the establishment. An example of this was the claim by Habib and Mabizela (2016) that the 2015 protests were only peaceful and 'successful' because the universities were at the head of them whereas at the end of 2015 and in 2016 protests were not because the students took matters into their own hands. Mainstream media also focused on student violence. There was also an alternative media that tended to have the opposite bias for example Vox. However, the establishment attacked outlets like Vox for providing a one sided view with Habib (2016) for example calling it "the online left-wing manifestation of Fox TV where information, propaganda and skewed analyses all morph into a toxic mix that is peddled as legitimate journalism".

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The protests generally started peacefully within various universities, supported by academics and other concerned stakeholders. The protest modus operandi across several universities was generally the same: disrupting university operations, campus shutdowns, chanting and singing historic struggle songs. Initially universities were fairly tolerant of the protests especially in 2015 when they first rose up, however as the protests became more robust the response became largely violently oppressive. Universities' and the state's response was mainly sanctioning the use of force by the police, commissioning the use of force by private security offices, securing interdicts and instituting disciplinary procedures against protesters. The protesters turned violent in most cases with some students burning and vandalising property and some facing arrest and imprisonment.

The right to protest is enshrined in and protected by the South African Constitution because this right is "recognised as an essential form of democratic expression rather than viewing it as a threat to democracy" (Duncan 2016: 3). The question is, why did protests become violent? What are the limitations of the right to protest, especially when this right infringes on others' rights? It is important to acknowledge that protests are disruptive in nature but not always violent. And it is important to acknowledge that rights are characterised by tensions. When a group of people gather to protest, they disrupt the rights of those who are not protesting. Duncan (2016) puts this aptly when she argues that protests are acts that "communicate grievances through disruption of existing societal arrangements, and bring problems in society to public attention". This is why it becomes such a grey area.

The universities tried to draw a sharp line and say only 'legal' protest is legitimate. Habib (2016) argued that any disruption of lectures or blocking of roads is 'violent' even if it is not actually violent because it disrupts people's rights. This is the mirror image of the student argument claiming that they were facing structural violence in the form of fees, exclusion, and cultural alienation around and therefore had no choice but to protest. Also, protests happen because things are clearly illegitimate and because the formal channels are unresponsive. Students asserted that university management was highly unresponsive to their demands. This involved vice-chancellors refusing to engage with student leaders or not coming to scheduled meetings and through a common response by the university management in most universities which was to get court interdicts against the protesting students.

Habib's argument that any disruption is 'violent' ignores the contradictions, but it effectively won the day. It legitimised the heavy handed response from the state through the police.

What followed was mass arrests, internal expulsions and court interdicts, including denial of bail in some cases; more than 830 protesters have since been arrested since the advent of #FeesMustFall (Kamanzi, 2016). The widespread media attention on property damage, along with the establishment of a security-heavy government task team, signalled to the movement that the state was ready to intensify the repression.

For the most part students blamed the police for instigating violence (although there were instances where some protesting students were also responsible for fuelling violence). Granted the violence engulfing the university protests cannot be blamed solely on the police, the dominant feeling among students was that the police too easily resorted to shooting protesters with rubber bullets and stun grenades without any attempt at negotiating or engaging with them. Students described their destruction of property as retaliation for the university management deploying police and private security officials in response to their demands. As noted in The Smoke that Calls (Von Holdt *et al*, 2011), the deployment of police often leads to more violence as police represent the state's symbolic power and repression in the eyes of protestors (McKinley and Veriava, 2005). The state's increasing use of repression had the effect of hurting the movement and encouraged perceptions of its violent nature.

The movement was an important cause but it was flawed in its approach and goals. On the whole, the #FeesMustFall movement has been widely commended for its achievement in raising awareness about the funding crisis in higher education in South Africa. This is a long-standing problem that universities have been battling for years but the #FeesMustFall movement brought the crisis to public attention within a period of two to three weeks. The movement achieved a number of positive things at various universities, including the renaming of university buildings, curriculum transformation and the insourcing of general workers. The state has also been pushed to explore other options and models to fund higher education, although the progress has been slow so far.

5.3 Landless People Movement: Overview

Land ownership in post-apartheid South Africa is still heavily skewed across racial lines. There are under 40 000 farming units covering about 67% of the country that are mostly white owned and also owned by a small number of blacks with access to capital (Walker and Dubb, 2013), 15% is black communal areas and 10% is other state land which includes urban areas. (Walker and Dubb, 2013). Under apartheid, 85% of the land was deemed white politically and the rest a periphery of ten ethnically defined African homelands plus a
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number of tiny coloured reserves. However throughout the twentieth century a large number of Africans and coloureds continued to live in so called white South Africa with varying levels of tenure security on white owned farms and conservation lands, in urban areas and a small number of black owned properties that escaped forced removals (Walker and Dubb, 2013). It is against this backdrop of uneven land ownership that land reform has become an issue of contention and discussion in South Africa (Lahiff, 2008: 1).

Despite a rhetorical position on land reform, since coming into power in 1994 the ANC has exhibited little interest in pursuing land and agrarian reform with vigour (Anseeuw and Alden, 2011: 25). Binswanger-Mkhize (2014: 253) argues that after years of land reform in post-apartheid South Africa there are some islands of success, especially in horticulture, but these exist in a sea of partial or complete failure, and the number of beneficiaries and the land area transferred is disappointingly low. Redistributive land reform has remained slow, affecting only around 5% of South Africa's farm land by 2010 (Anseeuw and Alden, 2011: 25). Aliber and Cousins (2013) show that the beneficiaries are still active on only 40% of agrarian reform projects while the outcome in terms of agricultural production and beneficiary income and livelihoods is poor on a large number of projects. Anseeuw and Alden (2011: 25) argue that the ANC committed itself publicly to pursue significant land reform (first as a liberation movement and then as a party in power), but has achieved so little in terms of land reform due to its relatively weak commitment to land issues, manifested in small budgets and low profile actions.

Further land reform policy has also been unstable, with new models introduced every few years, as well as new legal and institutional initiatives (Binswanger-Mkize, 2014: 253). For example, between 1994 and 1999, the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) programme was introduced. Through SLAG qualifying rural dwellers, farm workers and farm dwellers received a grant to purchase and develop agricultural land. The programme's objective was to improve secure tenure and livelihoods by providing access to and productive resources for beneficiaries. Following various challenges with the SLAG programme, in 2001 the department introduced the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development programme (LRAD) to replace it (Lahiff, 2008:1; Mfaise, 2017: 3).

LRAD was aimed at improving nutrition and incomes of rural communities, stimulating growth from agriculture and empowering beneficiaries to improve their socio-economic wellbeing. LRAD was also aimed at creating black commercial farmers. Some of the challenges which led to its failure include lack of access to capital and market, poor

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infrastructure, lack of mentorship and limited financial management skills. Further, the LRAD programme was critiqued for its slow pace in transferring land to previously disadvantaged persons. These, and many other challenges led to the phasing out of this programme between 2007 and 2010 (Lahiff, 2008:1; Mfaise, 2017: 3). Both SLAG and LRAD were phased out not because they had reached their finality, but rather because they failed. Both lasted only five years respectively and less than 3 per cent of land has changed hands from white to black since the end of apartheid in 1994 (Lahiff, 2008: 1, Alexander, 2006: 3). In 2015, the Minister of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform launched the One Household One Hectare programme to provide land to the landless and fast-track the establishment of agri-parks in district municipalities. Since it began, more than 4.7 million hectares of land have been acquired for redistribution and 1 496 farms have been created. And in 2017 government pledged to intensify the One Household One Hectare initiative through providing mechanised irrigation, mentorship and inputs so that redistributed land becomes productive and profitable. About R4.3 billion will be spent on this programme over the medium term. (Budget Review, 2017: 66).

These partial shifts on the ideological terrain, reveal a growing pressure to acknowledge the legitimacy of land demand and a tacit recognition of a 'landless' identity. However policy continues to be guided by the provisions of the White Paper on South African Land Reform Policy of 1997, with its emphasis on a neoliberal market-based approach loosely captured under the slogan of 'willing seller, willing buyer' (Lahiff, 2008: 3)

Overall, South Africa's approach to land issues appears to have reached a crossroads. The pace of land redistribution is far too slow to meet the expectations raised by the government's target that blacks should own 30% of commercial agricultural land by 2014 (CDE, 2008: 6). Many land reform projects involving large numbers of people have failed. Attempts to improve tenure for black people in rural areas have made little if any progress. Promising land initiatives in the private sector have been aborted or put on hold because of the scale of claims on private land and delays in resolving them; and also because of a lack of capacity within provincial and national state structures to engage constructively with private interests. Some new black farmers who had benefited from redistribution are now finding their new property under claim as the restitution process proceeds in isolation from other policies. The amount of money required to deal with land issues is far larger than originally assumed. And dealing with all these issues is far more complex than anticipated.

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In this context, dissatisfaction is growing on all sides (CDE, 2008: 6). And land reform has failed when measured against the above criteria.

The Landless People's Movement (LPM) emerged in 2001 against the backdrop of this growing dissatisfaction with the failure of the post-apartheid government to fulfil its promises of redistribution and restitution.   The state's political choices in selecting neoliberal instruments such as adopting a market-based approach to land redistribution, largely based on the 'willing buyer-willing seller' principle also led to the emergence of LPM. The Bredell land occupation in early July 2001 which saw thousands of impoverished settlers "buying" plots of land for US$ 3 but were promptly thrown off the land by agents of the post-apartheid state (Hart, 2008: 681; Anseeuw and Alden, 2011: 30) propelled the emergence of LPM in 2001. This represented a profound moral and socio-economic crisis of the post-apartheid state and fed into the accelerated rise of the LPM protesting the snail pace of land redistribution.

Though LPM began as a rural-based movement, it spread rapidly into the urban centre of Johannesburg, and then throughout Gauteng province, during 2002 (Rosa, 2012: 4). It was intended as a national instrument of pressure on the government for the fulfilment of promises made at the end of apartheid namely that land would be restituted to the Black population by 1999 (Rosa, 2012: 4). LPM developed around a program designed to pressure the South African government to drastically increase the speed of land redistribution and to enforce the promises of tenure security to those Africans who work for white farmers in exchange for access to land (so-called labour tenants).

5.3.1 The economics of land reform: the viability of redistribution

Arguably a key weaknesses of LPM is its vagueness about economics, except at the most general level. The movement has not nailed down how illegitimate the South African system is. For example they have not been able to dislodge the 'official' discourse that South Africa has 'done as well as could be expected in terms of land reform within the parameters of the law'. Further, LPM was also not clear on an economically viable agrarian reform model. The fact that these issues have not been clearly articulated made it relatively easy for the establishment to say that the demands were unrealistic. Several economic schools of thought have brought forward arguments with regards to the viability of land reform which are detailed in the following table. The LPM in essence advocates for a more radical political economy model but has largely failed to articulate this well enough in their demands.

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Table 2: Economic Schools of Thought: Arguments on the viability of land reform

Economic School of Thought	Neo-classical economics	New institutional economics	Livelihoods	Welfarism	Radical political economy	Marxism
Central focus	Well-functioning markets vs market distortions	Linking equity and productivity	Development as livelihood improvement and poverty reduction	Poverty alleviation, social protection	Development as agrarian transformation	The Agrarian Question, focusing on the transition to capitalism in agriculture
Key concepts	Efficiency in factor productivity (land, labour, capital)	Transaction costs, institutions, the inverse relationship	Multiple and diverse livelihoods; de-agrarianisation	Household food security; vulnerability; social protection	Peasants are a social class exploited by a global corporate food regime	Social relations of production, property and power (class); dynamics of accumulation in
Land and agric in wider context	Declining role of agric in economy; globalisation of agro-food markets is positive in lowering food costs	Unequal land distribution can constrain economic growth	Key role of agriculture in kick-starting growth; globalisation offers opportunities but often negative for the poor	Small-scale agriculture as residual, as safety net	A global corporate global food regime dispossesses peasants via market discipline & renders them 'redundant'	Links between agricultural development & industrialisation are a key issue. Globalisation is a key feature of contemporary capitalism
Policies	Market-led land reform: reduce market imperfections; register private property rights; provide credit to promote investment	Market-assisted land reform: reduce policy biases favouring large farms or urban consumers; promote efficient markets; secure property rights; credit; land	State action to support smallholder production e.g. land reform, targeted subsidies, co-ordination of marketing; .	Enhanced and secure access to land for small-scale food production as a safety net	Radical agrarian reform that secures rights to land and resources by peasant farmers. Food sovereignty	(a) Retain efficient large capitalist farms & improve conditions of labour), or (b) reforms that promote accumulation from below, or (c) support struggles for land by exploited classes
Beneficiaries	Efficient farmers at any scale; (often economies of scale apply and larger farms seen as socially efficient)	Efficient small farmers who maximise returns to land	The rural poor with multiple livelihoods; small farmers	The rural poor and unemployed with limited access to jobs or alternative incomes	Peasants (small family farmers); landless farm workers; the rural poor	Landless workers, semi-proletarians, petty commodity producers, emerging capitalist farmers
Measures of 'viability'	Farm efficiency; rates of return on investment; minimum viable farm size	Farm efficiency; distribution of income; poverty impacts; growth multipliers	Livelihood impacts; poverty measures	Levels of household food production that make efficient use of household resources	Rurality, agriculture & food are central to social and ecological sustainability	A function of class relations and dynamics. Agriculture's contribution to national economic growth

Key questions	How efficient is production on redistributed land? Returns to land, labour, capital?	What factors & conditions influence the efficiency of different scales of production?	What are the multiple sources of livelihood for land reform beneficiaries?	What difference does food production make to household welfare of land reform beneficiaries?	Does land reform transform exploitative agrarian structures and food regimes?	What dynamics of class differentiation and accumulation occur within Land Reform?

(Source: Cousins and Scoones, 2009: 20)

In the South African context, the dominant technical framings hardly centre on a broader focus on agrarian restructuring, livelihoods and welfare issues. They centre on narrow business and target income criteria of viability (Cousins and Scoones, 2009: 21). It is largely the neoliberal school of thought discourse that dominates. The land reform stance is neoliberal at core (believing essentially in the thorough commercialisation of land) but with distributive and developmental bits tacked on. Land reform might be necessary for political or even social purposes, but economically, there should be few or no obstacles placed in. Marxists have a position that has some affinities to this one. They see that economies of scale are important in agriculture so 'rural capitalism' is necessary. Land redistribution may be necessary only to break the power of the big landlords and for political reasons (Sender and Johnstone, 2004). The really big distinction is the radical political economy/food sovereignty argument. This is based on a very deep critique of the 'food regime' (industrial agriculture and globalised marketing of food) as well arguments about an alternative, sustainable, small scale, local system which is what the LPM in South Africa should have provided in its defence of land reform.

Much of government policy buys into a deracialised capitalist agriculture and pays lip service to deeper transformation. The discourse of a conservative alliance of landowners, agricultural economists and officials is opposed to changes in agrarian structure, and argue instead for de-racialisation of land ownership and the establishment of 'viable and sustainable upcoming commercial farmers'. This the orthodox view—that the modernised corporate globalised system is the only viable one.

Such visions of viability are located in terms of a neoliberal/neoclassical framing of land reform that emphasizes business profitability but with some political consideration. This view is expressed by private sector-funded think tanks such as the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE 2005, 2008), as well as organisations representing large-scale farmers. Given the legacies of colonial rule and apartheid, it is acknowledged by such groupings that the commercial farming sector has to be de-racialised, but the beneficiaries will be a few,

relatively better-off black farmers and landowners, not the rural poor, because land reform 'is not the answer to rural poverty' (CDE 2005: 30).

This vision underpins the Strategic Plan for Agriculture agreed in 2001 between farmers' unions (representing white and black commercial farmers) and government. The strategic goal for the sector is 'to generate equitable access and participation in a globally competitive, profitable and sustainable agricultural sector contributing to a better life for all' (Department of Agriculture 2001: 3). Land reform is identified as critically important for ensuring 'broad-based participation in the agricultural mainstream', not for altering agrarian structure (Cousins and Scoones, 2009: 20).

The neoliberal approach taken by the government has been rationalised on the basis of maintaining efficiency in the agricultural sector and retaining investor confidence. Alexander (2006) however argues that efficiency and equity are not (and cannot be) achieved simultaneously when it comes to land redistribution, and thus maintain that the landless poor are not finding reparation through the market (Alexander, 2006: 13). Further, Byres (2006: 227-229) asserts that neoclassical development economists have since accepted that planning and state interventions, including land reform, were necessary in poor economies before the market could come into its own. As Byres (2006: 228) notes, in the Washington Consensus there was no place for land reform of any kind. The beneficiaries of structural adjustment are seen to be efficient farmers at any scale. Walker and Dubb (2013) assert that increased black ownership of the land can be achieved through the market but a land reform programme aimed at improving livelihoods and tenure security for the rural poor has to be driven by the state. So there is need to shift to a more welfare state model and not a neoliberal approach.

With only 1.9% of the national budget devoted to land reform, far below the needs of achieving the stated aims of agrarian reform, it is obvious that the government has neither the capacity nor the will to accomplish the enormous task of alleviating land inequalities (Budget Review, 2017). The 2017 budget offered very limited evidence to suggest radical transformation, particularly in terms of land reform, is about to be accelerated. Spending on agriculture, rural development and land reform will only increase 2% from just less than R26billion in 2016-17 to R26.5billion in 2017-18. It will increase to about R30bn in 2019-20. Of this amount, the budget allocated for land redistribution has declined 3%, from R1.23billion in 2016-17 to R1.19billion in 2017-18. The allocation for restitution increased 2.5%, from R3.17billion in 2016-17 to R3.25billion in 2017-18 (Phakathi, 2017).

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The lack of finances accorded to this process also speaks to the poor standing and negotiating ability of the Department of Land Affairs (now Rural Development and Land Reform) within the government bureaucracy. The administrative complexity poses another set of problems for the advocates of swift action on agrarian reform. Transactions within the framework of the land reform programme take up to two years to complete. These long bureaucratic cycles serve to limit the number of potential farmers able to benefit from the best opportunities (Anseeuw and Alden, 2011: 25)

So the LPM emerges as important given the failure of the institutions in place to achieve results. However similar to #FeesMustFall, a flaw of the LPM has been its rights based classical approach to land reform and trying to change one thing—that is trying to achieve land tenure without changing the system as a whole. Radical agrarian reform is that land reform must take place in the context of a systemic shift away from neoliberalism but the LPM has largely based its land struggle on colonial dispossession and a rights based approach (as a result have faced the same problems as described by du Toit, 2013 discussed in chapter three and Bebbington (2010 in chapter two).

The fundamental demand for the LPM was not for agricultural land but for formal ownership of the lands that had been forcefully taken by the apartheid government from blacks into the hands of private white owners. They did not provide any economic reasoning behind this demand. No proofs on foundations such as work, production or large rural estates. The absence of this type of proof does not invalidate any aspirations to agriculture that LPM may have but it does show that agriculture is secondary in relation to racial and rights issues associated with land policies in South Africa (Rosa, 2012: 4).Being black means one is a victim of expropriation and this condition supersedes the realm of production, the market/economy. So land reform to LPM is not just about units of production, it is about justice. As a result the LPMs actions have been easy for the establishment to delegitimise (Rosa, 2014: 51-53). The LPM is caught between the discourses on rights and the developmental agenda and has little to offer in terms of agrarian transformation in South Africa The immediate concern is to take back land but claims based on ancestors and heritage are largely regarded as sentimentalist or populist and are generally sidelined (Rosa, 2014: 51-53).

Unlike the MST in Brazil which developed a discourse on the probability and intensive use of land for subsistence agriculture. In offering an alternative to the mainstream agriculture policies in the country, they were able to come up with an alternative mode rural

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development. They converted the term 'land' to mean an agrarian means of production, a source of subsistence through labour and the movement was able to spread and adapt to different groups. That form enabled government to act in the name of development providing credit, education and subsidies to rural citizens (Rosa, 2014: 51-53).

Or the approach by the Chavez Governement in Venezuela who "framed its policies as an explicit counter to neo-liberal development ideology and has reasserted a more activist role for the state in economic and social policy. In the agrarian realm the government has introduced policies aimed at developing an agricultural regime that is tropical, sustainable, agro-ecological, and socialist, and that will guarantee national food sovereignty. A centrepiece of the government's agricultural policies is a land reform programme that purports to place smallholders at the core of this agrarian transformation" (Lavelle, 2013: 134)

A point of economic contention is the viability of land reform in South Africa. With arguments for and against redistributive land reform often hinging on the notion of viability. Viability clearly has a major impact on the way land and agrarian reform is conceived and planned for. As with the student struggles, the politics is one things, but the really key question is whether the alternatives that are being proposed are *economically* viable. Justifications for public expenditure and budget allocations can be offered if programmes and projects are deemed viable.

5.3.2. The politics of the Landless People's Movement

LPM has generally followed the development described in previous chapters. LPM arose in the context of the increased commodification of a public good (in this case land) as a result of the neoliberal policy stance taken up by government. The 'willing buyer willing seller' land redistribution policy has seen the alienation of the black majority who are landless and the stunted progress of the land redistribution reform policy in South Africa.

Based on the failure of the government's 'willing seller, willing buyer' model of land reform, the movement is calling for a review of this policy and its replacement with a new and more effective process not so tightly based on the market. Arguably this is one of the weaknesses of the LPM. Similar to #FeesMustFall, LPM's demands were focused on simply rejecting one oppressive policy without providing an economically sound reasoning and achievable goal. The movement was able to articulate clearly what it does not want however did not clearly articulate what they do want instead.

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Despite pressure from LPM, the 'willing seller, willing buyer' model remains non-negotiable (Greenstein, 2004: 33). However, the increased emphasis on land redistribution cannot be separated from the rise of LPM, and at the very least indicates the broad appeal of its basic demands (Greenstein, 2004: 32). The LPM has directly challenged the ANC's construct of 'the nation', and has opened up new areas for political contestation. (Greenstein, 2004: 33). The movement's efforts have had visible impact on the living conditions of the community (Sinwell, 2015: 84).

Following the initial and much publicised rise of LPM, some elements of the hegemonic bloc have become more vocal about their opinions on land redistribution. Both the SACP and COSATU have made public statements calling for the speedier and more effective implementation of the official land reform programme (Greenstein, 2004: 31). However this has had little impact considering the general trend to date is that government has tended to be more responsive to the calls of capital and business than to the ANC's own alliance partners or the LPM. This is an important point to note. Similar to #FeesMustFall, LPM has been successful in highlighting the surface problems. They have been able to reveal the problem and get the process going. What is lacking is the real structural changes and impact.

The basic demands of the movement include the rapid and wide redistribution of land to the landless, and secure tenure for all. The movement also calls for an end to evictions, whether on farms or in informal and other settlements, and a process of transferring land to those residing and working on it. The LPM's daily efforts have thus been largely defensive, focused on preventing evictions from rural farms and urban settlements and apartment complexes. LPM's modus operandi has largely been driven by a deep frustration at the failure of patient engagement with the state's land reform programme to deliver. In some cases, community groups have waited for seven years or more without tangible progress in resolving land claims or in transferring land (Greenstein, 2004: 31).

LPM has adopted a number of tactics to highlight its demands for redistribution of land and secure tenure. Its current program of action includes: organising and mobilising large numbers of Africans evicted from white farms along with labour tenants with a view to using the moral power of highly publicised land invasions. Land occupations have been identified as part of the repertoire of actions the movement is willing to carry out (Greenstein, 2004: 30). They have identified unproductive, unused or underused land and land belonging to abusive white farmers as the focus for initial redistribution (Greenstein, 2004: 2). Mass occupations of vacant or abandoned rural land are also fairly widespread. In rural areas,

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there are a number of recorded occupations by groups onto land they have claimed through the restitution process, but have not received after a long period of time. Labour tenant occupations on functioning commercial farms are far less common, because of the much greater potential for violent opposition from landowners (Greenstein, 2004: 31).

The other type of mobilisation that formed the base of the LPM, is spontaneous organisation to resist invasion on existing land access and prevent evictions for those already occupying pieces of land. In the informal urban settlements, especially around Gauteng. LPM spread rapidly by coming to the defence of residents in generating or organising the new struggles (Greenstein, 2004: 15).

LPM also created links with other organisations opposing the government's neoliberal policies with more global organisations such as the NGOs which work in the field with labour tenants and evictees. LPM has also made contact with other social movements for land reform particularly with Brazil's Landless Worker's Movement (MST). (Alexander, 2004: 12). The is a key point of interest considering one of the sanguine lessons from the Latin American case includes that making horizontal alliances with allied groups helps social movement gain traction in achieving their goals.

What is interesting is that LPM, tried an alternative strategy: taking the government to court. As a result, in 2009, the people of Protea South were promised water, better and more sanitary Ventilated Improved Pit toilets, street lights, electricity in their shacks and that they would not be evicted against their will but the ANC never heeded to the court ruling undermining the victory (Sinwell, 2015: 84).

LPM has also undertaken march after march in an attempt to force the government to deliver but to no effect. The state has responded with increasing repression. State and institutional violence has various tactics including bringing charges which are then later dropped. Residents of informal settlements around Johannesburg marched to the provincial premier's office in the city centre to demand a moratorium on evictions and to be included in development planning in their areas. In April 2002 farm workers and labour tenants marching in the rural town of Ermelo were arrested by police for an 'illegal gathering'. Charges were later dropped. Police forcibly dispersed them, arresting 72 and detaining them for 3 days in Johannesburg Central police station. Charges were later dropped (Greenstein, 2004: 33). In 2003, seven LPM youth members were arrested on false murder charges and were kept in jail for three months before their trial, at which the charges were dropped. An

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attempt to hold a small gathering in Thembelihle in Gauteng on Election Day was met with high levels of police aggression, the jailing of protestors and the intimidation and torture of LPM members in police custody overnight.

The reliance by the state on coercive responses to LPM indicates that there is a perceived threat to its power. The movement must have struck a nerve, because the state has resorted to repressive tactics and even torture by the police to undermine the LPM struggle. This violent response suggests a vulnerability to the criticisms highlighted by the campaign, in particular the abysmal record of land redistribution ten years after democratisation, the rise in forced removals and evictions, and the failure of parliamentary democracy to design an acceptable process for resolving (rather than managing) long-standing social problems (Greenstein, 2004: 33).

However, at present, the LPM movement lacks the political or organisational strength to co-ordinate and sustain such actions (Greenstein, 2004: 31). The Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and the Anti-Eviction Campaign were some social movements that also rose up in 2001 following Bredell (Hart, 2008: 681). LPM could have formed meaningful alliances with these movements amongst others since they generally coalesce around the same grievances. The World Conference against Racism in 2001 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 for example provided platforms for these and other allied social movements to forge connections amongst themselves as well as with related movements globally and with sympathetic donors (Hart, 2008: 681).

There are still groups that are struggling for their land rights but remain outside the scope of any LPM influence. However for the local people, it remains important to be aware that there is a movement out there. The idea of mass occupations remains a popular expression of frustration and desire for rapid redistribution of land. The fact the movement was able to mobilise such a great number of protesters is more indicative of the importance of the land question in South Africa (attested by its high drawing power) than of the strength or force of the LPM (Rosa, 2014: 6).

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at two specific social movements in South Africa. Looking at how the social movements developed and how effective they have been in changing economic development in the country. The #FeesMustFall movement was a great success in pushing the government to rethink the provision of public goods namely tertiary education. The

Landless People's movement, though not as elaborate has also made great strides in advancing the call for land redistribution also forcing government to heed the push from below. The following chapter will conclude the research and summarise the conclusions.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

What this research set out to do was to bring the literature on economics and political agency (particularly, social movements) together in order to consider whether social movements may offer a solution to South Africa's economic development problems.

What was established early on through the theory was the role and relevance of social movements in the economic development project. Social movements emerge as a result of people becoming frustrated with their economic status quo and thus participate in political activities such as social movements in order to challenge their economic status quo and demand change. So in this way social movements act as vehicles to facilitate economic change. They give individuals a voice to challenge decision makers as well as an opportunity to mobilise and collectively engage with decision makers on issues that affect them. The underlying idea is that political decision makers usually display an inertia to change and often times require a kick in order to make policy changes. Social movements allow individuals to provide that kick and thus force political elites to heed the push from below and effect social and economic changes.

The role of social movements is also closely related to the underlying political economy. There have been a number of development strategies put in place in different countries in an attempt to realise economic development. Two competing strategies that feature in this regard are the neoliberal model and the developmentalist state model. What the literature has revealed is that the neoclassical model is characterised by a weakened role of the state in economic development. The state's role is mostly one of the night watchman intervening only in so far as to maintain a stable and conducive environment for the advancement of capital. The state aligns itself behind the interests of capital. As a result the neoclassical model deepens inequalities and brings about economic growth but neglects equity.

In both South Africa and Latin America, liberalisation and democratisation brought some gains including economic growth and some benefits to the poor. However there is a real sense of getting stuck. In the 1990s and the early 2000s in South Africa there seemed to be growth without redistribution. The case was more complicated in Latin America where there were also some improvements in the distribution of income. However subsequent to the 2008 crisis things soured and there is increasing recognition that the problem is not just distributional but the growth path itself is a problem.

There has since been an increasing nostalgia for the developmental state paradigm especially in both South Africa and Latin America. What this entails is a more state led development model with an alignment towards welfare. However, scholars such as Chibber warn that it is important to consider why the 20th century developmentalist state paradigm failed before reverting back to it. The early developmentalist state provided rapid economic development and industrialisation at first but this fizzled out into stagnation and increased rent seeking over time which paved the way for the rise of neoliberalism. Chibber blames its demise on the early developmentalist state model's reliance on a working alliance between the state and national capitalists. So naturally it follows that carrying on with the same model will lead to the same trajectory where the economic development project eventually becomes somehow 'stuck'. What this highlights is the need for some other economic model in the development project.

However, the emergence of a new economic development is not simply a question of economic considerations. It is inherently political in nature. In order for the economic model to shift, the politics must shift it. The twin situation of the economics being stuck and the politics unable or unwilling to get it unstuck results in a deadlock. This consolidates the emergence and role of social movements. Social movements emerge as an alternative form of politics that can pry the formal politics out of its inertia. However their ability to do so depends on the prevailing democracy. Liberal democracy (constitutions, elections, rule of law) is not enough to protect citizen participation in decision making. Social movements emerge outside liberal democracy to try and provide people with a voice. However in the presence of a neoliberal democracy, social movements face repression from the state and are often unable to achieve any meaningful structural change. Social movements need to be organised and focused on contesting structural and systemic change in order to be formidable in the face of state repression.

Following the collapse of apartheid, South Africa found itself in a unique position. The newly democratically elected government had to address the socio-economic inequalities that had been caused by the apartheid era and provide equitable redistribution of resources. Initially the neoliberal paradigm emerged as the leading economic development model in South Africa with rapid economic development and redistribution being the key targets. For example through economic growth models such as GEAR in 1996 which were inherently neoliberal. However over time, the economic growth path of South Africa began to stagnate and there was an increasing interest in shifting to a more developmentalist state approach to

economic development. The NDP in 2010 revealed the emerging interest in redirecting the development model towards a more developmentalist approach. The clear issues were that there were deep structural economic problems such as widening inequality, poverty and growing unemployment that plagued the country. However South Africa has failed to change its development model so economically South Africa is seemingly stuck. The neoliberal model in place has not produced the desirable economic growth path while at the same time there is a failure to shift to the developmentalist state paradigm due to, in part, the politics of the country.

Politically, there is an apparent hegemony of the ANC. The ANC believes in a single party led politics and development. And this can be in part attribute to the history of the politics in the country. Before independence there was a single clear unifying mandate amongst the political actors and that was to abolish the apartheid regime. However this surface unity papered over significant differences in the nature of the state and economic policy. Post-independence, the ANC assumed that this unity would continue and that all political actors would simply fall in line and form part of the new order. Further South Africa has shifted from a liberal democracy to a neoliberal democracy. The state and institutions are aligned behind an elitist national capitalist class in the country. As a result politically South Africa is also 'stuck' as the state has displayed a reluctance towards shifting towards more developmentalist policies as these go against neoliberal philosophies.

Given this background, the effectiveness and role of social movements in South Africa is of interest. In the early 1990's social movements were aligned towards challenging the apartheid regime in the country. After independence especially from the mid-2000s as the growth path in South Africa slowed down and the inequality and poverty issues deepened, there was increased frustration amongst individuals especially the marginalised poor black people. This saw an increase in social movement activity and the emergence of new social movements which are characterised by protests. The new social movement (protests) are largely fragmented dealing with single issues such as specific service delivery issues. The increase in protest action manifests the increasing dissatisfaction with the current processes of democracy in the country. Because people feel increasingly alienated from the state, they feel that protests are the only and most effective way to get the attention of government and force the government to listen. On the other hand due to the hegemony of the ANC, the state's response has largely been to silence protests often responding to protests with violent

disdain. So what this reveals is that the politics of the country needs to shift as well. There is a need for the deepening of democracy in South Africa further than just being able to vote.

Looking at the social movements themselves, the quality of social movements in South Africa comes into question. Social movements especially in South Africa have been somewhat focused on a rights based approach. They tend to seek radical transformation and highlighting injustices and infringements on people's rights. Social movements have been successful at mobilising people and creating an environment in which the demands of marginalised people are heard. However, the literature has revealed that social movements usually involve radical activism of small groups on narrowly defined single issues. As a result social movements have been unsuccessful at causing significant sustainable structural changes. The general tendency is that providing the kick from below is not enough to effect real change on a structural level. Things tend to revert once the pressure form social movements eases. The government often pretends to heed social movements putting in place superficial measures such as the formations of commissions to 'look into' whatever issue has been raised without any true tangible changes following. Social movements tend to flare up but just as quickly die down and become invalid without actually having effected any sustainable generalist structural changes. Leaderless, radical and unstructured social movements get easily dismissed because for the most part they usually demand social change without a clearly defined and convincing economic viability and achievability plan. What this highlights is the need for higher quality, better organised social movements with a clearly envisaged economic plan.

The Latin American case provides some sobering lessons. There does seem to be progress economically as well as politically in Latin America. The hard lessons that emerge is the need for more radical rather than classical agendas from social movements. The focus should be on considering the deeper structural issues rather than focusing on rights issues or social issues. For example looking at the MST in Brazil, their focus was on radical land reform. To a larger extent their model was based on redistributing land from landowners with large pieces of land but with little capacity to utilise it to those who landless people who were skilled but had no land. So the issue was largely economic and the MST were therefore able to achieve more systemic change. Whereas the LPM in South Africa were more focused on classical land reform where the primary objective was to give land back to black families who were unfairly dispossessed by the oppressive apartheid regime. The main issue was

largely about social redress and no mention was made of the economics of land reform hence they have been largely unsuccessful at achieving their goal.

Further, there is a need for a politically wider space for social movements. How social movements relate to power is important. The structure and internal political organisation of social movements is important. Flat, leaderless movements (such as the ones that characterise South African protests) are good but they tend to blow over quickly. There is a need for higher quality, hierarchical and more organised social movements in South Africa in order to effect deeper structural changes. Peasants in Bolivia for example formed alliances and used an organised and hierarchical, structured approach to push their government from the inside. In South Africa social movements remained largely fragmented and as result have remained outside and unable to penetrate the existing political structures and create an environment where government is receptive to their demands. A dilemma emerges here. Some argue that social movements are effective through being outside the hegemony because the danger is that institutionalism may lead to corporatism and therefore demobilisation. But the Latin American case provides a hard lesson that social movements need to be organised and structured. So the dilemma is how can social movements participate in legitimate processes and be inside the hegemony but without losing their autonomy? In order for social movements to be effective several factors come into play. Both the political space that social movements interact with and the social movements themselves need to mature and advance. There needs to be a wider political space with a deeper meaning of democracy. While social movements should be able to be better organised and institutionalised without the risk of jeopardising their autonomy and without facing the threat of demobilisation. The quality of social movements' contestation also needs to advance and align with deeper structural economic issues and questions in order to influence the economy beyond a superficial single issue level.

In answering the main research question: are social movements a viable tool in providing economic development in South Africa? Social movements can play an important role in shifting the developmental model to a different better model (whatever that may be) that stimulates economic development. Social movements emerge as important where the development model in place has failed to produce a satisfactory growth path. They can act as an important lever in the political economy to provide the push necessary to develop an economically viable and sustainable development model.

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