

SCHIZOPHRENIA AND MYSTICISM:  
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Carol Anne Hammond

Thesis presented to the Department  
of Psychology, Rhodes University,  
in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Psychology,  
January 1981.

For my mother, with gratitude

and

For my friends Isabella Childs, Priscilla Hall,  
Ron Hall and Ora Nell, for their generosity,  
encouragement and support.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to the following:

Professor H.W. Page for his critical discernment and patience.

Priscilla and Ron Hall for their kindness in opening their home to me and encouraging me in every conceivable way.

Isabella Childs for typing my thesis with her characteristic grace and efficiency.

Ida Bell, Jill Westcott, Priscilla Hall and Ron Hall for undertaking the dreary task of proof reading.

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
PART I THEORETICAL BACKGROUND	
CHAPTER 1 THE RISE OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND THE FALL OF MATERIALISM	9
1. Introduction	9
1.1 The emergence of parapsychology as a scientific discipline	11
1.2 The undermining of mechanistic theory	13
1.3 "Mind" as the organising principle of life	18
1.4 Wilber's model of the "Spectrum of Consciousness"	20
1.4.1 The Level of Mind.	21
1.4.2 The Transpersonal Bands	22
1.4.3 The Existential Level	22
1.4.4 The Biosocial Bands	22
1.4.5 The Ego Level	23
1.4.6 The Shadow Level	23
1.4.7 Interaction between various levels	24
1.4.8 The evolution of the spectrum, space and time	24
1.5 Evaluation of Wilber's model	26



	PAGE
CHAPTER 2 CONSCIOUSNESS AND ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS	30
2. Introduction	30
2.1 The concept of the generalised reality-orientation (GRO)	35
2.1.1 Comment	38
2.2 Reality, myth and language	40
2.3 Consciousness and the bicameral mind	43
2.3.1 Evaluation of Jaynes's theory	50
CHAPTER 3 SCHIZOPHRENIA	55
3. A model for schizophrenia?	55
3.1 The proper application of anti-psychiatry	64
3.2 The relevance of the concept of the generalised reality-orientation (GRO)	69
3.3 Psychoanalytical models of schizophrenia	78
3.3.1 Perry and the central archetype	80
3.3.2 Laing and the bird of paradise	86
3.4 Summary	94
CHAPTER 4 MYSTICISM AND THE MYSTIC	97
4. Introduction	97
4.1 The mystical experience	105
4.1.1 Deautomatization	110
4.1.2 Evaluation	116
4.1.3 Spontaneous mystical experience in persons classified as untrained-sensate	118
4.2 Psychedelic drug research	119

	PAGE
4.3 The role of the mystic in society	125
4.4 Summary	129
 CHAPTER 5 SCHIZOPHRENIC OR MYSTIC?	 131
5. Windmills and giants	131
5.1 Perry.	135
5.1.1 Evaluation.	137
5.2 Jaynes	138
5.2.1 Evaluation	139
5.3 Laing's psychedelic model of schizophrenia	145
5.4 Conclusions	151

## PART II JOAN OF ARC - AN EVALUATION

CHAPTER 6 A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	157
 CHAPTER 7 JOAN OF ARC - SCHIZOPHRENIC OR MYSTIC?	 163
7. Introduction	163
7.1 Joan of Arc as a schizophrenic.	170
7.1.1 The attitude of other persons to Joan	173
7.1.2 Skill and competence	178
7.1.3 Verbal ability	183
7.1.4 Joan's reaction to stress	186
7.1.5 Delusions of grandeur	188
7.1.6 Assessment.	193
7.2 Joan as a mystic.	194

	PAGE
7.2.1 Visions and voices	198
7.2.2 Joan as a prophetess	205
7.2.3 Concluding comment	208
SUMMARY	211
REFERENCE LIST	217
Additional books read	222
LIST OF FIGURES	
Figure I "The Spectrum of Consciousness"	21

## INTRODUCTION

In many societies the mystic experience has been regarded as akin to madness and prophet and schizophrenic have been bound in a queer relationship (like of course Joan of Arc herself).

Stephen Rose

The fact of her being schizophrenic in the dimension of psychiatry does not in the least detract from her significance in other dimensions. And vice versa. Even if we took it for granted that she was a saint, this would not change the fact that she was also a schizophrenic.

Victor Frankl

The aim of this thesis is to explore the "queer relationship" existing between mysticism and madness as it emerges from psychological writings and to examine and re-evaluate the life of Joan of Arc in terms of the conceptual framework that emerges.

An immediate difficulty arises with the definition of mysticism. It is problematic whether Joan sought "by contemplation and self-surrender to obtain union with or absorption into the deity" or believed "in spiritual apprehension of truths beyond the understanding" (O.E.D.). There is at first glance a considerable difference between Joan's experiences and those of the mystic studied predominantly today, who obtains his state of unity

within a highly structured framework. Joan's frame of reference was Christianity but her experience was hardly typical of everybody within it nor the result of a conscious technique employed by all as a means to a desirable end. Her voices came spontaneously, apparently as a side effect of her devotions. Eastern mysticism is the most accessible to modern investigators and is more in keeping with the quasi-humanistic spirit of modern scientism by virtue of its adaptability to a social milieu which in general scorns intercourse with incarnate personalities and feels interest in vague philosophies of spiritual enlightenment, love and peace. For these reasons it is expedient for the purposes of this thesis to extend the definition of mysticism to include potentially all those who have consistent and/or spontaneous "hallucinatory" or paranormal experience but who are not certifiable, though they may as a matter of opinion be deemed "mad" by some persons.

The example of Joan of Arc has the further difficulty that she lived in late mediaeval France, a citizen of another age, the daughter of another cosmology. Hence she is no longer available for questioning or testing; one cannot observe her behaviour at first hand. That she can be labelled "schizophrenic" or "mad" on the strength of her voices and visions alone is obviously believed by the authors of the quotations above. It is

the contention of this thesis that on this limited evidence, it is possible to question whether she was a schizophrenic or a mystic and to point out the difficulties inherent in this sort of evaluation. A lack of access to the original documents concerning Joan (which are written in Mediaeval French and Latin) and the need to rely on the discipline of history as represented by five studies can be defended on the basis that those writers who label her schizophrenic can be relying on nothing more. In the case of Joan, the investigator is fortunate in that, not only are there records of her trial, but also a rehabilitation set in motion at the instigation of her mother some twenty years after her execution, and a canonisation in this century. As one of her biographers points out:

We know practically every detail of her passive existence as a child and, as to the few months of her active career, they are so thoroughly documented that we know exactly where she spent each day, and in whose company; what she wore, what horse she rode, what arms she bore, what she ate and drank; and, more importantly still, what words she uttered. (Sackville-West, 1948, p. 21)

According to F.W.H. Myers, a founder of the British Psychological Research Society, "few pieces of history so remote as this can be so accurately known" (cited in Moss, 1976, p. 200).

The disadvantages are counterbalanced by the major advantage that it is only with the distancing that time pro-

vides that she (or any person of her kind) can be assessed. Bernard Shaw suggests, in a lively preface to his play St Joan (1957), that she was the first nationalist (and in this ahead of her time) because she believed uncompromisingly in France for the French; and the first Protestant martyr in that she died because she refused to acknowledge the Pope's and therefore the Catholic Church's, authority as greater than that of her voices, which she believed were her direct link with God. Though Shaw's comments are open to criticism it is possible to see that Joan's refusal can be equated with the refusal of Luther, for example, to accept the authority of the Catholic Church, taking into consideration that Joan was uneducated and Luther was not. It is the voice of personal experience and independent thought versus dogma and the establishment.

It would indeed be a trap to decide that Joan must be a mystic because of her political and religious significance alone - a clear indication of the stigma attached to the label "schizophrenic" (though let it be added that in some circles of psychological thought, the label "mystic" is hardly more respectable). If she is to be evaluated at all, it must be on her behaviour and speech, her autonomy and competence, rather than the honours that have accrued to her. It is significant to note that she was not merely a passive figurehead caught up



in circumstances beyond her control; nor can it be said that she was a schizophrenic shrewd enough to find a role for herself in a more gullible age. (The synchronicity of her appearance at such a pertinent moment in history would be astonishing indeed.) Joan accomplished much of what she set out to do, sublimely ignorant of theological or historical repercussions and naively innocent of any desire for self-aggrandisement, despite her acceptance and enjoyment of the pleasures incurred and honours accorded her by her early success.

In presenting his concept of ontological dimensions as a means of doing justice to man's ontological differences and anthropological unity, (from which discussion the quotation above is taken), Frankl (1971) makes the point that the danger of specialisation is that specialists often fall into the trap of generalising from their own discipline and reducing many phenomena so that they fit into the frame of reference within which the specialists are working. Unless the totality of the person's life is taken into account when the so-called "symptoms" are evaluated, there is the danger that what is normal may be mistaken for pathology. In most cases - and exceptions will be discussed later - it seems extremely unlikely that a person who experiences events not generally accessible will be incarcerated in a mental hospital as long as he/she maintains appropriate be-



haviour socially or, to express it another way, is able to incorporate his/her experiences into the warp and woof of everyday life, that is, find a meaning for them. But the psychiatrist may succumb to the temptation of labelling all unusual experience as pathological, with the result that great and creative persons like C.G. Jung and William Blake are assigned to the ranks of paranoid schizophrenics who got away. This argues either a very limited definition of what is normal or desirable experience in this culture, in which case the argument for psychiatry and mental hospitals as a traumatic instrument of social control becomes relevant; or a remarkably wide definition of schizophrenia, which would seem to be the result of anti-psychiatry taken to extremes. At a psychology seminar, for instance, Harry Stack Sullivan's remarkably accurate statement in a public lecture was mentioned (Sullivan, 1962). The remark was not intended as a prediction but as an illustration merely. He spoke of his death at the age of 57 years as the result of a cerebral haemorrhage, which occurred eighteen years later, when Sullivan was 56 years, 10 months and 24 days old. The supervisor's comment was that he had heard that Sullivan was a schizophrenic, which he, the supervisor, appeared to feel explained the coincidence adequately. This wide definition of schizophrenia seems based on those observations which show that the concept of madness is relative to the social milieu, that "psychotic" behav-

our is envied and given status in some tribes and that the hospitalisation of chronic schizophrenia can be seen as a punishment for social deviance. These ideas will be discussed later.

It is the fact of man's ontological differences and today's academic specialisation that makes the conceptual analysis of mysticism and schizophrenia a hazardous task. The study involves theories of consciousness and altered states of consciousness (often physiologically based), psychiatry, religion, and cultural and time gaps. For this reason, just as a study of the "mechanics" of belief aids the sociologist in analysing the belief systems of men, many of which systems overlap and contradict one another in both the individual and his culture, so a means of reconciling apparently contradictory disciplines must be sought so that the mechanics of mysticism and schizophrenia become the main focus and the content of the belief or delusional system and the form of its resultant overt behaviour largely irrelevant.

## P A R T I

### THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

He said to them, 'When, therefore, a teacher of the law has become a learner in the Kingdom of Heaven, he is like a householder who can produce from his store both the new and the old.'

The Gospel according to St Matthew

## CHAPTER 1

THE RISE OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY  
AND  
THE FALL OF MATERIALISM

This feeling of being lonely and very temporary visitors in the universe is in flat contradiction to everything known about man (and all other living organisms) in the sciences. We do not 'come into' this world; we come out of it, as leaves from a tree. As the ocean 'waves,' the universe 'peoples.' [sic] Every individual is an expression of the whole realm of nature, a unique action of the total universe. This fact is rarely, if ever, experienced by most individuals. Even those who know it to be true in theory do not sense or feel it, but continue to be aware of themselves as isolated 'egos' in bags of skin.

Alan Watts

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Koestler (1967) has written that orthodox science rests chiefly on "four pillars of unwisdom", which he summarises in simplified form. These are:

- (a) that biological evolution is the result of random mutations preserved by natural selection;
- (b) that mental evolution is the result of random tries preserved by 'reinforcements' (rewards);
- (c) that all organisms, including man, are essentially passive automata controlled by the environment, whose sole purpose in life is the reduction of tensions by adaptive responses:  
[sic]

- (d) that the only scientific method worth that name is quantitative measurement; and, consequently, that complex phenomena must be reduced to simple elements accessible to such treatment, without undue worry whether the specific characteristics of a complex phenomenon, for instance man, may be lost in the process. (Koestler, 1967, p. 3)

In defending his earlier and subsequent attack on behaviourism, he makes the point that the model of man as a machine has had a profound influence on our whole culture, permeating our attitude to disciplines like philosophy and the social sciences. Ornstein (1973), among others, concurs, pointing out that there has been a confusion between behaviourism as a useful tool and behaviourism as the total extent of knowledge. Psychologists have tended to ignore and even deny the phenomena which do not lend themselves to investigation by behaviouristic methods.

Granted that the conditioned response seems woefully inadequate as an explanation of how great works of art, for example, come into being, the following question about Joan of Arc becomes relevant. What is it about Joan's auditory and visual "hallucinations" and the beliefs engendered by them that particularly affronts the modern mind? Is it not that, conditioned by the scientific approach, nurtured in materialism and skilled in reductionism, it cannot perforce accept that Joan was in direct communication with disembodied entities calling themselves St Michael, St Catherine and

St Margaret? If the emphasis is shifted, however, it can be stated that Joan received information and inspiration from an unknown source, which she identified as these three saints. L. Rhine (1962) observed that information of this sort presents itself to the recipient in a manner congruent with his/her frame of reference. Moss (1976) concurs that beliefs and interests affect the form in which precognitive material presents itself to a person and has this to say about Joan.

It was recorded that Joan saw in a vision, and heard her voices tell her, that the siege of Orleans would be raised; that the Dauphin would be crowned King of France at the cathedral in Rheims; and that she would be wounded in battle. These prophecies were fulfilled. She also received the message that France would win a great victory over England within seven years. This prophecy was not fulfilled. This is an important item. Probably very few people in history have been as gifted, psychically, as Joan of Arc, yet she, too, was apparently sometimes wrong in her interpretations of the visions and voices.  
(p. 200)

In the ontological dimension of parapsychology, then, Joan was a psychic sensitive. Admittedly, this is hardly more acceptable to the scientifically oriented mind, although interest in the study of "psi" is growing fast.

#### 1.1 THE EMERGENCE OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, F.W.H. Myers founded, with among others Henry Sidgwick and Sir William Barrett, the Society for Psychical Research, which came into existence as a result of their dissatis-



faction with the prevailing view of man as a mere machine. When Myers published Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death in 1903, William James, in his review (1903), commented:

Anyone with a healthy sense of evidence, a sense not methodically blunted by the sectarianism of 'science' ought now ... to feel that exalted sensibilities and memories, veridical phantasms, haunted houses, trances with supernormal faculty, and even experimental thought-transference, are natural kinds of phenomena which ought, just like other natural events, to be followed up with scientific curiosity .... the existence all about us of thousands ... of persons, not perceptibly hysteric or unhealthy, who are mediumistic ... is a phenomenon of human life which [psychologists] do not even attempt to connect with any of the other facts of nature. Add the fact that the mediumship often gives supernormal information, and it becomes evident that the phenomenon cannot consist of pure eccentricity and isolation.... It cries aloud for serious investigation. (cited in S. Smith, 1961)

Notwithstanding the fact that the Society conducted laboratory experiments on hypnosis, automatic writing, dowsing and clairvoyance by methods comparable to the prevailing standards of the day, it became unwise for young psychologists to show interest in the field.

It took the efforts of two biologists, Dr Joseph Banks Rhine and his wife, Louisa, to confer on parapsychology some measure of respectability. With the use of Zener cards and statistical probability theory, they set out to investigate telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition and psychokinesis, which appear to be the principles operating in a host of vivid, spontaneous paranormal experiences universally present, apparently since the

beginning of recorded history. Their endeavours were successful to such an extent that in 1955 Dr George R. Price (cited in Randall, 1975) put two alternatives to the scientific world. Either it had to accept that ESP existed and so undermine the very foundations of modern science, the mechanistic theory, or it had to call in question the honesty of the experimenters. As Dr Hans Eysenck has pointed out, this would suggest a "gigantic conspiracy involving some thirty University departments all over the world, and several hundred highly respected scientists in various fields, many of them originally hostile to the claims of the psychical researchers" (cited in Randall, 1975, p. 111).

## 1.2 THE UNDERMINING OF MECHANISTIC THEORY

The mechanistic theory has not been undermined by parapsychology alone. The field of physics has found the need to widen its philosophical boundaries to accommodate its discoveries. Dr Henry Margenau, Professor of Physics and Natural Philosophy at Yale University, observed that:

This decline of materialism occurred first because various discoveries culminating in the demonstration of the Relativity Principle, made untenable the notion of a continuous material medium upon whose postulation materialism was dependent. Next, the atom, which had been conceived as a solid pellet of stuff, turned out to be wholly empty, containing nothing that could be called 'matter' at all. It had degenerated into a series of singularities haunting space. This rather disposed of matter. Furthermore...there has been a change



in the old-style dogmatism that imbued the whole of physical science.(cited in S. Smith, 1961, p. 15)

The most intriguing development in physics comes from quantum theory. One of the fundamental principles of quantum theory, the Principle of Complementarity, states that electrons, photons etc. are "Janus-faced" entities (Janus in mythology had two faces, each looking in a different direction), which can behave like waves in one set of circumstances and like grains in another. Though these modes of behaviour are contradictory, physicists are forced to treat them as if they are complementary. Moreover, quantum theory shows that the observer and the process observed are inseparably linked. This carries the implication that, any definite statement about a process is valid only for the observer of that process, so that what we call objective reality is questionable (Koestler, 1973). If then at the atomic level, the world in time and space no longer exists, Koestler suggests an analogy may be drawn with (and a resolution reached of) the mind-body continuum problem in that the contents of mental experiences may also be seen to exist outside the framework of space, time and substance, yet be linked with the material brain.

An increasing tendency to holism, that the understanding of the whole is as necessary to the understanding of the parts as the parts are for the understanding of the

whole, makes it possible to conceptualise a transcendence of physical causality and admit into man's understanding of his life an a-causal principle, a principle similar to that of Formative cause, outlined by Aristotle in contrast to Effective Cause when events are linked by a definite, strong, causal chain. Formative cause deals with relationships between the parts of a system imposed by the structure of the system as a whole. This, in the opinion of F.D. Peat (cited in Koestler, 1973), may be a more suitable framework of causality in which to obtain understanding of such reactions as perception, personal reactions, experiences and, in particular, "psi" phenomena.

Evolution, man's descent from the apes, the result of a chance cosmic occurrence which caused life to assemble itself, is another basic tenet of the deterministic faith. It too is being questioned in the light of new discoveries.

In 1953 Stanley Miller passed an electrical discharge through a mixture of hydrogen, methane, ammonia and water vapour and obtained traces of fifteen amino acids. This result led to the assumption that physical forces acting upon a mixture of gases produced a "prebiotic soup" containing the materials necessary for life to generate itself. Yet evidence for this cannot be found,

although compounds of nitrogenous matter like amino acids and purines are readily absorbed by rock and clay. Another requirement for the spontaneous emergence of life, a reducing atmosphere i.e. containing gases like methane rather than oxygen, has also left no trace behind it despite the fact that this spontaneous generation would have taken millions of years. Reduced iron beds, sometimes used as evidence for the presence of this atmosphere, were deposited after living systems had come into being and are probably the result of the activity of living organisms. A Cambridge zoologist, W.H. Thorpe, reasons thus:

The event which produced living matter must have been highly improbable even under primordial conditions. Assuming that an aqueous solution of amino-acids had been formed....and that the concentration of each free amino-acid is kept at one M, the equilibrium concentration of a protein with 100 residues (MW about 12,000) is  $10^{-99}M$  which represents 1 molecule in a volume  $10^{50}$  times the volume of the earth. This appears to rule out the possibility of the formation of any protein by mass action, even in the presence of a catalyst....Thus the formation of two or more molecules of any enzyme purely by chance is fantastically improbable. (cited in Randall, 1975, p. 205)

The spontaneous and mindless generation of life can be doubted in terms of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states that closed physical systems tend towards a state of maximum entropy, or maximum disorder. The scientist is confronted with the paradox of living organisms which apparently feed on negative entropy, showing a tendency to organise themselves into highly complex and harmonious patterns. If a new law of

thermodynamics is formulated for open systems (like living organisms), the difficulty is still how such open systems originated, except in the presence of some hypothetical organising force (Randall, 1975).

Information theory also tends to cast doubt upon the mindless and random origin of life. A patterned system requires that there be a certain amount of information available for the materials to be assembled in the correct order. The quantity of information is expressed in binary units or "bits". It has been estimated that the store of information in an amoeba alone must be several times that of the most advanced computer. If, then, life originated in gas, the most random substance known to science, containing negligible information, how was this lack of information transmuted into the incredible complexity found in living creatures (Randall, 1975)?

One of the most fundamental principles of evolution is that of homologous organs, which can no longer be explained in terms of biological theory. The proponents of evolution made much of the resemblances between the skeletons of the limbs of different animals. This would be acceptable if these structures were transmitted by the same gene-complex, albeit subject to the processes of natural selection. Homologous organs have, however, been shown to originate in totally different gene-complexes, undermining the simple concept of homo-

logy in terms of similar genes inherited from a common ancestor. There is evidence to suggest that genes are, instead, organised in each species according to an overall plan. The latter idea is supported by D'Arcy Thompson's work which suggests that the shapes of animals belonging to the same zoological group are related in a simple mathematical way and that the shape of one species can be obtained from the shape of another by distorting the spatial co-ordinates (Randall, 1975).

### 1.3 "MIND" AS THE ORGANISING PRINCIPLE OF LIFE

These indications that living things have developed according to a pre-ordained plan have led Randall (1975) to assert that the only way in which parapsychology can be fitted into our present cosmology is by a return to dualism. He postulates a hypothetical construct, Mind, as the force behind the organising principle in organic matter and indeed in the universe. There is a faint echo of agreement in the realm of astronomy and physics. For instance, Sir James Jeans's reaction to one of the fundamental principles of quantum theory is that "the universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine" (cited in Koestler, 1975, pp. 224 - 225).

While some scientists believe that consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon of brain function, that there is no "ghost in the machine", others do not feel that the ex-



perienicing self can be identified solely with brain activity on the physiological level. According to Bergson (cited in Heywood, 1968a), the brain is an organ of limitation, allowing man to focus attention, causing man to perceive what is exterior as divisible objects which can be manipulated - a phenomenon which has given rise to the mechanistic interpretation of nature. Sir Cyril Burt saw the brain as an organ designed, not to generate consciousness, but for detecting or transmitting conscious activity (cited in Heywood, 1968a).

Hence man is not a creature upon which the environment acts to produce a socially conditioned automaton, though clearly there is an interaction between person and environment to produce the unique being in time and space postulated here.

In view of these developments and the increased interest in mental, "subjective" events, the nature of consciousness and altered states of consciousness (ASCs) which has resulted from or been given impetus by drug-experimentation and meditation, it appears to be an appropriate time for psychologists to adopt a new model of man, which will accommodate not only objective and subjective events but also the many disciplines directed and operating at various levels of his experience.

#### 1.4 WILBER'S MODEL OF THE "SPECTRUM OF CONSCIOUSNESS"

Huxley (1958) describes a universal doctrine as to the nature of man and reality which lies at the core of every major metaphysical tradition. This represents an unchanging reality untouched by time and place, always true. Wilber (1975) points out that there is a psychologia perennis or perennial psychology which reflects the same insights, that is, a universal agreement as to the nature of human consciousness. He sets out to present a model of consciousness which will accommodate both Eastern and Western insights. Within the framework of this "spectrum of consciousness" the human personality is a multi-levelled manifestation or expression of a single consciousness, each level representing a different and easily recognised sense of individual identity, ranging from cosmic consciousness to the infinitely narrower sense of identity represented by egoic consciousness.

Wilber presents the concept of the Spectrum of Consciousness as it applies to man, diagrammatically in a figure, which in its adapted form is given below.




FIGURE I. The broad lines indicate the major levels of identity. The three line groupings represent the auxiliary bands. The diagonal line represents the self/not-self boundary which breaks at the Transpersonal Bands and vanishes at the Level of Mind. Note. Adapted from "Psychologia Perennis: The Spectrum of Consciousness" by Ken Wilber, Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1975, 7 (2), 107.

#### 1.4.1 THE LEVEL OF MIND

Man's innermost consciousness is identical to the ultimate reality of the universe, which in various religions is represented by a deity, but which Wilber calls Mind (not to be confused with the apparent plurality of minds). Here man is identified with the Absolute. This level is the only state of consciousness, all other states being illusions.



#### 1.4.2 THE TRANSPERSONAL BANDS

This is the area of the spectrum where man is not conscious of his Supreme Identity, nor yet confined to the boundaries of a single organism. It is here that paranormal phenomena could be expected to take place.

#### 1.4.3 THE EXISTENTIAL LEVEL

At this level man is identified only with his total psychophysical organism, for it is here that the distinction between self and others, organism and environment, is firmly drawn. This is where the rational processes and personal will first come into being. The Buddhist terms this the level of the manas and defines it as the persistent source of existential, rational, volitional awareness.

#### 1.4.4 THE BIOSOCIAL BANDS

These are located at the upper limits of the Existential Level, being composed of "the internalised matrix of cultural premises, familial relationships, and social glosses, as well as the all-pervading social institutions of language, logic, ethics and law .... those aspects of the organism's social environment that it has introjected across the organism-environment boundary" (p. 109) - the internalised society, which profoundly colours and moulds the organism's basic sense of existence. As anthropologist Edward Hall (cited in Wilber, 1975) ex-

plains:

Selective screening of sensory data admits some things while filtering others, so that experience as it is perceived through one set of culturally patterned sensory screens is quite different from the experience perceived through another. (p. 109)

#### 1.4.5 THE EGO LEVEL

Here man does not feel directly identified with his psychosomatic organism. Rather he identifies solely with the approximate mental representation or picture of his total organism, his ego or self-image. His total organism is split into a disembodied "psyche", "the ghost in the machine", and the "soma" (p. 109). He feels he exists in his body and not as his body. Since he is identified almost exclusively with this mental picture of his total self, his intellectual and symbolic processes predominate.

#### 1.4.6 THE SHADOW LEVEL

Sometimes man alienates various aspects of his psyche, dis-identifies with them and narrows his sphere of identity to only parts of the ego, which Wilber calls the persona. Man is identified with an impoverished and inaccurate self-image (i.e. the "persona") while the rest of his psychic tendencies, those too evil or undesirable, are alienated as the contents of the shadow.

#### 1.4.7 INTERACTION BETWEEN VARIOUS LEVELS

There is a flow and interaction between the various bands in the dynamic process called living. Nevertheless, each level represents an increasingly narrowed sphere of identity, from the universal Mind through to the facet of the psyche called the persona. Each level is also marked by a different mode of knowing, a different set of dualisms, a different class of unconscious processes.

#### 1.4.8 THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPECTRUM, SPACE AND TIME

The doctrine of maya supplies the answer to the question of why these levels seem to exist, since the level of Mind is held to be the only reality. Maya represents any experience stemming from dualism, especially the primary dualism of subject vs. object. In terms of the perennial psychology, all dualism is not so much unreal as illusory. According to G. Spencer Brown (cited in Wilber, 1975), in his mathematical treatise Laws of Form, the world is constituted in such a way as to be able to see itself; but in order to do so, it must cut itself into at least one part which sees and at least one part which is seen. Whatever it sees, then, is only partially itself (see also 1.2). The division only apparently divides the world. The psychologia perennis declares that since all levels of mind are the products of maya or dualism, they must exist only in an illusory

fashion, with the reality of each level remaining always Mind. For the purposes of the psychologia perennis the most convenient labels for the two halves of the original dualism are subject and object, self and other or organism and environment. With its occurrence is created the next major level after Mind, the Existential Level. Since this involves seer and seen, it simultaneously creates space. Once man identifies exclusively with his organism, the problem of life and death is created and the fear of death. The creation of the dualism of life vs. death is simultaneously the creation of time - for Mind is timeless and always present. (Hence it can perhaps be argued that all time is always present.) The consequence of the disruption of the life and death which exists at the organic level is to make man the historical animal. (This accounts for the uniqueness of the individual in a certain culture at a certain time - an action of the total universe.) He necessarily separates past from future and is thrown out of the timeless now into historical time, identified exclusively with his organism as it exists in time and space.

The creation of time sends man fleeing from death and results in the idealised image of himself, his ego, for being composed of fixed and stable symbols, it offers man the security his body does not. The everlasting escape from death is embodied in static symbols. He

identifies with the undying idea of himself, moving from his total psycho-physiological organism to his self-image, with the result that the Ego Level is created.

Finally he identifies with only a fraction of his psychic processes. He disowns unwanted aspects, distorting and impoverishing them by identifying with the persona and projecting the rest of himself into the shadow. The levels of the spectrum infinitely shade into one another. They appear real only to those unable to see through the illusion to the ever-present and unchanging reality, Mind.

#### 1.5 EVALUATION OF WILBER'S MODEL

The main objection which can be raised to this model is its basis in the religious and philosophical insights which underlie both Eastern and Christian mysticism. The use of words like maya and manas, for instance, must be accepted as names describing certain processes, as a justification for their use obviously lies beyond the scope of this study.

The fact that it is based on philosophy and religion at all needs little apology. McClelland (1964), for instance, has argued rather convincingly that Freud's theory had its origins in Jewish belief and mysticism



and that psychoanalysis can be seen as the religion of the intelligentsia. Even a slight acquaintance with the objectives of Eastern mysticism and of Christianity suggests that they have similarities to those of humanistic psychologists like Maslow. As Walker (1962) points out, science and religion have not always been, and are not necessarily, in conflict. The failure of Christianity as a myth (in the wider sense of the word) has been, in the opinion of Jung (1977), that it has neglected to grow in order to accommodate the needs of a changing social and scientific milieu. The conflict with science has arisen from the restrictions of institutionalised religion, which does not recognise that the revelations of God to his people did not necessarily grind to a halt with the last chapter of the Bible. Christianity has at last begun to respond to the challenges raised by this change in man's intellectual perspective in becoming more ethically oriented and in renewing its interest in mysticism or direct experience as opposed to theology or dogma.

There is another reason why this dimension of mind is appropriate. Persons like Joan of Arc are not deemed mad by virtue of "symptoms" alone but also by virtue of the beliefs concerning man's true nature within which these unusual events are interpreted. It is the inalienable right of every individual to interpret his ultimate

destiny in those terms which, by virtue of intelligence and nature, he finds emotionally satisfying. It is the business of psychologists, at least in some of the applications of their discipline, to respect and concern themselves with these beliefs even while taking into account their relativity to time, culture and person. If religion is seen as an expression of man's potential for dignity and meaning, there is every reason for him to reject the notion that his value can be assessed in terms of whether he, like a famous golfer's family, uses an equally famous brand of toothpaste. Consumer conformity is a poor substitute as the opiate of the masses. A model of consciousness which attempts to do justice to the mystic while failing to include a dimension that will accommodate his interpretation of himself would be ridiculous.

Wilber's Spectrum of Consciousness is extremely flexible and will be the tacit framework throughout this study for the following reasons.

Since he locates various therapies and schools of psychological thought at different levels of human experience, the apparent contradictions in theory and application can be neutralised. The model provides a useful and comprehensive framework within which to study the mechanics of schizophrenia and mysticism as relationships rather

than as sets of behaviour and content of belief. Because the model transcends the merely temporal and scientific without negating their importance, it is possible to evaluate a person without reducing him/her. Moreover, the model should prove acceptable to both dualists and monists and a dangerous area of controversy can be avoided.



## CHAPTER 2

## CONSCIOUSNESS

## AND

## ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (ASCs)

Our normal waking consciousness ... is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of conscious ~~/sle~~ entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are all there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question - for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality.

William James

## 2. INTRODUCTION

In its extreme reaction against the futilities of introspection as a means of studying the mind and its determination to become a quantitative science, the Behaviourist School refused to recognise consciousness as a subject for study; just as parapsychologists had to abandon the richness of spontaneous "psi" so that ESP was reduced to what A.J. Ayer called "no more than a colourful way of summarizing a mildly interesting collection of statistics" (cited in Parker, 1975, p. 11).

Renewed interest in ASCs and consciousness can be traced to at least two sources. The first was the emergence of the humanistic, existential and phenomenological approaches to psychology, which gave priority to experiencing and awareness. The second was the psychedelic experience of members of the counter-culture, which would appear to have been born of the existential vacuum produced by the overwhelming advances in technology, the hypocrisy of power politics and the values used to rationalise them. One can only begin to guess at the lack of meaning and despair of the followers of a Manson or a Jones.

The intensive attention given to ASCs, as a result of drug experimentation, has not met with uniform approval. Rose (1976), for example, has pointed out the similarities between drug-induced states and psychosis. He argues that our present brain structure is a product of a hundred thousand years of human social evolution and has proved its usefulness as an instrument for interpreting and manipulating the surrounding world; and that it is precisely these rational modes of enquiry which mysticism relegates to a position of secondary importance. Important as spontaneous ASCs may be for enriching our existence, he feels that mystic experience for the few should not be allowed to jeopardise the opportunities for mind expansion in the widest sense for all. He supports his views with those ideals that

scientists generally use to rationalise their own myth (again in the widest sense and not necessarily derogatory). He underlines the need to act upon the world so that conditions of poverty and ignorance can be changed. Rose is justified in pointing out the dangers of psychedelic drugs used indiscriminately, for this leads to psychological and behavioural degeneration as surely as the use of alcohol may lead to degeneration unless its use is ritualised as for instance, in the Jewish culture. It is also true that the rational consciousness he speaks of has high survival value. But to dismiss Ornstein's argument (1973) for a reintegration of the hypothetically more mystical functioning of the right cerebral hemisphere as a corrective to Western man's largely linear existence as merely fashionable and irrelevant at the present time is to misunderstand the nature of the true mystical experience. The present time is in fact the only time humanity, and even more pertinently, the individual has. For most people, constrained as are scientists by the vested interests of power politics, their sole effective gesture to alleviating the plight of the starving millions would seem to be eating every morsel on their plate in gratitude that they are able to eat at all; and the best antidote to the sort of despair and abandonment of values evidenced in activities like drug-taking is the renewal of a meaningful structure within which the individual can exercise his rational consciousness to its

fullest extent for those very ideals Rose puts forward - not distanced to Biafra or intellectualised to some hypothetical future time but in those opportunities presenting themselves here and now. It seems to be in the nature of the true, as opposed to the pseudo, mystical and religious experience to bring about a change of character and lifestyle, so that the individual may work with inexhaustible energy to actualise himself by alleviating those adverse conditions he finds about him (Masters & Houston, 1967; Underhill, 1967). Paradoxically the results of some types of mysticism are extremely practical.

The crux of the controversy surrounding ASCs and mystical experience is not whether all and sundry, encouraged by the trendiness of it, are going to abandon responsibilities and values for the intangible rewards and individual indulgence of meditation and contemplation. It is an attempt to redress the "nothing but" attitude of quantitative science to a large proportion of human experience. As Tart (1969) points out, it is in the nature of the experiencing person to form beliefs and theories around what he experiences. A scientific exploration of ASCs will diminish the likelihood that he will systematise his delusions. It is an exploration of the potential of the human psyche to experience realities which may exist under, over and above what men can only assume is the

reality they experience in common with their fellows; perhaps whether the structuring of reality is merely arbitrary relative to culture or whether there does indeed exist an anthropological unity of Mind in Wilber's sense.

Beloff's attitude (1975), though cautious, is a good deal more optimistic about the renewed interest in the richness and diversity of consciousness. He acknowledges the contribution of behaviourism in developing the methodology, sophisticated research design and instrumentation which make the scientific exploration of consciousness possible. He states that this area of study will aid the emergence of a more holistic and positive view of man. Man is no longer just a machine or a battleground of conflicting urges and desires but a creature with curiosity and creativity over and above biological determinism. Man can more confidently and optimistically direct his efforts towards the goals of self-fulfilment and self-transcendence as opposed to those of mere self-preservation and self-assertion. Beloff agrees with Ornstein (1973) in that he acknowledges the challenge to psychology to attempt to integrate the alien metaphysics of Eastern traditions into a scientific and linear mode of knowing which has proved so singularly successful. Parker (1975) points out that the conceptual framework which emerges from this area of study will be an effective vehicle for the exploration of parapsychology (and by inference other phenomena



like perception) which thus far has had to subjugate itself to the laws of logic when its subject-matter appears to defy and contradict those laws.

The purpose of the present chapter is not, however, an exhaustive discussion of consciousness, ASCs and mysticism. In fact, it will be necessary to return to these topics again if this study is to achieve coherence. The present requirement is that concepts which have been derived from the study of ASCs should be introduced and explicated so that they may be referred to later without further explanation, thus greatly facilitating the discussion to follow. These concepts can, within the framework of Wilber's Spectrum of Consciousness, be seen as attempts to explain aspects of how Mind (consciousness in the widest sense) uses the extraordinarily flexible brain to focus attention on the environment and to transmit and detect consciousness in the more limited sense relative to culture in historical time and space (1.3), the levels of the spectrum being mainly those extending from the Existential to the Ego level (1.4.3 -1.4.5).

## 2.1 THE CONCEPT OF THE GENERALISED REALITY-ORIENTATION

Shor (1969) postulates that the usual state of consciousness is characterised by the mobilisation of a structured frame of reference, which supports, interprets and gives meaning to all experiences. He calls this the usual gen-



eralised reality-orientation. It develops slowly throughout the life-cycle and is the only tool a person has to deal effectively with the enormous quantities of complex stimuli he encounters during his waking life. It is maintained effortlessly and is not usually consciously directed. When the person is fatigued or hyper-preoccupied with a task, the supportive energy of the generalised reality-orientation diminishes and it fades into the more distant background of attention, becoming relatively non-functional.

From this "structured complex of recollections", this "abstractive super-structure of ideas", this "superordinate gestalt of interrelationships", are derived concepts and functions like reality-testing, body image, critical self-awareness, cognition of self, world, other people, time, space, logic, purpose, various inhibitions, conscious fears and defences; yet it is not equivalent to the many processes that derive from it, nor is it the mere sum total of them. It does not exist just to test reality but is an inner surrogate for reality; and it is only in terms of the reality-orientation that the self and the world and the distinction between them can become meaningful. This generalised reality-orientation (GRO) is not inflexible. It has many facets; and what appears in the central background of attention depends on the demands of the immediate situation. Nevertheless, the re-

mainder of the reality-orientation is still within the bounds of consciousness, is in communication at all times. When close communication has faded into relatively non-functional awareness, the resultant state of mind may be designated as trance. Hence, when the subject's attention is focussed on a small range of preoccupations, certain behaviours can function in isolation. The concretisation, stimulus-boundedness and rigidity which occur when a brain-damaged person, for instance, no longer has functionally available the usual background to his behaviour, are paralleled in hypnosis by suggestibility and hypersuggestibility. The latter are not the primary processes of hypnosis but are derivative consequences of isolation. Hypnosis is an admixture of two fundamental processes, the construction of a special, temporary orientation to a small range of preoccupations and the relative fading of the GRO.

The GRO never fades away completely either in trance or sleep. Any situation which calls forth vigilance rapidly reinstates it. One is not usually aware that it has faded; indeed, awareness requires its partial remobilisation. When it does fade, experiences cannot have their usual meaning and may acquire special meanings as a result of their isolation from the totality of experience. Likewise, special orientations or special tasks function as the only possible reality in his phenomenal awareness

if the subject is hypnotised.

As a consequence of the fading of the GRO, a person may come or be brought closer to the sources of his non-conscious functioning. Various mental contents excluded before can now flow more freely into phenomenal awareness and primary-process material and modes of thought may flow into the background of awareness to orient experiences. These capacities and memories have been denied expression either by active repression or because they do not fit into the conventional schemata which are the "symbolic fabric" of the waking mind. The orientation resulting from the free flow of primary process material and modes of thought shares some of the qualities of the dream; and at this level, there is not only a greater possibility of experiences which do not fit the usual reality-orientation but of new, special orientations being constructed at profound levels, without reference to knowledge, logic or critical faculties.

#### 2.1.1 COMMENT

In terms of the Spectrum of Consciousness, the GRO is the end product of the process whereby the organism at birth becomes aware of itself as distinct from its environment and other organisms and acquires "the internalised matrix of cultural premises, familial relationships, and social glosses, .... and the all-pervading social institutions

of language, logic, ethics and law", which comprise its internalised society at the level of the Biosocial Bands (1.4.4). Added to this are those experiences and activities that are peculiar to the person himself, making him unique within his shared social or cultural context. To the extent that it (the generalised reality-orientation) is based on memory it is determining and limiting, yet making up for these disadvantages by being stable. To the extent that personality can be seen as a time gestalt (Angyal, 1965) so that events which have happened in time can achieve new relationships in the whole in response to new experience or to striving and creating a harmonious, fulfilling and meaningful life, the GRO may be seen as dynamic and flexible. As Shor states, it develops slowly throughout the life-cycle. In existential terms, Frankl (1971) describes the same process of becoming and being human as follows:

The essentially self-transcendent quality of human existence renders man a being reaching out beyond himself. Therefore, if Martin Buber ... interprets human existence basically in terms of a dialogue between I and Thou, we must recognise that this dialogue defeats itself unless I and Thou transcend themselves to refer to a meaning outside themselves ... what encounter one another are not two monads but rather human beings of which one confronts the other with logos, that is, the meaning of being. (pp. 8 - 9)

Angyal (1965) describes the process of development from Existential to Ego level in a way that will be equally important for an understanding of the argument in later

chapters. Through physiological maturation, disagreeable sensations and limitations in manipulating the external world, the child moves from a state of complete embeddedness in the environment to a sense of his separateness, the difference between the "I" and the "non-I". Though this results in anxiety, the sense of isolation provides the opportunity to become human because it requires that he exercise mastery and love to achieve homonomy and autonomy; that is, to re-relate himself to the world through loving relationships, which require separateness, and manipulation of his environment.

While it cannot be said that the GRO is totally synonymous with the ego, the part of man's consciousness with which he identifies and makes himself known to the world, it is clear that it is the vehicle through which the ego operates, defines itself and reveals itself. As Shor points out, it is only in terms of the GRO that the self and the world and the distinction between them can become meaningful.

## 2.2 REALITY, MYTH AND LANGUAGE

It is necessary, at this point, to examine very briefly the "reality" aspect of the GRO. Shotter (1975) has pointed out the importance to psychologists of observing the distinction that man is not a creature living in nature but living in a culture in nature. For every



person then, reality is relative to the cultural milieu in which he finds himself in that he shares with other members of it a common set of assumptions as to the nature of reality and a common language. The implications of this are that, once the basic cultural frame of reference or paradigm has been established, it is very difficult for him to perceive in any other way, for the reality-orientation is not re-erected from its foundations each time he wakes. In so far as it is maintained by memory automatically it is in the true sense of the word a surrogate for reality. He no longer perceives directly in that input from the sense organs is tested against the already established brain state and, unless it is in some way startlingly disparate, is discarded - and events which do not fit into his categories of what does exist may be ignored. The sense organs are essentially organs of limitation. If this were not so man would be inundated by the stimuli available. Far from perceiving directly an "objective reality" man selects from the mass of information available and constructs a stable personal consciousness, this limitation having survival value in that he is able to act, manipulate, avoid danger and separate himself from others in a predictable world.

As Blair (1975) asserts, man tends to perceive what he expects to perceive and it is what he believes to be



possible that influences what he sees and does. Myths then are a real part of perception, establishing the limits within which man is able to know. Any myth too firmly held prevents him from perceiving in new ways. Unhappily the material world, in which technologically oriented man puts so much faith that he denies any possible reality in a mode of perception different from the linear, analytical and scientific one, depends on his brain for shape, colour and meaning; for what assails the sense organs is not colours, smells, sounds and shapes but pulses of energy all of the same kind of electrical potential.

On the role of language as the means by which man communicates with his fellows and communes with his past, Aldous Huxley's assessment is particularly eloquent:

To formulate and express the contents of this reduced awareness, man has invented and endlessly elaborated those symbol systems and implicit philosophies which we call languages. Every individual is at once the beneficiary and the victim of the linguistic tradition into which he or she has been born - the beneficiary inasmuch as language gives access to the accumulated records of other people's experience, the victim in so far as it confirms him in the belief that reduced awareness is the only awareness and as it bedevils his sense of reality, so that he is all too apt to take his concepts for data, his words for actual things. That which, in the language of religion, is called 'this world' is the universe of reduced awareness, expressed and as it were, petrified by language. (Huxley, 1963, pp. 21 -22)

With this very much simplified information as to how man perceives himself within his world, it is possible to

have some inkling of how, according to Wilber (1975), man in his headlong flight from death may come to identify solely with the static symbols which comprise his existence at the Ego Level or even dissociate those parts of himself which he finds too painful to the Shadow, while he identifies with a very much impoverished Persona (1.4.5 - 1.4.6).

### 2.3 CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BICAMERAL MIND

The emotional life of man and the other mammals is similar. Intellectual life, culture, history, religion and science are different from anything else known by scientists in the universe. All life appears to have evolved to a certain point and then veered sharply in a different direction. From the metaphysical point of view it is as if something were added to the closed system of evolution from an outside source, if a phenomenon as different as consciousness is to be explained. Julian Jaynes (1976) has, rather controversially, attempted to solve the problem in terms of natural science alone. Since he progresses from the postulation of what consciousness is to theories on schizophrenia and types of mysticism and the role of the latter in society, his argument must be summarised here. Moreover, since it explores the role of language in the life of man, it takes Huxley's argument (2.2) a little further in a way that is particularly useful in explaining how man may come to identify

solely with what Wilber calls the static symbols of the ego - how he may structure and explore his world through language, not merely in nature, but in a culture in nature.

Language grows by metaphor, a metaphor or implied comparison being composed of a metaphrand, the thing described, and a metaphier, the thing or relationship used to elucidate it. With use metaphors become labels and the function of metaphor is the generation of new language as it is needed to deal with the increasing complexity of human culture. Man's powers of perception of his world and his understanding of it are enormously increased by metaphors and, moreover, metaphors literally create new objects. Language then, is an organ of perception as well as of communication, and man's command of it allows an ever more subtle structuring of life and his interpretation of it. Abstract words are "ancient coins" whose "concrete images" (p. 51) have worn away with usage and the lexicon of language is a "finite set of terms that by metaphor is able to stretch out over an infinite series of circumstances, even to creating new circumstances thereby" (p. 52). The process gains cumulative power by the existence of a transaction which can be described in terms of paraphriers (various associations or attributes of the metaphier) and paraphrands (created by the paraphriers projecting back into the

metaphrand). Thus a metaphor by means of the associations interacting back and forth between metaphier and metaphrand becomes enriched and dynamic. One of the new circumstances created by the infinite capacity of the metaphor to extend itself in any context is, in Jaynes's opinion, consciousness itself.

Understanding a thing is to arrive at a metaphor for that thing, that is, man explains it in terms of something he already knows, constructing theoretical models to understand nature. A theory is a metaphor between a model and data. In their efforts to set up models for consciousness, scientists have made errors in their attempted metaphors, consciousness being thought of as a thing with a location (which it does not have in the physical sense), rather than as a process or an interaction.

At this point, Jaynes introduces the concept of the analog, a model the scientific purpose of which is to act as a hypothesis of explanation or understanding. An analog is at every point generated by the thing it is an analog of. Subjective conscious mind is an analog of what is called the real world. Its reality is of the same order as mathematics. It allows man to shortcut behavioural processes and arrive at more appropriate decisions. Like mathematics it is an operator rather than a thing or repository and it is purposive because it is

clearly linked with volition and decision. If mind space then is a metaphor of real space, it is the real "external" world that is the metaphier. If metaphor generates consciousness, by the paraphrands of our verbal expression, rather than merely describing it, then consciousness is the metaphrand. Now a basic property of an analog is that the way it is generated is not the way it is used. Thus the functioning of consciousness is the return journey (in which presumably the external world may be seen as an analog of consciousness). Consciousness becomes the metaphier full of our past experiences, constantly and selectively operating on the unknowns of future actions, decisions, and partly remembered pasts. And it is by the generated structure of consciousness that we then understand the world. Consciousness possesses the following features:

- (a) Spatialisation, a mind-space metaphor. Man assumes spaces in things without spatial quality in consciousness because he could not otherwise be conscious of them, for example, time.
- (b) Excerption by which man selects aspects of his experience because consciousness is a metaphor of his actual behaviour. He is never conscious of things in their true nature (he can only assume their existence), only of the excerpts he makes of them, which will depend on a number of variables, for example, whether or not he likes another person. It is dis-



inct from memory because it is in consciousness the representative of a thing or event to which memories adhere (cf. the functioning of Pribram's hologram, 1971) and by which we retrieve memories. This is reminiscence, a particular conscious process of which no animal is capable.

- (c) The analog "I", the metaphor man has of himself, which can act vicariously in the imagination, doing things that man is not actually doing. It is not the behavioural, physical self which understands a theory but the analog "I".
- (d) The metaphor "Me" by means of which man catches glimpses of himself strolling down memory lane..
- (e) Narratisation, which is the capacity of a man to write his own life story within his cultural and historical context, selectively perceiving and excerpting those aspects of experience which are compatible with it. The assigning of motives according to values is a part of this.
- (f) Conciliation, based on simple recognition, where a slightly ambiguously perceived object is made to conform to the already established schema. It brings things together as conscious objects just as narratization creates a potential for unique meaning by allowing man to select the component parts of personality and experience most compatible with the story he is writing about himself, metaphorically speaking.



In developing his model of consciousness Jaynes points out what consciousness is not. It is quite distinct from reactivity because man is conscious of what he is reacting to only from time to time, and some things like reflexes of the eye have no phenomenal component in consciousness at all. That it (consciousness) is continuous may be merely an illusion as man cannot be conscious of when he is not conscious. Consciousness is not a mere copy of experience, nor is it recognition and recall, because conscious retrospection is not the retrieval of an image but the retrieval of what man has been conscious of before and the reorganising of these elements into rational and consistent patterns. Consciousness is not necessary for concepts which are simply classes of behaviourally equivalent things. Root concepts are prior to experience. It is not necessary for learning and, indeed, inhibits some kinds of learning. Its role here is to take man into the task. Similarly, it is not necessary for some types of thinking. The judgement of weights is unconscious. Man does his thinking before he knows what to think about. The important part is the instruction which starts off a largely automatic process. Although, traditionally, consciousness has been the seat of reason, it is not necessary for reason.

Because so much of man's brain function is automatised, it is, in Jaynes's opinion, possible to conceive of a

race of men who spoke, judged, reasoned, solved problems but were not conscious at all; and he postulates, largely on the tenuous evidence of events described in The Iliad, in which the heroes heard the voices of gods, that such a race did exist. The mind of this bicameral man was split, the specialisation of the left cerebral hemisphere being to carry out the automatic actions that make life possible, the specialisation of the right, the custodian of his experience, being to tell him what to do in emergencies. These voices originating in the right cerebral hemisphere, which were actually the voices of his own experience, he identified with the gods. Hence when the gods spoke to Achilles, they literally spoke - a case of mistaken identity merely. The difference in modern man is that he has somehow integrated his experience with the achievement of consciousness so that it is readily available. (This fits in with Perry's comment, 1974, that at one time, the voice of authority as represented by religion was located outside of the person, while with the decline of religion and the popularity of "situation ethics", decisions now have to be made within the realm of experience.) On the basis of his postulated bicameral mind, Jaynes explains schizophrenia and mysticism as a partial return to a more atavistic mode of brain function, the one pathological and the other serving a social imperative and learned.

### 2.3.1 EVALUATION OF JAYNES'S THEORY

The first and most obvious criticism that can be levelled at Jaynes's formulation of the bicameral mind is his use of The Iliad as the basis for his theory.

Kinsbourne (1977), in a highly entertaining review, has shown that The Iliad furnishes examples of self-consciousness, as for instance when Achilles sulks in his tent when crossed in love and Ulysses, having defeated the Trojans by inventing the Trojan Horse, orders himself to be lashed to the mast so that he cannot respond to the seductive songs of the sirens. Even without an intimate knowledge of The Iliad and despite its oral transmission, it is clear that speech, even in the mouths of the gods (and Jaynes is quite explicit that they spoke out loud and clear), must presuppose a common language and gods a cosmology. Jaynes has failed to make allowance for poetic licence and for the nature of the gods and heroes of which the Greeks sang. As Kinsbourne remarks, there is no mention of the same phenomenon in women and the lower classes. In Greek mythology, the intimacy of heroes and gods was perhaps a tacit acknowledgement of the godlike potential of ideal man or man's aspirations to acquire god-like status.

The second debatable aspect of the theory is that the sense of personal identity was lacking in Bicameral man, and that self-awareness is generated by metaphor alone.

Kinsbourne has cited studies which show that self recognition seems bound up with the transition from monkey to ape, as chimpanzees and orangoutangs recognise themselves in mirrors. Moreover, reflecting surfaces identified as mirrors were present in cultures pre-dating that of the Greeks. Again with a little reflection, anybody can see that when man retrospects, excerpts, narratizes and communes with his metaphor "Me", the result contains more than words. The analog is composed of aspects that reflect the activity of the sense organs, hence an analog of the world and self could be based on some symbolic representation other than language. Early attempts at recording, such as primitive drawings in caves, suggest this, unless the gods had appropriated the use of the left hand as well. Under certain circumstances man may find his sense of identity attenuated but common sense suggests that he possesses the brain mechanisms which will separate him either from the natural world, or the group or the culture, according to his needs in the fight for survival. Consciousness, as modern research tends to show, can be structured in many ways and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that, if a culture allows the existence of gods, the brain will provide the means by which they can be apprehended. What Jaynes's model of consciousness does very well is to show the way modern man's consciousness is structured.

It has become specialised to incorporate language as a tool both to create and understand his complex culture. The fact that he (Jaynes) admits that words themselves are a form of perception, suggests that Mind (in the widest sense) as it is purposive, cannot be identified solely with the individual ego. Teilhard de Chardin (1970) for instance, has advanced a powerful argument for spirituality as the end towards which all evolution appears to have striven. Jaynes's account of the way man interacts with his world and culture and hews a personal identity for himself within the determinants of his knowledge and milieu, supports what has already been said in this chapter and in no way conflicts with theories of personality which postulate that man selects from the input available to build up a consistent sense of self, and dissociates the rest. It is only by some such theory that the phenomenon of dissociated personality can be explained. While data reaching the brain may be discarded or ignored for the purposes of everyday consciousness, it can be postulated that the input is nevertheless stored.

Jaynes makes the interesting point that, since consciousness has no locality in the brain, the place where it is experienced is arbitrary. He dismisses out-of-the-body experiences as a function of this quality. His assumpt-



ion is to some extent supported by findings which show this type of experience to be more common in vivid visualisers, especially in children, non-bookish adults and women (Heywood, 1968a). If however, as Koestler (1973) has suggested, consciousness is somehow independent of time and space while linked to the material brain, so that it can be located or projected anywhere, it is possible that there is a different consciousness, as Jung (Fordham, 1966) and Wilber (1.4) postulate, shared by the group and perhaps by all mankind, with a purposiveness other than that of individual purposiveness, yet intimately bound up with the latter. Jaynes states, in describing how metaphor operates as an instrument of perception, that it moves out synchronically (i.e. independent of time) to explore the external world. The following example from Moss (1976) suggests that the vehicle of metaphor and mind may even move backwards (or forwards) in time and this rather colourful evidence may serve as a corrective to Jaynes's tendency to reductionism:

Mrs. Pearl Curran, a St. Louis housewife with an eight-grade education, was invited ... in 1912 to play the "ouija board game" with a group of friends. As soon as she joined them, the board became very active indeed. The friends continued the game for about two years, sometimes getting nonsense, but occasionally "receiving a message" that could be verified. Then suddenly, one day, came the statement: "Many moons ago I lived. Again I come. Patience Worth my name." Patience Worth stayed for five years, first with Mrs. Curran and friends at



the ouija board, and then with Mrs. Curran alone, through automatic writing. Patience Worth "dictated" more than a million and a half words, in sixteenth century English, prose and poetry, novels and stories, which critics hailed as having high literary merit. Most of these are extant and are available at libraries. One poem, "Telka", (of about 70 000 words) is written in a dialect used three centuries ago, containing a high percentage of Anglo-Saxon words. An analysis of the language made by Professor C.H.S. Schiller of London University demonstrates that the vocabulary contained no word used later than the year 1600. Schiller comments: "When we consider that the Authorised Version [of the Bible] has only 70% Anglo-Saxon, and it is necessary to go back to Layamon [1205] to equal Patience Worth's percentage, we realise we are face-to-face with a philological miracle."

Parapsychologist Dr. Walter F. Prince made a lengthy study of Mrs. Curran and published his observations as The Case of Patience Worth with this conclusion: "Either our concept of what we call the subconscious mind must be radically altered so as to include potencies of which we hitherto had no knowledge, or else some cause operating through but not originating in, the subconscious of Mrs. Curran must be acknowledged." (pp. 240 - 241)

## CHAPTER 3

## SCHIZOPHRENIA

I am but mad north-north-west; when the wind  
is southerly I know a hawk from a handsaw.

Shakespeare: Hamlet

## 3. A MODEL FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA?

Research in schizophrenia can be a very confusing experience to the uninitiated. By the time a patient presents himself for treatment, there is a vast range of interaction - the sum of the person's life strategy to date - to examine; and it is not surprising that such factors as genetics, parent-child relationships, parental personality, family environment and interaction, social environment, social isolation, social mobility, intra-psychic trauma, learning, vitamin deficiency, and an over-exposure to food additives resulting in masked food allergy have been studied with reference to their possible role in the etiology of schizophrenia. It may well be that many factors can be seen to have contributed to the end product of personality disorganisation that the person has become. Some of these theories are very persuasive, yet fall down when they claim to have the only answer.

A second confusing factor has already been mentioned - the casual equating of an influential psychiatrist and theorist, Sullivan's, apparently precognitive remark with his being a schizophrenic. Another example of what appears to be loose thinking about schizophrenia is the assumption that what psychologists would call psychotic behaviour is revered in other cultures or sub-cultures. Among the amaXhosa, persons who experience phenomena of this apparently pathological type are told by the witchdoctor that they are being called by their ancestors to become diviners (Kruger, 1977). Some persons, on the strength of this information, assume too readily that, were schizophrenics to live in another culture, they might find a role through which to channel and give meaning to their, presumably extrasensory, gifts, discriminated against in their own oppressive cultural milieu. The inconvenient fact that members of this same tribe, hospitalised for schizophrenia, say that they began to experience this process, called htwasa, but became schizophrenics rather than diviners is ignored (Kruger, 1977). The implications of this are that all that looks like htwasa is not htwasa, that the witchdoctor has no category into which to place the "failed" diviners and that the schizophrenic will tend to explain the phenomena he experiences in terms of his own knowledge. There is a difference between a social phenomenon and a schizophrenic phenomenon.

This sort of confusion is understandable in terms of the influence of the ideas of the anti-psychiatry theorists like Szasz and Laing on the eager but uninformed mind of the student; but it does leave him with a very vague idea about what schizophrenia is. In fact, he may even come to see schizophrenia as a status symbol. Multigene theories are postulated to explain what looks like a link between schizophrenia and creativity. In an attempt to accommodate what can only be seen as an increasingly inclusive and wide range of ideas about this condition or way of being in the world, Forrest (1975) proposes the following model:

But Claridge (1972) has made it easier by suggesting that what is inherited is only the schizoid trait, a trait which when allied with superior intelligence, can lead to unusual creativity in the intellectual sphere because of the unexpected associations between words and thoughts.

The schizoid subject, using another frame of reference, does not need to strive for early closure: a problem can be left in an ambiguous state, neither solved nor yet unsolved.

The model then proposed now [sic] is that an inherited trait, the schizoid trait, directs the individual towards intellectual pursuits, an interest in ideas and objects rather than an interest in people. Associated with this trait, especially in the presence of superior intelligence, is the tendency to an unusual or personalised use of language, the capacity to make unusual connections between different ideas and, [sic] concepts, the potential for literary, artistic and scientific creativity.

On the other hand this trait associated with more modest intelligence or an adverse family learning experience would predispose the individual to certain forms of psychiatric illness, ranging from schizoid personality disorders through obsessional

and hysterical illness to manifest schizophrenia.  
(pp. 11 - 12)

This model is clearly exactly the kind that could lay itself open to abuse by the ethically and politically unprincipled. There is evidence to suggest, for example, that purely political deviance could be seen as mental illness in a state like Russia (Wing, 1978). There is also the temptation to assume on reading the model in conjunction with Laing's works that the schizophrenic is in hospital because he is creative. Becoming schizophrenic can hardly be seen as a valid creative stance except by the highly motivated. Schizophrenia in great artists like Nijinsky, for example, led to impairment of creativity and Foucault saw madness as the ultimate break with the work of art (cited in Wing, 1978). While the argument that the role of chronic schizophrenic thrust upon the inmate of a mental hospital confirms him in his maladaptive approach to life is sound, the argument that the roles that society imposes on its members prevent the latter from adopting their own creative stance in life (Foucault, 1974), is dubious. It can be argued that without an internalised social frame of reference, there can be no life. Indeed, Laing (1967), who does not deny that schizophrenia exists, claims that the schizophrenic chooses existential death in what is for him an unliveable situation. Szasz argues that mental illness is a myth; Kety counters this assertion by



saying that if it is a myth, it is a myth with a strong genetic component (cited in Wing, 1978). That it is a myth seems denied by the daily experience of clinicians; and it cannot be subject to this age alone, as is evidenced by the device of the ship of fools described by Foucault (1967).

What stance should be taken on schizophrenia then? The only starting point in this writer's view is to accept that it is an abstraction which becomes relevant as a category only when a person who exhibits symptoms that have come to be associated with the syndrome presents himself or is presented for treatment because he has ceased to function effectively. Applied to persons in other contexts it has no meaning. It should be appreciated that the concept of mental health is itself an abstraction, which not only suggests the flexibility and range of behaviour possible within the framework of Western society but also that attempts to enforce rules of optimal personality development and to apply labels to the population in general are at the very least misguided and probably a sign of what Wing (1978) would call medical (and psychological) expansionism. Moreover, madness is a lay term which can be applied to behaviours ranging from inspirational to eccentric of which the speaker disapproves. Schizophrenia within the medical model is a much more precise term. In fact a schizophrenic may be completely sane in any lay sense of the term (Wing, 1978).



Wing argues most cogently for a model with a disease theory at its centre and, while not denying that it can be abused, says that it is the best way to ensure that no purely social phenomena are included. Moreover, he demonstrates that such a model, far from being antagonistic to the most useful insights of other theories can very easily absorb them to best advantage.

A favourite criticism of the medical model is that it is entirely dependent on a description of symptoms and cannot demonstrate a definite brain lesion in the schizophrenic. According to the anti-psychiatry school the psychiatrist is not justified in assuming that, because brain tumours, temporal lobe epilepsy, general paresis and organic brain disease give rise to similar symptoms, schizophrenia must be caused by some specific defect in brain functioning. It could equally well be argued that this is not an entirely illogical assumption, and is a sensible reason for putting forward a theory that can be subjected to proof. That the search has thus far been inconclusive is not a reason for abandoning it. Moreover, the description of symptoms has in the past preceded the discovery of the underlying causes in many diseases. The most promising field in this search, is in biochemistry. Accounts of how a schizophrenic child was restored to normal functioning through megavitamin therapy (Foy, 1971) or of how a leucotomy was prevented

by the discovery of food allergies in the patient (MacKarness, 1976) somehow carry more conviction than an account of an hysteric, misdiagnosed as schizophrenic, (Wing, 1978) being cured naturally through the Laingian method of the inner journey into the self to allow the warped personality to grow up again (Barnes & Berke, 1973).

Another criticism of this model is that psychiatrists cannot agree among themselves as to what symptoms justify a diagnosis of schizophrenia. For example, schizophrenia may be diagnosed twice as often in the U.S.A. as in Britain, given the same group of patients, and this causes confusion among readers of research papers, as they cannot be sure that schizophrenia as they know it is actually being treated (Baker, 1975). Another result of this is that a large amount of British and American research is not comparable (Kennedy, 1975). Wing (1978) points out that considerable advances have been made in this respect in the last ten years. He cites a study based on a standardised form of the psychiatric diagnostic interview, the Present State Examination (P.S.E.). Research psychiatrists speaking languages as diverse as Chinese, Hindi, Russian and Yorubi, carried out interviews with acutely ill patients in nine different parts of the world and their diagnoses were compared with results using the computer reference classification of P.S.E. known as CATEGO. The discrepancy

was only 10 percent. The three broad groupings of schizophrenia, mania and depression can therefore be reliably differentiated from one another and it is possible to state quite precisely what the descriptive criteria defining each type of syndrome are. While this does not necessarily prove the validity of the criteria, it does demonstrate the recognisability and reproducibility of the descriptive symptoms of schizophrenia and that it is possible to recognise the central groups regardless of the language of interview, the culture of patients, and the school of psychiatrists. While the discrepancy between seven of the centres and the CATEGO classification was 4,5 percent; it was 29,5 percent in Moscow and Washington. In America the prevailing concept of schizophrenia is much broader, including large parts of what British psychiatrists call depressive illness, neurotic illness and personality disorder and almost the whole of mania. In Moscow, psychiatrists are also regarded as having a broader concept, owing to the use of special categories such as "sluggish", "periodic" and "shift-like" schizophrenia.

The most highly discriminating symptoms which, when present, make the probability 90 percent that a diagnosis of schizophrenia will be given are: thought insertion, thought broadcast, and thought withdrawal, auditory hallucinations of a particular kind and delusions of con-

trol. Other symptoms may be present and are not ignored when the diagnosis is made but these can often be seen as a reaction to the primary ones, an attempt by the patient to make sense of what is happening to him (ibid). Thought insertion is the schizophrenic's experience that thoughts that are not his own are intruding into his mind. This is not the same as believing that an external agency is causing him to have thoughts of a particular kind; the thoughts themselves do not belong to him. Wing (1978) states that this is as close as one can get to a non-social phenomenon since a large-scale survey of the general population does not turn up anybody who has ever experienced it. In discussing another first rank symptom, delusions of control, when the patient notices that his will has been replaced by that of another, Wing points out that, while for the schizophrenic this is thoroughly unpleasant, it can be experienced as an enhancement of will, when a similar phenomenon, which is a social phenomenon, occurs. He gives the example of a Chinese priestess in Formosa who described how, when she went into a trance, she was possessed by a god which directed her speech and actions. She was not, of course, diagnosed as schizophrenic.

It seems logical that the way to combat abuse of the medical model is not to widen the definition to include all sorts of phenomena which may have a superficial sim-

ilarity but to narrow the range of symptoms and refine the use of the diagnostic tool thus constructed. While Foucault (1967) has demonstrated persuasively the punitive elements in the organisation of the early mental hospitals and the latter's tendency to the indiscriminate punishment of the deviant has been colourfully portrayed in the novel by Kesey (1973), too little attention has been paid to the initial humane intentions behind the establishment of asylums as a protection for those who might otherwise have been locked in cupboards or chained to bedsteads by embarrassed and exasperated relatives or burnt at the stake for witchcraft or totally ostracised. The use of the fool as a literary device in Shakespeare's King Lear is effective as a comment on the "sane" world; but the romantic and impractical desire to return to the good old days would probably not be shared by many schizophrenics. At one level the medical model is undoubtedly helpful because in labelling people it can more effectively prescribe treatment and forecast the prognosis in conditions which may look very similar - process schizophrenia, reactive schizophrenia, a bad trip. The mentally retarded, the manic, the depressed, the senile, the schizophrenic are no longer forced indiscriminately to sail in the same ship, as of old.

### 3.1. THE PROPER APPLICATION OF ANTI-PSYCHIATRY

If the medical model is the one preferred, does this



mean that the insights of the anti-psychiatry theorists have no relevance? Foudraine (1974) has shown that besides their obvious value in shaking psychiatrists out of complacency, they are a healthy corrective to the nihilistic attitude to schizophrenics who may in some hospitals be ignored, dehumanised and isolated because personnel believe they are suffering from an incurable brain disease and so have moved beyond the pale of human communication and understanding. Foudraine indulged in an experiment in what Popper (cited in Foudraine, 1974) has called "piecemeal social engineering", a concept he contrasts with "utopian" or "holistic social engineering", a measure very popular among the anti-psychiatry supporters. Popper believes that the latter is in conflict with a truly scientific attitude.

One of the differences between the Utopian or holistic approach and the piecemeal approach may therefore be stated in this way: while the piecemeal engineer can attack his problem with an open mind as to the scope of the reform, the holist cannot do this; for he had [*sic*] decided beforehand that a complete reconstruction is possible and necessary. (Foudraine, 1974, p. 310)

Foudraine set out to demythologise a ward in his charge. A schizophrenic, having been hospitalised, has not only his primary handicap (his condition) to deal with. He brings with him also the secondary handicap of the pathological attitudes developed by himself and those around him in response to his illness, leading to further social incapacity resulting from lack of self-respect, apathy



about the future and resentment and depression, which may be the reflection of his reaction to how others see him (Wing, cited in Kennedy, 1975). The symptoms of the chronic condition may be present before any acute attack takes place. These may include traits such as emotional apathy, slowness of thought and movement, underactivity, lack of drive, poverty of speech, social withdrawal, wooden facial expression, monotonous voice, stiff bodily posture and gait, incoherence of speech, unpredictability of association and long-standing hallucinations and delusions. Social performance at virtually any task, creative, routine and personal, may be impaired depending on the degree of intrinsic handicap (Wing, 1978). Clearly, in a rejecting social environment, development along the dimensions of homonomy and autonomy will be severely warped. Foudraine (1974) noticed that "ego weakness" is a characteristic of chronic schizophrenics and adopted White's model of competency to explain it. White (cited in Foudraine, 1974) postulates that therapists need a psychosexual, an interpersonal and a competency model to explain human behaviour adequately. He interprets the restless, exploratory, manipulative activity of the child as an expression of energy that he calls effectance. He defines competency in the following way.

The cumulative product of one's history of efficacies and inefficacies. It comes to operate in new behaviour as a kind of set: [sic] We judge whether or not we can jump over the brook or carry out a

proposed task. It also comes to be much cherished, so that we feel truly elated at new proofs of our ability, or deeply humiliated when we cannot do something we supposed was within our power.  
(Foudraine, 1974, p. 270)

In White's view too much attention has been paid to infantile fantasies in the theory of self esteem and too little to a frame of reference with an action theory at its centre. In adverse circumstances (interpreted differently according to the school the therapist belongs to) the child does not get a chance to develop a sense of socio-cultural competence. He is left with an inability to live a life of his own. According to Foudraine, while the prevailing treatment milieu alleges that its aim is to strengthen the patient's ego, the forces in psychiatric institutions where the emphasis is on smooth running and good behaviour do just the opposite, placing him in the "sick role" and confirming his sense of inadequacy.

Foudraine places the relationship between patient and analyst firmly at the centre of treatment. This is understandable as the analyst or therapist in a sense teaches the patient his own life story, which, no matter what the model used, is likely to be far more congruent with his culture than his own account of himself, his experience often differing radically from that of his associates outside the hospital. Foudraine found that the work done by the analyst for one hour a day was sys-

tematically undone by the staff during the other twenty-three because of the symbiotic relationships between some aides and patients and because patients and staff were so locked in their roles of staff (well) and patients (sick). Using very directive methods, which forced patients to take responsibility for the results of their "crazy" actions, building up their sense of competence by making them take an active part in cleaning, cooking and gardening, increasing their self-esteem by making the nurses discard their uniforms as a means to more open communication, and including them in what had previously been private talk about them and even changing the language used from words with medical connotations to words with educational connotations, he was able to produce considerable improvement in their condition and the morale of the staff.

It seems that this is the proper area of application of existential and phenomenological insights and for the valid stance that schizophrenics are people and should be treated with respect and also firmness. Lest the more energetic measures employed by Foudraine in the rehabilitation of his schizophrenics, (ruined by the bad effects of institutionalism), call forth militant cries for a better deal for schizophrenics, it should be remembered that man is only free and human through an acceptance of his cultural framework, and education into

that framework must often be quite rigorous. Both Martin Buber (cited in Gray, 1977) and Heidegger (cited in Frankl, 1971) have pointed out the errors of subjectivism. Storr (1963) has commented that there is no group of persons so lacking in individuality as a ward of chronic schizophrenic patients, for it is in interaction with the world and others that man finds himself.

### 3.2 THE RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE GENERALISED REALITY-ORIENTATION (GRO)

In terms of Wilber's Spectrum of Consciousness (1.4), models of schizophrenia can be seen as operating between those levels designated Existential (1.4.3), Biosocial Bands (1.4.4) and Ego (1.4.5). These approximate at any given moment the person's development from birth, when self and environment are not clearly differentiated, through socialisation to the end product of Ego, which is, of course, not a completely static construct. The level of the Biosocial Bands is crucial in effecting the transformation by which man becomes, not a creature in nature but a creature living in a culture in nature. They are the "internalised matrix of cultural premises, familial relationships, and social glosses, as well as the all-pervading social institutions of language, logic, ethics, and law...those aspects of the organism's social environment that it has introjected across the organism-environment boundary of the Existential Level" (Wilber,

1975, p. 109) - the internalised society which profoundly colours and moulds the organism's basic sense of existence. They comprise as an end result the phenomenally flexible GRO (2.1) which, while not totally synonymous with the ego, is the vehicle by which man identifies and reveals himself to his world and by which his world identifies and reveals itself to him at any specific time in a specific culture. It is the inner surrogate for reality, maintained effortlessly and unconsciously, comprising the usual contents of waking consciousness and presumably based on memory. In states of fatigue or hyper-preoccupation, its supportive energy diminishes and it fades into the background of attention; but it is always available should it be needed. All important psychological concepts and functions are derived from it. Based on automatisisation, it, to some degree, sacrifices immediacy of perception for the advantage of a stable inner world. Otherwise man would be inundated by stimuli.

One of the implications (for this study), of the GRO as a concept is that its existence as a tool for attention to the outside world is dependent not only on the complex social and cognitive skills that give it its shape but also on normal physiological brain functioning. If the latter is present, the former should be available also. (A great deal of learning is acquired unconscious-



ly and automatically and is also applied automatically.) The presence of the former, however, does not guarantee the latter and in the presence of organic brain dysfunction it may become warped in a number of ways, no matter how optimally the person was able to develop his competence and interpersonal skills.

There are several reasons for this writer's suspicion that in schizophrenia, the mechanisms that control the maintenance of a stable GRO are defective. These reasons are not formally linked but take on the appearance of a fragmentary jigsaw puzzle. This type of solution is capable of absorbing insights from other levels of personality development and explaining them. Other models are not nearly as comprehensive.

Smythies' (1975) view on the biochemical model is as follows:

It seems generally agreed that what is inherited is a predisposition to develop schizophrenia and that other factors (e.g. intrauterine, minimal birth injury, stress) are involved in many cases. In which case it is most likely that some defective enzyme system or systems are involved, as genetic faults nearly always express themselves in this manner. It is also unlikely that a condition so amorphous, ill-defined and whose nosology is based entirely on symptom complexes, should turn out to represent the phenotypic expression of only one genotypic abnormality. The biochemical mechanisms controlling the kinds of brain function and behaviour that go wrong in schizophrenia are likely to be very complex, and faulty enzyme(s) at any one of a number of different key loci might be ex-



pected to derange the machinery in such a way that a 'final common path' type of disordered behaviour results. (pp. 51 - 52)

McGhie (cited in McGuire, 1975) asserts that schizophrenics have suffered a breakdown in the filter mechanism which limits sensory input to a level at which the decision channel in the brain can deal with it. An alternative theory developed by Broen and Storm (cited in McGuire, 1975) is that the ceiling of response strength is low in schizophrenics. Under pressure they very easily reach the response ceiling and the most suitable response of a number of possible responses is no longer dominant. This leads to bewilderment and inappropriate reactions.

Schizophrenics are noted for an idiosyncratic use of language. This is sometimes seen as similar to creativity. However, combined with evidence that they appear to have most difficulty with abstract concepts and least with concrete words, it is legitimate to suggest that, since the use of language itself is dependent on automatization, the mechanisms controlling the latter may be faulty. Imagination is also dependent on automatization. That the inner map of the schizophrenic is not sustained is suggested by the fact that some schizophrenics cannot do tasks like pretending to drink from a glass in which there is no water. This suggests depletion of fantasy life rather than an increase in it. There is evidence

to show that schizophrenic thought is not only different from normal thinking but also different from his own thinking at another time. Bannister's theory of thought disorder is that it is a form of loose construing and, because it is loose, it is inconsistent (cited in McGuire, 1975).

Venables (cited in Wing, 1978) discovered that chronic schizophrenic impairment, particularly social withdrawal, was accompanied unexpectedly by what appeared to be over-arousal. (Schizophrenics appear to be less anxious than most other people on account of unvarying facial expression and tone of voice and because they tend not to use nonverbal means of indicating emotion.) The more withdrawn they were, the more physiologically anxious the sufferers appeared to be, having a wetter handshake and faster heart rate. This accords with the view of Jaynes (1976) that the schizophrenic is genetically deficient in an enzyme that allows the metabolic by-products of stress to be evacuated. Moreover, schizophrenic patients appear unduly upset by any unexpected event and even stimulation like occupational therapy, designed to overcome the negative effects of institutionalism, can precipitate an acute attack if they are too demanding. Wing (1978) suggests that the unusual interaction and behaviour within the family, such as walking around at night and sleeping during the day can be seen as a pro-

protective device because the schizophrenic is unable to deal with the stress of a too emotional or intrusive relative. The more usual view is that the mother refuses to allow the child independence owing to her own emotional conflicts and that the child may connive at this if the relationship is symbiotic.

The schizophrenic does not show the usual REM rebound following deprivation of REM sleep, the period of sleep in which dreams occur (Smythies, 1975). Rosen (1951) saw the schizophrenic as a dreamer. K. Jung (cited in Wing, 1978) suggested that an impairment of attention with a consequent release of unconscious associations seemed to fit many of the phenomena of schizophrenia. This accords well with Shor's account (2.1) of how, when the energy supporting the GRO is at a low ebb as in hypnogogic and deep hypnotic states, primary process thinking and odd associations come to the fore.

Many persons appear to have healthy relationships and self-concepts until they suffer an acute schizophrenic attack in early adulthood. Many others may be withdrawn and isolated but never become schizophrenics, even under severe stress. Again, the logical place to look for malfunctioning is in the biochemical and physiological maintenance of the GRO.

If it were decided to reject the common sense stance that normal brain functioning will automatically provide persons with interpersonal and cognitive skills in the normal development of the GRO (and it is astonishing to see how persons who are eager to accept physiological explanations to deny the validity of mystical experience, will show a perverse refusal to entertain the notion of such a factor in schizophrenia), the concept is still capable of accommodating all the theories put forward by other schools. For example, a symbiotic relationship with a dominant mother may prevent the construction of a healthy GRO along the dimensions of homonomy and autonomy (2.1.1).

The following will suffice as an example of the usefulness of the GRO, once its implications are understood. The psychodynamic and interpersonal approach might read: the schizophrenic, through isolation and other trauma has turned his attention inward and the GRO has become so distorted as regards meaning structure by comparison with that of his fellows that only intensive re-education will rehabilitate him. A psycho-physiological model might read as follows. The energy support of the GRO is intermittent or inadequate to maintain the schizophrenic in a state of optimal waking consciousness as normally functioning persons experience it. Anyone who has perceived a stimulus in the waking process, given it an in-

terpretation or identified it in the hypnopompic frame of reference and then been conscious of its gradual but perceptible fading into its rightful place in relation to a now fully reconstituted GRO, will realise the implications in preventing the growth to maturity and self-confidence of the schizophrenic. If the energy that supports the GRO is inadequate, it means a world of perceptions which cannot be interpreted with any degree of confidence since the path they take through the hologram (to adopt Pribram's, 1971, model of brain functioning) will be idiosyncratic and dreamlike in quality, with chance stimuli such as knocks at the door precipitating the person into fantasy-mimicking explanations or alternatively, hallucinations. This is not withdrawal into fantasy but involuntary dreaming.

Jaynes's model of schizophrenia as a partial return to the bicameral mind (2.3), has the same advantages as the use of the GRO and rivals it in simplicity. As has already been mentioned, he sees the schizophrenic as being precipitated into psychosis by a genetic inability to metabolise the biochemical products of continued stress. He explains the distress caused by the deterioration of consciousness in the enforced return to bicamerality in terms of the loss of the analog "I", and subsequent loss of ego boundaries, sense of time, mind space and the ability to narratise. To one who has never experienced



a true bicameral existence a loss of these aspects of consciousness is very confusing since enough of the old structures remain for him to be aware of the difference. Auditory hallucinations of an authoritative and religious kind are a sign of underlying bicamerality.

The reasons for choosing the GRO in preference to Jaynes's model as the central concept in the analysis of the relationship between mysticism and schizophrenia are based on the reservations expressed in the evaluation of his theory (2.3.1). Jaynes relies too heavily on the role language plays in the generation of consciousness and his evidence for the existence of the bicameral mind is not convincing. In fact, his picture of tireless automatons building the Pyramids of Egypt or the Ziggurats of Suma in the service of some unconscious social imperative would make sense only if he acknowledged the actual existence of Mind at Large and the voices as those of actual gods rather than as those of man's own experience. It was suggested that symbolic representations other than language and based on the data of the sense organs could have allowed man to differentiate himself from the world and others and given him self-consciousness. The GRO is able to absorb Jaynes's theory and make up the deficit. Although our perception of our environment is inside ourselves and is a surrogate for reality built up through action in time, we experience ourselves quite consciously, not only verbally as he suggests, but also as moving in a three di-

mensional world, mapped presumably by means of space, time, kinaesthetic and other co-ordinates and remembered in terms of those co-ordinates.

The relevance of the GRO for this study is that it is a convenient shorthand term, the implications of which incorporate everything we know and are. Hence schizophrenia can be seen usefully as a mode of being out of touch with reality and being subject to extraordinary events. The GRO is not automatically reconstituted once lost or has never functioned optimally, the result being mental and social crippling. In non-schizophrenics the opposite is the case.

### 3.3 PSYCHOANALYTICAL MODELS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA

It has been stated that the relationship between patient and therapist is indispensable to his rehabilitation. Because doctors and other staff in mental hospitals assume that the patient's statements are meaningless and find their inflation and other "crazy" behaviours embarrassing, they tend sometimes to rely on chemotherapy alone, which leads to an artificial rather than an authentic adjustment. They forget that patients, withdrawn into the ASC which is acute schizophrenia, need empathy and support. Perry (1974) mentions the case of Perceval, son of an aristocratic English family, who experienced madness for several years. He reported that, when his

experience became too strange, others shrank from it and their withdrawal and rejection drove him further into his madness. Sechehaye (1951) wrote that when she attempted to reach Renée, her chronic schizophrenic patient, by way of rational explication of her condition, which Renée was intellectually capable of understanding, the latter was driven further into autism. Sechehaye concluded that since the patient did not understand her language, she must use the patient's. The process by which Renée made her needs known and Sechehaye satisfied them, the latter called "symbolic realisation". Foudraine (1974) also insists that, once over the initial difficulty, the doctor can learn to understand the patient's private use of language. If then there is a need to enter the patient's phenomenology, it would seem that the therapist might use the phenomenological approach alone - in practice he probably does so to some degree. What then is the point of complicated psychoanalytical models at all? Presumably, they act as guidelines for the therapist himself, as a means to aid his understanding of the phenomena with which he deals. To enter the patient's world is not enough. The therapist has to tell the patient who he is in terms of a shared reality. In a sense he has to narratise for the patient. Success in therapy appears to be independent of the theoretical affiliations of the therapist, the crucial factor being the warmth he brings to the therapeutic relationship.

It is not proposed to discuss all the psychoanalytical models. It is sufficient to say that all would see the pathology of the schizophrenic condition as a failure at the Ego Level, the person having failed for one reason or other to function as a fully-fledged autonomous human being. For this study that is enough. The discussions of the models to follow are motivated by the fact that both are linked to mysticism.

### 3.3.1 PERRY AND THE CENTRAL ARCHETYPE

Since Perry's frame of reference in his study (1974) of acute schizophrenic episodes in young adults is the Jungian model, which takes into account all the levels of Wilber's model, except that of Mind (1.4.1) a few introductory comments may facilitate an understanding of what Perry is saying.

Jung postulated that the unconscious is the matrix of consciousness in which are to be found the seedlings for new life potential. From the unconscious rises like an island the conscious aspect of the psyche, the ego, the centre of consciousness, synonymous with the knowing, willing "I". What belongs to consciousness or is known by the person about himself and his world or can be directed and controlled by him is not fully available to consciousness all the time. More important still for an understanding of Perry is Fordham's (1966) version



of Jung's formulation of the self:

But if the ego can relinquish some of the belief in its own omnipotence, a position can be found somewhere between that of consciousness with its hardly-won values and unconsciousness with its vitality and power, and a new centre of personality can emerge, differing in its nature from the ego-centre. Jung called this new centre of personality 'the self'. [He uses this in the Eastern manner .... "In Hindu thought the self is the supreme principle, the supreme oneness of being." Fordham, 1966, p.63 - footnote.]

The ego ... can only be regarded as the centre of the conscious, and if it tries to add unconscious contents to itself (i.e. collective contents, not the personal unconscious or shadow which does belong to the ego) it is in danger of destruction, like an overloaded vessel which sinks under the strain. The self, however, can include both the conscious and the unconscious. It appears to act as something like a magnet to the disparate elements of the personality and the processes of the unconscious, and is the centre of this totality as the ego is the centre of consciousness, for it is the function which unites all the opposing elements in man and woman, consciousness and unconsciousness, good and bad, male and female, &c., and in so doing transmutes them. To reach it necessitates acceptance of what is inferior in one's nature, as well as what is irrational and chaotic ....

Jung makes it clear that his concept of the self is not that of a kind of universal consciousness, which is really only another name for the unconscious. It consists rather in an awareness on the one hand of our unique natures, and on the other of our intimate relationship with all life, not only human, but animal and plant, and even that of inorganic matter and the cosmos itself. It brings a feeling of 'oneness', and of reconciliation with life, which can now be accepted as it is, not as it ought to be. (Fordham, 1966, pp. 61 - 63)

Psychosis is a compensatory process in the Jungian model.

Perry, like Laing, sees schizophrenia as a potentially healthy and creative process, the psyche seeking reintegration in an orderly way. The sickness in schizophren-



ia lies in the pre-psychotic personality (at the Ego Level in Wilber's model). As a result of early damage to the self-image in the maternal relationship, a constricted and impoverished ego is formed, an ego out of contact with the natural elements, emotion and image, of psychic life. The person is educated into an identity that does not belong to him, in which the power principle (Logos) takes precedence over the Eros principle. When the personal self-image is debased, the archetypal self-image is exalted to the same degree, leading to an unstable psychic situation full of a sense of unreality and anxiety. At times of great crisis, the libido is attracted to the archetypal level to redress the balance by reorganising the central archetype (the self) and reconstituting the self-image. To do this the libido activates those components, the elements of the self, whose nature it is to effect a transformation, or redistribution of psychic energy. Perry calls these "dynamisms" affect images since they express themselves in terms of symbols and their appropriate emotional charge. An example of an affect image is the statement: "I'm called by special election to save the world", which means, "There's an image appearing in my inner psychic world representing a redeemer, a messianic hero" (p. 66).

Intrapsychically the reforming hero represents one's motivation to participate meaningfully and effectively in the great societal issues of the times.... The part one actually takes in the social setting depends entirely upon the real gifts

one happens to possess. The redeeming hero as an image describes not the specific part one is to play in life, but the potential and the motivation to fulfill it. (Perry, 1974, p. 66)

The ego, having abrogated its control, readily identifies with any of the forms of the central archetype, especially with royal and divine figures, leading to abnormal inflation and delusions of grandeur. The ideation expressed by the acute psychotic is not bizarre thinking but metaphorical expressions of emotional states, a return to an archaic mode of thought or primary process thought. In terms of affect imagery, the self represents itself as a centre (cf. the religious symbolism of the mandala, a symbol of the wholeness of the psyche); hence Perry calls it the central archetype. Through the symbolic mechanisms of death and rebirth and through clash and reversal and through the union of opposites it becomes reconstituted. Only when the affect images have reached their objectives is the person able to reconnect the concerns they represent with the issues of his normally adjusted life. This leads to a new way of experiencing people and things, new interests and new investments in relationships. The inner solutions are only potentials until they find reconnection with the actual emotional problems of everyday life.

In a study of twelve young acute catatonic schizophrenic patients, Perry found remarkable parallels between the

symbolism of their affect imagery and that of a New Year ritual drama, the rites of renewal of the King and his Kingdom. These symbols are: Centre, Death, Return to Beginnings, Cosmic Conflict, Threat of Opposite, Apotheosis, Sacred Marriage, New Birth, New Society, Quadrate World.

Perry says that the sacral kingship had its roots in the urban revolution, when primitive democracy was no longer adequate to cope with the need for aggression and defence and a potent chief had to be elected. With the rise of these first royal chiefs appeared for the first time in man's history a remarkable array of gods, each portraying actual dynamic historical forces:

They came upon the scene as a function of the differentiation of culture itself, which in turn was an expression of the differentiation of the psyche. We can only suppose that culture-making is at the same time psyche-making, that the creative work of structuring the one is equivalent to the same work upon the other. (p. 43)

Perry's explanation of how the symbolism of the ritual drama of the renewal of the King and his Kingdom has become the symbolism of the psyche during an acute psychotic episode, shows some similarity to Jaynes's bicameral mind theory (2.3). While the latter sees modern consciousness as a kind of synthesis between right and left cerebral hemisphere activity, the former sees it as an internalisation of archetypal forms which were at first concretized and externalised, built into man's material and social world, by his own activity and perception.

This internalisation led to a more spiritual consciousness, allowing each man to accomplish his own "individuality, uniqueness and immortality" by the realisation of the kingly powers within himself. Jaynes conceptualises schizophrenia as a partial return to a more primitive way of functioning, the *Bicameral mind*, a physiological theory of brain functioning. Perry sees kingship as the natural historical framework and vehicle of transition from the concretisation of the archaic mentality to the spirit quality of the more fully awakened mind of our era. Hence elements of the ritual of sacral kingship in the affect images of the acute schizophrenic turmoil are a partial return of a psychodynamic kind.

The embeddedness of the person in his cultural milieu, itself embedded in a matrix that Jung called the *Collective Unconscious*, is the premise upon which Perry bases his theory of the role of the mystic and the nature of the mystical experience. When a culture has become stagnant and institutionalisation has drained the spirit of the great innovative creations of the past, persons sensitive to their society's need for change react by going through what appears to be exactly the same process as he describes for acute catatonic schizophrenia. To support his argument he points to persons like George Fox, founder of the Quaker movement, whose "symptoms", Perry claims, might well have placed them in a mental hospital if they had lived in our modern world.



### 3.3.2 LAING AND THE BIRD OF PARADISE

R.D. Laing's first book The Divided Self (1960) was an attempt to apply the insights of existentialism to the subject of schizophrenia. Within the existential frame of reference Laing sought to explicate the situation of the schizophrenic as that of a person estranged both from himself and society. To deal with ontological insecurity, that is, the failure to experience oneself as real in terms of identity and autonomy in the face of the psychotic's main fears, engulfment, implosion, petrification and depersonalisation, the schizophrenic develops a split self, the false self existing to complement the disembodied or inner self. In the words of Sedgwick (1972):

A major form of psychosis was elucidated as a mental system possessing lawful shape and sequence, comprehensible in existential terms as the outcome of rational strategies adopted by the patient in the face of an ambiguous and threatening personal environment. (p. 13)

Since the traditional model of man as a machine failed to see man as autonomous and intentional, Laing (1960) proposed that psychology substitute a science of persons for its usual fragmented orientation.

The science of persons is the study of human beings that begins from a relationship with the other as a person and proceeds to an account of the other still as a person. (p. 20)

For terms like "ego", which can lead to reification, Laing had substituted words with interpersonal connotations, the schizophrenic being seen in terms of interaction and process. Of this book, which is indeed of



great interest, Sedgwick (1972) wrote:

One of the most difficult of philosophies was brought to bear on one of the most baffling mental conditions, which, somewhat surprisingly, helped to clarify both. (p. 13)

For this study, it is enough to say that Laing presented yet another model operating between the levels "Existential" and "Ego" in Wilber's model (1.4).

It is Laing's The Politics of Experience (1967) that is of particular interest in a study of mysticism and schizophrenia. In it Laing for the first time hints that he and the schizophrenic know something about reality that the "sane" do not, the latter having adjusted to an impoverished reality, validated by an insane society.

Laing's style is polemical and his tone dogmatic. The content of the book is not entirely original, enlarging as it does on some intimations of Bateson. Laing cites the latter's introduction to the story of Perceval already mentioned (3.3.1):

It would appear that once precipitated into psychosis the patient has a course to run. He is, as it were, embarked upon a voyage of discovery which is only completed by his return to the normal world, to which he comes back with insights different from those of the inhabitants who never embarked on such a voyage. Once begun, a schizophrenic episode would appear to have as definite a course as an initiation ceremony - a death and rebirth - into which the novice may have been precipitated by his family life or by adventitious circumstances, but which in its course is largely steered by endogenous process.

In terms of this picture, spontaneous remission is no problem. This is only the final and natural out-

come of the total process. What needs to be explained is the failure of many who embark upon this voyage to return from it. Do these encounter circumstances either in family life or in institutional care so grossly maladaptive that even the richest and best organised hallucinatory experience cannot save them? (Laing, 1975, pp. 97 - 98)

The similarity between Bateson's ideas and Perry's is obvious, though the latter does not imply that all persons need to undergo a psychotic breakdown or that the whole of Western culture is maladaptive. Bateson is simply stating in a provocative way the main issues dealt with in this chapter.

The Politics of Experience is, however, a confusing book. All Laing appears to be saying is that schizophrenia is not all "breakdown" but also "breakthrough", that the patient cannot be blamed for refusing to adjust to a reality which is merely another form of alienation from man's true nature - "it is the insane man's commitment to the truth that drives him crazy" (Gray, 1977) - and that he is discriminated against when his family in conspiracy with a tame psychiatrist, has him incarcerated in a mental hospital. The reason for the confusing effects of this book is probably that Laing is concerned not so much with psychology as with tyranny and victimisation (ibid). The experiences of Rosenhan and his co-experimenters suggest that in some systems this may be a valid political stance. It is the stigma and the

stereotyping attached to the label "schizophrenic" that makes Laing suggest that the schizophrenic be sent on his "mystic" journey with society's approval, and also to suggest the substitution of a ceremony that will define his position as one of the chosen, for the existing, degrading ceremony which launches him into a career as a lunatic. The fact that all psychoses are not benign (Wing, 1978) and that he might never return from the journey might deter the schizophrenic, if he had a choice, but does not appear to bother Laing.

Laing appears to give undue emphasis to the opinion of Bateson that the schizophrenic may return with insights that are different from those of the persons who have never gone through the ordeal or embarked on the journey. It would seem wiser to change this to "insights that are different from the ones that failed him and made his psychotic experience necessary before he could adjust in a way satisfying to his own needs". Laing is presumptuous in assuming that the experience of those who share in this consensually validated "delusion" is necessarily stripped of all emotional and spiritual satisfaction. As Gray (1977) points out, the most unattractive feature of Laing's work is his contempt for ordinary people. This springs perhaps from his need to be the mouthpiece of the anti-establishment counter-culture and, perhaps, as Sedgewick (1972) suggests, from his interest in the use of drugs

in therapy, a procedure which has been restrained to some degree by growing suspicion that drugs are dangerous. Laing would see this perfectly logical conclusion as a conspiracy on the part of the establishment to restrict psychedelic experience's alleged potential for overthrowing the "insane" system in supremacy at this time.

There seems to be a fundamental flaw in Laing's conception of reality as we know it in the Western world. The basic tools of communication that are a birthright of sharers in our reality should not be confused with the apparently insane and suicidal behaviour of participants in the various power games permeating politics and business. An acknowledgement of their existence is not necessarily to connive at their perpetuation but to see the world as it is rather than as it ought to be. The acquisition of the basic tools necessary to change life must be seen as a prime requisite of anybody elected to hyper-sanity and the schizophrenic's failure to acquire them must then be considered blameworthy in the moral frame of reference to which he has been transported by Laing.

That schizophrenic experience is experience in a mode discriminated against by the majority of the mundane minded is a concept that does not bear close scrutiny.

First, the schizophrenic mode alone is quite clearly limited in survival value. Second, it is a complete fallacy to believe that our culture makes use of the linear mode of experiencing to the total exclusion of any other. Split-brain experiments suggest very strongly that there are two modes of experience and Ornstein (1973) uses data from these experiments in his comparison of the Western and Eastern ways of life. Split brains are, however, a very rare phenomenon, dependent for their existence on medical intervention in some disease process. The point is that Westerners experience both modes quite unconsciously. According to Perry (1974), psychic development is not linear, one type of knowing being that of the mundane handling of the mundane world of the ego, the other being knowing in depth, reverberations of meaning and emotion not quite conscious. It is probable that normal psychic activity follows the same rules. The great works of art, and the appreciation of them, is one example. Another might be religious experience at its best. Other examples might include falling in love or creative activity. Though man in the West is technologically orientated, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that his brain is not constricted to the rational mode of thinking alone. The two ways are complementary and the mistake the West has made is to imagine that the non-linear mode is less important and to deny the relevance and meaningfulness



to his own life of any experience a person has, inexplicable in terms of the prevailing scientific paradigm. The "underground" social life of the psyche has never been wholly eradicated and today's environment probably provides more potential for its satisfaction than any other period in history. The failure to satisfy lies in the emphasis being on the experience rather than the meaning. Experience in any mode is likely to be unsatisfying unless some fundamental purpose can be found for individual existence. This is the advantage of mysticism. And it is to the disadvantage of the schizophrenic that any mystical experience he may have must remain valueless until he has acquired some cultural conceptual framework within which to experience himself as an autonomous being and in terms of which to evaluate the experience.

The concept of the relativity of reality needs some clarification as well if Laing is not seriously to mislead the researcher. It is clear that the reality which persons build up consensually has its origin in the organ of integration of perception, the brain, and that some stimuli must be ignored for the advantage of a stable inner world (the surrogate of the actual environment). What may not be clear is that the range of the reality built up this way is apparently fairly standard and innate. For example, it is beyond the realm of belief

that, if one placed a table in the path of a primitive denizen of the Amazon jungle who had no previous knowledge of such a thing, he would fail to see it and walk right through it. Physiological theories of brain function would suggest that he would display dishabituation; that is, he would be alerted until he had built the table into his inner surrogate for reality or made allowance for it in his brain state of the moment as inert and harmless. If he were not fully awake he might invest the table with all sorts of properties it does not possess and it is possible to imagine other circumstances in which the table might take on connotations over and above its normal properties of tableness. Man in nature alone appears to have a range of gross perception that is universal. What may be phased out by the "reducing valve" (Huxley, 1959) of the brain are subtler stimuli which may be culturally biased. The testimony of persons of unquestionable integrity like Eileen Garrett indicates that there might be finer areas of perception which the majority cannot experience most of the time. A common sense approach suggests that, given the same sense organs, men will perceive more or less the same thing and have been doing so for at least the last three thousand years.

The relativity of cultural reality is not at all the same thing as the relativity of sensory perception, even in relation to cultural values. The real difference lies

in the relationships of the things persons perceive within different cultures, functions of its ethos, its organisation of daily life and its meaning structures. To a scientist a dead rat might suggest the danger of a plague. To someone in a more "primitive" frame of reference it might mean an omen of misfortune. For each its meaning is "real" and may be proved by subsequent events. But each sees a dead rat.

In view of these reservations about the validity of Laing's ideas and in view of his failure to demonstrate them to the satisfaction of the scientific community, his more controversial hypotheses have been largely ignored in this study, despite his influential status among liberals and reformers the world over.

### 3.4 SUMMARY

The following picture of the schizophrenic should now have clarified. He has a different way of being in the world from normal persons, caused by factors that have not yet been fully ascertained - physiological, biochemical, developmental, genetic, interpersonal and intrapsychic. It is probable that combinations of intrinsic and secondary handicap will vary from patient to patient.

If assessed within the medical model he will share some symptoms with other patients but his thinking is charac-

terised by a frame of reference which is peculiarly his own as distinct from the frame of reference shared by other persons in his culture or from other schizophrenics, each of which inhabits a "mental universe" conditioned to a large extent by the loneliness and isolation which results from his predicament. This is not merely a delusional belief as might be found in paranoid disorders where the core of the personality is much less affected. The schizophrenic does not possess the tools for effective living incorporated in the GRO, for structuring and manipulating a consensually validated reality.

In terms of Wilber's model, the levels of the Biosocial Bands (1.4.4) and Ego (1.4.5) are defective or intermittently maintained. Sometimes the Existential Level (1.4.3) may be involved also, as when the patient loses his body boundaries. In other words, he has failed to differentiate himself as a unique member of his culture at a certain time and place in history. He may enter the level of the Transpersonal Bands (1.4.2) but there is at present little evidence of this, since the difficulty of communicating in his isolation makes it impossible to assess him for increased performance efficiency in standard ESP tests, for example. Religious ideation may be misleading from a semantic point of view.

Seen in terms of his relationship to society, the schiz-

ophrenic is a-human (in a non-pejorative sense) in that he has failed to differentiate himself as a person along Angyal's (1965) parameters of mastery and love.



## CHAPTER 4

## MYSTICISM AND THE MYSTIC

Weave a circle round him thrice  
And close your eyes with holy dread;  
For he on honey-dew hath fed  
And drunk the milk of Paradise.

Coleridge: Kubla Khan

## 4. INTRODUCTION

Knowles (1967) attributes the renewed interest in mysticism, which began in the nineteenth century, to two sources. Within the Church, thinkers reacted to the overwhelming oppression of materialistic philosophies, which in this century has culminated in the extremes of logical positivism and behaviourism. Outside the Church, the scientific study of psychology focused on religious phenomena as providing examples of unusual, and probably undesirable, psychological conditions. In contrast to this academic concern, interest in mysticism as a source of alternative lifestyles was given impetus by the drug-taking counter-cultural movement. Toffler (1971) sees it as a defence against the spiralling technological complexity of today's world, the impact of which is too great for the human organism to assimilate. The implication in this latter view is that mysticism is largely

delusional and escapist.

Just as madness as a term can be used in a rather careless and colloquial way, so can mysticism be misunderstood, so that the old joke about mysticism's beginning in "mist" and ending in "schism" becomes applicable. According to Cuthbert Butler (1960) "it has come to be applied to many things of many kinds: to theosophy and Christian Science; to spiritualism and clairvoyance; to demonology and witchcraft; to occultism and magic; to weird psychical experiences, if only they have some religious colour; to revelations and visions; to otherworldliness; or even mere dreaminess and impracticability" (p. 65).

There are many definitions of mysticism (Dean Inge, 1969, lists twenty-six). Some definitions emphasise love, others understanding, all to a greater or lesser degree determined by the intellectual or emotional allegiance of the formulators. The examples listed below are cited by Happold (1970):

/Mysticism is/ the filling of the consciousness by a content (feeling, thought, desire) by an involuntary emergence of the same from the unconscious.

Von Hartmann

The mystical phenomena of the soul-life are anticipations of the biological process. Soul is our spirit within the self-consciousness, spirit is the

soul beyond the self-consciousness.

Du Prel

The essence of mysticism is the assertion of an intuition which transcends the temporal categories of the understanding, relying on speculative reason. Rationalism cannot conduct us to the essence of things; we therefore need intellectual vision.

Lasson

Mysticism is the art of union with Reality. The mystic is a person who has attained that union in a greater or lesser degree; or who aims at and believes in such attainment.

Evelyn Underhill

It [mysticism] appears in connexion with the endeavour of the human mind to grasp the Divine essence of the ultimate reality of things and to enjoy the blessedness of actual communion with the highest.

Professor A. Seth

(pp. 37 - 38)

Great mystics and visionaries are rare. Some of the greatest like Jacob Boehme are more easily categorised as nature mystics. The mystical experience on the other hand is catholic in its occurrence, though perhaps happening once in an individual lifetime, and, moreover, may bear elements of creative insight rather than religious ideation. It would be possible to choose one of a number of alternative definitions as a starting point. For the reason that Joan of Arc lived within the framework of a mediaeval Christian cosmology it seems appropriate to use the definition of McNamara (1975) as the basis for this introductory discussion of mysticism. He states that mysticism is the science of mystical

experience, that is, the realisation of union with God, and the latter is simply the most profound and most sought-after kind of religious experience. The data of this science are the experiences of the great mystics, all of whom, when differences in philosophical and religious frames of reference have been taken into account, have reported phenomena of remarkably similar nature. McNamara finds in St Augustine's words, "My mind in the flash of a trembling glance came to Absolute Being - That which is" (cited on p. 399), the most concise and impressive statement of the mystic's claim. Blaise Pascal's words:

God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,  
Not the God of philosophers and scholars.  
Absolute Certainty: Beyond reason. Joy. Peace.  
Forgetfulness of the world and everything but God.  
The world has not known thee, but I have known thee.

(Happold, 1970, p. 39)

emphasise the independence of the mystic's encounter with God from the God of theology and dogma, its essentially empirical quality. The fundamental assumption arising from the accumulated testimony of those who have been gifted with consistent mystical ability, is that, at the root of the mystic's being, the centre of his true self as opposed to the phenomenal ego, there is a direct experience of Transcendental Reality. The mystic does not come to God by intellectual activity or metaphysical speculation but by experience - a union of love with God.

The sceptic may question the validity of a science based on the reports of persons whose experiences are private events. To the extent that all man knows is based on his experience of life, the reality of the mystical experience is no more questionable than that of the everyday consensory experience shared with other members of the same culture. A science must adjust its method to suit its subject matter, not distort the data to fit in to its own possible misconceptions. Happold (1970) points out that the status of intuition, creative insight or imagination is acknowledged by the scientist as well as the mystic, poet or philosopher. He cites the testimony of Dr H.H. Huntley in The Faith of the Physicist:

The physicist is driven by his own experience to conclude that his personality has depths and resources beyond the analysing conscious mind, wherein lie powers of synthesis, appreciation, and understanding, a latent skill and wisdom superior to that to which his consciousness is routinely accustomed. This suggests that the framework of physics, filled in with a host of facts, has been fabricated in mental regions where analysis is secondary to synthesis. Thus, both the inner experience of the individual scientist and the confessions of genius concerning the mental mechanism of discovery indicate that, no less than poetry and music, this framework of generalizations, principles, and laws which constitute science has been built up in mental levels below the levels of consciousness. (pp. 28 - 29)

The existence of at least two main mystical traditions, oriental and Western, make a discussion of this subject difficult, for the interpretation of mystical experience, ineffable by nature, seeks its expression in the religious and philosophical framework in which the mystic



finds himself. Clearly, any attempt to assert the validity of one approach over another, or one explanation of the event over another explanation of a similar event, must depend on the belief of the person involved. Arguments that the apparent similarities between the mystic experiences of Christians, like St Theresa of Avila or St John of the Cross, and those of Eastern mystics can be attributed to the paganistically influenced Neo-Platonist ideas adopted by St Augustine and Denis the Areopagite are hardly convincing except through personal commitment justified by studies in theology and philosophy. For the purposes of the present study, the insights of Huxley in The Perennial Philosophy (1958) incorporated by Wilber in his model (1.4) are the most useful, although to do full justice to any individual mystic, considerations based on the findings of experimental psychology must be supplemented by ontological and theological considerations (McNamara, 1975). According to Zilboorg, "while psychology can throw a great deal of psychological light on religious experience, and religious faith may enrich one's psychological functioning, psychology as a scientific discipline can shed no light whatsoever on the relations between man and God" (cited in McNamara, 1975, pp. 393 - 394).

A first step to the full acceptance of the validity of the mystical experience is clearly, as Happold (1970)

says, the acknowledgement that God exists and this affects the concept of the nature of man. In such a framework the religious act becomes consent to the transcendence of man's being. His subjection to God in this framework does not enslave him but instead liberates him to become his best and most noble self (McNamara, 1975). His goals in life are then no longer those conditioned by his unique occupation of cultural space in time but are first and foremost transcendent and universal. This does not, however, alienate him from the dimensions of his cultural being. According to Underhill (1967), the mystic, having established his relationship with the Absolute, returns to his reality-oriented tasks with renewed and apparently inexhaustible vigour. The denial of the desires of the phenomenal ego, so frustrating in, for example, a Freudian frame of reference, becomes self-actualising in a cosmology which includes the Transcendent. Adrian van Kaam calls this the "self-actualising surrender" which "arises from the authentic gift of one-self ... [and] implies growth in maturity by constant participation in the Transcendent " (cited in McNamara, 1975, p. 396). It is a function of the whole person and thus truly integrative. The religious act is the supreme manifestation of the essence of man and faith in God is super-rational and intelligent, not sub-rational.

Although psychology alone cannot do justice to the individual mystic, there are now within the discipline theoretical formulations and empirical evidence that tend to support the contention that mystical experience has in truth the intentional and integrative qualities that are claimed for it (as opposed to the disintegrative schizophrenic experience). For example, while from a purely psychological point of view, it is not possible to state that God exists, it is possible to agree unequivocally with the conclusion of Masters and Houston (1967) that the God myth is the most powerful myth in man's armoury of self-actualising metaphors. Since the crucial issues involved in a comparison between the schizophrenic and the mystic are their apparently or allegedly similar perceptual idiosyncracies and their role in society, the focus in the remainder of this chapter will be on the nature and occurrence of the mystical experience and the role of the mystic in the culture of which he is a member. Though aspects of these studies can be criticised, the contribution of transpersonal psychology and psychedelic experimentation and the theoretical formulations they have produced is that they place the experience and life of the mystic firmly within the normal range of interaction between man and his environment; or alternatively, extend the range of normality to include those phenomena which, though unquestionably present in the sane, were excluded by the rigidity of the paradigm accepted

by psychologists.

#### 4.1 THE MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

In all human beings, waking consciousness is a discrete state of consciousness (d-SoC) defined by Tart (1975) as a "specific pattern of functioning of the mind, recognising that this pattern may show a range of variation in its specifics while still remaining the same overall pattern" (p. 14)...."It is an active way of coping with reality, with incoming information both about the external world and about one's body and own experiences" (p. 16). Modern psychological research has shown that, contrary to what it might seem, "any d-SoC is an arbitrary way of working with information" in that it is selective, a "construction built up in accordance with biological and cultural imperatives for the purpose of dealing with our physical, intrapersonal, and interpersonal environments" (p. 16). What Tart is describing here is the GRO (2.1) essential to any person if he is to function in his society and never very far away from consciousness even when attention is firmly fixed in some specific frame of reference embedded within it, for example, in the reading of an extremely technical book. A discrete altered state of consciousness (d-ASC) "is a radical alteration of the overall patterning of consciousness (compared to some reference d-SoC...) such that the

experiencer of the d-ASC (or perhaps an observer) can tell that different laws are functioning, that a new, overall pattern is superimposed on his experience" (p. 14). Hypnagogic and hypnopompic states, alcohol intoxication, drug intoxication, meditative states, spirit possession states, hypnotic and auto-hypnotic states are examples of d-ASCs. Though some d-ASCs may appear to be the same, they can differ widely both in cause and physiology. Doxey (1974), for example, demonstrated that the brain states and physiological reactions accompanying biofeedback, hypnotic and TM states were significantly different from one another.

The mystical experience is a particular d-ASC recognisable by the following qualities:

- (a) It has the quality of ineffability - it defies description in terms which can be understood by one who has not had a similar experience. It resembles a state in which feeling rather than intellect predominates.
- (b) It is, nevertheless, a state of knowledge, having a noetic quality resulting in insight not accessible in terms of discursive intellect but bearing an undeniable and completely convincing sense of authority.
- (c) It has the quality of transiency, rarely lasting for any length of time before the experiencing



person returns to normality. Certain practices and ways of life can increase its frequency and it may even become controllable in the adept.

- (d) While it is possible to prepare oneself for mystical experience, it occurs invariably as something given. The mystic experiences passivity, his own will being in abeyance while he is in the grip of some external force.
- (e) In the mystical state there is the consciousness of the "Oneness" of everything. All existence is experienced as a unity.
- (f) There is a sense of timelessness. Since the nature of time is controversial, (subjective experience of time is relative and clock-time probably only one aspect of time), this is by no means incomprehensible. The fact of pre-cognition in certain (as yet not fully understood) circumstances is also suggestive of the curious role of time in relation to man's life. (Dunne, 1934; Gooch, 1979; Moss, 1976; A.Smith, 1976).
- (g) Closely related to (e) and (f) is the characteristic that the phenomenal "ego" is not the real "I". On the basis of this quality, the Hindu postulates that in man there is another self, the true self, not affected by daily, humdrum happenings, unchanging and eternal. In Christian mysticism it is expressed as the "spark", the "centre" or "apex of

the soul". (Happold, 1970)

Deikmann (1969) divides persons who experience the mystical d-ASC into three groups: untrained-sensate, trained-sensate and trained-transcendent. The term "sensate" refers to what adepts would regard as the lesser phenomena of the mystic way, involving as they do, emotion and ideation. The experiences of the first two groups are phenomenologically indistinguishable except that in the trained-sensate group, experiences conform closely to the specific religious cosmology of the individual mystic and also, for this reason, have a more significant and persisting psychological effect. The untrained-sensate group has no categories with which to interpret his experience and may eventually forget it. For example, take the experience of a fifteen-year-old boy:

What had been merely an outside became an inside. The objective was somehow transformed into a completely subjective fact, which was experienced as 'mine', but on a level where the word had no meaning; for 'I' was no longer the familiar ego. Nothing more can be said about the experience, it brought no accession of knowledge about anything except, very obscurely, the knower and his way of knowing. After a few minutes there was a 'return to normalcy'. The event made a deep impression on me at the time; but, because it did not fit into any of the thought patterns - religious, philosophical, scientific - with which, as a boy of fifteen, I was familiar, it came to seem more and more anomalous, more and more irrelevant to 'real life', and was finally forgotten. (Happold, 1970, p. 130)

Persons classified as belonging to the trained-transcendent group experience a higher, ultimate union that goes

beyond affect, occurring almost always in association with long training.

Of the aforementioned groups the trained-sensate and trained-transcendent are in a sense of less interest to this discussion than those who experience a mystical d-ASC spontaneously or undergo a conversion experience which changes the course of their lives. While persons in the former two groups may have pursued their subsequent aesthetic disciplines as a result of such an experience, there is nothing really surprising in the fact that certain practices and lifestyles are more conducive to mystical experience. Research into sensory deprivation and the physiological effects of flagellation and fasting suggest very strongly that the inducement and more frequent occurrence of the experience is partially explicable in physiological terms (Masters & Houston, 1967). This does not mean that it is reducible to these causes, since the motive force is the belief system of the mystic or rather the way he uses the experience intentionally to actualise himself according to his concept of the nature of man in relationship with the Absolute. (The physiological effects of his practices may also contribute to the high incidence of psychosomatic symptoms in the great mystics, who nevertheless appear in general to have been at least as long-lived as their contemporaries.)

The untrained-sensate group would appear to be more relevant to the schizophrenic/mystic relationship being studied in that the mystical d-ASC is not solicited. And the relevant question is whether or not such experience must be labelled as pathological or may be seen as creative and meaningful, and potentially within the range of all humans.

#### 4.1.1 DEAUTOMATIZATION

Deikman (1969) states that the mystical experience can be conceptualised as a process of the deautomatization of psychological processes, automatization referring to processes which become habitual or automatic, in the sense that the person is no longer aware of their stages. These can be motor, affective or intellectual responses. An example is formulated by Werner (cited in Deikman, 1969) in a statement based on studies of eidetic imagery in children as well as on broader studies of perceptual development:

The image ... gradually changed in functional character. It becomes [sic] essentially subject to the exigencies of abstract thought. Once the image changes in function and becomes an instrument in reflective thought, its structure will also change. It is only through such structural change that the image can serve as an instrument of expression in abstract mental activity. This is why, of necessity, the sensuousness, fullness of detail, the color and the vivacity of the image must fade. (Deikman, 1969, p. 32)

Deautomatization is a reversal of this process in the direction of a more primitive mode of functioning. This

permits a gain in sensory intensity and richness in the presence of a loss of abstract categorisation and differentiation. It is through its contrast with adult memories and functioning, controlled by a different mode of consciousness, that the experience of deautomatization acquires its peculiar flavour of vividness and intensity. In other words the GRO is still somewhere in the background as a standard for testing.

When Benson (cited in A. Smith, 1976) postulated that the relaxation response was at the root of all mystical and religious experience, it was found that this was a partial truth but that relaxation alone could not account for the increased alertness that is a characteristic of Transcendental Meditation, nor for the efficacy of prayer in the life of the devotee. In the same way, deautomatization is a useful concept in that it makes the mystical experience intelligible in terms of psychological theory and physiology and shows it to be well within the range of normal brain functioning, especially in the presence of a supportive setting in which renunciation of the world, poverty, chastity, isolation and silence play a large part. In the hierarchy of mystical interaction, with transcendence as its pinnacle, changes in sensory perception and subsequent cognitive and affective functioning are not regarded as being very high on the scale. Nor can deautomatization alone account for the profound



changes such an experience produces in the person. For example, Vera Brittain (cited in Happold, 1970) describes a mystical experience of Winifred Holtby, who at the age of thirty-three, with a promising career as a novelist before her, learned that she had only two years to live. Rebellious and exhausted, she took a walk and came upon some lambs which could not drink from the trough because it had frozen over;

She broke the ice for them with her stick, and as she did so heard a voice within her saying 'Having nothing, yet possessing all things'. It was so distinct that she looked round startled, but she was alone with the lambs on the top of the hill. Suddenly, in a flash, the grief, the bitterness, the sense of frustration disappeared; all desire to possess power and glory for herself vanished away, and never came back.... She always associated it afterwards with the words of Bernard Bosanquet on Salvation: 'And now we are saved absolutely, we need not say from what, we are at home in the universe, and in principle and in the main, feeble and timid creatures as we are, there is nothing within the world or without it that can make us afraid.' (p. 131)

Deikman (1969) also puts forward possible explanations for the unique qualities of the mystical d-ASC. While making these intelligible within the psychologist's frame of reference he does not reduce the experience and deprive it of its richness.

Concerning the sense of reality, of authority, that accompanies this d-ASC, he argues that the feeling of realness is a function distinct from that of reality judgement (although they usually operate in concert), and is

not inherent in sensations as such. Hence, realness as a quantity function can be displaced and is subject to intensification, reduction or transfer. The quality of reality during deautomatization, formerly invested in the material world, becomes attached to sensations and ideas.

Unusual sensory perceptions, such as increased light or other visionary experience not normally associated with the real world, are, according to Deikman, not due to unusual sensory input from another dimension but are representative of an unusual mode of perception. Deikman defines this as "sensory translation", the perception of psychic action in terms of unstructured sensations during the deautomatized state. In contrast to symbolic translation of psychic activity in hypnogogic phenomena, sensory translation is "non-verbal, simple, concrete perceptual equivalents of psychic action" (p. 37). Within this model, "Illumination" may not simply be a metaphor for mystical experience but an actual sensory experience of the liberation of energy or the resolution of an unconscious conflict. The mystic, becoming aware of intra-psychic processes ordinarily outside the range of everyday consciousness and displacing the feeling of realness, misinterprets the perception as being caused by an external stimulus.

Concerning the sense of unity with nature or God, Deikman suggests two possibilities. It could be attributable to the fact that the actual stuff of perception is the electro-chemical activity that constitutes perception and thought in the functioning of the brain and that, at this level, the contents of awareness would be homogeneous. An alternative possibility is that unity is a correct evaluation of the external world in that deautomatization with its concomitant of requiring more attention to the increased detail and sensation available to the mystic, may allow him an awareness of new dimensions of the total stimulus array, a process Deikman terms "perceptual expansion". The normal psychic organization of an adult requires that some stimuli be selected at the expense of others. If this process is temporarily suspended, more aspects of reality become available.

The quality of ineffability as conceptualised by Deikman is of particular interest dealing as it does with the elements of love and knowledge, which most experts agree are the most important aspects of the mystical d-ASC.

One type of experience is ineffable, in his opinion, because it is based on primitive memories and preverbal fantasies or non-verbal sensory experience. In the regression in thought processes that results from renunciation, infantile longings may be activated by the

promise inherent in the religious frame of reference. It is necessary to place this formulation of Deikman in perspective as its implications are derogatory. All that appears regressive is not necessarily so. It could equally well be argued that in general the love between mother and child is the most perfect state of love the human experiences, so that it becomes a paradigm for all the needs expressed in non-verbal fashion in adult love relationships. It is immature only when it is exercised without the leaven of adult responsibility and unselfishness.

The second type of experience is ineffable because it is comprised of a revelation too complex to be verbalised, of the significance and inter-relationships of many dimensions of life, simultaneously revealed. Deikman hypothesises that an attempt to express the experience verbally is analogous to trying to communicate the impact of a great novel without having recourse to the actual linear argument and detail that the novelist used to create that impact. It would be like trying to convey verbally the vertical inter-relationships of layers of conceptual structures.

The great adepts describe a stage of the latter experience that goes beyond sensory and intellectual elements familiar to everyday experience. This variant of the

mystical d-ASC transcends and is yet not a blank but filled with intense, profound and vivid perception. It is considered to be the peak experience of the mystical route to union with the Absolute. Deikman sees this as the operation of a new perceptual capacity responsive to areas of the stimulus array previously blocked from consciousness - perhaps a combination of those processes put forward as explanations of the quality of union and intellectually holistic insight. The mental event is unidentifiable and so, indescribable. The loss of self reported also suggests a new perceptual mode outside of reflective awareness, the phenomenal ego thus falling into abeyance. Since the mystic is motivated to perceive something, it is likely that alternative and undeveloped perceptual capacities, if they do indeed exist, will come into operation when the awareness is focused<sup>s</sup><sub>k</sub> away from the ordinary contents of consciousness.

#### 4.1.2 EVALUATION

The logical and creative explanations presented by Deikman are in marked contrast to such exotica as Alexander's definition of mystical experience as a withdrawal of libido from the world to be reinvested in the ego until intra-uterine narcissism ("the narcissism of the sperm") is achieved (cited in Deikman, 1969, p. 30). This is an absurdity to anyone who does not subscribe to Alexander's belief system. Deikman's ideas go a long way towards



reinstating the mystical experience as a potentially fulfilling state of consciousness. There is a tendency to believe that if something can be explained it is automatically discredited or reducible to an epiphenomenon. A knowledge of the physiological mechanisms of orgasm does not explain love or the noble or ignoble acts committed in the name of love; nor does similar knowledge about human aggression account for its positive and negative applications in man's life. If Mind is indeed the organising principle of life (Randall, 1975), if the end or purpose of biological evolution is indeed the spiritual development of the individual (De Chardin, 1970), the so-called epiphenomena of man's cultural being are clearly essential and have a significance that the psychologist cannot afford to despise.

Radnakrishnan (cited in Happold, 1970) emphasised the intellectual and noetic qualities of the mystical d-ASC when he defined mysticism as integrated thought bringing things together in a new pattern rather than breaking them down into parts as in analytical thought. A creative insight welling up from the depths of the unconscious relates parts into a meaningful whole.

Deikman concludes his article as follows:

The available scientific evidence tends to support the view that the mystic experience is one of internal perception, an experience that can be ecsta-

tic, profound, or therapeutic for purely internal reasons. Yet for psychological science, the problem of understanding such internal processes is hardly less complex than the theological problem of understanding God. Indeed, regardless of one's direction in the search to know what reality is, a feeling of awe, beauty, reverence, and humility seems to be the product of one's efforts. Since these emotions are characteristic of the mystic experience, itself, the question of the epistemological validity of that experience may have less importance than was initially supposed. (p. 43)

#### 4.1.3 SPONTANEOUS MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE IN PERSONS CLASSIFIED AS UNTRAINED-SENSATE

The special conditions which create the spontaneous mystical d-ASC in the untrained-sensate group are as yet unknown and may be combinations of causes specific to the individual. However, many persons such as St Paul and St Francis and more recently, Bucke and Allen, had experienced a period of restlessness or defiance or sense of purposelessness which culminated in what could be described as a revelation. In this context the spontaneous conversion or mystical d-ASC may be seen as a response of the psyche to the need of the person.

Increased alertness or mental involvement, the focusing<sup>s</sup> of attention intensely on a specific area of thought, leading to peripheral hypoalertness, may be conducive to a mystical ASC. Conversely, decreased alertness and a relaxation of critical faculties may precipitate its occurrence (Ludwig, 1969).

Sensory translation may occur when heightened attention is directed at the sensory pathways, in the absence of controlled analytical thought (Deikman, 1969). John Buchan, the novelist, has described an episode which suggests some of these features:

I had been ploughing all day in the black dust of the Lichtenburg roads, and had come very late to a place called the eye of Malmani - Malmani Oog - the spring of a river which presently loses itself in the Kalahari. We watered our horses and went supperless to bed. Next morning I bathed in one of the Malmani pools - and icy cold it was - and then basked in the early sunshine while breakfast was cooking. The water made a pleasant music, and near by was a covert of willows filled with singing birds. Then and there came on me the hour of revelation, when, though savagely hungry, I forgot about breakfast. Scents, sights, and sounds blended into a harmony so perfect that it transcended human expression, even human thought. It was like a glimpse of the peace of eternity. (cited in Happold, 1970, p. 131)

These perfectly intelligible processes suggested by Ludwig and Deikman, together with a more or less rapid return to the confines of the GRO, establish the unsolicited experience of the untrained-sensate group well within the range of normal and quite probably desirable, perceptual modes and ASCs available to man for his enrichment and perhaps for a radical change in a direction meaningful to the person and his culture.

#### 4.2 PSYCHEDELIC DRUG RESEARCH

Masters and Houston (1967) studied the effects of LSD and peyote. Their findings, based upon first-hand observation of two hundred and six drug sessions and upon

interviews with another two hundred and fourteen persons who had been volunteer subjects, or psychotherapy patients, or who had obtained and taken drugs on their own, tend to confirm the picture of the mystic as it emerges in this chapter.

It is extremely likely that drugs have been used for centuries to produce religious experience in a supportive setting and probably preceded askesis-provoked mysticism. De Felice (cited in Masters & Houston, 1967) theorised that the failure of the drug in the soma to survive Aryan migration to India led to the intricate Hatha Yoga exercises designed to simulate or recapture such experience by natural means. The Solanaceae drugs were probably responsible for the hallucinations and nightmares which led to witches confessing that they had done deeds which they had only dreamed about. A modern example is the Peyote religion of the American Indian. The interesting aspect here is that belief systems firmly based in the GRO tend to control the sort of experience that the mind constructs under the stimulus of drugs. This is supported by the fact that well-adjusted subjects in the Masters and Houston experimental drug sessions tended to have experiences which confirmed and enriched an already worthwhile life. Maladjusted persons were as far as possible screened out as subjects in this research but unforeseen reactions could be controlled and

re-directed by the guide, the guide and the subject having in common a congruent, shared GRO as a means towards trust and understanding. Though in abeyance, the GRO was still available to the subject, a vehicle by virtue of which he could interpret and share his experience. In religious disciplines, the spiritual mentors would serve a similar function, having already travelled the road upon which the novice is embarking.

The existence of four levels of experience under drug intoxication emerged in the Masters and Houston study:

- (a) the Sensory Level - phenomena were limited to perceptual distortions and changes and fantasies based on these.
- (b) the Recollective-analytical - adjustment problems involving relationships and other difficulties were lived through, (most likely in persons who had been in therapy).
- (c) the Symbolic Level - where psychodynamic conflicts were dealt with in archetypal, universal terms.
- (d) the Integral Level - where new insights contributed to a restructuring of personality and lifestyle.

These levels cannot be discussed in detail but it is interesting to note their approximation to the levels of



Wilber's model. The sensory level at which subjects experienced phenomena like that of the merging of the self with object is of interest in that much mystical and religious metaphor was used and that subjects might on the basis of this, report religious experience, yet have their lives totally unaffected by the experience, vivid though it seemed at the time.

Masters and Houston contend that it is almost exclusively at the Integral Level (very rarely at the Symbolic Level) that true religious experience can be said to take place. Other studies have claimed a high percentage of religious experience but they set the level at six percent of their sample, pointing out that this is a problem of language (in that religious metaphor may be used to describe unusual experience), and a matter of definition:

Our major criteria for establishing the validity of these most profound religious and mystical experiences are three: Encounter with the Other on the integral level; transformation of the self; and, in most cases, a process of phenomenological progression through the sensory, recollective-analytic and symbolic levels before passing into the integral. In the case of these authentic experiences this progression has been at the same time a rich and varied exploration of the contents of these levels providing a cumulative expansion of insight and association until, at the threshold of the integral, the subject has experienced a comprehensive familiarity with the complex network of his being such as he had never known before. This process is greatly intensified and approaches culmination during the subject's passage through the symbolic level. (Masters & Houston, 1967, p. 267)

True mystical and religious experience produced a radical change in the lifestyle and interpersonal relationships of the subject, a positive trend to better adjustment; and seemed to be either a resolution of a long-standing conflict with regard to the subject's orientation to the transcendent or, alternatively, a culmination of the actual practising of a discipline as a means to enlightenment. Of interest is that persons in the latter category, having a rather distracted air before ingestion of the drug, also showed a tendency to embrace real life in terms of the insights gained, a positive reaction confirming the assessment of Underhill (1967) that the mystic is filled with inexhaustible energy for work in the world after the relationship with the Absolute is established - a harmony of love and knowledge (not necessarily discursive) applied to everyday, cultural problems, activities and relationships.

When Aldous Huxley (1959) wrote an account of his experiences after his experimental ingestion of mescaline, he suggested controversially that drugs would be a fast and easy method for bringing mystical and religious experience to the masses, who in a world of stimuli bombardment could no longer obtain the same satisfaction from such simple devices as the gentle translucence from a stained glass window, for example. This would, in effect be instant religion. In an analysis of Huxley's exper-

ience, Zaehner (cited in D'Arcy, 1958) has pointed out the danger in confusing pantheism, monism, monotheism, natural mysticism and theistic mysticism. In identifying oneself with nature, one initiates a dissociation between the conscious self and the will and the unconscious, a process Jung maintained led to incipient madness. In calling "creatures", the natural world, by the name of God, Huxley experienced a fear near to panic and madness (D'Arcy, 1958). Though they and psychopathology may mimic it, drug-induced phenomena are not synonymous with the mystical d-ASCs. Von Hügel (cited in D'Arcy, 1958) maintained that the expansion or contraction of the personality, and love were the test. The madman loses interest in duties and friends while the genuine mystic becomes increasingly generous and integrated (ibid). McNamara (1975) supports the claim that genuine mystical and religious experience under drugs is only possible to those already predisposed by their interests and preoccupations and perhaps also some degree of preparation. He sees it as a gift from God, just as Knowles (1967) claims that the spontaneous mystical d-ASC in non-Christians comes by the grace of God:

Drugs might heighten the possibility [of mystical experience] in the case of an individual already morally disposed by changing his temperament from dominantly opaque [not given to mystical d-ASCs] to dominantly transparent. This transparency due to drugs... can expose the divine content of the soul otherwise imperceptible to the subject. The use of narcotics, however, generally leads to

pseudomysticism. (McNamara, 1975, p. 400)

The danger is present that in using drugs the person may come to accept the pseudo for the genuine. Also he may feel he is growing in love and empathy and yet his lifestyle will indicate the very opposite in that he shirks responsibility and decreases his circle of associates to a few anti-social and possibly criminal persons. Others may profess a love for all humanity, for the entire universe, as a façade for narcissism (Masters & Houston, 1967).

The value of the Masters and Houston study is that it demonstrates empirically the existence of an integral level of the psyche at which new insights can be accommodated into the subject's psychical functioning and lead to positive, vital adjustment at all cultural levels. It supports what scholars in other disciplines have maintained, that mystical experience is not mere self indulgence and posturing, that easy access to it may in fact lead to a worsening of functioning and adjustment, that not all that appears mystical is indeed mystical (the problem of metaphor and semantics leading to the confusion) and that genuine mystical activity manifests itself in the life and actions of the person who experiences it.

#### 4.3 THE ROLE OF THE MYSTIC IN SOCIETY

Wilber's model of the Spectrum of Consciousness (1.4)



postulates on the basis of Eastern and Western insights, that Mind, the Absolute or God, some cognizant and highly purposeful force, is the organising principle through which all people and all the universe have their being. It is interesting to note the similarity between Schrodinger, the founder of quantum mechanics', words and those of Bernard Bosanquet on salvation (4.1.1):

Inconceivable as it seems to ordinary reason, you - and all other conscious beings as such - are all in all. Hence this life of yours you are living is not merely a piece of the entire existence, but is in a certain sense the whole.... Thus you can throw yourself flat on the ground, stretched out upon Mother Earth, with the certain conviction that you are one with her and she with you. You are as firmly established, as invulnerable as she, indeed a thousand times firmer and more invulnerable. (cited in Wilber, 1977, p. 108)

Perry (1974), using as a theoretical base Jung's conceptualisation of the collective unconscious and archetypes integrated by the central archetype, the self (the reconciler of opposites), puts forward a theory of the value of mystical experience and the role of the mystic in society, which is appealing in that it appears to explain why the mystical experience is of most value when it is an adjunct to normal psychological adjustment and may have a detrimental effect if it is merely an indulgence and escape. The latter effects are possible only in commercial-commodity types of experience like those produced by drugs. Active seeking in other contexts demands a discipline and aestheticism daunting to one who is not in earnest. Even a relatively simple technique like



Transcendental Meditation does not produce instant euphoria or cosmic consciousness. Without perseverance and high seriousness it becomes at best a remarkably effective relaxation technique.

The work of the mystic can be seen as relative in the sense that cultures change, institutions change, ideas change, so that what these persons produce at cultural level sometimes becomes outmoded or, in the case of the political reformer, temporal, with relevance to only one period in history when judged from the perspective of distance in time. The great legacy of the mystics is their account of the mystical d-ASC and its inspiration; their works in time are usually relative. If she is viewed as a mystic, Joan's accomplishing the crowning of the Dauphin in a divided France does not seem worth the while of such illustrious entities as St Michael, St Catherine and St Margaret.

Perry points out that new ideas generally inject new vitality into institutions, which, designed as they are to give structure and expression to the human psyche by some collective action of the totality of those psyches, may have become repressive in their rigidity, leading to stagnation. Logos predominates over Eros, if Perry's somewhat limited definition of Logos is accepted. Just as the individual psyche strives to redress the balance

if the person's orientation has become too one-sided; so in such circumstances, the collective psyche becomes restless. The mystic, the prophet, the contemplative, the reformer, the artist, are persons who are temperamentally sensitive to this collective unrest, this need for change. They experience what, in some cases, may be a cataclysmic, psychic reorganisation similar to that which Perry postulated for schizophrenics (3.3.1), an event which, while not always pleasant, may be profound in its effect. As a result of this event's striking nature and its anomaly in comparison to routine events, they spend the rest of their lives integrating the experience intrapsychically and finding expression for it in writing, teaching, religious and political reorganisation and other measures for change and reform. As a result, changes are effected which, at first full of life and spirit, become institutionalised in their turn and eventually rigid and repressive, so that once again a new formulation becomes necessary.

The tendency for institutions to become rigid, for society to resist change, has some positive value in that it is only in a stable society that creative activity can find its basic shape or context. Nevertheless, at the core of the spiritual life of the people are the mystics, positioned along some mysterious creative continuum, who are committed by temperament to constant efforts to ef-

fect a balance in the expression of collective psychic needs.

In this sense, the mystical d-ASC and the mystic are essential to their time and creative in their impact. That they have the conservatism of their fellow men to contend with may be the essential ingredient in the creating of the tension needed for change. Out of conflict comes a new dispensation. If existence in the cave had been euphoric, presumably man would never have embarked on the search for knowledge and for control of the environment and would no longer exist as a species.

#### 4.4 SUMMARY

Emerging from the arguments above is the picture of the mystic as one who, while not necessarily conforming to the norms of the man in the street, is super-adjusted, in that he is adjusted to the ethos of his temporal culture and is one of the catalysts which bring about change, though it is impossible to state categorically that this is always change for the better. In terms of Wilber's model, he has at his disposal not only the GRO, or psychical tool for effective functioning at the Ego Level, but also has contact with a transcendent principle. This contact beyond the confines of his existence at the phenomenal level, may lead him to a variety of experiences at the level of the Transpersonal Bands (1.4.2) and per-

haps even at the level of Mind (1.4.1). Perhaps it would be useful to postulate a concept like the Generalised Transcendental Orientation - GTO - to supplement that of the GRO.

## CHAPTER 5

## SCHIZOPHRENIC OR MYSTIC?

Whom the gods destroy they first make mad.

Euripides

Let not the conceit of intellect hinder thee  
from worshipping mystery.

M.F. Tupper

## 5. WINDMILLS AND GIANTS

From a reading of the preceding chapters the following pictures of the schizophrenic and the mystic should have crystallised.

The schizophrenic has failed to adjust to his social environment along the dimensions of homonomy and autonomy, or, alternatively, has a tenuous hold upon reality in that the maintenance of the GRO is unpredictable/unreliable for an as yet undetermined reason. As a result, he has been unable to differentiate himself to his full potential as a person capable of functioning without some supportive therapy or milieu. He may, as a result of the secondary effects of his primary handicap, take on a role which our society calls "chronic schizophrenic" and have developed "symptoms" not unrelated to institu-



tionalism and the attitudes of those who see him as sick. He may, as an alternative, have carved out for himself a fringe adjustment in the care of a relative in a world structured enough to allow him relief from the anxiety which new situations can create in such persons.

On the other hand, stalking through the pages of history, are persons who have contributed to mankind's conception of himself and the universe and who have frequently claimed that their power lay not in themselves but that it came from another source: Gautama Buddha, Jesus Christ, St Paul, St Francis, St Teresa of Avila, St John of the Cross, Blaise Pascal, Swedenborg, William Blake and C.G. Jung, to mention but a few. There are also relatively unknown persons who have claimed to have experienced the mystical d-ASC or what appear to be related phenomena at some time in their lives. The mystic, as a result of his belief, may voluntarily have excluded himself from the mainstream of society by entering a monastic institution; at the same time, he is capable of sharing a consensually validated GRO with other persons. He may experience unusual phenomena over and beyond the mystic experience as defined in Chapter 4, for example, visions and voices. These may at first glance appear to be the same as those experienced in some types of schizophrenia. In the case of the mystic, however, they are desirable in that they tend to confirm his be-

lief. Also, they may have an integrative and beneficial effect on his life, leading to greater adjustment in the areas of love and mastery. This is in contrast to their incapacitating effect on the schizophrenic. It should also be clear that being a mystic does not, as a matter of course, exempt the person from sharing the lot of humanity at large. He may at times display traits that could be seen as hysterical or neurotic. Sainthood is not bestowed on all who are mystical by nature. Bernadette was not canonised because she saw visions of what was believed to be the Virgin Mary at Lourdes. Her exemplary life as a nun later was the decisive factor.

It has also been suggested that a great many curious patterns of behaviour have come to be accepted in Western society, its not being dissent that is the crucial issue but whether or not the dissenter uses the same vehicle of expression as others (the GRO), even if it is to negate its own values. Hence, the view that the schizophrenic is a deviant against whom society discriminates has been treated with scepticism. It may well be that chronic schizophrenia could be made to look different at a superficial level if society changed its attitudes to those who are "different". Nevertheless, it is vulnerability and the danger to himself and sometimes to others that are decisive factors in his finding himself in a mental hospital.

Voices, visions (hallucinations) and beliefs (delusions) would seem to be the areas where there is the greatest overlap in schizophrenic and mystical experience. They are either the same phenomena in different contexts or they are entirely unrelated. There is some evidence, and much opinion, that the latter is true. Auden (1964), for instance, makes the observation that in nature mysticism (which he calls the vision of Dame Kind), the person does not perceive an alternative reality to that of his everyday experience. Instead it is a reality suddenly charged with additional meaning and beauty - existence is extended:

The experience seems to the subject not only more important than anything he experiences when in a "normal" state, but also a revelation of reality. When he returns to a normal state, he does not say: "That was a pleasant dream but, of course, an illusion. Now I am awake and see things as they really are"; he says: "For a moment a veil was lifted and I saw what really is. Now the veil has fallen again and reality is again hidden from me." His conclusion is similar to that of Don Quixote who in his bouts of madness sees windmills as giants, but when in his lucid intervals he sees them as windmills, says: "Those cursed magicians delude me, first drawing me into dangerous adventures by the appearance of things as they really are, and then presently changing the face of things as they please." .... The experience is totally different from that of "seeing things" whether in dreams or waking visions. In the case of the first three kinds [Auden's categories of mystical experience] which are concerned with visible creatures, these are seen with extraordinary vividness and charged with extraordinary significance, but they are not physically distorted; square objects do not become round or blue ones red, nor does the subject see objects which are not there when the vision fades. Again, one thinks of Don Quixote. He may see a windmill as a giant, but he doesn't see a giant unless there

is a windmill there. (pp. 10 - 11)

There is also clearly a difference between a schizophrenic at the mercy of a voice that commands him to commit suicide; and a man who, on the point of committing suicide because he has cancer, sees "the Lord" who tells him not to take his own life as he will be healed; he is subsequently healed and dedicates his life to that cause with which he associates the authority he encountered. In the face of this kind of evidence, the student may still elect to believe that the phenomena are the same. Should he do so, it is still possible to point out to him the area in which the pathology lies and so bring him to a closer understanding of the difference between schizophrenia and mysticism. To illustrate this, it would be useful to look once more at some of the theorists who have theories of schizophrenia and mysticism within the same model and also, at the same time, to look at voices and visions and other phenomena to see whether they must be labelled pathological or whether they can be considered neutral in terms of societal approbation. Hopefully it will be demonstrated that voices and visions are not the main issue.

## 5.1 PERRY

In his discussion of mysticism Perry (1974) remarks that persons like George Fox were fortunate that there were no psychiatrists to lock them up when their experiences

of conversion or guidance assumed more dramatic aspects. Fox's account of his encounter with the spirit is as follows:

Then I was commanded by the Lord to pull off my shoes. I stood still, for it was winter: but the word of the Lord was like a fire in me. So I put off my shoes and left them with the shepherds; and the poor shepherds trembled, and were astonished. Then I walked about a mile, and as soon as I was got within the city, the word of the Lord came to me again, saying: "Cry, 'Woe to the bloody city of Lichfield!'" So I went up and down the streets, crying with a loud voice.... And no one laid hands on me. As I went thus crying through the streets, there seemed to me to be a channel of blood running down the streets, and the marketplace appeared like a pool of blood. (cited in Perry, 1974, p. 96)

Perry also states that, instead of searching for what is pathological in mysticism, it might be more productive to search for what is mystical in intent in psychosis. In developing this train of thought he compares the elements of the sacral kingship he discerned in acute catatonic schizophrenia, that is, the centre, the divine kingship, the royal marriage and so forth (3.3.1) with similar themes emerging in the records of the mystics. His model of schizophrenia is linked with mysticism (4.3) in that he suggests that some persons sensitive to the unrest of the collective psyche react as do the mystics but that their psychic organisation is not strong enough to withstand this onslaught of material from the unconscious and so fails to reintegrate.



### 5.1.1 EVALUATION

The implication of Perry's explanation for this study is that he definitely locates the difficulty of the schizophrenic at the Ego Level of Wilber's model. It is pathological in that adjustment to consensually validated reality is in some way faulty or not firmly established.

The GRO, having once been displaced, is not again readily available.

It must be pointed out that Perry's reasoning, persuasive though it is, can be questioned in the light of the myths and language and the range of emotional experience available to persons of the same culture, and, at universal level, of the archetypes shared by the human race. The language looks the same because language is finite and limited. The themes appearing in mystical experience and in schizophrenia may well appear in other human endeavours and states simply because they are common themes. Frankl tells the anecdote of how an audience, confronted with a passage by Heidegger, the philosopher, and a passage originating in the utterances or writings of a schizophrenic, agreed that the former was the ravings of a madman. Frankl (1971) comments that it is a crisis of expression that links the two. Blake's prophetic writings do not necessarily indicate Blake's insanity. Their obscurity may measure the failure of the visionary poet to give intelligible form to his vision. Blake was per-

fectly aware that his way of perceiving was different from that of others. On being asked where he had seen a landscape that had made a particular impression on him, he replied by pointing to his head, since the actual physical surroundings would not have produced the same effect on his questioner (Lister, 1968).

It is also possible to question Perry's assertion that the existence of psychiatrists would have put paid to the expression of persons like Fox. Should such a danger have existed it is very probable that Fox and others like him would not have given such uninhibited performances where there was a likelihood that they would be considered insane. Thornton (1967) comments on his awareness at the time of his initiation into mystical experience that he should not reveal to anyone what he was experiencing, since he knew they would not be capable of understanding it. He continued to work effectively during this time.

## 5.2 JAYNES

In the earlier discussion of Jaynes's model of the bicameral mind (2.3), the concept of the role of language as the sole generator of consciousness was rejected. Its role in generating particular aspects of consciousness was, however, seen to be feasible and even enlightening. The actual existence of the bicameral mind at

any point in man's history is still in question. Using this construct of a more primitive mode of functioning, ousted by consciousness as man now experiences it, Jaynes sees the phenomenon of voices which intrude upon the schizophrenic, commanding, heckling, consoling or whatever, as a partial return to bicameral functioning, resulting from the effects of stress on a specific type of metabolism (3.2). Trance states or possession states can be learned social phenomena which follow a similar pattern, the voice of the control in the case of mediumship emerging through the mechanism of the undeveloped Wernicke's area in the right cerebral lobe, using Broca's area of the left to produce articulated speech.

Jaynes makes the point that the general bicameral paradigm he is using to explain the phenomena of possession and prophecy is representative of but a vestige of the bicameral mind proper. The schizophrenic is unable, for instance, to return to true bicameral functioning. The medium or oracle is unconscious during the possession state, and does not remember what has been said, while Achilles did hear Athene. This distinction is of interest in the brief consideration of St Theresa to follow.

#### 5.2.1 EVALUATION

Jaynes sees religion and interest in psychical phenomena

as a nostalgic harking back to the blissful days of the bicameral mind, when man did not consider himself as finite and where he lived an unreflective and experiencing life as opposed to the hyper-reflective and vicarious mental experience of modern man, from whose life divine authorisation has departed. The actual existence of the gods he considers to be "ontological nonsense". If his theory is divorced from this reductionist tendency, it is interesting as a model of the physiological mechanisms of both types of phenomena. If voices heard in schizophrenia do occur for the reasons he suggests, the theory supports the idea of impairment of functioning at Wilber's Ego Level since the GRO is partially or completely immobilised. The linking of schizophrenia and trance and possession states in the social context by means of a similar mechanism, that is, the reassertion of aspects of bicameral functioning, is also supportive of the argument as, once again, the normal GRO through which personality manifests itself falls into abeyance temporarily while an alternative entity takes control. Theories of dissociation of values and information which do not fit in with the person's sense of self can be considered in conjunction with Jaynes's model. It is a commonplace in psychical research that the alleged spirit guides of a medium may be simply dissociated aspects of his or her personality. It is clear that mediumship of a kind can be learned by some types

of person (Gooch, 1979). And, once again, the researcher in this field is confronted by pseudo-phenomena as opposed to phenomena that carry with them a high degree of credibility, at least for the existence of extra-sensory perception, in that they give information about past, present and future which can be checked. Heywood (1968b) comments that there appears to be a facet of the human unconscious ever willing to dramatise in accordance with the cues given it. Hence the danger in an over-gullible acceptance of all that practitioners in ESP can offer, and also the existence of pseudo-phenomena known to all who follow the mystic way and regarded with suspicion by adepts when present in themselves or in the novices under their guidance.

Jaynes then is making a clear distinction between a pathological set of phenomena (in this case attributed to a biochemical malfunction) and a social set of phenomena. It is a distinction that Wing (1978) claims that any competent psychiatrist would make. The social role demands the possession state and the person possessed welcomes it. The pathological state is one in which the voices come unbidden and cause severe distress to the sufferer.

That the mystic's sense of unreality is unimpaired, although extended to include another dimension of function-



ing, is suggested by the sturdy common sense and discernment, the self-critical faculty in terms of which the great mystics evaluated the phenomena occurring as a by-product of their vocation. St John of the Cross wrote:

I am really terrified ... by what passes among us in these days. Anyone who has barely begun to meditate, if he becomes conscious of words of this kind during his self-recollection, pronounces them forthwith to be the work of God; and, convinced that they are so, goes about proclaiming 'God has told me this,' or 'I have had that answer from God!' But all is illusion and fancy; such an one has only been speaking to himself. Besides, the desire for these words, and the attention they give to them, end by persuading men that all the observations which they address to themselves are the responses of God. (cited in Underhill, 1967, p. 275)

Underhill comments that "these are the words of one who was at once the sanest of saints and the most penetrating of psychologists: words which our modern unruly amateurs of the 'subconscious' might well take to heart".

St Theresa of Avila, renowned for her practicality and her genius for organisation, was governed and guided by voices, which sometimes interfered with her plans, gave judgements different from her own and criticised or forbade certain actions. She learned to discriminate between the true and the false. She seldom resisted their commands, although what they advised appeared foolish to her and frequently caused her difficulties. She never had cause to regret obedience to and reliance upon those voices she judged as coming from God. Of the words spoken by these voices she reported that:

... They are very distinctly formed; but by the bodily ear they are not heard. They are, however, much more clearly understood than if they were heard by the ear. It is impossible not to understand them, whatever resistance we may offer.... The words formed by the understanding effect nothing, but when our Lord speaks, it is at once word and work .... The human locution [i.e., the work of the imagination] is as something we cannot well make out, as if we were half asleep: but the divine locution is a voice so clear, that not a syllable of its utterance is lost. It may occur, too, when the understanding and the soul are so troubled and distracted that they cannot form one sentence correctly: and yet grand sentences, perfectly arranged, such as the soul in its most recollected state never could have formed, are uttered: and at the first word, as I have said, change it utterly. (cited in Underhill, 1967, pp. 275 - 276)

Jaynes states that the true bicameral mind no longer exists (5.2) because in social phenomena involving his General Bicameral Paradigm, the person possessed does not remember what was said by the alternative consciousness, while Achilles did hear Athene. Kinsbourne (2.3.1) pointed out that in The Iliad Achilles showed definite signs of self-consciousness as when he sulked in his tent. Taken in conjunction with the testimony of St Theresa, these observations have the inescapable implication that the bicameral mind as conceptualised by Jaynes has never existed. As St Theresa was conscious when she heard her voices, so was Achilles. This mode of perception is one which depends on temperament, cosmology and meditation for its appearance. The person has available to him his own experience as stored in the personal unconscious and also other information presumably originating in what could be called the collective unconscious, and manifest-

ing itself symbolically in the identity of the local deity or deities. A further inference from St Theresa's account is that, in the lives of mystics who exhibit ESP, voices and visions are probably dramatic and symbolic forms of communication between the unconscious and the phenomenal ego and, though unusual, are natural modes of functioning encouraged in certain milieus. Underhill's exposition seems as sound as any other in this context:

If we would cease, once for all, to regard visions and voices as objective, and be content to see in them forms of symbolic expression, ways in which the subconscious activity of the spiritual self reaches the surface-mind, many of the disharmonies noticeable in visionary experience, which have teased the devout, and delighted the agnostic, would fade away. Visionary experience is - or at least may be - the outward sign of a real experience. It is the picture which the mind constructs, it is true, from raw materials already at its disposal: as the artist constructs his picture with canvas and paint. But, as the artist's paint and canvas picture is the fruit, not merely of contact between brush and canvas, but also of a more vital contact between his creative genius and visible beauty or truth; so too we may see in vision, where the subject is a mystic, the fruit of a more mysterious contact between the visionary and a transcendental beauty or truth.... The transcendental powers take for this purpose such material as they can find amongst the hoarded beliefs and memories of the self. Hence Plotinus sees the Celestial Venus, Suso the Eternal Wisdom, St Theresa the Humanity of Christ, Blake the strange personages of his prophetic books  
....

Visions and voices, then, may stand in the same relation to the mystic as pictures, poems, and musical compositions stand to the great painter, poet, musician. They are the artistic expressions and creative results (a) of thought, (b) of intuition, (c) of direct perception. (Underhill, 1967, pp. 271 - 272)

### 5.3 LAING'S PSYCHEDELIC MODEL OF SCHIZOPHRENIA

It has already been suggested that Laing has come to be regarded by some as a prophet of the counter-culture. Siegler, Osmond and Mann (1972), using dimensions like "definition", "etiology", "prognosis" and "the rights and duties of patients", have detected in Laing's Politics of Experience (1967) the existence of three models of schizophrenia, "the conspiratorial model", "the psychedelic model" and "the psychoanalytical model", the first being an account of how Laing thinks schizophrenics are treated, the second being an account of the way he feels they ought to be treated and the third being an account of what he actually does himself in therapy with the schizophrenic patient. The actual psychedelic model states that schizophrenia is a natural healing process to rectify our present state of alienation. It may appear like a breakdown but it is potentially a breakthrough, the alternatives being either liberation and renewal or enslavement and existential death. It is not an illness but a "voyage" and is one of the forms in which light may dawn through cracks in closed minds.

Siegler et al (1972) assert that Laing has failed to distinguish between two very different kinds of experience - psychedelic and psychotic. While not denying that schizophrenics may have psychedelic experience, especially at the beginning of their illnesses and that they



have on occasion made creative use of their experiences, they point out that victims of other illnesses have also been able to incorporate illness into their lives in a positive way, to gain new insights during prolonged inactivity. In discussing the implications of Laing's proposed "voyage of self discovery", they mention first of all the arbitrariness with which schizophrenics find themselves precipitated into their turmoil and the resultant helplessness in the face of sometimes severely unpleasant experiences. The latter sort of experience can be avoided in solicited psychedelic experiences by pleasant surroundings and the presence of loved ones. The latter condition may make the experience worse for schizophrenics as they often feel hatred for those they love; and guilt because they really do love them. The psychedelic experience is short while the psychosis is indefinite.

Siegler et al (1972) draw up the following comprehensive table to illustrate the differences between the psychedelic and psychotic experience. Since psychedelic experience has some of the qualities of the mystical experience - albeit a pseudo-mysticism - the contents of the comparison are relevant to this analysis.



## PSYCHEDELIC EXPERIENCE

## PSYCHOTIC EXPERIENCE

Time dimension

Liberation from time.

Frozen in time: nothing will ever change.

Expansion of time dimensions.

Shrinkage and collapse of time dimensions.

Internal or external time may speed up, increasing possibility of quick and decisive action.

Internal and external time may slow down, inhibiting action and creating despair.

Ability to modify past, present, future.

Inability to influence any of the temporal categories.

The future is the realm of ambition and motivation.

The future is the realm of anxiety and danger.

Space dimension

Expanded depth.

Reduced depth.

Enhanced distance.

Reduced distance.

Distance perception stable.

Distance perception highly variable.

Distances so vast that one feels liberated.

Distances so vast that one feels isolated and alienated.

Affect

Feeling that everything is meaningful and exhilarating.

Feeling that everything contains hidden, threatening meanings.

Feelings of love, empathy, consideration, affection.

Feelings of isolation, fear, hatred, suspicion.

Euphoria.

Depression.

Feeling of delight with oneself.

Feeling of disgust with oneself.

PSYCHEDELIC EXPERIENCE  
(continued)

Thought processes

Thought changes are sought for, expected, valued.

Seeing more possibilities that can be acted upon, which makes life exciting.

Seeing beyond the usual categories.

Seeing new connections which have always been possible.

Ability to see things objectively.

Ability to see things subjectively.

Ability to explain thought changes.

Perceptions

Clear and distinct vision.

Augmentation of perception.

Unusual perceptions seem to emanate from greater-than-human spirit or force.

Perceptual changes may be experienced as exhilarating, exciting, novel.

PSYCHOTIC EXPERIENCE  
(continued)

Thought changes come unawares, are not welcome, are seen as accidental.

Seeing so many possibilities that action is impossible.

Seeing only fragments or parts of the usual categories.

Seeing connections which are not possible.

No objectivity, inability to disengage from total involvement.

No subjectivity, estrangement from self.

Desperate attempts (delusions) to explain thought changes.

Blurred and distorted vision.

Diminution of perception.

Unusual perceptions seem to emanate from mechanical or sub-human forces.

Perceptual changes may be experienced as frightening, threatening, dangerous.

PSYCHEDELIC EXPERIENCE  
(continued)

PSYCHOTIC EXPERIENCE  
(continued)

Identity

Feeling of unity with people and material objects.

Feeling of invasion by people and material objects.

Experience of the Self.

Experience of the No-self, ego fragmentation.

Feeling of being at one with the world.

Feeling of being opposed to and in conflict with oneself and the world.

Feelings of humility and awe as one sees oneself as part of the universe.

Feelings of smallness and insignificance as one feels at the mercy of the universe.

Feelings of integrity and identity.

Loss of integrity and identity.

Pleasant, creative fantasies that one can control.

Nightmarish fantasies that one cannot control.

Feeling that one can join the company of other enlightened people.

Feeling that one is less and less human, more and more isolated.

(pp. 117 - 119)

Psychedelic experience then appears to involve an extension of the GRO, a reaching out towards and a positive relationship with the physical and cultural environments at all levels. Psychotic experience suggests the partial collapse of the GRO so that the person feels he has become trapped within it.

This trend is supported by an experiment in hypnosis carried out by Aaronson (1969). A subject was given

first the suggestion that the dimension of depth was gone. He showed marked schizophreniform behaviour with catatonic features. He perceived the ceilings and walls as closing down on him. When he was given the suggestion of expanded depth, lines seemed sharper, colours intensified, everything seemed to have a place and to be in its place and to be aesthetically satisfying, the hand of God manifesting itself in his creation. The subject had not read material which could have suggested these reactions to him. Another subject, given a "no depth" suggestion experienced everything as flattened out, and colours, shapes and sounds as less intense. He reported a loss of sensitivity to touch and became bored, withdrawn and hostile. A second suggestion of "no depth" in the same subject four months later produced apathy and withdrawal with little affect shown. He did not appear hostile but felt the environment had become alien and the people around him dehumanised.

Since the GRO is the surrogate of the environment at all levels, and since depth must be one of its dimensions as persons experience it, this study is very suggestive of the partial collapse (as opposed to deautomatization) of the GRO in the production of schizophrenic symptoms.

An experiment cited by Masters and Houston (1967) also supports the distinction made by Siegler et al (1972).

Schizophrenics given psychedelic drugs insisted that the ensuing experience was not the same as the psychotic experience. Huxley (1959) gave the example of the hard, alien world experienced by the schizophrenic, Renée, and remarked on the bewilderment of the schizophrenic at not being able to reverse his experience in the direction of normal perception and functioning. Wilber (1975) states that, if the schizophrenic sometimes does reach the level of the Transpersonal Bands, it is an experience which produces bewilderment, while in the mystic it is a positive experience. There is in fact the distinct possibility that the schizophrenic's experiences are limited to the sensory level (as described by Masters & Houston, 1967) or alternatively to the contents of the personal unconscious as opposed to the collective unconscious of Wilber's model. Presentation of material in either of these modes would be symbolic in the same way as dreams are symbolic. The similarity between psychotic and psychedelic experience then is semantic and symbolic in origin, rather than a true similarity.

#### 5.4 CONCLUSIONS

In a comprehensive article, Ludwig (1969) discusses the production of ASCs, the basic features they have in common, despite differences in manifestation and subjective experience, and their maladaptive and adaptive functions.



Maladaptive expressions represent: attempts to resolve emotional conflicts as in fugues, amnesias, traumatic neuroses, depersonalisation and dissociation; defensive functions in threatening situations conducive to the arousal of anxiety as in hypnoidal states during psychotherapy; a breakthrough of forbidden impulses as in acute psychotic and panic reactions; escape from responsibilities and inner tensions in the use of narcotics, marijuana and alcohol; the symbolic acting-out of unconscious conflicts as in demoniacal possession and bewitchment; manifestations of organic lesions or neurophysiological disturbances as in auras and toxic conditions; inadvertent and potentially dangerous responses to certain stimuli as in highway hypnosis, and radar screen and sentry duty trance.

Adaptive functions of ASCs are found in the healing arts and practices; in their use as avenues of new knowledge and experience; and in their use in groups to serve individual and group needs.

Ludwig concludes that ASCs might be regarded as final common pathways for a great variety of human expression, some of which is atavistic and harmful to the individual or society, the rest of which enables man to transcend the bounds of logic and formality or express repressed needs and desires in a socially sanctioned way.

It would seem that any confusion between schizophrenia and mysticism arises from the fact that they have ASCs in common. It has been argued that ASCs are potentially within the range of experience of all humans, inferentially in all cultures throughout recorded time. Hence it cannot be argued that pathology results from a lack of social channels for the expression of a talent like ESP. Nor can it be argued that during earlier periods of history, schizophrenics got away with deviant behaviour because persons in their culture were superstitious and gullible. ASCs in isolation are neutral in quality regardless of the prevailing cosmology. They take their significance from the character and behaviour of the person experiencing them. Hence the main consideration in distinguishing between mysticism and schizophrenia is that of relationship to culture at the Ego Level and the accent is not on conformity but on the degree to which the person in question is able to use the culturally determined GRO for self-actualisation at every level. In this sense the schizophrenic has a negative relationship to his culture and by inference, to life itself, while the mystic not only has a positive relationship to his culture but also to some transcendent, creative principle which would seem to link humans in a purpose that goes beyond that of mere self-actualisation.

As Moss (1976) indicates, a distinction is drawn in primitive cultures between those who possess their spirits and those who are possessed by them. It is possible to assert that, when faced with the grosser manifestations of the latter condition, most persons are capable of making this distinction.

## P A R T    II

### JOAN   OF   ARC   -   AN   EVALUATION

Whether her career was a miracle of Heaven or a device of men ... I should find it hard to say ....It is a phenomenon which deserves to be recorded, although after ages are likely to regard it with more wonder than credulity.

Pope Pius II (1405 - 1464)

## CHAPTER 6

## A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The legend is now too old, too rugged, even too hallowed ever to be seriously modified.

Milton Waldman

The France into which Joan of Arc was born in 1412 had been harassed and devastated by war with England since 1337, the so-called Hundred Years' War, which had been fought entirely on French soil. Through this war the English kings tried to unite France and England under one crown, their own. England, smaller, less wealthy and less populous than France, had been able to sustain a war of this nature only because France itself was in the throes of civil war, being by 1429, the year of Joan's emergence on the political scene, divided into two parts, Armagnac and Burgundian. The Armagnacs, who were the supporters of Louis of Orleans and who backed the Dauphin Charles in his claim to the throne, held most of France south of the Loire. The opposing faction, led by the Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good, controlled most of the north and east of France and also the rich cloth towns and trading centres of the low countries. The Burgundians were allies of the English against



Charles and the Armagnacs.

By the Treaty of Troyes (May 1420), it had been agreed that Henry V of England should take the title of Regent and Heir of France, should marry Catherine, the daughter of the French King, Charles VI, and should succeed to the throne of France upon Charles VI's death, so uniting France and England. By this treaty, the claims of the Dauphin Charles were disregarded, his mother tacitly agreeing and so implying he was a bastard. Henry V died on 31 August 1422 and Charles VI on 21 October 1422, leaving France with what amounted to two heirs to the throne (Sackville-West, 1948). The infant English king, Henry VI's, interests in France were defended by his uncle and regent, the Duke of Bedford. The Dauphin Charles was old enough to press his claim to the throne but is represented as being rather weak and indecisive at this stage of his career.

Joan's birthplace, Domrémy, lay on the borders of the Duchies of Bar and Lorraine. While it was technically part of the Duchy of Bar, it belonged to that part which depended directly from the French crown, making Joan by birth a subject of the French king, ruled directly by royal administration. Part of the village of Domrémy itself formed a seigneurie belonging to the Bourlément family, making it part of the portion of the Duchy of

Bar which was not under the control of the French crown. Although this sort of arrangement was not unusual in feudal times, in the case of Domrémy it is significant because the various relationships could be interpreted in national terms, making the village a microcosm of the distressed conditions of the kingdom, while at the same time it was not subject to the social breakdown which was present in other parts of the realm (Lucie-Smith, 1976).

Joan's father was not a peasant but a fairly influential tenant farmer (Vale, 1974). Evidence suggests that her mother was an enthusiastic pilgrim and belonged to a religious movement popular among the lower classes at that time (Fabre, 1954). It was probably in her twelfth year that Joan began to see visions and hear voices. The voices were those of the Archangel Michael, and of St Catherine and St Margaret, who succeeded him as her personal advisers. The Archangel revealed to Joan that she had been chosen by God, who was moved by a great compassion for France, to go to the aid of the Dauphin. She would cause the siege of Orleans to be raised and the Dauphin to be crowned. It took four years for her scepticism to be worn down by the persistence of the voices (ibid). She had heard of the prophecy that a virgin would undo the wickedness caused by an evil woman and this probably provided further authorisation for the

purpose being formed in her with the aid of her voices (Lucie-Smith, 1976).

In 1428 Joan persuaded her cousin's husband, Durand Laxart, to take her to Vaucouleurs to request Robert de Baudricourt, the captain of the garrison there, to send her to the Dauphin at Chinon. As her voices had predicted her reception was unfavourable, De Baudricourt being a down-to-earth, professional soldier, not easily influenced by superstition. By February 1429, however, he had been persuaded to support her, and Joan and her party set out for Chinon on 23 February.

At her first meeting with the Dauphin, she won his confidence; and after she had been subjected to tests like an enquiry before the learned men at Poitiers and an examination to ascertain that her claim to be a virgin was true, she was sent to Orleans where she played a colourful, if unorthodox, part in the raising of the siege, which ended on 8 May 1429. Other victories followed and, on 17 July 1429, Joan was present at the crowning of Charles VII at Rheims.

Joan wished Charles to follow through his advantage and subdue Paris, from which he had been driven by the Burgundians in 1418. Charles delayed, perhaps owing to his growing uneasiness over Joan's influence; perhaps per-

suaded by his advisers, who could not have been happy at the threat to their vested interests. It seems clear that the diplomatic strategy favoured by Charles now he had become king and Joan's less subtle intention of driving the English willy-nilly from France caused the interests of the Maid and the king to diverge (Lucie-Smith, 1976).

The attack on Paris, which eventually took place on 18 September, was a failure. Joan's impressive successes had by now come to an end and Lucie-Smith suggests that not only did Charles VII lose some of his confidence in her but that she began to lose confidence in herself. She was finally taken prisoner at Compiègne by the Burgundians, who sold her to the English. The latter delivered her into the hands of the Inquisition. Pierre Cauchon, Bishop of Beauvais, was appointed to judge the case.

At first her inquisitors tried to lay a charge of sorcery against her. They failed to prove that Joan was a sorceress; but from her replies during the preliminary investigations, saw that they could profitably charge her with heresy. The trial at Rouen was a fair one in the narrow sense of the word, since in terms of the definition of heresy of that time, Joan was an heretic (Lucie-Smith, 1976). Nevertheless, it must also be borne in mind that

the English were determined to burn her, so that her abjuration on 24 May was an embarrassment; for by this means she escaped death at the stake, if not imprisonment. There is indeed evidence to suggest that her subsequent relapse into heresy on 27 May was engineered (ibid). Joan was condemned as an heretic and handed over to the secular power, in this case the English, for execution. She was burnt at the stake three days later.

In July 1456, after rehabilitation proceedings begun in 1450, the sentence was revoked by Pope Calixtus III. On 16 May 1920, Joan was canonised by Pope Benedict XV.

6



## CHAPTER 7

## JOAN OF ARC - SCHIZOPHRENIC OR MYSTIC?

But nothing that is human ever assumes final form:  
no crystallization is exempt from the flux and  
flow that is life itself.

Charles Wayland Lightbody

## 7. INTRODUCTION

Joan of Arc is one of the most controversial figures in history. Lightbody (1961) remarks that "each generation, each new grouping of creative spirits, even each historian, poet or artist, if of an independent and original turn of mind, sees her in a different light" (p 17). It is perhaps a tribute to the complexity of Joan's personality and the activeness of the role she played during a turbulent period in French history that they can sustain such interest. A study of her life does impress the reader with the curious interplay of synchronicity, human motive and decision, and events that shape a person's life and the fairly limited application of the rules of cause and effect in human affairs.

The nature of this study forbids excursions into many aspects of the life of Joan. There are, however, a number of problems in viewing her career that should be mentioned before she can be discussed in terms of the frame of reference established in Part 1.

The modern reader, perhaps any reader, approaches the subject of Joan of Arc at a disadvantage. It is a disadvantage which results from the stereotyped connotations of the title "saint". The Church confers the honour of sainthood, selecting those details of a total life that suggest a more than ordinary Christian dedication. The ensuing hagiographic myth is a working of that detail and an adaptation of other detail into a pattern that best fits the tenets of the Church's dogma. Should the reader be a believer, he will be dismayed to read a biography in which the human failings of Joan are revealed. As Lightbody says, "the a priori assumption of the great majority of historical [sic] students who deal with Joan is that, since she was always right, anyone who opposed her can only have been wrong" (p.19).

Should the reader on the other hand be an unbeliever and especially a psychologist, he will feel the need to expose the humanity denied by this paragon of piety, passivity and asexuality. Having shown to his satisfaction that ordinary human impulses were present, he may debunk saintliness as a characteristic and, in the presence of visions and voices, may triumphantly consign his victim to the many imaginary mental hospitals scattered throughout the centuries. It is important to realise that saintliness, far from being an inherent quality of the psyche, is the result of a series of conscious choices

throughout a life-time. If the saint in question is found to be as full of allegedly wicked impulses as the ordinary person, his distinction is a tribute to the strength of his commitment. It should not be surprising then that, as Lucie-Smith (1976) states, the myth and the facts in the case of Joan are subtly at variance. In no circumstances should the human qualities of arrogance or boastfulness or an example even of an outright lie (ibid) make a reader diagnose schizophrenia in a panic reaction to his own misguided preconceptions. He must also beware of accepting without question the latest myth erected on the factual substratum. It is a myth both enticingly familiar and dear to the heart of psychology students, so much so that its very application makes Joan of Arc a much more recognisable human figure. It is the psychoanalytic myth.

Lucie-Smith, in his outstanding biography, puts forward a number of interesting speculations about Joan's psychology, which tell the reader a great deal about Lucie-Smith's beliefs with regard to the human psyche and very little that is helpful in explaining the phenomenon of Joan in her totality. While speculation can be stimulating and valuable, it is important to realise that, should the underlying purpose be to prove abnormality, it is presumptuous to narratise for and so reduce, one who is capable of narratising for himself. Psychoanalytical

theory derived from the neurotic and psychotic and then applied to fully functioning persons can be very misleading. Two examples of the pitfalls inherent in this approach will suffice.

Joan's father had a dream in which his daughter rode away with men-at-arms. He reacted violently to this, saying that if he thought it would happen, he would drown her if her brothers would not. Lucie-Smith's comment is as follows:

To a modern psychoanalyst such a dream might have quite complex implications. To 'go away with men-at-arms' meant, in a fifteenth-century context, that Joan was doomed to become a soldiers' trull. If her father's subconscious was ready to place her in such a situation, it implies a wish to possess her himself. The dream, therefore, has a strongly incestuous element, combined with a degree of sadism. This is a rape fantasy, as well as an incest fantasy. (p. 24)

In addition, Joan was involved in a breach of promise suit brought by a young man who maintained that she had promised to marry him. Her parents did not accompany her to Toul to defend herself, implying that they wished her to marry and in fact had made a determined effort to arrange this. Lucie-Smith sees this also as an indication of "unformulated family tensions" (p. 26) which made Joan's presence in her father's house uncomfortable. He suggests that this illicit sexual longing played a part not only in the production of her voices but also in the shaping of her mission.

The problem with this sort of speculation is that there can be hardly a parent who has not had at least one such dream about his or her child, nor indeed a child who could not be shown to have had covert incestuous desires by the motivated researcher. The presence of such dreams is not enough to produce abnormality and to use them to suggest it is already to presuppose abnormality. Surely, the most logical and least misleading explanation is that Jacques d'Arc, anxious because of his daughter's growing interest in military affairs (Fabre, 1954) or perhaps having been told of some unguarded remark of Joan (Guillemin, 1972), expressed in a dream his anxiety that she would be a camp follower, the only role he could have imagined for women among soldiers. Any eagerness to marry Joan to her suitor would be prompted by concern lest she disgrace the family and herself.

After the battle of Patay, Joan saw a Frenchman in charge of a group of English prisoners knock one of them on the head and leave him for dead. She heard the dying man's confession and comforted him as much as possible. Joan had no love of the English and for this reason alone the incident is interesting. Lucie-Smith (1976) comments that Joan was shocked as she always was when she was confronted with the horrors of war. There is some validity in this remark if it is remembered that it is a healthy defence mechanism to blot from the mind those things that



cannot be changed and which might hamper efficient functioning. A hagiographer would probably quote this as an example of Joan's divine compassion. The psychoanalytic time traveller would wax professional on the act as a symptom of growing delusions of grandeur as Joan took upon herself an office that lies within the province of a priest. Surely, a sensible explanation is that Joan did feel genuine compassion for the man as opposed to the easily counterfeited compassion of almsgiving; and gave him what she firmly believed would both comfort and save him. She was her usual practical self and her lack of learning combined with her confidence would prevent her from seeing the action as unorthodox. That she could not have been making claims for her own holiness on the strength of her reputation is suggested by the probability that the Englishman would be more prone to see her as a sorceress.

To do Lucie-Smith justice his intention is not to prove that Joan was mad. He quotes only one statement to suggest mental instability and on the whole his comments would be more applicable to the neurotic personality. His intention is simply to "exhaust the possibilities of the natural world before accepting any kind of supernatural explanation" (pp. 22 - 23), for there are three possible views that can be taken of Joan's career. The first is that her voices were divine in origin and that she was

appointed by God to rescue France. The second is that her voices and her character and career can be explained rationally and that no supernatural intervention took place. The last is that, though Joan is explicable in terms of common experience, the part she played in the history of France was not a mere coincidence or accident but was subject to divine influence (ibid). The approach in this study is to discuss as rationally as possible events which at one level are explicable in terms of common experience but which also contain elements for which there is not as yet any convincing explanation in the paradigm generally accepted as being a rational view of the universe. As an aid the transpersonal model of Wilber (1.4) has been adopted, first because it accommodates supernatural events and second because, implicit in it, is the importance of the person in constructing his own world and interacting with it in ways that defy explanations.

Joan's naïveté, vanity and arrogance; her wearing of male clothing; her conviction on a charge of heresy; her burning; whether her mission can be considered important in the long view of history; whether her rehabilitation in 1456 was undertaken merely to make Charles VII's crowning respectable; whether she was an imposter, or a protégée of a faction intending to increase their influence with the king; the fact that

she was human and subject to life's chances like everybody else; none of these is relevant to the question of whether Joan was a schizophrenic or a mystic. The answer for this study lies in an attempt to establish the health or otherwise of the GRO. It has already been stated that this is easier in the case of Joan because there is so much reliable evidence recorded:

Though Joan did not live in an illiterate society, she lived in one where the written word occupied a position which was both more and less authoritative than the one it has today. It was more authoritative because it was rarer, and people relied upon it less for the same reason. One noticeable thing about the accounts given by witnesses at the Trial of Rehabilitation is the way in which Joan's personality fills the direct quotations they give. Their recollections of what she said are quite astonishingly consistent with the record of the Trial of Condemnation, which is based on notes which were made on the spot, then welded into a continuous narrative after each day's session. We may reasonably believe that the men and women of the fifteenth century were in some respects better equipped to preserve the truth for us than a similarly varied band of witnesses would be today. Their verbal memories were demonstrably better, and we do well to pay attention to the nuances, as well as the actual content, of their testimony. The way in which a thing is reported can be nearly as important as the facts. (Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. xiv)

Lucie-Smith comments that the inner consistency of a great part of the documentation has been underestimated, rather than overestimated, by historians.

## 7.1 JOAN OF ARC AS A SCHIZOPHRENIC

It has been postulated that schizophrenics are persons who, owing to an intrinsic handicap which is probably of a biochemical nature, have developed secondary hand-

icaps as a result of the reactions of other persons to such symptoms as wooden facial expression and stiff gait. The result is a range of reactions that have come to be associated with schizophrenia because the GRO at the schizophrenios' disposal is not congruent with that of other members of their culture. Their performance at virtually any task, creative, routine and personal, may be impaired, depending on the degree of intrinsic handicap. The inadequacy of the GRO as a tool for autonomous living may be due either to a physiological failure to maintain it (waking consciousness) at optimal level, with resulting aberrations of perception; or due to the cumulative effects of isolation.

There has been a tendency in the past to see Joan as spending a great deal of her childhood as a herder of sheep in a remote and isolated place in the country; a possible conclusion from this is that Joan's thinking became distorted as a result of a lack of stimulation. The picture, however, owes something to the allegorical thinking of mediaeval times (Lucie-Smith, 1976) and is not particularly accurate. While Joan probably did drive the flocks to pasture, she did so only when it was her turn. Though Domrémy was not as devastated by the war as other parts of France, it is clear that it was not isolated, despite the lack of sophisticated mass communication. The war was reflected in the rivalry

between the children of Maxey (Burgundian in sympathy) and Domrémy; and there were other sources of information available, such as the talk of elders and the great Roman road because along it passed persons of all ranks and occupations (Fabre, 1954). The issues of the war, then, were within the range of a child's comprehension of its environment (Lucie-Smith, 1976). Moreover, the fifteenth century was one permeated with faith and mysticism in a way almost impossible for the modern person to comprehend. The supernatural occurrence was theoretically as likely as any more mundane one (Fabre, 1954). Added to this there were precedents of seers wielding influence in high places, and an abundance of astrologers, magicians, prophets and visionaries (Lucie-Smith, 1976). It seems then that, in a general sense, the cultural content of the GRO in the case of Joan was both congruent and appropriate, the only really unusual and original aspect being her wearing of male clothes and participation in warfare. "The role of prophetess was one of the few which allowed a woman to play an active part in great affairs" (ibid, p. 69). From this point of view, Joan's mission can be seen as a creative synthesis of cultural components serving as authorisation for goal-directed behaviour totally in harmony with her social context.



### 7.1.1 THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER PERSONS TO JOAN

With the exception of growing piety, excessive in the eyes of those who did not share it, Joan's childhood friendships appear to have been normal. Referring to Joan's being pious, her friend, Mengette, said that "her comrades and I said she was too much so" (Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 14). This is revealing in that it suggests that, while Joan's comrades found occasion to criticise her devotion, she was, nevertheless, one of them. Another friend, Hauviette, when she heard of Joan's departure wept, saying that Joan had been her best friend and "I loved her much for her many kindnesses" (Fabre, 1954, p. 72). Again, the implication is that Joan participated equally in the relationship and was not merely pitied and sheltered by Hauviette.

That Joan, besides not exhibiting the physical peculiarities and/or eccentricities of the schizophrenic, possessed an unusually persuasive and arresting personality and great confidence is suggested by the reactions of those about her to her mission. These reactions were not confined only to the beginning of her career. In fact descriptions of her conduct are unusually consistent throughout it. Joan did not lose popularity because her hypothetical "condition" deteriorated but because, like all those who play a definitive role in public life, she was subject to life's fortunes.

To launch herself into the destiny she believed she was born for, Joan persuaded Durand Laxart, a humble field-worker, to take her before Robert de Baudricourt, the captain of the garrison of Vaucouleurs. While it may be true that fifteenth century persons were more willing to believe in those who claimed to be divinely inspired, it is also likely that the criteria used to separate the competent from the incompetent would be more strongly relevant. It is unlikely that Laxart would have risked censure by presenting Joan to De Baudricourt if there had been any hint of the characteristics that, according to this study, prevent schizophrenics from being accepted. The captain himself, a professional soldier, was not the man to accept this sort of claim readily and his initial reaction was scepticism. During the interval that elapsed between Joan's announcing herself to De Baudricourt and his finally agreeing to support her, she made many converts to her cause, so much so that the people of Vaucouleurs, charmed by her piety and quiet manner, had a full set of male clothing made for her before she left for the Dauphin's court at Chinon (Lucie-Smith, 1976). This suggests that her conformity in other spheres must have been impressive indeed for them to accept what must have been a stunning innovation. It is probable that their enthusiasm influenced De Baudricourt favourably.

De Baudricourt seems to have tested Joan before risking his reputation by sending her to the Dauphin. He was, for example, satisfied by her demeanour when she visited the court of Duke Charles of Lorraine at Nancy, the visit having the appearance of a trial to test Joan's mettle. He also had the local curé exorcise Joan, much to her indignation. She had confessed herself to the curé already and been granted absolution. Needless to say, she was not possessed of devils. If, as Vale (1974) suggests, Joan was a protégée of the House of Anjou, which wished to exploit the Dauphin's interest in astrology and prognostication by introducing Joan as the virgin foretold by Maria d'Avignon as the saviour of France, the chances are that they would have chosen a seer quite obviously sane. It has also been suggested that persons at Charles's court gave De Baudricourt permission to send her to Chinon (Guillemin, 1972). Again, it is clear that Joan must have met the cultural criteria of normality and conformity.

Charles himself was impressed with Joan. Nevertheless, he did not send her straight to Orleans but subjected her to tests, one being held at Poitiers where she appeared before a committee of churchmen he had appointed; and "... they were greatly astonished, that a simple shepherdess, a young girl, should so prudently reply" (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 74). It is likely that

the examiners at Poitiers were prejudiced in Joan's favour, Gérard Machet and Jean Érault actually recalling Marie d'Avignon's prophecy. It would, however, be presumptuous to believe that these men would be blind to the symptoms of madness.

If it were supposed that Joan's astonishing claims and her early success blinded those about her to what was obvious, it would be as logical to suppose that once she had lost her aura of invincibility, that once she had lost her influence, that once her own confidence had been shaken, the hitherto unacknowledged symptoms of madness would have been discerned. After the defeat at Paris, for instance, the royal troops "cursed the Maid bitterly, for she had promised them that Paris would certainly fall to their assault" (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 179). This represents a complete reversal in Joan's popularity in this quarter. Shortly afterwards, Joan spent a period of three weeks in the house of Margaret La Touroulde, the wife of the royal councillor in charge of finances. In her deposition before the Trial of Rehabilitation she said that she had been constantly in Joan's company and never perceived anything wrong, Joan's behaving like an honest Catholic woman (Lucie-Smith, 1976). Lest it be suggested that the form of the question would exclude comments that could pertain to sanity, it must be remembered that the aim at the

Trial of Rehabilitation was to clear the Maid of heresy. "Mad" symptoms could have been defined as heretical or due to sorcery. Margaret added that Joan, in response to a remark that her bravery in battle was due to the fact that she knew she could not be killed, replied that she was no safer than any other combatant. If the student does not assume that this was a rather boastful defence of her courage (and courage after all would be sacrificed to the much more impressive quality of omniscience), this was the modest reply of a woman who was not making any special claim for herself. Certainly it does not accord with the accepted picture of a deluded woman.

While Joan was a prisoner of Jean de Luxembourg, she was transferred to the château of Beaurevoir. Here, she and her hostesses, Jean's wife, aunt and step-daughter, established a strong bond of sympathy. Joan's liking was so great that she declared that of all the women in France, with the exception of the Queen, these had the greatest chance of persuading her to adopt woman's dress, could she be so persuaded. Jean's aunt was so impressed that she attempted to persuade her nephew to deal lightly with Joan; and he did in fact delay handing her over to her enemies until the aunt's death.

During her trial, Joan spoke scathingly of the English in reply to a question. A great English lord, who had



managed to secure entrance into the court, commented in admiration, "Really, this is a fine woman. If only she was English" (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 240). A well-respected priest and legal expert, Jean Lohier, arrived in Rouen. Asked to give his opinion of the trial, he replied after two or three days' study, that he thought it invalid. Moreover, he commented as follows:

You see how they are setting about it. They will catch her, if they can, through her own words, I mean thanks to those assertions where she says I know for certain about her apparitions. But if she said It seems to me, rather than I know for certain, then I am convinced that no man could condemn her. It looks as if they are proceeding more out of hatred than otherwise; and for this reason I will not remain here, because I do not want to be in this place any longer. (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 244)

Lohier's criticism of Joan is of a legal and theological nature. It is clear that she must have made a favourable impression upon him. Lucie-Smith comments that she impressed her judges despite themselves and the threat she posed to them.

There appears to be a consistency both of reaction to, and behaviour on the part of, Joan that suggests that her personality was clearly defined and that she possessed integrity.

#### 7.1.2 SKILL AND COMPETENCE

In this section it is necessary to decide whether Joan

developed a sense of socio-cultural competence and was able to live a life of her own. According to White, competency is "the cumulative product of one's history of efficacies and inefficacies" (3.1). Lightbody (1961) comments that Joan's confidence was sublime. The facts suggest that this confidence was not entirely misplaced.

Joan's village contemporaries testified to her being a hard and willing worker, both at tasks that required strenuous physical effort (which built up the reserves of strength she was to demonstrate later) and at household tasks like sewing and spinning, at which she was accomplished, claiming that she could hold her own with any woman in Rouen. She also carried out all the household tasks common to girls of her class. Clearly, in competence, she conformed to the expectations of her community.

Joan's ability and confidence were such that they could be generalised to operate in a more sophisticated milieu. The court at Chinon was impressed with her "graceful good manners" (Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 126). She was also an excellent horsewoman.

That her competence extended to the management of people is suggested by her shrewd sensitivity to the laws governing morale when she insisted that the armies approaching Orleans with her should be shriven. During the rais-

ing of the siege another example of this can be found:

Excited by their successes of the previous day, the French on this occasion might easily have accepted the challenge, probably with disastrous consequences. Their leaders had some difficulty in holding them back. Joan, though hot-headed, did not lack common sense, and on this occasion she was in favour of restraint. Her reasons were religious as well as practical. She did not want to fight on a Sunday, unless the English themselves were the first to make an assault. Her method of ensuring that her commands were obeyed shows what a shrewd instinctive psychologist she could be. She commanded some of the clergymen of Orleans to put on their vestments and come into the fields with the troops, and here they 'sang with great solemnity hymns, responses and devout orisons, giving praise and thanks to God'. A portable altar was brought, and two masses were said. Once this had been done, Joan asked: 'Now, look and see if they have their faces towards you, or their backs?' She was told that the enemy were retreating, and said: 'Let them go. It is not Messire's God's pleasure that they should be fought today. You will have them another time.' (ibid, p. 123)

There are two other examples at least that suggest this quality of shrewdness in Joan. During the examination at Poitiers, Joan "... greatly moved the women, 'ladies, damoiselles and townswomen', who flocked into her presence, speaking to them 'so gently and graciously that she made them weep'. At other times she was to be seen engaged in more warlike exercises, 'going with the men-at-arms to the fields and coursing with the lance as well as any, and riding black chargers, so bad-tempered that none dared to ride them' " (ibid, p. 75).

The second example is:

And she rode always armed in habiliments of war,

and the other people of her company were also thus, and she spoke as prudently of war as any captain could. And when it happened that there was in the host any cry or affray, she came whether on horseback or on foot, as valiantly as a captain of the company would have known how to do, giving courage and hardiness to all the others, and admonishing them to keep good watch and guard in the army, as reasonably one ought to do. (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, pp. 149 - 150)

Lucie-Smith comments that these were some of the happiest days she ever spent, implying that her fantasy found full and unlicensed expression at this time. It is, however, arguable that Joan was not living out a fantasy as a small boy might play at soldiers. There is a strong element of unconscious showmanship in these examples. Joan knew how to sell herself. It is an ability that is essential to most forms of spectacular public life.

When Joan rode to war to relieve the siege of Orleans, she appears to have known very little about strategy. Indeed, her main contribution seems to have been catalytic in that, in her presence, potentials already present but suppressed by the tedium and despair of the war were realised. The captains viewed with alarm some of what they considered her more reckless decisions. Her ambiguous position among the leaders is suggested by her being relegated to the rearguard before the battle of Patay (Lucie-Smith, 1976). Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that Joan learned something of the art of war. The Burgundian chronicler, Monstrelet, denied that Joan played a decisive part in the raising of the siege of

Orleans but reported that the garrison at Beaugency felt that they had lost the battle because of her presence in the opposing army (ibid). Joan's reputation probably played a part here. The compliment of Dunois to Joan's ability during the siege of Troyes, however, is unequivocal in its significance.

The positions she took up were so admirable ... that the most famous and experienced captains would not have made so good a plan of battle. (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976,p. 155)

Joan's ignorance, far from detracting from a sense of her competence, enhances it. By the time of her capture there is evidence to suggest that Joan had been given her own command by King Charles VII. The latter's motives may be questionable (it is embarrassing to owe one's crown to a young woman who understands nothing of diplomatic expedience and is dedicated to battles with the English and the launching of crusades ). It seems clear, however, that he could not have bestowed such a position on an inadequate or incompetent personality.

Lucie-Smith, in discussing Joan's feelings on the road to Rheims, makes the following comment:

Her obsession demanded of her that she establish complete control over the situation in which she found herself, so that events would follow the patterns it prescribed. (Lucie-Smith, 1976,p. 159)

This is in fact a tremendous compliment to Joan's competence if the reader allows that he is correct. Her control after all did not extend to a household or a school. The life picture she was constructing contained factors



like a king, courtiers, generals, soldiers of fortune, recruits from all over the kingdom (enlisting in the army at their own expense) and the actual need to do battle. She did this for several months. Even if allowance is made for mass fervour and luck, it is still a remarkable feat. According to T. Douglas Murray (cited in Lightbody, 1961) Joan achieved "in short months .. .. more than Alexander and Caesar accomplished in so much time, and at an age when even Alexander had as yet achieved nothing" (p. 29). That she achieved this in unorthodox ways should not alarm anyone other than a tactical purist.

#### 7.1.3 VERBAL ABILITY

There is a second area in which Joan's skill seems unquestionable, an area where on the whole the experts agree that the average schizophrenic does not shine. Joan's verbal skill was remarkable. Her "incomparable pithiness and directness are things which carry across the ages, and which would in themselves serve to justify her apparently undying renown" (Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. xiv).

Her successful defence of herself in the breach of promise suit brought by her suitor before the ecclesiastical tribunal at Toul bears early testimony, not only to her confidence but to her ability to present her case convincingly and intelligibly.

A few examples of these comments will suffice to show their pertinence and their clarity.

At the coronation of Charles VII at Rheims, Joan was permitted to take her standard into the cathedral while those of the other captains were not allowed. In reply to her judges' question about this, she replied, "It had borne the burden ... and it was right that it should have the honour" (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 162).

Joan was asked, during the trial whether she believed she was in a state of grace. This was a trick question because, if Joan did not admit she was not in a state of grace, she would be claiming to know God's mind on the subject. She replied, "If I am not, may God put me in it; and if I am may God keep me in it" (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 239).

In the end, they took to threatening her. She would be burnt, they said, if she persisted in her heresy. She answered - and the clerk wrote the words Superba responsio in the margin of his manuscript - 'I will say no more about that. Were I to see the fire, I would still say all that I have said, and would not do otherwise.'  
(Sackville-West, 1948, p. 271)

It is due to Joan's verbal skill that an added dimension of the health of her GRO can be established. Bannister's theory of thought disorder already mentioned (3.2) is that it is a form of loose construing and, because it is loose, it is inconsistent. Hence a schizophrenic's thought is not only different from normal thinking but

also different from his own thinking at another time.

During the second session of the court, on 22 February, there was an attempt to make a record parallel to the one made by the official notaries. The purpose appears to have been to prejudice the records against Joan.

One of the notaries, Manchon, recorded his indignation thus:

At the beginning, by command of Cauchon, the two clerics stationed themselves near a window behind a curtain, just by the place where the judges were, while my fellow notary and I were at the foot of the judges, in addition to Jean Monnet, secretary to Jean Beaupère. These two hidden clerks wrote while Joan spoke, and they reported what went against her and suppressed her excuses. I think Master Loiselleur kept himself hidden with them, to keep an eye on what they wrote. After dinner there was made, in the bishop's house, in the presence of several doctors, the collation of our writings. But as the two clerks reported things differently from me, and did not put in what excused Joan, Cauchon became very angry with me. It was represented to me that others had written differently, and people tried to get me to write what they did. But I replied that I had written faithfully and refused to change anything. At the same time, as I have said, I marked with a Nota the points which were controversial, and where the interrogators should begin. The next day Joan was once more questioned about the doubtful points, and her replies confirmed exactly what I had written. (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 236)

That Joan was able to grasp and appreciate the attitudes of other persons to her and that she was amused by these is shown in her response to Brother Richard, when they first met:

It seemed to me that the people of Troyes, fearing this was something that did not come from God, sent him to me. And when he came to me, approaching, he made the sign of the cross, and threw holy water,

and I said to him: 'Approach boldly - I will not fly away.' (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 151)

For Joan there was no "crisis of expression". She lacked formal learning and she knew nothing of the subtleties of the intellectual crime of heresy. These were what condemned her in the hands of her enemies.

#### 7.1.4 JOAN'S REACTION TO STRESS

While stress does not cause schizophrenia, there are a number of reasons for supposing that the schizophrenic person is badly affected by it and will avoid new situations and potentially stressful emotional encounters. Jaynes sees the schizophrenic as deficient in an enzyme that allows the metabolic by-products of stress to be evacuated. Venables (3.2) discovered that while schizophrenics appear less anxious than others, they are in fact more anxious physiologically, the more withdrawn they are.

By no stretch of the imagination can Joan's career be described as stress-free. She reacted to the challenges of battle with unvarying courage, where a schizophrenic might be expected to react with helplessness because of a physiological failure to maintain the GRO. One illustration is enough to make the point:

While she was uttering her threat that all the defenders would be killed if the city was stormed, a crossbowman was taking aim. 'Shall we, you bloody tart?' he yelled, and put his bolt through the

fleshy part of her thigh. As she turned away, her standard-bearer was shot in the foot, and then, as the unfortunate man lifted his visor to examine the wound, another bolt caught him full between the eyes and killed him. Joan dragged herself to shelter behind the ridge that divided the two ditches and here for some time she remained, trying to direct the bringing up and positioning of the fascines, so that the ladders could be planted. (Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 178)

Joan's trial can be seen as the most stressful period of her life. She was subjected to incessant and inconsiderate questioning, inconsiderate because all put their questions at once and did not allow Joan to complete her answers. At the same time she was tormented by her five English guards when she was in her cell. In these circumstances, it might be expected that Joan's "condition" would have become worse, her "symptoms" more florid, her voices more intrusive and destructive. Yet for a time her voices left her altogether (Sackville-West, 1948). Her reactions during her trial were in no way different from those of others, that is, she had her moments of weakness and despair and terror; yet she acquitted herself well and found many sympathisers who tried to advise her during the rare opportunities available (Lucie-Smith, 1976).

A controversial reaction is her sixty foot leap from the tower of the château at Beaurevoir. This may well have been a rationalised suicide attempt as the prospect of being handed over to the hated English must have been distressing and humiliating. Joan, desperate to escape,



was aware of the enormous risk she took in leaping from that height. She must have believed the risk worth the gain, should she succeed. While it is established that schizophrenics have a high suicide rate, it is also true that not all suicides are schizophrenics.

#### 7.1.5 DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR

A question that must be asked is whether Joan had delusions of grandeur, for the criteria so far discussed are particularly appropriate to chronic schizophrenia, while in paranoid schizophrenia the core of the personality is much less affected.

It is true that Joan saw herself as being sent by God to rescue the Kingdom of France, that her voices called her "daughter of God" (Lucie-Smith, 1976) and that she told her judges that they would be punished for mistreating her. These ideas have a ring of grandeur which ill-accords with her humble origins and her human failings. Given her identification with the Catholic world view and her experiences and her utter ignorance in most other fields of worldly knowledge, these utterances become those of simplicity rather than of madness. In terms of her finished life and her fame, the claims become more plausible. Hyperbolic they may sound but this mode of expression is not unusual in mystics, who express rapturous emotion, or a sense of identity in relation to God in extravagant metaphors that have a ring of pride.

Compare Joan with the following examples. A man claims that he has been appointed by God to save the world from the communists. If he is incapacitated functionally he will probably be in a mental hospital. If he is expressing this belief in letters to the press or a distribution of pamphlets, or addresses on street corners, he will be seen as deluded. If he is President of the U.S.A. and has indeed taken admirable measures to combat the threat of communism, he will be seen as a deeply religious man with a strong sense of commitment. The point is not that society discriminates against the lowly. In each instance the man is describing his feelings and goals in metaphorical terms. In the first, the GRO is inadequate and his description of himself inept. Narrativisation and action are not congruent. In the second the man may be carrying out an intention which he believes is God-inspired and may be overestimating the importance of his contribution. In the presence of a truly healthy GRO his effort would be more accurately presented as he would see himself more clearly as his fellows would assess him. As long as his behaviour is appropriate in other areas he will be seen as inoffensive and may even acquire a following. In the third instance, the man's assessment of his actions and motives will be accepted because action and metaphor can be seen to be congruent. The difference between this third example and Joan of Arc would appear to lie in the difference in their education.

Joan was not stupid but as has been stated, in the affairs of the world in which her life ended, she was simplicity itself. The religious myth in which she believed was inadequate to describe her experience and at the same time it was the only frame of reference she had at her disposal. Lucie-Smith (1976) argues plausibly that Joan was trapped by her own reputation, so that once her power as a prophetess was no longer relevant or useful, she could not move into a new career like having her own command in the army. To the common people she was a saint and they made claims upon her to intercede for them. Her legend effectively prevented her from developing new potentials.

It is true that Joan planned to rescue the Duke of Orleans from his imprisonment in England and to embark on a crusade. These aspirations may sound deluded but may also be interpreted as expressions of intention and potential. Joan's ideas of geography were vague.

If Joan was deluded it is a matter of some surprise to find that she did not see herself as a potential martyr and saint. For someone fed on the lives of saints it would have been an obvious development, even a temptation, since the common people behaved as if she were one. There is evidence to suggest that Joan rejected ideas of her own beatitude. Brother Richard, France's Billy Graham of the time, was disposed to see her in this light.

In his opinion, she "had as much power to know God's secrets as any saint in paradise with St John the Evangelist, and ... she could, if she wanted, make the King's army enter over the walls in any way she wanted" (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 153). Joan's action in kneeling to Brother Richard as soon as he knelt to her indicated that she did not lay claim to honours accorded to God and the saints. "Daughter of God" was not a declaration of rank for Joan.

Margaret La Touroulde's deposition is even more revealing:

I remember that several times women came to the house while Joan was staying there, and brought rosaries and other objects of piety so that she might touch them, which made her laugh and say to me: 'Touch them yourself, [sic] they will be as good from your touch as they will from mine.' (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 185)

Joan feared burning and signed her abjuration because she saw the executioner's cart, an act of disloyalty to her voices that she regretted later. If she had been deluded, apotheosis would have been the obvious route to take, for in imprisonment lay only humiliation. Joan finally chose to die but she was not motivated by a masochistic desire for martyrdom. The conditions of her imprisonment were such that death was preferable.

Joan's choice of male clothing has been attributed to her need to single herself out as somebody special to whom no ordinary rules applied (Lucie-Smith, 1976).

There may be some truth in this. Yet, as when the nun takes the veil and habit and forswears earthly adornment, it also expressed symbolically her forgoing of womanly characteristics to be a soldier among soldiers, in which environment it had the added advantage of playing down any feminine attractions she might possess. The puzzle is why Joan refused to adopt woman's clothes when her military career came to an end. Sackville-West (1948) suggests that she feared rape at the hands of her ruffianly guards and Lucie-Smith points out that, when she finally did consent to wear woman's clothing, there appears to have been a simulated rape attempt to force her to resume male attire and so relapse once more into heresy.

The relevant point here is that, if Joan's intention in wearing masculine clothing was merely to single herself out as important, it becomes a mystery why she adopted the elegant clothing of the soldiers of fortune with whom she later fraternised. To maintain a delusion of special election, the simple clothing of her early career would have been more useful and appropriate. The adoption of the clothing of the military leaders shows that she identified with them and laid claim to them as her peers, a truly social action out of keeping with a delusion that required outward singularity for its projection. The most that can be inferred from Joan's attachment to male dress is that she may have been un-



certain of her sexual identity.

#### 7.1.6 ASSESSMENT

Evidence presented thus far suggests that the GRO possessed by Joan of Arc was compatible with the social environment in which she grew up and into which she later moved. If love is defined in the broader sense of the word, Joan was not deficient in her ability to show love (to her king, her country, her comrades, the wretched and her God) and to receive love (the adulation of the crowds, the admiration and sympathy of her hostesses at Beaurevoir). She was unusually competent in manipulating her environment and in expressing herself to some purpose verbally. At the same time she possessed an uncompromising simplicity that made her unique. When Joan was face to face with the Anglo-Burgundian captains during the negotiations at Troyes, an eye-witness found her a disappointing phenomenon:

... 'she was the simplest thing he ever saw, and in what she did there was neither rhyme nor reason, any more than the stupidest thing he ever saw'. He thought she was not to be compared with Madame d'Or, the female jester of the Duke of Burgundy who was famous for her long blond hair. There were always a few who took this view of Joan, mistaking her simplicity of speech for stupidity. (Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 157)

It is the contention of this writer that if there had been a fifteenth century psychiatrist available, he would by these criteria have found that Joan was not a schizophrenic.

## 7.2 JOAN AS A MYSTIC

In this study the mystic has emerged as one who has a cosmic experience of a particular type and who spends the rest of his life trying to give expression to this insight in whatever medium is available to him. According to Perry (4.3), the mystic is sensitive to the collective unrest of others in his culture and is the catalyst in the presence of which the required change materialises. Since in Wilber's model (1.4) the contents of the collective unconscious or the cultural ethos are located at the level of the Transpersonal Bands and since the mystic to be an effective instrument of change must be an autonomous human being, he must possess both transpersonal sensitivity and a fully developed and stable GRO to operate at the level of the Biosocial Bands. Since in the case of Joan, her voices persisted from about 1424 until her death in 1431, the experiences of St Theresa of Avila and St John of the Cross, to name only two, are relevant in the study of Joan, for they enjoyed the constant mystical experience of adepts at contemplation.

When William Blake was first taken to be apprenticed to an engraver, he rejected the first possible master because, he said, he looked like a man who would hang. According to Bronowski (1972), the fact that this man did meet his death on the gallows does not necessarily

prove foresight on the part of Blake. In his opinion it demonstrates insight into an age. It is upon the hypothesis that Joan possessed this insight that the case for her being a mystic stands or falls.

There is a good deal of information available to suggest that the emotions of the people of France were particularly turbulent at the time. It has already been mentioned that Domrémy was a microcosm of France so that the experience of the people of France, exhausted by the depredations of armies engaged in the civil war and Hundred Years' War, must have been available to a sensitive child. Through her mother, Isabeau, Joan came into contact with another collective phenomenon. This was the cult of the name of Jesus, of which the Franciscan, Brother Richard, was an exponent and which had the support of the anti-pope Calixtus but not the sanction of Pope Martin V. If conflict is a source of creative energy, here was another schism to stoke the fires of social metamorphosis. It is debatable whether Joan was a member of this cult but her own unorthodox experiences appear to have been influenced by it. She headed her letters to the English with the words "Jhesus Maria", wore a ring inscribed "Jesus Marie" (in honour of her parents), and also had "Jesus Maria" inscribed on her standard.

The culmination of her mission as she first presented

it was the crowning of the king at Rheims. In this goal can be seen the coalescence of the two social forces to which Joan responded. Bernard Shaw called Joan the first nationalist and it is clear from Joan's utterances that a sense of nationality, full-blown in the nineteenth century, was beginning to grow. Joan was passionately determined to drive out the English and restore France to its own people. In the case of the Dauphin Charles, a coronation was not essential to his position. The practice of election to the kingship had long since given way to the idea of hereditary right, so the days when the ceremony created the king were over. Charles had been accepted as the new king by the lords loyal to his cause seven years before on the basis of his undeniable hereditary right to the crown (Vale, 1974). It was Joan's belief in the efficacy of the anointing oil that made Charles VII's coronation so important to her and to the simple people from whom she had sprung (Lucie-Smith, 1976). Joan said, "When the king shall be crowned and consecrated, the power of his enemies will always be lessened, nor will they ultimately be able to harm him or the kingdom" (cited in Vale, 1974, p. 57). Since the act of anointing was in the religious sense more significant than the crowning and since Joan saw France as belonging to God and Charles as His chosen steward, it is clear that for her the political and the religious fervour had coalesced to what was synonymous

with forming God's Kingdom on earth.

In this context the apparition of St Michael to Joan takes on an enriched symbolic significance. The loss of the Abbey of Saint Denis and of the royal Oriflamme to the enemy; that St Denis had allowed the burial place of the kings of France to be profaned and the English to proclaim Henry VI monarch of France and England; these occurrences had dealt a severe blow to the morale of the French people:

So deeply penetrated was Christendom by a sense of the divine, so perturbed by the thought that it might be out of communion with the Creator and the tutelary saints, that the desertion filled the people of France with bewilderment and despair. (Fabre, 1954, p. 31)

The Dauphin Charles had miraculously escaped death when a floor had collapsed at La Rochelle. He had called upon St Michael at the critical moment and had attributed his escape to the intervention of the saint. St Michael had replaced St Denis as the national patron saint and, significantly, the saint who appeared to Joan, instead of wearing a bishop's vestments as St Denis had done, bore the warrior's sword. It is as though France had presented its will to Joan in the symbolic form of a sword, and she took upon herself the responsibility of wielding it.

The synthesis of political and religious motifs created



by Joan is strongly suggested by a description of her army at the height of her influence:

Volunteers came to serve the Maid - it was as though a popular preacher had aroused the hearts of the soldiery. Her army, with her banner bearing the name of Jesus, her standard bearing the image of Christ in Judgement, her banner showing Christ Crucified, with the mendicant friars marching in front of the troops, singing hymns and anthems, was like a revivalist meeting in motion. (Vale, 1974, p. 57)

Joan's fervour then found a ready response in the hearts of the people. It was a fervour to which the poor, especially the women, were to respond even after Joan's fortunes had declined; and the response since her burning has never quite faded.

#### 7.2.1 VISIONS AND VOICES

It has already been established that voices and visions are not the prerogative of the schizophrenic alone. Joan is unusual in that her "hallucinations" were mainly auditory ( a rarer phenomenon than visual) and that she experienced hallucinations involving more than one sense. One of her rare similarities to religious mystics is that her saints smelt very sweet when she embraced them (Lucie-Smith, 1976). It should not alarm the reader to hear that Joan's relationship with her saints and the manner of her perception of them shows parallels with those familiar to specialists today (ibid). It is the contention here that such details are irrelevant in distinguishing a schizophrenic from a mystic. They merely tell the student

more about the way in which the brain functions. Voices and visions in the presence of a healthy GRO can be classified as social phenomena. And Joan is not alone in experiencing prolonged auditory phenomena. St Theresa, eminently sane and practical, heard and obeyed voices she believed to come from God (Underhill, 1967). It is interesting to examine an account of her experience given by Joan to the Dauphin and three others:

And she answered the king that she would, and said these words or others like them: that when something was not going well because they would not leave it to her to follow the counsel that was sent her from God, she would retire apart and pray to God, complaining to Him that the men to whom she spoke would not readily believe in her. And when she had prayed to God, she heard a voice which said to her: 'Go, child of God, go, go! Go, and I will help you.' And when she heard this voice she felt a great joy, and wanted to be in that state always. And, what is more, when she thus repeated the words of her voices, she was seized with a marvellous rapture, and raised her eyes to heaven. (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 127).

This account has a great deal in common with the prayer of any practising Christian. The difference lies in that the reassurance or answer is heard rather than felt. There is clearly a moment when Joan experiences such rapture that she finds it difficult to express except non-verbally. The voice she hears embodies the authority mentioned by Happold as being a quality of mystical experience (4.1). Another point which links Joan with the mystics is the uncontrolled and conceited sounding "child of God". If Charles was embarrassed by this description it is because this is an emotive account of the anxieties

and raptures of the individual psyche, a uniquely private event. The significance of the similarity between this language and that of madness has already been discussed. Joan's account of her experience appears to owe nothing to art and it is interesting to find it so much like that of other mystical experiences.

Another aspect of Joan's voices that places them within the mystical orbit is the ready restitution of the GRO. There were occasions when the voices would assert their presence with great insistence when her attention was focused<sup>s</sup> elsewhere but on the whole Joan needed solitude to hear them and the need to use the GRO prevented her from understanding them, as did the noise of the prison and the guards (Lucie-Smith, 1976).

Jaynes pointed out that the social phenomena of possession and trance are learned behaviour. The element of learning in Joan's case is quite strong. The church bells at Domrémy served to trigger off the voices (perhaps through deautomatization) and she heard them especially when the bells sounded for Compline and Matins. Later, she was able to consult them at will.

Wing (1978) made the distinction that, in the social phenomenon, possession enhanced the power of the person experiencing it while the intrusion of thought not his

own was for the schizophrenic a distressing and debilitating experience. While Joan can hardly be said to have been possessed (like St Theresa she demonstrated the true bicamerality which according to Jaynes no longer exists), her voices nevertheless were a source of power and comfort to her. They provided the authorisation both she and her society needed to accept the validity of her mission. Lucie-Smith gives an interesting account of what he calls a fugue condition. He sees Joan as being for a short time disorientated and out of touch with reality. In view of the result it would seem more appropriate to see Joan as expressing herself in a metaphor of power. Her sense that she could win and her determination to do so come out very clearly. The image seems appropriate enough in the circumstances:

Because of the great number of soldiers in the town and its great strength, and also because of the resistance which the garrison put up, the French were forcibly compelled to retire. At that moment I came up. But I had already been so severely wounded in the heel by an arrow that I could neither stand nor walk without crutches. I saw that the Maid had been left with a very small company of her own men and others, and had no doubt that harm would ensue. So I mounted a horse and rushed towards her. I asked her what she was doing alone there like that, and why she did not retire with the rest. After taking her helmet from her head, she answered that she was not alone, that she still had 50 000 men in her company, and that she would not leave that spot until she had taken the town.

At that moment, whatever she might say, she had no more than four or five men with her, which I know for certain, as do several others who also saw her. Therefore I told her out of hand to go away and re-



tire like the rest. She told me, however, to send for faggots and withies to make a bridge over the moat so that it might be possible to get near. And when she had said this she shouted: 'Faggots and withies, everybody, so that we can make a bridge!' And they were immediately brought and put in position. The whole thing utterly astonished me, for the town was immediately taken by assault, and at that time there was no great resistance. (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, pp. 188 - 189)

A criticism of Joan's voices frequently tendered, is that they often expressed Joan's own wishes and opinions. An examination of two examples will illustrate what is meant.

Joan stated at Rouen that she had given the king a sign which had made him believe in her. She refused to reveal what it was:

At one moment she claimed that she had promised St Catherine and St Margaret to remain silent on the subject, but 'without their requiring it. And Joan made this promise at her own request, for too many people would have asked her about it, had she not made this promise to the saints aforesaid.' (Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 61)

Most people debate with themselves mentally. The first point here is that Joan's internal debates were dramatised. Clearly too, she took refuge in her saints when she was being defensive or evasive. She used them to rationalise her own actions.

The second example is taken from a record of what Joan said to Cauchon on the Monday after her abjuration:

We asked her if, since Thursday, she had heard the voices of St Catherine and St Margaret. She replied that she had. Asked what they said, [She] replied that God had told her, through St Catherine and St Margaret, of the great pity of this signal treason



to which she, Joan, had consented in making the abjuration and recantation in order to save her life. She said that, before Thursday, her voices had told her what she would do that day, and she had then done it. She said, in addition that her voices told her, when she was on the scaffold, before the people, that she would reply boldly to the preacher who was then preaching. And Joan said he was a false preacher who said that she did several things which she had not done. She said that, if she declared God had not sent her, she would damn herself, and that God had in truth sent her. She said that her voices had told her, since Thursday, that she had committed a great crime in confessing that what she had done was not well done. (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, pp. 271 - 272)

One of the most striking aspects of this passage is the integrity it reveals in the religious core of Joan's being. She is utterly sincere in her belief in her voices and with regard to her divinely inspired mission she does not, as she so easily could have done, use them to rationalise an escape from the fire which she feared very greatly. She accepts responsibility for the guilt of this action (the abjuration). Looked at from a slightly different angle, the passage suggests that, if Joan knew nothing of what the abjuration ceremony entailed, the voices were the repository of her clairvoyance or precognition; and, if she did know what to expect, that she attributed to St Catherine and St Margaret her own resolutions as to how she would comport herself. Clearly also, the voices were partly the voices of her own conscience when she had had time to reflect on her disloyalty to God through cowardice.

Over and above the initial and continuing inspiration of

the voices, Joan clearly needed them for another reason; and the clue to her need would seem to lie in the fact that she attributed to her saints much of the intelligence and imagination and common sense that a modern woman would attribute to herself. Part of the answer then may lie in the position of Joan as a woman in the fifteenth century. The roles for her as a female were very much circumscribed and, moreover, the roles for her as a peasant woman were more circumscribed still. If Joan were a woman of genius (and her career hints that she had ability of no mean order) trapped in a world which had no use for such talent; and if the religion of which she was an ardent devotee supported this view of the place of a woman in society, Joan would need authorisation of an unusual type to allow her to give rein to her energies and talents. Her voices and visions would be authorisation for her compatriots to accept her, and for Joan herself to take a giant leap out of her niche in the God-ordained order of society.

That she confused the voices of her saints with her own thoughts or with promptings from dissociated parts of her own self is neither culpable, damning nor surprising for another reason. St Theresa of Avila and St John of the Cross were aware of the danger (5.2.1). They were accomplished in subtle self-examination. There seems very little to suggest that Joan was the self-analytical

type.

### 7.2.2 JOAN AS A PROPHETESS

In the creative continuum postulated earlier, mysticism and prophecy are closely allied. There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that Joan's powers of clairvoyance and precognition were highly developed. Moss's comment has already been mentioned (1.). Joan foresaw the relief of the siege at Orleans and the coronation of Charles VII at Rheims. She also foresaw that she would be wounded in battle, one of the best attested of her prophecies. On the other hand, she predicted that the French would score a major victory over the English in the next seven years. In this prediction she was wrong. In the world of the psychic sensitive, the likelihood of a mistake is par for the course, which may be why critics suggest with some truth that, if enough predictions are made, some will inevitably come true. Exponents of ESP engaged in occupations where they are forced to perform at will are also forced to cheat, consciously or unconsciously. Yet there is a suggestion that meaning somehow invalidates statistics.

What Lucie-Smith calls Joan's unconscious myth-making may be seen as an example of this tendency. Joan had to convince herself as well as others and so, in her self-narratisation, the story she told herself and the world,

she saw as supernatural and presented as supernatural, events which could be explained in natural ways. Her ability to recognise the king in a crowd of people when the court played a trick on her is one such occurrence. Joan must have been familiar with the king's appearance from description. Features like bandy legs and pendulous noses are quite distinctive (Fabre, 1954). Similarly, she sent a message for a sword to be dug up from behind the altar in the Church of Sainte Cathérine-de-Fierbois. The sword was found, apparently miraculously, but as Lucie-Smith (1976) states, if she spent time in the chapel on the way to Chinon, she may have noted the presence of the sword subliminally. Weapons of war and armour were frequently brought to and left in the chapel. She also saved the Duke of Alençon's life by warning him to move just before a cannon ball struck the spot where he had been standing. This can be attributed to a quick eye and quick reflexes. Joan had promised to return the Duke safely to his family, so the event would have gained in significance in such a context. Much of what man experiences as supernatural or amazing beyond the usual sphere can be explained in terms of the remarkable brain he possesses. By the same token it can be suggested that man's influence on the train of events is perceptible (he is constructing what he will see and what he will allow to happen); and also that supernatural events so far

defying explanation in terms of man's scientific paradigm may be no less the product of man's remarkable brain and no less real.

That some of Joan's apparent powers can be explained in terms of what psychologists know is possible should not, therefore, detract from the fascination of those that cannot. Joan on several occasions mentioned that she would last only a year. Her active career can be seen as stretching from 25 April 1429, when she set off for Orleans, to 23 May 1430, when she was captured. The phenomenal ego that was Joan did not behave like one doomed to destruction or to obscurity after a year. She was full of enthusiastic plans for wielding her sword for France and Christendom. This statement about lasting only a year would appear to argue for a source of knowledge and purpose with origins other than Joan herself; or other than an unconscious mind limited in extent of its knowledge to the experience of the person possessing it. Moreover, Joan's voices spoke of the siege of Orleans long before it began and Joan was very definite that she had to be with the Dauphin before mid-Lent, suggesting that she was following a timetable beyond the phenomenal awareness of any single human being. This cluster of events is not easily explicable and to label it as coincidence is to refuse to deal with it in its full complexity. Joan was not solely responsible for many of what have been seen as



her triumphs and the twenty-four years following Charles VII's coronation hardly suggest that Joan's alleged purpose in crowning him was totally valid in its assumptions (Vale, 1974). Yet, some collective upsurge of emotion and configuration of events with Joan at their centre are inescapably suggested. Synchronicity, an a-causal principle, formative cause - the terms are there to be used, though they explain nothing. To be a mystic it is not necessary to be either right or permanent in influence.

### 7.2.3 CONCLUDING COMMENT

The evidence selected for this study indicates that Joan possessed a healthy GRO capable of absorbing creative insights into and formulating creative solutions for the society of which she was a member. If it is assumed that she was not a fraud, it follows that she was a mystic who spontaneously and consistently experienced "hallucinations" combining ideation, and sensory and transcendent qualities.

Lucie-Smith comments that in our own day Joan would be considered deranged as those around her would not as readily tolerate the courses of action she would be forced to try to impose on her fellows. If the principle of the GRO is accepted it becomes clear that, since Joan was able to develop and maintain it competently, she could not be a product of any other age but her own. The human

unlike the seed, is not programmed to certain courses of action at birth. A healthy person will be suitably influenced by his environment, "suitably" here representing a wide latitude of choice. Born into the twentieth century, Joan would have found other outlets for her talents.

Lightbody (1961) comments that psychiatrists give one reason to believe that, had Joan lived, her condition would have deteriorated. Again the student is faced with a sweeping and unscientific statement. The theory of psychopathology gains nothing from studying what did not happen. Theorists are begging the question by assuming abnormality before it has been proved. They assume that Joan was simply lucky in that she met with no obstacles. It has already been mentioned that Joan was probably handicapped in her further adjustment by her reputation as a prophet, so that even when she had apparently settled into a career as a soldier, she was forced back to the old image by requests that required her as an intermediary with God. To suggest that this would have precipitated her into schizophrenia is to go too far. Though she spoke nostalgically of her home, it is unlikely that she would have wished to return there. She herself gave the clue as to where her future endeavors would lie. She wished to liberate the Duke of Orleans, a prisoner in England; she wished to expel the English from France; she wished to lead a crusade.

Though Joan's wishes and the King's diplomatic interests were in conflict, there is no indication that he intended to curtail her activities and there is also some evidence that, contrary to the traditional view, he did try to purchase her back from her captors (Vale, 1974; Lightbody, 1961). In fact it was in his interests to do so.

Joan's career was a dangerous one, as not only was she at the forefront of the political stage but also of the ecclesiastical stage. Her enemies would have been indefatigable in their attempts to destroy her. She lived with passion, a protagonist on two battlefronts - French/English; good/evil. The schizophrenic is destroyed by passion, the mystic a master of it.

## SUMMARY

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,  
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

Shakespeare

In an exploration of the relationship between mysticism and schizophrenia it seemed clear at the outset that the reason why a mystic can be labelled schizophrenic by the psychologist or psychiatrist is that he experiences voices and visions and other phenomena with a superficial similarity to some of the symptoms characteristic of this condition. The reason for the confusion is that the prevailing view of the universe and of man has for a long time excluded the possibility that there could be a good deal more to the phenomenon of life than is immediately evidenced.

As a corrective, a brief review was presented of the growing dissatisfaction with the picture of man and his environment promulgated by behaviourism, logical positivism and the mechanistic view of the universe. Since the status of the material world has become parlous in the light of insights originating in quantum physics and since there is mounting evidence to suggest that the phenomena studied in parapsychology cannot be

dismissed as mere self-delusion, it would seem logical for psychologists to adopt a model of man capable of absorbing insights at levels of interaction between man and his milieu, ranging through all the gradations between "physical" and "spiritual". Wilber's Spectrum of Consciousness (1.4) was seen as the most useful in this respect. Because of cultural and time gaps in using Joan of Arc as a test case, it was necessary to explicate mysticism and schizophrenia in terms of a relationship to culture, independent of cultural norms and consensually validated structuring of reality. Man's view of the world is determined by the ways in which he perceives; for all practical purposes, the world as he knows it exists only by virtue of his brain's ability to build up and maintain a surrogate of reality based on an interaction between memory and input; with its aid he operates as an autonomous human being in the phenomenal world. For this reason, consciousness and altered states of consciousness were seen as essential areas of discussion for the elucidation of the relationship in question. Shor's concept of the Generalised Reality-Oriented -GRO- (2.1) was seen as the most useful concept to emerge from this area of research. The GRO is a highly flexible tool at the disposal of a man or woman, comprising the multiplicity of learning skills, cultural relationships and behavioural norms essential for efficient and appropriate interaction



within the social milieu. This structure, though it may differ in content, is one which from a physiological point of view, modern persons have in common with persons of the fifteenth century. Jaynes's theory of the origin of consciousness in the bicameral mind (2.3) was also discussed because of its parallels with the GRO and because Jaynes usefully incorporates theories of schizophrenia and mysticism which tend to support the argument.

The GRO is the tool without which a person is unable first to define himself as having distinct identity within a culture and second to operate effectively in the spheres of life relevant to him. As the schizophrenic is notoriously defective in his ability to accomplish either of these two things, it is logical to suggest that the malfunction lies in an inability to maintain the GRO at optimal level for a reason or reasons unknown. The result is a cumulative deficit in competence and social skills at any level of cultural interaction. The implication is that schizophrenia as we know it is not the disease but the cultural manifestation (or logical outcome, given the human condition) of years of physiological or psychic handicap. The lesion (and this writer favours a theory of schizophrenia with a disease theory at its centre) may not be only one malfunction. A variety of biochemical or neurolog-

ical deficits could each lead to the mode of being in the world that society calls schizophrenia. The crucial point for the argument is that in times of even minimal stress in some cases, the schizophrenic fails to maintain the brain state which comprises the GRO of the normal, waking adult. The frustration of his helplessness could be the reason for his more florid attacks of "madness". He has not at his disposal the more usual ways of expressing anger. Because he cannot operate autonomously in his world, having failed to acquire the necessary skills or the structures to canalise his drives, he is seen as standing in a negative relationship to his culture.

The mystic, on the other hand, has an experience of such startling intellectual and emotional (and/or sensory) impact that he has not the categories of thought and language available to do it justice. The result may be confused with schizophrenic symptoms because of inescapable semantic similarities in persons of the same culture. The crucial difference lies in the fact that the GRO is readily re-established (may in fact be simply in abeyance rather than shattered during the mystic experience). Instead of having a crippling effect on the percipient, the mystic d-ASC, especially when learned and repeated, can lead to a sense of power and an increased capacity for positive interaction along the

parameters of homonomy and autonomy. Evidence garnered from transpersonal psychology and experiments in hallucinogenic drugs suggests that not only is the mystic experience explicable in terms of, and potentially available to persons with, normal brain functioning and cultural adjustment, but also that this d-ASC may well have a profound positive effect on the person having it, given the right circumstances. There is a strong suggestion that the mystic experience and creative activity are correlated, leading to innovation in all spheres of human activity. The mystic then could be seen to stand in a positive relationship not only to his culture but to the purposeful collective consciousness which, for want of a better term, could be called metaculture. Unlike the schizophrenic, the mystic has a GRO which allows him to operate competently in everyday life.

The life of Joan of Arc has been discussed with a view to establishing whether or not she possessed a healthy GRO. The rationale is that the relationship to society would be the same in the fifteenth century, for both the schizophrenic and the mystic, even though the fifteenth was more sympathetic to phenomena like voices and visions than is the twentieth century. In this writer's opinion there is more evidence to suggest that Joan possessed a healthy GRO than there is evidence to the contrary, given the premises stated. It must be

admitted that the selection of detail plays an important role in any assessment of this kind; yet, making allowance for this, the evidence is still very strong that Joan was a mystic and not a schizophrenic. She was confident, competent and immune to stress to a degree unimaginable in a chronic schizophrenic. The mere establishment of the fact that the picture changes depending on the selection of the evidence is of value, since persons who argue the other way fall into the same trap. Much is accomplished if this can be acknowledged. The label of schizophrenia is relevant only when a person ceases to function and comes within the aegis of a psychiatrist. The range of normal human experience, so severely narrowed by the narrowness of the prevailing behaviouristic paradigm, is potentially very wide. The meaning of man's existence is still open-ended.

## REFERENCE LIST

- Aaronson, B.S. Hypnosis, depth perception and the psychedelic experience. In C.T. Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969.
- Angyal, A. Neurosis and treatment: a holistic theory. (E. Hanfmann & R.M. Jones, Eds.). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965.
- Auden, W.H. Introduction. In A. Fremantle (Ed.), The Protestant mystics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.
- Baker, R. Behavioural techniques in the treatment of schizophrenia. In A. Forrest & J. Affleck (Eds.), New perspectives in schizophrenia. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 1975.
- Barnes, M. & Berke, J. Mary Barnes. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973.
- Beloff, J. Preface. In A. Parker, States of mind: ESP and altered states of consciousness. London: Malaby Press, 1975.
- Blair, L. Rhythms of vision. London: Croom Helm, 1975.
- Bronowski, J. William Blake and the age of revolution. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.
- Butler, C. Western mysticism. London: Arrow Books, 1960.
- D'Arcy, M.C. The meeting of love and knowledge. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958.
- De Chardin, P.T. The phenomenon of Man. London: Collins, 1970.
- Deikman, A.J. Deautomatization and the mystic experience. In C.T. Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969.
- Doxey, N.C.S. A comparative multidisciplinary investigation into three hypothetical altered states of consciousness. Doctoral dissertation presented to the Department of Psychology, University of Cape Town, 1974.



- Dunne, J.W. An experiment with time. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1934.
- Fabre, L. Joan of Arc. London: Adam's Press Ltd., 1954.
- Fordham, F. An introduction to Jung's psychology. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966.
- Forrest, A.D. Concepts of schizophrenia: historical review. In A. Forrest & J. Affleck (Eds.), New perspectives in schizophrenia. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 1975.
- Foucault, M. Madness and civilisation. London: Tavistock Publications, 1967.
- Foudraine, J. /Not made of wood/ (H.H. Hoskins, trans.). London: Quartet Books, 1974.
- Foy, J.G. Gone is shadow's child. Plainfield, New Jersey: Logos Books, 1971.
- Frankl, V.E. The will to meaning. London: Souvenir Press, 1971.
- Gooch, S. The paranormal. Glasgow: Collins, 1979.
- Gray, G.V. The gospel according to Laing. (Review of The philosophy and politics of psychotherapy by R.D. Laing). The Times Literary Supplement, 2 December, 1977.
- Guillemin, H. /The true history of Joan 'of Arc'./ (W. Ox-ferry, trans.). London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972.
- Happold, F.C. Mysticism. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970.
- Heywood, R. Attitudes to death in the light of dreams and other out-of-the-body experience. In A. Toynbee (Ed.), Man's concern with death. Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968. (a)
- Heywood, R. Death and psychical research. In A. Toynbee (Ed.), Man's concern with death. Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968. (b)
- Huxley, A. The perennial philosophy. London: Collins, 1958.

- Huxley, A. The doors of perception & Heaven and hell. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1959.
- Inge, W.R. Studies of English mystics. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969.
- Jaynes, J. The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976.
- Jung, C.G. Memories, dreams, reflections. Great Britain: Collins, 1977.
- Kennedy, P.F. The ecology of schizophrenia. In A. Forrest & J. Affleck (Eds.), New perspectives in schizophrenia. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 1975.
- Kesey, K. One flew over the cuckoo's nest. London: Pan Books Limited, 1973.
- Kinsbourne, M. Bicameral man and the narcissian conspiracy. (Review of The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind by J. Jaynes). Contemporary Psychology, 1977, 22 (11), pp. 801 - 802.
- Knowles, D. What is mysticism? London: Burns & Oates, 1967.
- Koestler, A. The ghost in the machine. London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1967.
- Koestler, A. Speculation on problems beyond our present understanding. In A. Hardy, R. Harvie & A. Koestler, The challenge of chance. London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1973.
- Kruger, T.M.D. Personal communication, August, 1977.
- Laing, R.D. The divided self. London: Tavistock Publications, 1960.
- Laing, R.D. The politics of experience & The bird of paradise. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967.
- Lightbody, C.W. The judgements of Joan. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961.
- Lister, R. William Blake. London: G.B. & Sons, 1968.

- Sackville-West, V. St Joan of Arc. London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1948.
- Sechehaye, M. Symbolic realisation. New York: International Universities Press, 1951.
- Sedgwick, P. Self, symptom and society. In R. Boyers (Ed.), Laing and anti-psychiatry. Harmondsworth: Penguin Education, 1972.
- Siegler, M., Osmond, H., & Mann, H. Laing's models of madness. In R. Boyers (Ed.), Laing and anti-psychiatry. Harmondsworth: Penguin Education, 1972.
- Shaw, G.B. St Joan. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957.
- Shor, R. Hypnosis and the concept of the generalised reality-orientation. In C.T. Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969.
- Shotter, J. Images of man in psychological research. London: Methuen, 1975.
- Smith, A. Powers of mind. London: W.H. Allen, 1976.
- Smith, S. Introduction. In F.W.H. Myers, Human personality and its survival of bodily death. (S. Smith, Ed.). New York: University Books, Inc., 1961.
- Smythies, J.R. The biochemical basis of schizophrenia. In A. Forrest & J. Affleck (Eds.), New perspectives in schizophrenia. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 1975.
- Storr, A. The integrity of the personality. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963.
- Sullivan, H.S. Schizophrenia as a human process. (Introduction and commentaries by H.S. Perry.). New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1962.
- Tart, C.T. Introduction. In C.T. Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969.
- Tart, C.T. (Ed.). Transpersonal Psychologies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.
- Thornton, E. The diary of a mystic. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967.

- Toffler, A. Future shock. London: Pan Books Ltd., 1971.
- Underhill, E. Mysticism. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1967.
- Vale, M.G.A. Charles VII. London: Eyre Methuen, 1974.
- Walker, K. Diagnosis of man. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962.
- Wilber, K. The spectrum of consciousness. The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1975, 7 (2), 105 - 132.
- Wing, J.K. Reasoning about madness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

#### ADDITIONAL BOOKS READ

- Boyers, R. (Ed.). Laing and anti-psychiatry. Harmondsworth: Penguin Education, 1972.
- David-Darnac, M. The true story of the Maid of Orleans. London: W.H. Allen, 1969.
- Evans, C. Cults of unreason. New York: Farrar, Straus & Gervaise, 1974.
- Knight, D.C. (Ed.). The ESP reader. U.S.A.: Castle Books, 1969.
- Laing, R.D. Self and others. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971.
- Laing, R.D., & Esterson, A. Sanity, madness and the family. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970.
- Lepp, I. Death and its mysteries. London: Burns and Oates Limited, 1969.
- McClelland, D.C. Visions of power. New York: Irvington Publishers, Inc., 1975.
- Pernoud, R. Joan of Arc. London: Evergreen Books Ltd., 1961.
- Sacks, O. Awakenings. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976.

Vonnegut, M.

The Eden Express. London: Jonathan  
Cape, 1976.

Wilson, C.

The occult. London: Hodder and Stoughton  
Ltd., 1971