Land expropriation without compensation: a study of constructions of the Parliamentary process in selected mainstream and “ground-up” media from 27 February – 12 August 2018.

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of

RHODES UNIVERSITY

By

LUZUKO JACOBS

ORCID ID

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1274-822X

June 2022
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables and Figures</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachments</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Acronyms</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part 1

### Chapter 1  Introduction of the study and its design
- Goals of the research
- Methodology
- **Epistemological assumptions**
- Methodology and nature of data
- **Reliability and Validity**
  - *Reliability*
  - *Validity*
- Sampling

### Chapter 2  Theoretical framework
- Introduction
- Liberalism, neoliberalism, capitalism and justice
- Epistemologies of the South and Marxism: carving an intellectual breakthrough
  - Rethinking colonisation and the land question
- Ideology and discourse- mediated communication about politics
- Framing and frame analysis
- Conclusion

### Chapter 3  An institutional perspective of the role of the press from colonialism to democracy: the contested and unstable fulcrum of liberal-capitalistic oppression in South Africa
- Introduction
Media as a political institution 58
The South African political communication arrangements: from colonialism to Apartheid 63
  The English Press 66
  Afrikaans Press 68
  The Black Press 72
The Alternative Press phase
The South African political communication arrangements: the democratic era 81
  Structure of the local media markets 88
  Role of the state 92
Conclusion 97

Part 2

Chapter 4 Methods of analysis 99
  Step one: Qualitative framing analysis 99
  Step two: Critical discourse analysis 103
Conclusion 106

Chapter 5 Qualitative framing analysis of the narrative structure of the discourse on land expropriation without compensation 107
  Moneyweb: Land expropriation without compensation frames 108
  Afriforum: Land expropriation without compensation frames 114
  City Press: Land expropriation without compensation frames 117
  AFASA: Land expropriation without compensation frames 120
Summary 122
Conclusion 124

Critical discourse analysis of the Land Expropriation without Compensation narratives 126

Chapter 6 Moneyweb discourse: ideological structure and strategies in discourse 127
  Schema: the discursive anchor for Moneyweb’s discoursal integration 128
Racism and its reproduction in discourse 131
  Dichotomisation through semantic merger 139
  Positioning through activity assignment 142
    The out-group 142
    The in-group 145
| Polarisation through values and norms | 152 |
| Summary | 156 |
| Afriforum discourse: ideological structure and strategies in discourse | 156 |
| Reproduction of racism | 158 |
| Globalization of local politics | 162 |
| Populism and anti-establishment positioning | 164 |
| Fear mongering | 168 |
| The paradox and moral entrepreneurship | 171 |
| Civic virtue: grounds for exclusion | 173 |
| Summary | 173 |

**Chapter 7**  
City Press: ideological structure and strategies in discourse  
| Political advocacy | 176 |
| Social conditions and political context | 178 |
| Reconciliation | 179 |
| Discoursal habitus | 180 |
| Social cohesion and inclusivity | 182 |
| Social justice and equality | 183 |
| Summary | 185 |

**AFASA**: Ideological structure and strategies in discourse  
| Recreating society | 186 |
| Back-to-the-land | 191 |
| Championing radicality | 192 |
| Summary | 193 |

**Chapter 8**  
Findings and discussion  
| Meanings of the land question: linking 1652 to 2018 | 199 |
| Convergences and polarities in ideologies and frames of LEwC | 201 |
| Reactionary framing in the constructions of the land question | 208 |
| Conservative framing in the constructions of the land question | 216 |
| Liberal-transformational framing in the constructions of the land question | 220 |
| Radical-prefigurative framing in the constructions of the land question | 224 |
Conclusion

Bibliography

List of Figures and tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.</td>
<td>Hallin’s Spheres of Consensus, controversy and deviance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.</td>
<td>Spectrum of frames in the discourses of Moneyweb, Afriforum, City Press and AFASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.</td>
<td>Moneyweb narrative frames, framing devices and codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.</td>
<td>Afriforum narrative frames, framing devices and codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.</td>
<td>City Press narrative frames, framing devices and codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.</td>
<td>AFASA narrative frames, framing devices and codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.</td>
<td>Representation of intertextual relations between constructed schema, on the right and their analogical interpretations on the left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.</td>
<td>Cross-tabulation of frame devices of LEwC in Moneyweb, City Press, Afriforum and AFASA platforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.</td>
<td>Distribution of Moneyweb, City Press, Afriforum and AFASA frame elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tables 8.</td>
<td>Criteria-based mapping of the frame devices between the four discourses reflecting dichotomies and overlaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure 1</td>
<td>Redacted Unrevised Hansard: National Assembly, 27 February 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexure 2  Correspondence from Acting Secretary to Parliament, B. Tyawa. Information in Relation to Media within Parliamentary Precinct. Dated 10 December 2019  297

Annexure 3  Confirmation letter from Executive Director: SA Press Council  300

Annexure 4  Refusal by SABC to share information about its “protected” contract with Moneyweb. Sylvia Tladi.  301

Appendix  Platforms, article titles and dates of publication  303

Personal Declaration  309

List of Acronyms

Agoa  Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
AFASA  African Farmers’ Association of South Africa
ANC  African National Congress
CDA  Critical Discourse Analysis
DA  Democratic Alliance
EFF  Economic Freedom Fighters
EU  European Union
GNU  Government of National Unity
IMF  International Monetary Fund
LEwC  Land expropriation without compensation
MW  Moneyweb
NP  National Party
RDP  Reconstruction and Development Programme
SANNC  South African Native National Congress
WFO  World Farmers’ Association
Abstract

This study investigates the constructions of land expropriation without compensation (LEwC) in the discourses of two mainstream media, Moneyweb and City Press, and two ground-up platforms, Afriforum and the African Farmers’ Association of South Africa (AFASA). It follows the February 2018 adoption by Parliament, of LEwC as a policy to reorder the country’s unequal and racially bifurcated economy. The motivations for, and opposition to the policy locate land as ‘the issue’ in conquest and capitalism. How land is signified therefore, is important to the understandings of ‘restitution’ and/or ‘resolution’. The news platforms selected here are diverse: Moneyweb focuses on investments. City Press concerns itself with politics. Afriforum and AFASA are alternative sphericules linked to ethnically-polarised quotidian concerns with land as a key focus. Discourses are central to how citizens see and construct themselves and one another as subjects. As such, media frames can be connected to justice and inter-‘race’ complexities. This is a study of media influences in cultivating certain meanings and understandings of tenuous and fractious political situations characterised by inequality and interracial enmity. The thesis draws from the Epistemologies of the South as well as Marxism to constitute the locus of its enunciation of colonisation, liberal capitalism, land question, justice, ideology, discourse, and framing. This framework is geared towards emic understanding of interrelated local and global contexts of the land question. Conceptual clarity is key to the development of an emancipatory imagination.

Qualitative framing analysis and critical discourse analysis are used in this study to examine a diachronic corpus of 124 articles from the four platforms covering 167-days, from the adoption of the LEwC motion through the initial round of public hearings. The findings suggest a strong influence of the structures of coloniality in discourses across a wide political spectrum. The frames and counter-frames in the four platforms are simultaneously divergent and similar. Some are reactionary and conservative, others are liberal-transformational and even radical-prefigurative. All however, orbit around abyssal, North-centric, liberal capitalist normativity as the centripetal centre. The study proposes rethinking of the land question, a radical exorcism from land discourses, of structures of coloniality of power, knowledge, and being. Their mobilisation, predominance and naturalisation in political communication is anti-transformation and helps keep Black South Africans to this day, under the heavy yoke of an oppressive colonial and Apartheid reality as perpetual economic slaves.
Acknowledgements

Words fail me. I cannot adequately describe the transformative and eventful the experience of going through the journey of this study. The credibility of scholarship must be measured against its applied value in society, the real-world intervention that it makes possible to advance humanity. I do hope that it speaks for itself in shedding important light on some of the solid, hidden nuts and bolts that hold oppression, suffering, and hate in place, in a society crying out for justice. I hope it inspires a universal commitment towards a better life for all.

Talita, my wife and friend is a blessing. Your sacrifices, your unending support and undying faith are deeply appreciated. I am grateful to my children, my Mishy, my Stamza (Thandokazi) who kept asking ‘when do you finish the thesis?’ Luthando, Mbal’entle and Zama, my people, and my second mom, Nombeko. There are many others….

Professor Lynette Steenveld, my indefatigable supervisor is simply an outstanding human being with a mind and energy like no other. Thank you for the cultivation and patience.

I dedicate this work to the memory of the two unforgettable path-finders

Nombulelo Debra Jacobs and Stanford Tanase Jacobs.

Rest in Peace
Chapter 1

Introduction of the study and its design

Dealing with complexity presupposes that we lift our gaze beyond the smoking gun in order to build better understanding, to look beyond into, at least, the middle distance if we can seek a full explanation. In particular, we need to understand the important and extremely sophisticated role played by otherwise invisible villains – like capital – in deeply shaping the prospects of the downtrodden. The reality is that there always is a constellation of forces at work, at any given moment, that may be hard to discern and, frankly, harder to address (Handley 2016: 81-82).

This study investigates the meaning(s) that different media platforms: *Moneyweb*, *City Press*, *Afriforum* and the African Farmers’ Association of South Africa (*AFASA*) sought to secure for the landmark policy of land expropriation without compensation (LEwC) in their discourses that they made available to national and global audiences. It also focuses on potential links between these meanings and the issues of justice and ‘race’ in the context of the South Africa’s complex history of colonialism and Apartheid. This study follows the adoption by Parliament in 2018, of LEwC as a policy to reorder the foundations of the country’s economic structure – the most unequal and racially bifurcated in the world.

The key question which this study raises is:

**RQ1** What frames, counter-frames, and articulatory practices of land expropriation without compensation are used in the discourse(s) in *Moneyweb*, *City Press* and the websites of *Afriforum* and *AFASA* and what implied meanings about LEwC did they offer their different audiences?

**RQ1.1** How do the frames in the discourse(s) relate to the broader issues of social justice and ‘race’ relations given the country’s history of colonisation and Apartheid?

This study proposes a rethink of the land question in South Africa. This reflective moment presupposes identification and radical exorcism from land discourses, of the regressive structures of coloniality. Coloniality refers to long standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond colonial administrations (Quijano 2000). Their
mobilisation and predominance in political communication is anti-transformation and helps keep Black South Africans under the heavy yoke of economic oppression as perpetual, albeit optimistic, economic slaves.

Economic slaves in the New world order, may have abundant political power, characterised by an illusion of control and the benefits of rhetorical and other sweeteners that the privileged political managers may deliver. This political privilege however, has no commensurate economic or material benefits to remedy the reality of dispossession, poverty and deprivation, over which the political managers preside. The dichotomies between political power and economic power in liberal capitalism, absurd as they may be, are inter-dependent and mutually sustaining in complex ways that this study engages.

Media constructions of critical and complex societal concerns such as LEwC are important in the knowledge ecosystem (see Thompson 1995: 17). They are at the centre of how people cognitively comprehend and relate to issues (Papacharissi and Oliviera 2008) and thus make sense of their pseudo environment¹ (Lippman 1922). Media discourses have also come to assume considerable significance in understanding asymmetrical power relations in societies and how these are sustained [and contested] through political communication (Fairclough 1989: 34). Discourses are potent social practices through which dominance can be exercised, injustice legitimated, and inequality fostered. The media in this context, are dialectically connected with transformations of economies and social circumstances. Such is the importance of media discourses as mechanisms through which knowledge is produced, circulated and consumed (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Hart 2002).

Society in today’s third age of political communication and globalisation (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999), has become increasingly exposed to a proliferation of ubiquitous communication platforms with almost unlimited celerity (Berger 1999: 113; Blumler and Kavanagh 1999: 213). New, unconventional producers, circulators and processors of important political communication on a world scale, include large and small social actors such as Afriforum and AFASA. Their reach to global audiences brings them various communication possibilities including how they construct issues and how they facilitate

¹Lippman uses this concept to refer to meditated truth structured by the media or by individuals through stories.
networks around partisan causes. As the globalisation-inspired transformation of political communication continues, for better or worse, quality news has never been in more demand than it is today\(^2\).

*Moneyweb, City Press, Afriforum* and *AFASA*, operate in this dynamic transnational public sphere as important catalysts in the formation of strong (national and global) alliances to respond to the LEwC policy with important implications for the economic status quo (Inglehart 1997; Archibugi, Held and Kohler 1998; Dasgupta and Kiely 2006; Papacharissi and Oliviera 2008). The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa – the connective tissue of the political settlement for a liberal capitalist democracy that was ratified in 1994, and the ruling African National Congress’ (ANC) relationship to it, is a topical issue. This relationship continues to be a matter of “intense scrutiny, internationally as much as domestically” (Southall 2014: 198). The LEwC issue integrates powerful subjects: the economic status quo, predicated on land as its foundation, and the Constitution, in the same debate.

Under globalisation, conventional meanings of sovereignty, democracy and citizenship are being questioned and rethought (Brants 1998; Buckingham 1987). Landerer (2013: 251), views this development as a consequence of (but equally a contributing factor to) increasing influence of economic factors and values on the political agenda. Allern and Blach-Ørsten (2011: 93) characterise it in the context of the media moving towards the centre of the social process. Mediatisation, a development of increasing media influence (Asp 2014: 80-1), has become a prime axis on which modern political communication process now revolves (Brants and Voltrer 2011; Kriesi, Lavenex, Esser, Matthes, Buhlmann and Bochsler 2013).

The ANC has consistently employed various iterations to acknowledge what it calls, the triple threat of poverty, hunger and inequality in South Africa. From as far back as its Mangaung national conference in 2012 and in every policy statement from 2013 through to 2017, the party has coined an array of radical-sounding concepts in its discourse about land. It continuously spoke of an urgent need for “economic freedom”, “decisive action for economic transformation”, “land expropriation” and “radical socio-economic transformation.” The party even started talking about the need to review “willing-buyer, willing-seller principle” to return the land to the people. The rhetoric culminated in 2017 with a conference resolution “that the expropriation of land without compensation should be among the mechanisms available to government to give effect to land reform and redistribution.”

Throughout the ANC’s time in government, inequality in South Africa has been getting worse (see Scott 2019). The Gini coefficient of the country reached 0.65 in 2014 based on expenditure data, and 0.69 based on income data. Inequality now is out of control (Oxfam 2020: 12). It takes just 23 hours for an average Chief Executive Officer to earn what the average worker earns in a year (Oxfam 2020). The 2020/21 annual-report disclosures record annual ‘earnings’ of over R300 million and R80 million, paid to individual CEOs in one year. Another CEO was paid more than R30 million to leave. At the same time, unemployment now exceeds 35%. Only 10 percent of South Africans own 90 percent of

3Former President of the ANC, Jacob Zuma (available at https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/2017-02-07-jacob-zuma-admits-triple-threat-is-hindering-sas-economic-growth/)
4https://www.anc1912.org.za/?s=Mangaung+Manifesto
5The ANC was founded on 8 January 1912 and the occasion of this anniversary is marked with the release by the National Executive Committee of a major statement for the forthcoming year. Such statements map out the main activities for the year ahead. This tradition has been maintained since the first democratic elections in 1994. The statement is known in ANC speak as the January 8 statement (see https://www.anc1912.org.za/)
7Closing address by ANC President, Cyril Ramaphosa at the 54th National Conference in December 2017. (See https://www.anc1912.org.za/54th-national-conference-closing-address-by-anc-president-cyril-ramaphosa/)
8http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10341
the country’s wealth, with only 10 percent of the wealth in the hands of the Black majority (Korhonen 2018; Oxfam 2020). Citing a Land Audit Report of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Minister Gugile Nkwinti told Parliament in 2018, that the White groups of South Africa owned 72% of the land, and Africans who constitute over 90 percent majority\(^1\), owned a mere 4% (Hansard\(^2\)). This is the continuation and deepening of the dispossession suffered by Black people under colonialism and Apartheid.

The disturbing dualism of White privilege and Black deprivation, resulting from this iniquitous distributive picture may be unconscionable, it however provides ideal circumstances for capitalism (see Cudd 2015). White opulence in South Africa exists precisely because of the economic hardships of the Black population and the abundance of cheap labour resulting from their suffering.

The Economic Freedom Fighters\(^3\) (EFF) is a product of this crisis-ridden South African monopoly, financialised and globalized capitalism and the related social, political and economic conditions. The alarming deterioration of the socio-economic situation has led to the unraveling of the ANC’s hegemony (Satgar 2019: 582) and opened up the political space for new populist politics around the neglected land issue. The EFF fits into a global pattern of populism in electoral politics (Mbete 2014: 55). The party adopted as one of the “cardinal pillars” in its constitution, expropriation of South Africa’s land without compensation for equal redistribution\(^4\). “Economic emancipation in our lifetime” is its rallying call in a direct clash with the ANC’s continuing pursuit of a trickle-down, neo-liberal economic path, national consensus-building and gradualist reform (Oxfam 2020; Bond and Zapiro 2004; Satgar 2019).

\(^1\) As of 2019 South Africa's population stood at approximately 58.4 million. Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1116076/total-population-of-south-africa-by-population-group/


\(^3\) Third-largest party in the South African Parliament formed in 2013 by former members of the ANC Youth League led by the expelled former president Julius Malema.

This is part of an important background against which the EFF leader, Julius Malema, moved a motion\textsuperscript{15} in Parliament in February 2018 calling for the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa\textsuperscript{16} to legalise expropriation of land without compensation. Part of Malema’s speech was an impassioned plea:

> We invite you, not to pick up spears and guns, we invite you to come to the table and realise that nothing means anything for our people except their dignity in land ownership. For a lasting peace, security and justice, land must be expropriated without compensation for equal redistribution. (Hansard 27/02/2018)

Some legal minds such as the former Deputy Chief Justice, Dikgang Moseneke, argue that contrary to much of the bluster that often surrounds the land issue, the Constitution does allow for expropriation (Pithouse 2015). He notes that neither the phrase ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ nor the logic behind it, appear in the Constitution. He laments that the often strident misrepresentation of the Constitution in this regard has two primary political functions (1) to deflect responsibility for the failure to achieve meaningful land reform after Apartheid, away from the ruling ANC and, (2) to do so in a manner that presented the constitutional order as an impermeable barrier to the realisation of popular aspirations which are both legitimate and urgent (Pithouse 2015).

The Democratic Alliance’s\textsuperscript{17} (DA) Thandeka Mbabama vehemently opposed Malema’s motion. Expropriation of land without compensation, she argued, “fundamentally undermines property ownership… This poses serious risks to investment in agriculture and South Africa if … implemented” (Hansard 27/02/2018). She quoted various experts including the Managing Director of the Banking Association of South Africa (Basa), Cassim Coovadia, who cautioned that expropriation without compensation “eroded property rights.”

The ANC\textsuperscript{18} supported the “principle” of expropriating land without compensation. Importantly, the party introduced several amendments relating to the “modalities” of the implementation of LEwC that reflected apprehension and conditionalities evident in its

\textsuperscript{15}See Annexure 1: Redacted Unrevised Hansard National Assembly, 27 February 2018
\textsuperscript{16}Section 25 is about property rights. Clause 2 states that property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application and specifies a range of conditions attached thereto.
\textsuperscript{17}The official opposition to the governing ANC in the Parliament of the RSA.
\textsuperscript{18}Various speakers including the Minister of Water and Sanitation, Mr. Gugile Nkwinti and the Deputy Chief Whip, Dorries Dlakude addressed Parliament during the debate.
conference resolution. These included that, expropriation should be “among” the mechanisms available to government to give effect to land reform and redistribution, that it must be implemented in a way that increased agricultural production, improved food security and that ensured that land was returned to those from whom it was taken.

Parliament resolved to adopt the amended motion following a vote in the National Assembly. A slew of articles and running public commentary had heralded the debate. This continued in the ensuing months when public hearings into the resolution were held. The country was in the throes of a gripping public discussion on various media platforms including internet sites. Intense and vociferous engagement for and against Parliament’s resolution are evident in the examples cited below.

On the eve of the debate, a major online publication ran an article with the following headline:

Banks adamant that they do not support land expropriation without compensation

(Business Live 26/02/2018)

The article raised concerns about property rights and investments and “the risk of losing benefits from initiatives such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) which was adopted by the US Congress to give free access for certain products to US market to exporters from Africa.

On the day the motion was adopted, 27 February 2018, Moneyweb, a multi-platform news channel, one of the top financial publications in SA, carried an article titled: Land expropriation debate ‘reckless and damaging’. On the same day, the Mail and Guardian, a national publication with large numbers of readers among them professionals, academics, diplomats, lobbyists and non-governmental groups19, carried an article titled: DA slams land expropriation without compensation proposal.

19 According to its website: a niche market publication, interested in a critical approach to politics, arts and current affairs. https://mg.co.za/
In *News24wire*\(^{20}\), news distributor to digital publishers, and via a syndication service for print, broadcast and corporate use, the Chief Executive Officer of a self-styled lobby group that focusses on the rights of *Afrikaners*, Afriforum\(^{21}\), Kallie Kriel, undertook “…to warn the international community about land expropriation.” Kriel further warned of “conflict in the country” and about a “threat to property rights in South Africa” (*News24*, 01/03/2018). On 3 March, *Moneyweb* reiterated the concern about the “risk for SA banks.” It further warned of “widespread bankruptcy and an ensuing economic crisis” resulting from expropriation of land. *News24*, South Africa’s leading online news source\(^{22}\) on 4 March, reported that the Minister of International Relations, Lindiwe Sisulu, urged the international community “…not to panic over South Africa’s Parliamentary processes with regards to the controversial land expropriation policy.”

Shortly following Sisulu’s reported plea, an unprecedented diplomatic spat broke out after Australian Minister for Home Affairs, Peter Dutton, “suggested White farmers [in South Africa] were being persecuted and should receive fast-tracked humanitarian visas from a ‘civilised country’” (*The Guardian* AU 15 March 2018). *The Guardian* is the Australian online presence of the global online publication *The Guardian*\(^{23}\). Subsequently, Richard Tren, a Washington-based correspondent for *BusinessLive*, a multi-site news publisher that focuses on finance and business news, analysis and financial markets, in a speculative piece, wrote:

> Parliament’s recent vote on land expropriation would likely disqualify SA from Agoa [African Growth and Opportunity Act]… While South Africa risks losing a trading partner, there is growing outrage in the US about racial targeting of Whites. Tucker Carlson of Fox news, an influential conservative media pundit, questioned why US taxpayers should send aid to SA if the ANC is determined to undermine property rights. Trump has vowed to cut overseas development aid and is known to be an avid Fox News watcher. (*BusinessLive* 23 March 2013)

The sampled media above are prestigious, influential, and powerful multi-platform agencies with rated internet presence. Dissemination to large audiences enhances the constitutive

\(^{20}\)https://news24wire.com/
\(^{21}\)www.Afriforum.co.za
\(^{23}\)https://www.theguardian.com/au
effect of discourse – its power to shape widely shared constructions of reality (Mautner 2008: 32). The potential of reaching international audiences including multilateral organisations, big international capital networks, and international lobby groups opens up various and important possibilities for issue-construction, including how they are defined and framed. We live in a neo-Westphalian world in which the state shares the field of international relations with powerful non-state actors who are interested in the local natural resources in less-powerful states (De Sousa Santos 2014: 44). Cross-cutting concerns in the articles was that LEwC represents an assault on private property rights and that it was an investment repellant, both sacred concepts in liberal societies globally.

At the time the motion was adopted by Parliament, the Constitution had been amended seventeen times24. None of the previous amendments triggered similar widespread responses. The land question is an emotive, critical, and complex issue in South Africa with dynamic connections to powerful global capitalist networks. Private land and wealth ownership are an important motive force for liberal capitalism and its media.

Many reasons have been posited for the seemingly unbreakable racialised inequalities in the ownership of land in the country. Chief among these are first, constitutional guarantees for the protection of private property and the sanctification of ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ approaches (Ntsebeza and Hall 2007; Moyo 2007). In many cases, although there were many willing buyers, there were a few willing sellers (Andrews 2007). Second, is a claim about a lack of political will or incapacity on the part of the governing ANC (Akinola 2016). Third, internal politics within the ANC and the dominance of a neo-liberal faction are listed as potential reasons (Turok 2008; Marais 1998; Ntsebeza and Hall 2007). Manji (2001) highlights global economic pressures as an incentive for governments not to implement land reform in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The analyses of the post-Apartheid problems of land reform have a common feature: they focus on policy – what Hendricks, Ntsebeza and Helliker (2013: 2) refer to as a “state-centric thrust.” Much scholarship has adopted this focus which takes various forms: the legal, institutional and constitutional frameworks in sub-Saharan Africa (Walker 2008, Moyo 2007); various land reforms and the law generally, including restrictions on the pace of land

reform owing to the willing-buyer, willing-seller principle, as well as the models for the success of the land reform programme in SA (Aliber and Cousins 2013, Fraser 2008, Binswanger-Mkhize 2014, and Commey 2015); investigation of the attitude of the previous owners to facilitate successful land reform programmes (Makombe 2018); and also exploring the subject from the beneficiaries’ perspective, including the skill of the implementers, planning, and post-allocation support (Logan, Tengbeh and Petja 2012; Cousins 2013).

While the state is indeed the central locus of power and a significant driver of land reform through the relevant policies and programmes, the ‘fixation’ with a state-centric thrust could limit analysing the land question as a political project and a terrain for contestation and class struggle (Hendricks et al 2013). To cure this fixation, Hendricks et al, advocate a scholarly focus on social movements, as states are animated by “significant forms of pressure” (2013: 2). Pu and Scanlan (2012) have looked at how social movements constituted themselves in China around “politics of demand” (Hendricks et al 2013: 2) to stop expropriation of land by government. Related studies explore the role of civil society in the land battle (Akinola 2016).

What is missing is a consideration of the media as a political institution (Cook 1998) that constructs the public discourses that contribute to the ways in which the state, social movements, organisations, and communities’ potentially understand and respond to the ‘land question.’ This is the focus of my thesis. I engage the concepts of coloniality of power, knowledge and being as important definers of culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production beyond colonialism (Mignolo 2003; Maldonado-Torres 2007). I apply them here to make sense of the media’s practices in constructing their discourses and how ideology features in their processes (Hall 2011: 82), and ‘shapes’ their various frames.

Coloniality of power refers to the relationship of domination and exploitation between colonial masters and their subjects, and the structures created to sustain this relationship once colonization had formally ‘ended’. Coloniality of knowledge refers to the ‘colonisation’, and sometimes destruction of indigenous knowledge so that western knowledges continue as the singular, sovereign knowledge system in post-colonies. Coloniality of being refers to the ways in which colonial power and knowledge continue to shape the lived experiences and sense of being/identity of the formerly colonised (Mignolo 2003; Maldonado-Torres 2007).
Together, the terms thread the worldview that this study adopts in relation to LEwC discourse.

The growing urgency expressed in the Parliamentary resolution to change the Constitution to enable LEwC, and the increased legitimacy being given to such demands from many quarters, including the state, suggest that “… something is afoot that needs to be watched and analysed” (Hendricks et al 2013: 2) in relation to the “intractable external political and economic climate in trying to unravel the knots in understanding the limitations and achievements of land reform” (Walker 2008: 68). This study contributes to the understanding of the role and the interconnected power of some of Handley’s (2016: 81-82) invisible villains like capital and political communication, in shaping the prospects for the poor in the context of globalization.

**Goals of the research**

The central concern of this study is understanding the link between contemporary discourse on LEwC and colonial, Apartheid and the current political system in South Africa. This concern includes the ways in which discourses may contribute to shaping the economy and inhibit or advance social change. The research question and the related sub-question give it shape and direction within this broad commitment (Agee 2009). The questions are the main guide for important theoretical and methodological decisions throughout (Krippendorff 1980, Tuchman 1978). They are formulated with an interest in the analysis of news content. These questions have the potential to carve a novel analytic path to illuminate deeply intricate modalities of framing and ideology in media discourses and their relation to inequality and intersubjective relations.

**Methodology**

This study is about meanings and mediated social interaction – both artefacts of the social world (Lune and Berg 2017). Meanings, Blumler (1969:5) argues, are social products formed through people’s interactions, allowing them to produce various realities that constitute the sensory world (‘real world’). Reality is an interpretation of various definitional options (Lune and Berg 2017: 17; Neuman 1997). Whether or not the interpretations are correct is immaterial. If people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences (Thomas
and Swaine 1928: 572). Blumler (1969: 2) summarises this position in three premises. First, human beings act towards things based on the meanings that things have for them. Second, the meaning of such things is derived from social interactions. Third, meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things s/he encounters.

Interactionism centralises language in the development of shared meanings and communication (Neuman 1997) in the creation of social order, highlighting its dynamism and social significance (see Schwandt 1998: 221). This study probes the relationship between language (the discourses of Moneyweb, Afriforum, City Press and AFASA) and “world-making” (the meaning or meanings of LEwC) (Schutz 1962: 59). It follows the assumption that context is the framework of interaction, which is produced in, and through, interaction at the same time (Heritage 1985; Sacks 1992). Actors in particular spaces, at particular times, fashion meaning out of events and phenomena through complex processes of social interaction involving history, language, and action (Schwandt 1998: 221-2).

This study follows “a tight research design” (Miles and Huberman 1994: 16). It is not about a search for ‘the truth’. I have no desire to infer causal relationships between phenomena. For these reasons, this study is rooted in a qualitative approach to research.

Epistemological assumptions

Discourses (language, text), this study’s ontology, are immeasurably dynamic and respond to the fluctuations of human interaction, perception, and creation of meaning. To study them presupposes the inside out approach (Neuman 1997) to social science that qualitative research espouses. The foundational beliefs and guidelines on which qualitative research proceeds render it especially suitable for this purpose. Qualitative research is however, not a unified theoretical and methodological concept. It is a broad field of enquiry characterised by a complex and interconnected family of terms and assumptions (Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 102; Nelson, Triechler and Grossberg 1992: 4; Flick 2002: 7). The broad strokes of the methodological and epistemological commitments below highlight a selection of ‘family resemblances’ (Wittgenstein 1978; Zitzen 1999) from broad general approaches to qualitative research from which this study draws.
Methodology and nature of the data

Qualitative research accesses unquantifiable knowledge and elusive data (Lune and Berg 2017). It tends towards “why” and “how” questions that help us to understand our lives (Lune and Berg 2017: 12), the world, society, and its institutions (Tracy 2013: 5) in a holistic manner (Willis 2007: 211). Its methods are especially suited for this study as a project that embraces knowledge-as intervention-in-reality (De Sousa Santos 2014: 201). Qualitative research provides insights into cultural activities, the tacit, taken-for-granted intuitive understandings that might otherwise be missed in structured surveys or performed solutions (Willis 2007; Tracy 2013). Qualitative research can shed light on an issue and/or open a path for possible social transformation (Tracy 2013: 4). Willis (2007: 189) goes as far as highlighting its essential ideology: “emancipation for the disenfranchised.” Continued domination of certain ways of being and knowledge over time, is a good example of disenfranchisement. From the ‘normalcy’ created through the legitimation of domination in discourse, powerful ideologies, and assumptions about the ‘truth’ and large discourses of power are created (Eisenberg 2007).

Proponents of qualitative research such as Chambliss and Schutt (2010) and Tracy (2013) speak of emic understandings of the ‘scene’. This is about understanding the world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it (Schwandt 1998: 221), in a context-specific manner (Tracy 2013). Stokes (1997) uses the concept “use-inspired” research to argue for the suitability of contextual research for socially embedded purposes. All ‘meaningful reality’ is contingent upon human practices being constructed in and out of, the interactions between human beings and their world, developed and transmitted within a social context (Crotty 1998: 42). Directly linked to context, Geertz (1973) argues, is the idea of ‘thick description’ according to which a researcher immerses him/herself in a culture and investigates the circumstances present in that scene. This description provides an important framework, vocabulary, and an analytic focus in terms of which I constructed the context for analysis in this study (Krippendorff 2013: 33).

In interpretive approaches, reality (social action and human activity) presents itself to a scientist as a text (Flick 2002; 2006; Miles and Huberman 1994), a collection of symbols expressing layers of meanings (Lune and Berg 2017). The study of context involves an examination of people’s actions (texts and interactions) and the structures (societal norms and
(myths) that encourage, shape, and constrain such action (Tracy 2013: 22). The specificity and structure of the research subject is contained in these texts as the empirical material for interpretive procedures: break down of its structure, rules for its functioning, the meaning underlying it, the parts that characterise it (Nelson et al 1992: 4; Flick 2002), and the inferences made (Flick 2002: 174).

Qualitative research views research as a non-linear, recursive (iterative) process in which data collection, analysis, and interpretation occur throughout the study and influence one another (Willis 2007: 201-2). There is mutual interdependence between the single parts of the research process (Flick 2002: 40). It comprises a specific understanding of the relation between issue and method (Becker 1996; Willis 2007). The focus is on attending carefully to the details, complexity, and situated meanings of the everyday lifeworld. Qualitative researchers take the position that “provisional guidelines” or “rules of the thumb” (Hirsh 1967: 202 - 3) are more appropriate than specific technical requirements because each research situation is unique (Willis 2007: 198). They design methods to do justice to the complexity of the object under study (Flick 2002: 5). This does not however mean that everything goes. Decisions should be informed by the available guidelines, rather than made in ignorance of them (Willis 2007).

Some forms, methods, and ways of knowing go well beyond the scientific method (Eisner 1998). The commitment is to matters of knowing and being, rather than to a particular research paradigm (Schwandt 1998; Willis 2007: 192). “In qualitative research [for instance], the researcher is the instrument” (Patton 2002: 14). Observations are registered through his/her mind and body (Tracy 2013: 25). Willis’ (2007: 230) “reflection principle”, that is, problem framing, implementation, and improvisation, is relevant here25. It represents an effort to reduce the reliance on pure data and to increase the use of reason (Schon 1987; Willis 2007). Denzin and Lincoln (2005: 4) describe this work as “bricolage: … pieced-together set of representations that is fitted to the specifics of a complex situation”. The researcher is a bricoleur (Nelson et al 1992), a kind of professional do-it-yourself person

---

25I draw from a very rich experience as a Black South African who grew up under Apartheid, in various social circumstances and well-versed with the country’s history, as a former media professional who covered the transition to democracy in 1994, a former senior government official in the Executive and legislative arms of state, and an academic, as the basis for intellectual input to this study.

No single methodology is privileged over any other in qualitative research (Kelle and Erzberger 2013: 172-3), nor is there a distinct set of methods that are entirely its own (Schwandt 1998: 5). Researchers might even find it useful to generate their own numerical data (Bogdan and Biklen 1992: 147; Willis 2007: 196). The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research, some argue, is a mistaken dichotomy (Krippendorff 2013: 88). The two are not incompatible opposites that should not be combined (Flick 2002: 40). Qualitative researchers use both to build different complementary pictures of the things that they observe (Lune and Berg 2017: 12), enjoying the rewards of both numbers and words (Glesne and Peshkin 1992: 8). Qualitative researchers use content analysis, discourse analysis, semiotics, and even statistics (Schwandt 1998: 5).

Qualitative research concerns itself with partial relationships between social variables and sets these relationships in a context (Lune and Berg 2017). Research seeks to understand in depth the relationship of human beings to their environment and the part those people play in creating the social fabric of which they are part (Flick 2002; McQueen 2002). Instead of a generalisable truth, the aim is to engage in research that probes for deeper understanding, rather than examining surface features (Johnson 1997: 4; Willis 2007: 189).

Researchers always need to test and demonstrate that their studies are credible (Golofshani 2003: 600), valid, and reliable. The nature of qualitative research exposes it to cynicism. Validity and reliability are therefore vital in qualitative work and require meticulous attention (Brink 1993: 35). These are two factors, Patton (2002) advises, that any researcher should be concerned about while designing, analysing results, and judging the quality of the study.

Reliability and Validity

A major threat is error at three important research moments: the researcher, context and data collection and analysis. With the researcher, the threat relates to failure to declare the underlying values and assumptions regarding the research situations (from interest in the
study, purpose, data gathering and data processing) (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Brink 1993). Related to this threat is the failure to build an intimate understanding of the research subject (Leininger 1991: 11). Secondly, Brink (1993) raises the need for awareness of the critical influence of the cultural, socio-political, and economic context. The nature of the setting in which the data was collected is embedded in the ‘thick description’ (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Chambliss and Schutt 2010). From the description that conveys a sense of what social reality is like from the standpoint of the natural actors in that setting (Chambliss and Schutt 2010: 276), the reader is enabled to audit the study and follow the progression of events and understand their logic (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Data collection and analysis is the third moment. The risk here includes a vague account of the design, sampling bias, inaccurate or insufficient data, and poor data selection procedures (Brink 1993). Failure to make explicit and provide a detailed account (Lincoln and Guba 1985) of how these concerns are addressed throughout the study undermines its auditability and systematic evaluation (Brink 1993).

The quality of a study in either the qualitative or quantitative paradigm should be judged on its own terms (Healy and Perry 2000). The concepts validity and reliability are based on the assumption that a researcher is looking for universals – for laws – and wants to conduct research that is generalisable and replicable (Campbell and Stanley 1963: 5; Willis 2007: 218). Qualitative research eschews such positivism in its view that our reality is both socially situated and constructed. Validity and reliability in this context refer to research that is credible as determined by the ability and effort of the researcher (Golofshani 2003: 600) as the instrument of research. I expand on this assertion below in respect of each of the concepts. Their convenient separation is for clarity more than conceptually informed.

---

26 I am disturbed by the rigid economic oppression, deepening inequality and related human suffering that I grew up under and to which I am exposed to daily in South Africa. I feel a sense of obligation to contribute to the reinvigoration of re-imagining society that many had hoped for pre-1994. (See Personal Declaration for full disclosure)

The experience of the cruel crime of racism-inspired land dispossession visited upon all Black people in colonialism and Apartheid while the rest of the world looked on, as captured in the writings of Sol Plaatje (1921; 1930) and many Black intellectuals, the dehumanizing intersubjective relations predicated on master/slave mentality between Black and White to this day, the enduring physical, psychological and emotional torture of economic deprivation in the liberated New South Africa, are reasons enough for common outrage against inequality and political betrayal. (See Personal Declaration for full disclosure).
Reliability

The distinct purpose of qualitative research has critical consequences. When judging (testing) qualitative research, Strauss and Corbin (1990: 250) suggest that the usual canons of ‘good science’ require redefinition in order to fit the realities of qualitative research. Good qualitative research can help us understand a situation that would otherwise be enigmatic or confusing (Eisner 1998: 58). For Golofshani (2003: 601) and Stenbacka (2001: 551), where the purpose is to explain or to generate understanding, the most important means for testing or evaluation of any study is its quality.

Some qualitative scholars, such as Stenbacka (2001), Clont (1992), Seale (1999), Lincoln and Guba (1985), contend that the concept of reliability is irrelevant and even misleading in qualitative research. They emphasise dependability as the close equivalent of the notion of reliability alongside related concepts such as credibility, neutrality, confirmability, consistency, and applicability or transferability. For Hoepfl (1997), ‘inquiry audit’ is one measure which might enhance dependability when used to measure both the process and the product of the research for consistency. Trustworthiness, (Seale 1999: 266) lies at the heart of issues conventionally discussed as reliability.

Validity

Validity is not treated as a single, fixed, or universal concept. Winter (2000: 1) even views validity as a contingent construct inescapably grounded in the process and intentions of particular research methodologies. In Kirk and Miller’s summary, validity is a question of whether the researcher sees what s/he thinks s/he sees (1986: 21). Validity turns into a question of how far the researcher’s constructions are grounded in the constructions of the subjects of study and the empirical material (Schutz 1962; Flick 2002), whether the methods have been appropriately selected and applied (Flick 2002: 5), and how far this grounding is transparent to others (Willis 2007: 222). Validity can thus be described as the best account of the ‘truth’ (Botes 2003: 176).
The production of data is one starting point for judging their validity (Gerhardt 1986), and the presentation of the inferences drawn from them becomes another (Willis 2007). Mishler’s (1990) concept of validity starts from the process of validating as the social construction of knowledge by which we evaluate the trustworthiness of observations and interpretations.

Qualitative researchers like Davies and Dodd (2002), Lincoln and Guba (1985), Mishler (1990), and Stenbacka (2001), have developed their own concepts of validity as potential ‘measures’ for qualitative research. These include quality, rigour, and trustworthiness (Ando, Cousins, Young 2014). Davies and Dodd (2002: 281), and Hammand and Wellington (2013: 152) even link the application of rigour to subjectivity, reflexive negotiation of meaning, or social interaction as a way to divest the concept of its inherent positivistic undertones. Reformulating validation as a social discourse through which trustworthiness is established elides such familiar shibboleths as reliability, falsifiability, and objectivity (Mishler 1990: 420). The very nature of qualitative research methods does not lend itself to statistical or empirical calculations of validity (Brink 1993: 35).

Reliability and validity are not viewed separately in qualitative research. Redefined methods and terminology that encompass both are used as strategies for establishing confidence in the “defensibility” (Johnson 1997: 282) or “warranted assertions” (Hammand and Wellington 2013: 152) in the findings of qualitative research.

**Sampling**

Sampling decisions in a study like this substantially determine empirical data as a corpus of texts, what is extracted from the texts, and how it is used (Flick 2002; 2006). Sampling decisions emerged during data collection (case selection), during interpretation (selection of material and selection within material), and during presentation of results (presentation of material) (Merkens 2004; Flick 2006). A decisive factor in selecting was the richness of text regarding the relevant information (Flick 2006: 131). Principles of efficiency and reliability were paramount in this process.

I deal first with the selection of the population universe of discourse (Bell 1991: 10), or the universe of possible texts (Titscher Meyer, Wodak; Vetter 2000: 33) that correlate with the research questions and that lead to their answers (Mautner 2008: 35). First, was the choice of
the mediums from which I sampled. I selected them because they were appropriate to answer
the research questions (Flick 2002). Because the mediums selected influence the meanings
and understandings developed by the research (Willis 2007: 203), four diverse mediums were
selected: Moneyweb, City Press and websites of two prominent interest groups, Afriforum and
AFASA, as the population universe of the discourses of this study (Bell 1991: 10).

Moneyweb and City Press fall under the rubric of mainstream journalistic, quality press, as
defined by Gittins (1995). Afriforum and AFASA platforms are operated by prominent interest
groups and fit the categorisations of the ‘ground-up’ interest groups’ unmediated discourses
(Boyd and Ellisons 2007) as alternative public spheres (Ornerbring and Jonsson 2004: 285).

Moneyweb is a giant online portal that produces “independent, high-quality business, finance
and investment news and information” targeted at a “high-net-worth audience of business
decision makers and investors”\(^{27}\) world-wide. It is regarded as one of the top four business
publications in the country based on readership\(^ {28}\). This rating however, does not take into
account Moneyweb’s unique business model that none of its competitors in the top four
category, Businesstech, Business Insider, and BusinessLive could boast of. Moneyweb
publishes its content on various print, digital platforms including flagship radio programmes
of the national broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) on Radio
Sonder Grense (Radio without borders) and SAfm channels\(^ {29}\). Moneyweb claims to be the
“official supplier” of business news to the SABC. Its tentacles even reach established print
media. The Citizen, “one of the most trusted news brands in South Africa”\(^ {30}\), “republishes”
Moneyweb’s content\(^ {31}\). The platform’s internet brand generates between 1.5 million to 2
million unique visitors\(^ {32}\) a month and more than 7 million page views. Moneyweb is owned

\(^{27}\) https://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-company-pages/about-moneyweb/
\(^{29}\) SA’s only national news and talk radio station. “Leading the nation's conversation”
(http://www.safm.co.za/sabc/home/safm/aboutus)
\(^{30}\) https://www.citizen.co.za/about-us/
\(^{31}\) https://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-company-pages/about-moneyweb/
\(^{32}\) This metric is different from the number of visits. A unique visitor refers to a person who
visits the site at least once and is counted only once in the applicable time period. Moneyweb
claims in its site that unique visitors have an exceptional average visit duration of 5:45 which
suggests intense engagement on the part of the users with the information on the site.
by African Media Entertainment (AME) with over 85 percent White members of the executive management team.\(^{33}\)

*City Press* was founded by White capital at the height of Apartheid in 1982, to target an urban, working-class Black audience (see Cooper, Anafi, Sun, Naidoo, Reddy and Buchanan 2008: 109). It is owned by *Media24*, by far the biggest news platform in the country with an estimated monthly readership of just under 13 million nationally, twice the size of the second placed *TimesLive* which has 5.5 million readers.\(^{34}\) *Media24* is the media arm of *Naspers*, a global internet giant and one of the largest technology investors in the world with interests in online retail, publishing and investments.\(^ {35}\) *Naspers’* principal shareholder is a Dutch-listed investment subsidiary *Prosus*.\(^ {36}\) As an “agenda setting” and “independent” national publication, *City Press* specialises in politics and “justice” and is followed closely by decision-makers (see Cooper et al 2008: 109; Sesanti 2011: 237; Wasserman 2010; Moodie 2012).

As member publications of the Press Council's Code of Ethics and Conduct for South African Print and Online Media,\(^ {38}\) both *Moneyweb* and *City Press* “exist to serve society. Their [Press] freedom provides for independent scrutiny of the forces that shape society and are essential to realising the promise of democracy”\(^ {39}\). Research confirms that such media have the ability to set the agenda of others as a result of their standard routines and journalistic norms (Dearing and Rogers 1996; McCombs 2004; Moon 2008; Reese and Danielian 1989).

*Afriforum* and *AFASA* platforms are critical carriers of quotidian politics (McClure 1992: 123) with a significant albeit fundamentally polarised interest in the LEwC policy. *Afriforum* with just under 300 000 signed-up members, characterises itself as a civil rights organisation focusing on the *Afrikaner* community. It was created to call up *Afrikaners* to participate in

\(^{33}\) Ame.co.za

\(^{34}\) https://mybroadband.co.za/news/internet/432674-south-africas-top-20-online-publications.html

\(^{35}\) https://www.naspers.com/about

\(^{36}\) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naspers

\(^{37}\) Citypress.news24.com

\(^{38}\) Membership during the period of investigation was confirmed by Latiefa Mobara, Executive Director: Press Council (email dated 2020/05/18) Annexure 3

public debate and actions outside of the sphere of party politics. The human rights organisation was led by a White “management” of 80 percent White males and mimics a business structure headed up by a “Chief Executive Officer.” Part of its stated value proposition is creating a future with a “fight and build plan.” The plan involves *Afriforum* fighting for justice and against deterioration, while simultaneously building alternative realities on ground level, which makes it possible “for us as a community to look after our own [Afrikaner] interests with an increasing degree of independence and self-management”.

*AFASA* is a “democratic, consultative structure” with a membership of 3000 developing “African farmers” that seek to influence government policy through lobbying and advocacy in favour of Black farmers to improve their participation in the agricultural sector.

Membership, according to its website, is open to anyone who is interested or is already in farming.

The diverse foci and journalistic identities (Blumler 1969) of the platforms, their overlapping claims notwithstanding, for example, both *City Press* and *Afriforum* include justice as part of their *raison d’être*, *City Press* and *Moneyweb* both “scrutinize the forces that shape society”, suggest important social, political and ideological diversity. In the context of this assumed diversity, my interest is in whether and/or how this potentially influenced the meanings that each may have sought to secure for LEwC, their applications of justice and their constructions of inter-“racial” relations.

I used a nuanced approach that draws from different, but linked traditions to examine the deployment of ideology and how this deployment influenced frames in the narratives. I looked for illuminating choices of relevant and meaning-rich formations and their ‘manifestation’ in the narratives. I examined the narratives in relation to their articulation and dis-articulation of LEwC (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) that contribute to the transformation and modification of its identity and meaning. All interpretations in this regard are circumscribed in the specificity of their situatedness in the theoretical framework of this study and its understanding of the relevant historic influences. This broad approach enabled nuanced

---

42 https://AFASA.org.za/about/ (May 2020)
understanding(s) of the exercise of domination, resistance and inequality developed by this research (Willis 2007: 203) and enables fresh theoretical insights into how discourse works through time and space, from colonialism, to Apartheid to the present coloniality, as a solid, unbroken, yet adaptable, thread in the service of power.

The data collection period (Flick 2002) is from 27 February to 6 August 2018. This 167-day timeframe (five-month period) covers the adoption by Parliament of the resolution to expropriate land without compensation and a countrywide wave of public hearings that followed. The period was extended by a few days to include the publication, following the last (Mon)day of the hearings in that week, of the edition of the weekly (Sunday) City Press of 12 August. In this life cycle, the discourses on LEwC solidified with distinguishable and regular patterns and typical forms of action and meaning (Lune and Berg 2017: 222).

Meanings about LEwC crystalised, and frames, counter-frames, and articulatory practices on LEwC became clearer.

The third sampling decision concerned the selection of appropriate content. My design used “the strategy of complete collection” (Gerhardt 1986: 67). This a priori definition of the sample structure limits sampling in advance by certain criteria (Flick 2002: 63). At one level, my sample focused on different journalistic genres such as news reports and other authored forms of journalism. To avoid “methodological over-complexity” (Fowler 1991: 8) and to enable a fuller analytic treatment of one level within the time and space limits of this study, I focused only on written texts as the most important semiotic form that seeks to influence the political environment in news articles (Fairclough 2014; Hall 2011; KhosraviNik 2010). All other communicative practices such as graphics, typographics, photography, cartoons, captions etc. were excluded.

The delimitation of the articles during the period was not done mechanically and randomly. I designed a system with appropriate checks and balances (Mautner 2008: 37) by way of a syntactically defined key word search tool that relied on English typographical conventions as defined by Krippendorff (2013). This tool consists of the words ‘land expropriation’ and ‘compensation’. Articles that only included ‘land expropriation’ without the word ‘compensation’, and others that had the word ‘compensation’ in them, without ‘land expropriation’ were excluded from the sample. Articles that used both terms, irrespective of the nature of the preposition that linked them and/or whether they appeared close together or
far apart in the article were included. Such articles were deemed relevant to the research question. They were assumed to be dealing with issues of land expropriation in the context of (non)compensation and vice versa. At this level of sampling, synonyms, and taxonomic characters (Krippendorff 2013) such as property (for land) or payment (for compensation), and comprehensive units such as themas (Murray 1943), themes (Holsti 1969), combination of categories (Aron 1950), motifs (Thompson 1932) and imagery (Krippendorff 2013), were not considered.

The result was a specialised, topic-oriented and diachronic corpus (Baker 2006: 26-29) of 124 ‘articles’ (N=124) that are used here as discourse units (Husselbee and Elliot 2002), with three broad content measures (Hester and Dougall 2007): ‘objective’ news reports (Cameron 1996), editorialising43 (Barbera, Vacarri and Valeriani 2017: 26) and punditry (Martin 1992), including readers’ contributions. I was especially cognisant of the complexity of interdiscursivity (Fairclough 2003; Wodak 2008) in generating such neat classification schemes. *Moneyweb* carried 48 of these articles (‘hard news’, n=45; and ‘analyses’, n=3). *City Press* published 44 articles (‘hard news’, n=34; editorialising/analysis, n=5; features, n=2; and letters, n=3), *Afriforum* had 25 and *AFASA* published 11 articles. I eliminated the readers’ letters from the sample in favour of (i) news stories for their role in the creation and reinforcement of cultural norms (Stitt and Perron 2020), and (ii) punditry/editorialising for its role in reflecting the partisanship of a news medium (McNair 2011). Both address themselves to the questions of this study.

The next two chapters constitutes part one of the study and construct the conceptual world (context) in which the texts of the four platforms ‘speak to’ to the research questions (Willis 2007; Krippendorff 2013). Together, they constitute its thick description (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Chambliss and Schutt 2010; Geertz 1973) in which the narratives are understood and interpreted. Chapter two elaborates a theoretical framework and introduces a range of concepts that pervade this study. Key political traditions, liberalism, Epistemologies of the South and Marxism and their key postulates in relation to colonialism, justice and the role of political communication in society are introduced to explain and critique the South African

---

43 These are commentary-intensive ‘news’ articles with explicit expressions of opinion by journalists.
socio-economic condition of inequality and to foreshadow this study’s standpoint on the land question.

Chapter three presents a literature review that looks at the specificities of the politics-media nexus in the country. The discussion is located in the context of the various capitalist transitions from colonialism to Apartheid and to the present democratic dispensation. The press is foregrounded as an important struggle terrain in a complex web of a broader social power structure. The discussion links the media with a continuum of struggles from domination and hegemony to resistance inspired by a subaltern, insurgent cosmopolitan reasoning⁴⁴ (Santos 2014: 133-135).

Chapter four introduces part two of the study and provides a descriptive account of the methods of analysis of the narratives of the four platforms. The analytic strategy involves triangulation of two interpretive methods – qualitative framing analysis and critical discourse analysis. The discussion also fits these methods to the theoretical framework and links them to the ontology of this study. The two methods are geared towards textual analysis with due sensitivity to the discourse units (news articles), the units of analysis (paragraphs, sentences, words, or phrases) and the relevant explanatory variables in the texts that include their descriptive significance(s) (Decuir-Gunby, Marshall, McCulloch 2011: 145; Bernard and Ryan 2010; Krippendorff 2013: 189).

Chapter five presents a comprehensive sociological summary of the narratives couched in everyday terms as the first analytical step. It applies text-based techniques to reveal and describe frames without quantification. A continuum of radically different and similar frames emerges.

Chapters six and seven present the critical discourse analysis of the narratives. This constructivist analysis leverages context in the identification and comprehensive explanation of the frames in the texts, their ideological functions and how they accomplish these functions. The separation of the analysis into two chapters: Moneyweb and Afriforum – chapter six, and City Press and AFASA – chapter seven, is influenced by the coincidences and

---

⁴⁴ Santos uses the term to refer to global resistance against abyssal (North-centric) thinking. It reflects an aspiration of oppressed groups to organise their resistance and consolidate political coalitions on the same scale as the one used by the colonisers.
polarisation of their framing that suggests ideological fault lines linked to the country’s social structure that colonialism instantiated and which Apartheid solidified.

The findings in the last chapter present and discuss the frames and ideologies with which the narratives constructed the LEwC policy and link them to issues of justice and ‘race’ in the context of the entire study, its politics, assumptions, and conceptual framework. The frames crystalise in a wide continuum: reactionary, conservative, liberal-transformational and prefigurative that are radically different and somehow ‘unified’ within the orbit radius of liberal capitalist normativity in complex ways.

This study presents a complex symbiosis and discord between hate and reconciliation, oppression and resistance and media discourses. It suggests that discourses can be the lifeblood and a fertile habitat for various social afflictions and struggles through time and space. The four narratives that it analyses are part of a complex edifice that reproduces inequality and interracial hate, alongside floundering and hitherto unsuccessful efforts to resist these potent maladies of colonialism, Apartheid and coloniality in South Africa. It shows in detail, how appellation and hegemony, both related to discourse, can work to limit and even paralyse human imagination.

The texts analysed here are a window to deeply-held ideological positions that have been cultivated and contested for centuries. South Africa’s [hi]story is a [hi]story of liberal capitalism characterised from its violent instantiation in colonialism to the present time, by untold suffering untouched by the human spirit. It is however, simultaneously, a [hi]story of great resilience, fortitude and an unyielding struggle for substantive fairness, equality and opportunity for all, a struggle for a new humanity, a new spirit in a truly new South Africa.
Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

Increasingly, philosophers and scientists have affirmed that all knowledge is theory-laden and that methods are theory-driven.


Introduction

In this chapter, a theoretical framework of complementary, related and dichotomous concepts and propositions that are pervasive throughout this study are introduced. They demarcate the conceptual and analytic instruments that are used to answer the questions that this research study raises. This is a study of the media’s influence in cultivating certain meanings to secure particular understandings of the land question. Land is a controversial issue in South Africa. It is characterised by deep historic interracial enmity in the context of colonial conquest and Apartheid land expropriation without compensation. It is connected to issues of the organisation of society socially and economically and the attendant injustices under the liberal capitalist system in South Africa since colonialism. Today, the capitalist doctrine has become deeper, based on technological revolution and the internationalization of the markets (Sennett 2007). The implications of political communication in this changing global environment are immense.

The framework presented in this chapter relates to the following contexts: the ideological political traditions in which this study is located namely: liberalism, Marxism and the Epistemologies of the South. I start with the normative assumptions of the liberal tradition as the ideology underpinning the prevailing socio-economic order in the country and the related political communication arrangements. I proceed almost by way of a critique of the liberal ideology, to discuss the Epistemologies of the South and Marxism and their assumptions about a just society, the nature of politics and the role of political communication. This discussion is followed by a discussion of the land question in the context of colonisation in South Africa, and lastly, the explanations of media constructions of social reality from the perspective of this study. This framework overall, elaborates the dominant conceptions of the South African socio-economic condition, expresses this study’s insights in this regard, and
offers a different and desperately needed perspective on the South African land question (see also (Silver 1983).

**Liberalism, neoliberalism, capitalism and justice.**

Liberalism and neoliberalism are complex philosophies that range over a wide expanse with regard to ethical foundations and their normative conclusions (see for instance Friedman 1962, 1970, 1980; Hayek 1944, 1973; Nozick 1974). They however share some roots, some basic vocabulary and important overriding features, among them, ‘new capitalism’ or unrestricted capitalism (Ryan 1993; Bourdieu 1998; Chomsky 1999; Plehwe, Bernard and Gisela 2006). They are united in their dependence on individual freedom within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free and self-regulating markets, non-teleological methodology and a belief in an unregulated social order based on a legal framework (Harvey 2005; Schumpeter, Hayek, Popper 2003; Thorsen and Luie 2006; Amadae 2003).

In the liberalist thinking, all decisions, from the most banal to the most excruciating such as the policy on land expropriation without compensation (LEwC), can be left to the markets and other processes in which individuals freely choose to take part, and can also be made in terms of a measurable scale of trade-offs (Amadae 2003: 5; Thorsen and Lie 2006: 15) between ‘willing-buyers and a willing-sellers’. The pursuit of profit in liberal thought is encouraged as the capitalist spirit (Wolff 2000). This applies in all situations, even those that are directed at the whole of society and meant to correct historical wrongs. Friedman epitomizes this ethos: “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (1970:1).

The role of the state in liberalism is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to the market forces, keeping its intervention in the markets to a bare minimum (Wolff 2000; Harvey 2005). Market sovereignty is an alternative to any kind of politics, as it denies the need for political decisions about common and group interests as distinct from the sum of choices of individuals pursuing their private preferences (Amadae 2006). If a democratic process such as the Parliament-driven LEwC policy, impedes neoliberal imperatives, or threaten individual or commercial liberty, then democracy ought to be

---

45 Friedman was an adviser to former US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
sidestepped and replaced by the rule of experts or legal instruments (Thorsen and Lie 2006: 15). The practical implementation of neoliberal policies leads to a relocation of power from political to economic processes, from the state to the markets and individuals (Thorsen and Lie 2006: 15). The disrepute of the concepts of the public and politics is accompanied by a significant change in the language of citizenship. MacPherson (1978) equates this phenomenon to the liberalisation of democracy and democratisation of liberalism where private economic mechanisms replace active and passive mobilisation of citizens (Hobsbawn 2001).

In the liberal perspective on moral virtue, individuals are seen as being solely responsible for the consequences of the choices they freely make. ‘Desert’ is the basic meaning of justice from a liberal viewpoint (Rawls 1971). Desert justice is about fair distribution of goods, and fair distribution means giving each person his/her due, that is, distributing social goods (liberties, powers, authority, opportunities, income, and wealth) fairly, according to the principle of desert (Rawls 1971; Buchanan 1982). Injustice, Xinsheng (2015) explains, is when people do not get what they deserve (their deserts/dues) or get what they do not deserve.

Four critical postulates of the desert theory of justice are worth mentioning – see Miller (2013) and Xinsheng (2015):

- a person’s deserts are entirely dependent on his (sic) particular entitlement to them.
- political rights are the highest goals of the theory.
- private property is the premise of the argument for what is deserved in terms of income and wealth. A rational explanation can be found for private property and the equal distribution of social goods.
- civil society is a logical model of society derived from man’s (sic) natural self-interest. Society cannot only regulate itself but can protect the individual against the state.

An important consequence of scrupulous individualism of liberalism, echoing latent concerns over postulating a “general will”, is skepticism over the meaningfulness of “the public”, “public interest”, or “general welfare” (Amadae 2003: 4). Instances of inequality and glaring social injustice are morally acceptable in liberal capitalism, at least to the degree in which they could be seen as the result of freely made decisions (Nozick 1974; Hayek 1976). A person who demands that the state should regulate the market, prioritises a collective over an individual or act in favour of political ideals, is viewed as morally depraved and
under-developed and scarcely different from a proponent of a totalitarian state (Mises 1962; Schumpeter, Hayek and Popper 2003). Liberalism views as a “unique danger,” persons who would “wish to survive and succeed on the basis not of their own effort of good fortune but of wrestling support from other people” (Machan and Duncan 2005: 23). Liberalism’s ‘truth’ about inequality and its solutions, depend on an individualistic, asocial and ahistorical society that it creates (Walzer 2007: 97).

Whiggish liberalist postulates of the tasks of the media herald them as the ultimate instruments of democracy. They are seen as the ‘watchdog’ of the nation-state (Nerone 1995) on permanent duty patrolling against the abuse of executive power and safeguarding individual liberty (Buckingham 1987; Curran 1991: 29; Benson 2004). This extralegal check on the government, viewed “as the seat of power” (Curran 1991: 29), is seen as the “right and duty” of the news media (Siebert 1976: 56). They are positioned centrally at the nexus between individuals and the state as “the fourth estate of the realm.” Free media are seen as great organs of the public mind (Curran 1991) even helping to present and clarify the goals and values of society (Peterson 1976: 91).

The news media assume the role of an institution (Siebert 1976: 51), representing the interests of the populace rather than the dominant groups. Control of the media is placed in the hands of autonomous managerial elite who allow considerable degree of flexibility to media professionals (Curran 2002). These professional journalists adhere to professional standards and the ethic of objectivity describing the world “as it is”, and presenting many sides of an issue without any distinctive point of view (Lichtenberg 1987: 349; McNair 2007). This is known as responsible journalism (Nerone 1995). It is necessary for them to report “the truth about the facts” (Peterson 1976: 88). Objectivity implies a clear journalistic distancing from the opinions expressed in political debates, and a determination not to confuse the expression of opinion with the reporting of facts (McNair 2007). By doing this, by presenting more than one side, the press expedites the self-righting process (Peterson 1976: 88) towards discovering “the truth.” This is viewed as evidence of the media’s fidelity

46 Edmund Burke coined the term when he said there were three estates in Parliament referring to the Executive, Judiciary and Legislature, “but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Estate)

Political content is the defining characteristic of the liberal news media. As primary carriers of political information, the media’s role includes informing individual political choices and preferences and ensuring effective bidirectional communication between citizens and their government (Buckingham 1987). The public sphere is seen as the space between government and society in which private individuals exercise formal and informal control over the state – formal control through the election of governments and informal control through the pressure of public opinion (Curran 1991: 29).

**Epistemologies of the South and Marxism: carving an intellectual breakthrough**

This research is a passionately interested enquiry (Gill 1995) that seeks to contribute to efforts to break the back of colonialism and the oppressive ambitions of Westernisation (Fanon 1963: 206; Mignolo 2002) It seeks, to borrow the words of Blaise Pascal (1888: 66), to contribute to the efforts to bring justice and power together, so that whatever is just may be powerful, and whatever is powerful may be just. The Epistemologies of the South and Marxism complement each other (see Maldonado-Torres 2008: 3, Mignolo 2018: X) as its key interpretive framework.

Epistemologies of the South are critical sociologies of a new kind built in opposition to hegemonic liberal capitalism and upon alternative epistemological presuppositions (De Sousa Santos 2004: 15). They cut through abyssal thinking: a previously invisible bias that privileges all things European, limiting the legitimacy and validity of situated explanatory alternatives and related transformative possibilities (Barreto 2014: 398). They challenge liberal capitalist dogma, legitimise radicalism and centre social justice in social change (De Sousa Santos 2016). Colonisation is seen as a starting historical and analytical point, showing how it drove first, mercantile capitalism and then later, different forms of capitalist expansionism, initiating the differentiation of people into classes and ‘races’ so that it might be easier to exploit them as sources of labour (see also Dussel 1993). As sources of labour, the *Les Damnés de la Terre* (wretched of the earth) (Fanon 1963; Maldonado-Torres 2008,
2016) underpin the development of European ‘modernity’ from the darker side that they inhabit (Mignolo 2011; Rosa 2014). This colonialism and Apartheid metaphysical catastrophe – the production of zones of being human (habitat for White and economically privileged), and zones of not-being human or not being human enough (habitat for Black people) (Fanon 1963: 37-38; Maldonado-Torres 2016: 13) – is evident in the ‘new’ South Africa. The country is simultaneously regarded as one of the world’s most admired liberal capitalist democracies (Southall 2014: 147) and a global case study in racialised inequality, social deficits, and economic oppression. On the darker side of ‘modernity’, the modern paradigm of war or the non-ethics of war apply. Ideals of war ordinarily include expropriation, exploitation, accumulation by dispossession, economic enslavement etc. (Harvey 2003: 147; Maldonado-Torres 2008: 3; Maldonado-Torres 2016: 217; De Sousa Santos 2014: 15) in the context of complete lack of empathy and human feeling. Owing to colonialism and Apartheid’s anthropic skepticism, where they predicated their idea of “race”, these ideals of war ceased to be only a special code of behaviour for periods of war and became a standard of conduct that reflects “the way things are” (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 248).

Through the concept of coloniality, Epistemologies of the South interrogate the interrelation among modern forms of exploitation and their unbroken linkage to colonial domination. Social experience that resists destruction is unconcealed, and the space-time capable of identifying and rendering capable new counter-hegemonic social experiences is opened up (De Sousa Santos 2004: 15). Coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, are the primary concepts that they deploy to identify the traces of colonization which perpetuate the colonial relationship of violence between the former colonial powers and structures, and the colonized (Fanon 1963). Coloniality of power refers to the interrelation among modern forms of exploitation and domination; coloniality of knowledge refers to the impact of colonization on the different areas of knowledge production – often its decimation in the South; coloniality of being refers to the lived experience wrought by colonization and its aftermath and its impact on language (Mignolo 2003: 669; Maldonado-Torres 2007: 242)

The Epistemologies of the South understand ‘absences’ of alternatives to the hegemonic liberal capitalism in dominant discourses as a widely produced ‘non-existence’. This production of non-existence includes constructions and characterisation of alternatives as non-credible to the existing socio-political system (De Sousa Santos 2004: 15). Non-
existence is produced whenever alternatives to the dominant liberal capitalistic socio-political system are disqualified and rendered invisible, unintelligible or irreversibly discardable (De Sousa Santos 2004: 16). By showing alternative frameworks of knowledge, power and being, Epistemologies of the South challenge and free the human imagination through “a process of untraining” to create life possibilities that differ from the dominant liberalist conception of the world and related modes of experiencing society and nature (De Sousa Santos 2014: 15). The worldview of the Epistemologies of the South is expressed in the concepts of pluriversality and multipolarity in the context of decoloniality and disintegration of Eurocentrism\(^{47}\). The concepts foreground politico-economic de-Westernization (see also Latouche 1982) and renounce the conviction that the world must be conceived as a unified totality (as in Christian, Liberal, or Marxist thought) in order for it to make sense. Instead the world is conceived as a pluriverse of diverse peoples, knowledges, systems and practices rather than the universe (Mignolo 2018). This potentially sets the mind free and allows humanity to imagine a truly ‘post-colonial’ world.

Epistemologies of the South resonate with Mbiti’s (1971) maxim: “I am, because we are, and since we are, therefore I am” in their proposal of a diametrically opposite social paradigm to the colonialist doctrine. This study subscribes to this conceptual framework in its affirmation of human subjectivity that puts the communitarian good before individual good (Eze 2011). It is geared towards a shared morality, social interdependence, and a humanistic orientation towards fellow beings (Mokgoro 1998; Letseka 2011: 48) that colonialism, Apartheid and coloniality render impossible to attain.

Like the Epistemologies of the South, Marxism holds that changing the world for the better depends upon being able to explain how it has come to be the way it is. Without an adequate historical appreciation of how South Africa’s inequality was instantiated, it would be difficult to understand what holds it in place and how it could be resolved. Marxism recognises our common humanity and our communal essence as human beings that are dependent on one

---

\(^{47}\) In their broad sense decolonial project are envisaged to include deracializing and depatriarchising projects, food sovereignty, reciprocal economic organization and the definancialisation of money, decolonization of knowledge and of being, decolonization of religion as a way to liberate spirituality, decolonization of aesthetics as a way to liberate aethesthesis (Mignolo 2018)
another (Wolff 2000: 276). It also reduces the metaphysical status of the revered market forces of liberalism to no more than the accumulated consequences of human behaviour with capitalism being viewed as a mad machine, out of control, determining the behaviour of people in ways that intensify its control (Wolff 2000: 276). Capitalism is a human product even though it often is made to appear as a fixture of nature (Wolff 2000).

Critical theory and Epistemologies of the South inform this study’s advocacy for social justice. Justice cannot be captured in terms of one or more principles that apply in all situations (Miller 2013). Sometimes justice is about people being treated differently, and sometimes being treated in the same way (Hook 1975). Justice is about promoting participatory parity in relation to social (re)distribution and intersubjective recognition as a deliberate remedy for the injustice of colonialism, Apartheid and coloniality (Fraser and Honneth 2003: 38). Injustice occurs when people are impeded from participation by economic structures that deny them the resources they need to interact with others as peers (Fraser 2008: 145).

The notion of equal rights for all that is central to the liberal justice is problematic when contrasted with the disturbing socially engineered inequality in South Africa. This is the core of the self-imposed limitations of the liberal pursuit of justice through equality (Xinsheng 2015). Faced with the right to private property as immutable, liberal justice stands stock-still as if bewitched by equal political rights and unequal economic rights, and formal equality and substantive inequality (Xinsheng 2015). Liberal justice fails to capture the full depths of capitalist injustice because it neglects the relations of production and fails to problematise exploitation, domination, and commodification (Fraser and Honneth 2003: 11). Broadly, this model based on market exchange relationships (where everyone’s needs are met when they meet the needs of others) is evidence of the ‘justice’ of capitalism and is undoubtedly the premise of the desert theory of justice (Xinsheng 2015). In such a situation, the problem is the class structure of society which corresponds with the economic dimension of justice (Fraser 2008). Where political rights (liberation) have been actualized, the real difficulty for liberal justice is how to find a rational basis for the fair distribution of income and wealth (private property). The primary question in South Africa is whether private property itself is just.

This study embraces Marx’s conceptualisation of justice based on transcendent ideals – from each according to his (sic) ability, to each according to his (sic) needs (Schumpenter et al
2003: 19). Its enunciation of justice embraces the insights of the Epistemologies of the South that foreground the perspectives of those who have systematically suffered the injustices, dominations and oppressions caused by colonialism, Apartheid and capitalism.

While this study embodies an understanding of desert justice, the key difference lies in the premises of the arguments and the distinctive nature of the theoretical framework on which they rely (Xinsheng 2015). In the concept of social justice, two notions are involved but not fused, equality and human welfare (Hook 1975). The Marxist approach to justice is accomplished through a critique of political economy and incorporates what Fraser (2008: 3) refers to as, the economic dimension of distribution. The theory searches for a more extensive value of equality: it breaks through the constraints placed on substantive equality by equal rights. An example of this balance is offered by Mamdani (1998: 16):

Addressing the tension between social justice and individual rights may require moving away from an absolute emphasis of either, so as to contextualize and revitalize the emphasis on both. If the first step in reconciliation was to guarantee security for the minority by temporarily breaching the rights of the majority - no Nuremberg (types trials), no regime of equal political rights in the short run so as to allow for minority vetoes in the interim, “sunset” clauses that allow for a presence of the minority in the state apparatus, a presence out of all proportion to its numerical weight in society – then does not the second step call for a breach, also limited and temporary, but this time in the rights of the privileged minority, in order to ensure a measure of dignity for the majority, through a form of group redress that is equally dramatic if temporary, that gives the hitherto deprived majority a stake in reformed social institutions?

The basic logic of the Marxist theory of justice is that the relations of distribution are to be interpreted not through political or legal concepts of fairness and justice, but through the relations of production interpreted through productive labour (Xinsheng 2015). The underlying object of justice is to diminish human suffering and maximise welfare (Hook 1975). In this respect Marxism offers an alternative model of a harmonious society where “… human production is not a means of survival, but a release of human ability; people are no longer actuated by self-interest and no longer treat others as a means or tools for satisfying their own needs, or as objects, and they treat nature not as a source of profit but as a subject of aesthetics” (Xinsheng 2015:12; Jayawardena 1969; Marx and Engels 1848).
To make reconciliation durable and nation-building a possibility require moving from a narrow recognition of rights that individualises and dehistoricises them, accenting the rights of property holders above those of the rest, to a broad recognition that underlines the need to right historical wrongs and thus provide a measure of justice to previously excluded groups (Mamdani 1998). South Africa’s political system, in its support for unjust private property relations, is grounded not in politics and justice but, in the economy and the injustice of capitalist greed.

The Epistemologies of the South and Marxist frameworks are employed here to analyse the media’s role and place in the widening social cleavages in the exercise of power in the country’s capitalist structure. Owing to the powerful regulation of the country’s public sphere by market imperatives (Smith 1946; Sandwith 1998), this study’s understanding of politics is broad and relates it to influence (see Laswell 1951: 295) and not just government action. This is important to uncover the identity of the influential forces in society, the source of their influence, and how they exercise that influence (Leftwich 2004: 2). This understanding raises three related issues concerning meaning-making (see Cook 1998: 85-6; Laswell 1951: 295).

First, politics is about choice for society. Second, it is about which choices are considered authoritative and binding on individuals who do not independently contest the bases of that choice. Third, politics establishes what is valuable in society and the distribution of deference. Politics thus conceived is at the heart of the characterisation of the power of capital and the media and their influence on the colonial inheritance of cognitive injustice in South Africa (De Sousa Santos 2014; 2016).

The media are located in this politics/power matrix as powerful businesses with a key role in the reproduction and continuation of various kinds of social inequalities in the country (Devereaux 2003:13; Nerone 1995: 29; see also Hall et al 1981). The media power and influence are defined along these lines, including how they affect adjustments in social norms and interpersonal relationships (Maldonado-Torres 2008; Curran 1991). Intersubjective relations link with economic activity and the production of knowledge to constitute the nexus of power oriented by imperatives of domination and control that mirror the logic of a division between the White ‘masters’ and Black ‘slaves’ (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 3). Injustices, whether economic, social, political, intersubjective or in knowledge production, are intertwined, constituting one another (see also Barreto 2014: 396).
The complementary frameworks of the Epistemologies of the South and Marxism potentially present a way to support a different conversation about South Africa, the bleeding site of a crime against humanity, and gross violations of rights of the Black people (Mamdani 2002; Gobodo-Madikizela 2002). The country is failing to emerge from the morass of capitalism produced through colonialism, and reproduced in Apartheid and in the ‘new’ South Africa. This is a result of abyssal thinking that must give way to a decolonial imagination so that South Africa be born anew.

Rethinking colonisation and the land question

Given South Africa’s long colonial history, the land question is a prominent and enduringly controversial subject in the country’s politics. Much of this history is temporally presented and oriented episodically towards static geographies and agrarian concerns. Jan van Riebeeck, for instance, was simply an employee of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) who was contracted to grow vegetables for sailors in Cape Town in 165248 (Pooley 2009). Immigration into South Africa and demographic growth of the nascent White settler population that he brought with him to the Cape, are key factors in the explanations of the expansion by the colonists into the interior (see for example Ross 2017; Kotze 1969; Head 2016). The Afrikaner Voortrekker’s destructive Great Trek of 1834-1854 was a result of their opposition to the abolition of slavery in the colony (Ross 2017; Plaatje 1930; Kotze 1969; Petzold 2007; Head 2016). This history details the heroics of war and their outcomes, during the violent encounters between the first peoples and the colonisers in different parts of South Africa (Plaatje 1921, 1930; Lephakga 2015; Gordon 1997; Weaver 2003; Ross 2017; Head 2016; Nattrass 2017). Importantly, landforms in these accounts are generally treated in isolation from the complex anatomy of colonialism and global liberal capitalism in which they are deeply entrenched.

There is an important difference between the ‘facts and the truth’ about the history of South Africa in these accounts, and the “true reflection” (Palmberg 2001: 10) of the history of colonialism and the land question. This study treats land as an economic asset and an important social question (Hall and Ntsebeza 2007; Moyo 2007). Inequality in land ownership tends to mirror inequality in various other areas including the distribution of

income and access to services and other assets (Adams 2000: 1). The argument here is about the land question being both a rural and an urban concern, throwing a spotlight on the multiple nonagricultural uses of land – for settlement (housing), for security, for natural resource harvesting – which tend to be underestimated (Kepe and Hall 2016; Hall and Ntsebeza 2007). This framing of the land question also links land to identity and citizenship in complex and shifting ways (Walker 2007). Politically, this view imbues the land question with a somewhat latent, currently more overt, yet always potent emotional and symbolic appeal in national discourses about inequality and redress (Walker 2007). This conceptualization links the land question organically and dialectically to the wider political economy locally, nationally, and globally (Harvey 2003: 171; Hall and Ntsebeza 2007; Warriner 1969; Ahmad 1975; Bernstein 2007; Zarin and Bujang 1994).

This study develops a non-static perspective of the land question. It employs Luxemburg’s (2013) capitalist social environment concept as an important lever to analyse the dynamic and enduring links between established capitalist economies – where surplus value is produced – and the geopolitics of violent capitalist expansion from modernity to this day. This is important for a sound critique of the dynamics of today’s liberal capitalist social relations of production in South Africa. At the heart of this undertaking is the re-thinking of colonialism and its motive force to open the analytical space to realities about colonialism and the land question in South Africa that are “surprising” because they have been made invisible in the dominant liberal, Eurocentric accounts. The Marxist conception of capitalism, and Eurocentricism viewed from the perspective of the Epistemologies of the South, together constitute the analytic framework of this study to accomplish its objectives – critiquing the country oppressive liberal capitalism.

From a Marxist point of view, capitalism must have something “outside of itself” in order to stabilize itself (Harvey 2003: 140). This capitalism’s outside is not understood solely in territorial terms but primarily in its dependence on the constant possibility of outward expansion and the related campaign against the natural economy (Luxemburg 2003: 348-398). This study locates this relentless ‘outward expansion’ as a critical motive force for colonialism. It connects colonisation to the contradictions of capitalist development in Europe, not least among them, the economic hardships caused by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (see Palmer 2011). This catalysed mass migration of the “surplus”, poor
European citizens who sought to become capitalists and property owners themselves in the colonies (Dussel 1993: 74; see also O’Rourke 2006; Baines 1995). A critical enabler for this capitalist project was the coercive political, economic, and symbolic power exercised by the West over the rest of the world, cruelty and an infinite sense of superiority (Dussel 1993). This early globalisation movement reached the South African shores in 1652, mounted on mercantile capitalism, (Dussel 1993: 70; Fieldhouse 1981:4). South Africa had become a ‘new frontier of capitalist advance’ that was to be integrated into global capitalism (Nash 1994: 7).

Brute force and a battery of laws from colonialism such as the Glen Grey Act (1894) to the Apartheid Natives Land Act (1913), and Native Land and Trust Act (1936) were part of the violent hallmarks of capitalist expansionism that enabled the wholesale procurement of the South African land and all its riches and the radical limitation of the economic options of Black people. The Apartheid authorities used legal instruments and militarism as a ‘province of accumulation’ (Luxemburg 2003: 434) to implement violent land expropriation without compensation and to deal with amblankevraagstuk (poor Whiteism)⁴⁹. At a stroke of a pen (Plaatje 1921: 18), revolutionary changes would be wrought to expropriate the wealth of Black people for the benefit of White people and to transform social relations of production (Beinart, Delius, and Trapido 1986; Nattrass 2017; Ross 2017). At the height of the dispossession project, the settlers managed to appropriate for themselves 87 percent of the land, leaving only 13 percent for the 90 percent African majority (Ntsebeza and Hall 2007 and Makombe 2018).

The highly praised individualised and transferable property rights – the foundation of liberal morality, or as Karl Marx calls it, bourgeois freedom follow these developments (see Walicki 1983: 51). Today’s property relations (capitalist landed property and agrarian capital) and agrarian and industrial labour are a product of these foreign and poisonous (Luxemburg 1977: 87) transformations. These transformations lacked the social connection with the natural development of the economy and necessitated a reorganisation and

⁴⁹ The severe poverty of the White poor was evident in the 1880s (Terreblanche, 2002: 266). In the early 1930s, (coinciding with the rise of aggressive Afrikaner nationalism) eradicating White poverty became a social, economic and political objective. The Carnegie Commission of 1932 investigated the causes, consequences and corrective measures of the poor White phenomenon (Fourie 2006). The problem of White poverty was solved through a doctrinaire expropriation without compensation under the Nationalist Party.
restructuring of established relations in society (Luxemburg 1977). The market values that they spawned corroded all pre-colonisation relations between people, leaving callous cash payment and naked self-interest in their place (Jayawardena 1969; Marx and Engels 1848). The settlers installed the influential doctrine of private property rights for regulation and domination (Barreto 2014: 397). With it, the modern notion that land is an object to be measured, allocated, traded, and improved was powerfully advanced (Weaver 2003).

Improvement, the Trojan horse of Western cosmology (Mignolo 2018), and its synonyms – betterments and advancements – became intrinsic to formal and informal practices of taking and allocating land. The rationalisations and rhetoric of legislators and administrators incorporated these ‘almighty words’ when they justified formal schemes to take land from indigenous people or drafted regulations for distributing land to White people (Weaver 2003). Given the ‘civilising’ and redemptive character of modernity, when the ‘primitive’ and ‘immature’ Black people opposed its processes, modernity had recourse to the violence necessary to remove the ‘obstacles’ to modernisation (Dussel 1993: 75). The suffering and sacrifices of Black people were seen as inevitable and necessary costs of modernisation (Dussel 1993). This was to become a turning point psychologically, economically, culturally, spiritually and socially, for the indigenous people: a veritable metaphysical catastrophe to this day (Maldonado-Torres 2016: 11). Colonialism is the genesis of the country’s contemporary anti-human and anti-ethical social arrangements (see Fanon 1963: 30; Maldonado-Torres 2008: 100, Plaatje 1921, 1930).

This is an important backdrop to the relationships, ideologies and intersubjectivities that stamped their imprint on later developments in the evolution of today’s South Africa within the framework of deepening global capitalism. Since 1652, South African society has undergone multiple interconnected capitalist transformations from agrarian classes, to Apartheid, to the present coloniality, without much change to the economic structure instantiated in colonialism. The modern forms of exploitation evident in the country’s inequality, bears an unbroken linkage to colonial domination. They are made possible by how land was appropriated and used under colonialism, how labour was reproduced, and how capital was accumulated (Mignolo 2007; Bernstein 2007; Ntsebeza and Hall 2007). They are tightly connected to the impact of colonisation on the different areas of knowledge production, the lived experience of colonisation and, its impact on language (see Mignolo 2003: 669; Maldonado-Torres 2007: 242). This understanding underpins this study’s
explanation of culture, intersubjectivity, and knowledge production in South Africa today. It is an important instrument to better understand the rigidity of the country’s oppressive socio-economic circumstances, specifically the retention of resources in the hands of a narrow class of predominantly White citizens.

Marx’s *Trinity Formula* summarises the interconnections between dispossession in colonialism and Apartheid and how these questions continue to feed into economic and social life as active structuring processes:

The formula recognizes that the triadic dialectic among labour, capital and land, leads to a fuller understanding of the economic, cultural and political processes entailed in the mutual constitution of Europe and its colonies, processes that continue to define the relation between post-colonial and imperial states. It helps to specify the operations through which Europe’s colonies, first in America, and then in Africa, and Asia provided it with cultural and material resources with which it fashioned itself as the standard of humanity – the bearer of superior religion, reason and civilization embodied in European selves. (Coronil 2000: 357)

The racialisation of people and its naturalisation, an important achievement of colonialism, determined their status or potential, their jobs, where they lived or died, and the privileges they were entitled to. It formed the basis of the division of labour and the control of resources of production (Dussel 1993: 70; Quijano and Ennis 2000, Quijano 2000, 2016). The hierarchies created to justify domination and oppression were considered the product of the inferiority of Black people and not the cause of their so-called inferiority (De Sousa Santos 2016: 18). Black people were seen by leading politicians in South Africa such as Cecil Rhodes, Jan van Riebeeck, Paul Kruger, Jan Smuts and James Hertzog as infrahuman (Eze 2011; Holtz and Wagner 2009: 421) undeserving, and with no rights (Muller 1969; Maldonado-Torres 2016: 11; Edgar and Houser 2016: 30; Boesekem 1969). The classifications were even assumed to be objective and scientific (Wade 2015: 1293; Quijano 2000: 168). Discourse was an important means for the daily validation and cultivation of the colonial and Apartheid ethos thus providing moral justification for continued application of the non-ethics of war against Black people (Henri and Grunebaum 2003: 6; De Sousa Santos 2016: 18; Maldonado-Torres 2008: 217).

Residual and deeply inculcated views that resonate with this colonial power structure are apparent in the strong views evidenced in the media discourses on LEwC that this thesis examines. It is difficult to make meaningful sense of the divergent worldviews, expectations,
and assumptions embedded in their claims and counter-claims outside of the material and intersubjective zones of struggle and violence that were crystallised in colonialism, refined in Apartheid, bequeathed to the present as coloniality and hard-wired in the collective soul of the South African “nation”.

This study engages with the complexity of the land question in this context and locates it within the frame of the discursive power of the media in a globalized world as an inexorable disabler that limits the scope and pace of land reform in the developing world (Hayter 1971; Moyo 2007; Dasgupta and Kiely 2006). Two perspectives of the land question emerge from this frame. The first is a social question – to the extent that development tends to be skewed by agrarian structures (Moyo 2007). This perspective emphasises the distribution of economic advantages based on access to land resources. Second, is a political project and terrain for contestation – which places issues of power and agency, charted by the course of class and popular struggles, at the centre of questions about land reform (Lipton 2010; Moyo 2007; Bernstein 2007). The understanding of the land question in this study includes related capitalist circulatory processes in the dominant neo-liberal imperialism, beyond chasing hectares (Greenberg 2010: 5) and measuring redress in terms of landmasses transferred, or a technicist focus that limits the understanding of the land question to policy in terms of expropriation, compensation, land taxes, subdivision of land-holdings, limitation on foreign ownership etc. (Hall and Ntsebeza 2007).

Land reform is located in the context of social justice in the face of economic oppression and within a specific historical context (Bernstein 2007: 28; Miller 2013: 168). It is linked with positive economic growth (Warriner 1969; Ahmad 1975), security for those employed in farming as well as more productive agriculture (Bernstein 2007: 28). Key benchmarks for progressive land reform include publicly controlled transformation of the existing land ownership patterns and attempts at diffusion of wealth, income or productive capacity throughout society (Bernstein 2007: 28; Zarin and Bujang 1994: 10). South Africa’s ‘land reform’ programme falls short in this respect and in relation to the specific agricultural practices that characterise it, such as diversified, smallholder-led sustainable farming (see Ashton 2012; Murray and O’Regan 1990; Kepe and Hall 2016). A succinct summary of the post-liberation South African land programme is that it has evolved and “… developed in ways that are antithetical to land reform” (Hall and Ntsebeza 2007: 10).
The framing of the land question in this study attaches it to the understanding of the South African liberation project that gave birth to the problematic and fragile economic transformation today, and how the country missed the decolonising ethico-political turn, or decolonial turn (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 6; see also Davis and Womack 2001). To borrow from Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 4), the state of becoming that never materialised. The conceptualisation explodes the liberal myth that the elimination of colonial and Apartheid administrations amounted to decolonisation and substantive freedom, and hence the idea of a decolonised South Africa (see Grosfoguel 2007: 219; De Sousa Santos 2016: 18). Critically, it demonstrates the vacuous nature of South Africa’s 1994 democratic project that is tied to intolerable Eurocentrism by an unbroken history of colonisation and racialisation that goes back to 1652 (see also Maldonado-Torres 2008: 6-7; Southall 2014: 655; Iqani 2017: 109).

Growing out of these connections, this study disarticulates (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) the land question from the discourses of simple redistribution of property rights in agricultural land and from individual restitution claims. It articulates and frames it in terms of the new forms of primitive accumulation by (racialised and class) dispossession, including the erosion of social security, theft of wages, and the eternal renewal of colonialism, revealing the same old genocidal impulse, racist sociability, thirst for appropriation, and violence exerted on resources and on people deemed inferior (De Sousa Santos 2014: 44-45; Bernstein 2003, 2007; Hart 2002; 2006). It integrates into the land question an array of working class struggles over systemic crises of livelihoods and reproduction of labour, displacement, privatisation and depredations of nature (De Sousa Santos 2014; Maldonado-Torres 2008; Harvey 2005; Hart 2002, 2006; Bernstein 2003).

Ideology and discourse – mediated communication about politics.

Ideology and discourse are a critical entry point to the examination of the narratives of this study. Ideology however, with its strong focus on the material integument of social life (Williams 1977: 21) and discourse, a post-structuralist, constructivist approach (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Howarth 2018), form distinct research traditions. The two can be linked to enable an incisive, multi-faceted analysis of textual material through the application of different epistemological strategies. I apply Cook’s (1998: 165) political institution approach to the media as the framework for separating and unifying them. Institutionalism places emphasis on the “walls that isolate [the media] from other political forces”, on the news-making process and how it includes [f]actors inside and outside of that wall (Cook 2006: 160;
The Marxist conception of ideology is concerned with the realm of the lived, or the experienced, rather than the \textit{thinking} or ideational dimension (Althusser 1971; Williams 1977: 21). Ideology manifests in two variants namely, macro-sociological/critical and sociological (Ryfe 2006; Schudson 2002; Lundby 2014; Cook 2006). The macro-sociological level is about media ownership as the determining factor in news-making (Bourdieu 1998: 68; Williams 1977: 21; Badgikian 1983: 314). The sociological perspective foregrounds discourse as the \textit{thing} for which and by which there is a struggle, discourse is the power to be seized (Foucault 1977). While the influence of ownership is acknowledged, the routines and practices – the strategic rituals – that define journalism are viewed as an institution (Ryfe 2006: 138; Kaplan 2006: 174, Tuchman 1972). They form a criteria according to which the world is delimited and events categorised or otherwise deemed worthy of transformation into a story (Cook 1998: 89; 2006). The news institution can be defined in terms of these rules of the game on two levels: (i) media logic: where media dramaturgy, media format, media rationales and media routines form the news institution’s modus operandi and, (ii) media ideology (i.e. claims on independence, objectivity and facticity) (Orsten 2004; Lundby 2014). Routines not only structure the news but, Eliasoph (1988: 315) states, they also act as an alibi for hidden ideology. News follows a science-like model where reporters ‘gather’ authoritative data from experts and then present it without explicitly taking sides (Berkowitz 2009: 103; see also Herman and Chomsky 1988).

Discourse on the other hand, is a methodologically, theoretically, and analytically diverse research tradition that offers interpretations of the meaning of text in the context in which it occurs (Blomaert 2005, Brown and Yule 1983, Cameron 2001, Phillips and Jorgensen 2002, Weiss and Wodak 2003). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) supports the preoccupation of this study with structures that are deployed in the reproduction and resistance of social dominance. CDA focusses on the ideology-discourse-ideology triangle that underpins the way social power abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by texts in a social and political context (van Dijk 1996, 2005, 2015; Richardson 2007: 26, KhosraviNik 2010: 61). It locates language at the heart of the negotiation and construction of knowledge, meaning, identities and the distribution of social goods (Lyons 1971; Chandler 2002; Starks and Trinidad 2007). Key assumptions at the heart of CDA are:

- Society and culture are shaped by discourse and at the same time constitute discourse
- Discourse does ideological work
• Power relations are discursive
• Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory
• Discourse is a form of social action
• Discourse is historical

This view connects language with questions of ideology in important ways where discourse is seen as the favoured vehicle for ideology (Fairclough 1989: 34). It projects a discursive conception of ideology with language as “a material form of ideology” (Hall 1983: 64; Bloor and Bloor 2007: 73). It also underscores the directionality of ideology i.e. how this connection works to favour some and disadvantage others when types of discourse work to naturalise and sustain unequal power relations (Fairclough 1989; Purvis and Hunt 1993). Thompson (1995) identifies what he calls ideological subsystems within this dominant ideological structure. Ideological subsystems are constrained by the dominant ideology, they are part of an ideological field which is ultimately structured by the ideology of the dominant class (Thompson 2007)

In this sense ideology and discourse refer to pretty much the same aspect of social life (Purvis and Hunt 1993: 474). The abstract collective mentality (ideology as the macro-structure existing in society) needs to slip into concrete linguistic forms to permeate society (KhosraviNik 2010: 61). At the heart of this assertion is the concept of dialogicity (Bakhtin 1981) that is based on an assumption that discourse is socially constitutive of, as well as constituting the society (Fairclough and Wodak 1997)

Complementarity between an ideology and discourse-based analysis can enhance rigour and depth in the examination of the processes of making news (Schudson 2003: 8; Tuchman 1976; Philo 1983) and thus role that political communication plays in the exercise of power.

This study’s examination of ideology combines social, cognitive, and discursive components (Van Dijk 2006: 115; Hall 2011: 381). Ideology features in this context as a means of signification that produces consciousness and that organises the identity, actions, norms, values and resources and social relations between groups (Thompson 1990; Van Dijk 2006: 115; Hall 2005, 2011: 381). Political communication is understood as a purposeful process of political meaning-making mediated through print and electronic media (McNair 2007: 4; Denton and Woodward 1990: 4; Bimber 2007; Blumler 2015; Benson 2004).
The concentration of most of society’s symbolic resources in the institutional sphere we call ‘the media’ (Couldry and Curran 2003: 1) raises distinctive social issues that this study seeks to understand. The media are a space of social agency, a major site of struggle, and a terrain of incorporation and resistance (see Steenveld 2004: 104; Storey 1996: 4). Social dominance, theorised by Gramsci (1971: 57) as hegemony\textsuperscript{50}, occurs when privileged norms and values are adopted throughout society and domination need no longer be maintained by force (Hall 2011: 381).

\textit{Framing and frame analysis}

The preceding theorisation of ideology and discourse links both research traditions to framing in important ways. All three traditions are centred on analysing links between media texts and society. Framing offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text to influence human consciousness (Entman 1993). Framing is however, more a research programme than a unified paradigm (D’Angelo 2002; Reese 2007). It combines diverse theoretical perspectives that differ in important philosophical assumptions – cognitive, constructivist, and critical (Riffe and Freitag 1997; D’Angelo 2002). This diversity can be leveraged to enable a comprehensive understanding of various facets of the framing process from production, to content, and effects of news (D’Angelo 2002). Research analysis of political communication can move from description of media content to advancing deep understanding of frames (Matthes 2009: 352).

There are many definitions of frames in the literature (see for instance Gitlin 1980: 6; Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143). For Entman (1993: 52), to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (my emphasis). The highlighted variables in this definition can have several categories in the analysis of frames.

\textsuperscript{50}Hegemony is a product of ideological power. Hall (2005) refers to ideological power as the power to signify events in a particular way. It produces consciousness. This ideological power is exercised in what Storey (1996: 4), calls the field of culture as a major site of ideological struggle, a terrain of ‘incorporation’ and ‘resistance’, one of the sites where hegemony is won or lost.
A problem definition can consist of an issue and relevant actors that discuss the problem, a causal interpretation is an attribution of failure or success regarding a specific outcome, an evaluation can be positive, negative, or neutral and can refer to different objects and, a treatment recommendation can include a ‘call’ for or against, a certain action (Matthes and Kohring 2008: 264).

Framing is not limited to only what is included in text or “just the facts” (Brewer and Gross 2010: 159). Qualitative framing also looks at what is excluded, examine the key-words, metaphors and narratives in the context of the text as a whole, and recognises that the words repeated most often in a text may not be the most important (Entman 1993: 369; Connolly and Broadway 2008: 367). In this way, frames can be defined by their omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations and recommendations which are critical as inclusions in guiding the reader (Edelman 1993: 232; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991: 52). Dominance is also exercised through epistemicide and ‘absences’ of alternatives in dominant narratives (De Sousa Santos 2014: 92).

Frames construct knowledge of the world, Lippman’s (1922) pseudo environment, through media narratives that encourage those thinking about events to develop particular understandings of them (Entman 1991; Brewer and Gross 2010). They do so by providing a central organising idea that gives meaning to an unfolding set of events, weaving a connection among them, suggesting what the controversy is about and the essence of the issue (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143). Schattschneider’s (1960) concept of “bias” links frames to the distribution of power. This linkage happens when partisan frames constantly highlight certain information and ideas to present one position (or set of positions) on the issue as being correct, and other positions as being wrong (Brewer and Gross 2010; Entman 2007). Ideologies held by reporters and editors may play a role in shaping frames (Patterson and Donsbach 1996). Other forces such as internal pressures from owners and executives responding to market incentives are also at play in the construction of partisan frames (Bennett 2007; Entman 1989; Gillens and Hertzman 2000). The media thus operate, in part, to transmit elite debates by serving as conduits for frames developed by social actors who advocate specific issue positions to move opinion in ways conducive to their preferred positions and preferred policy solutions (Brewer and Gross 2010).

Thus understood, frames in a news text can be an imprint of power registering the identity of
actors or interests that competed to dominate the text (Entman 1993: 55). Framing recognises the directionality of ideology and centres political communication through language and writing in how we make the world meaningful in certain ways (Fairclough 2014: 11; Gee 2011: 12). This links framing epistemologically and ontologically to ideology and discourse without collapsing the important differences between the three as distinct traditions. The class bias of the media and their general tendency towards hegemony are reflected in the connection between economic interests and ideological representations in the media that serve dominant rather than universal societal emancipatory interests (Lichtenberg 1987: 330; Curran 1991: 39; Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng and White 2009: 14; Thompson 1984; Clarke, Connell, and McDonough 1978). Importantly this linkage between the three traditions breaches the liberalist confusion that tends to equate media with information, education and entertainment51.

This study draws from pioneering research on the sociology of journalistic practice and institutions (Curran 1990) to interrogate media patterns of content creation including those that are inspired by a subaltern, insurgent cosmopolitan reasoning (De Sousa Santos 2014: 125). By focusing on texts and locating these in their social context, it seeks to demonstrate how the circuit of power is not disconnected at two points: the process of encoding in media organisations and decoding by audiences (Curran 1990: 152). Framing contests are studied in texts from sociological and constructivist perspectives for better understanding to identify the hills and valleys, sinkholes and impenetrable jungles, where these contests take place alongside the ways in which they advantage and disadvantage in uneven ways (Benson 2004).

Conclusion

The foregoing theoretical discussion navigates established body of knowledge about a good society, justice and the role of discourse to narrow the intellectual space wherein the research questions of this study are located. This conceptual scope is understood and explained in the

---

51, Lord Reith’s (1927) classic definition of the core responsibilities of the British Broadcasting Corporation as entertaining, informing, and educating. This ethos was subsequently adopted widely. Today, this is the mission statement of South Africa’s public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporations (see https://www.sabc.co.za/sabc/about-us/)
context of the liberalism, the radical Epistemologies of the South and Marxism. This study constructs a framework from the postulates of the Epistemologies of the South and Marxism as a critical thought-guiding and an explanatory tool for the understandings and assumptions underpinning its investigation of the discourses of Moneyweb, Afriforum, City Press and AFASA on LEwC (Buchanan 1982).

The genealogy of South Africa’s inequality is causally linked to colonialism land dispossession as its instantiation and an important genesis of durable structures that hold it in place today. Liberalism, capitalism and racism are projected as critical ideological levers that both enabled and that continue to sustain this legacy, relying on discourse as the lifeblood and an infectious carrier of the underlying ideological impulses. The discussion provides an enlightening, albeit tentative, explanation the country’s complex socio-economic situation as well as important means with which to investigate and verify the general assertions made therein (see Anfara and Mertz 2015: 5). The next chapter deepens and refines the context of this study. It is focused on a review of the significance, role and on the contributions of media discourses to the transformations of South Africa from colonial to contemporary times.
Chapter 3

An institutional perspective of the role of the press from colonialism to democracy: the contested and unstable fulcrum of liberal-capitalistic oppression in South Africa

It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power.

Foucault (1977: 52)

Introduction

This chapter presents an account of the press as a political institution in South Africa (Cook 1998). It traces the role of the press in different contexts from its introduction in colonialism and covers the major social and political transitions and transformations since then. The focus is on the mutual influences between these contexts and the political communication arrangements in each. Key among these transitions from colonialism are: the post-South African war (the so-called Anglo-Boer war) period in the early 1900s, the rise of Afrikaner ethno-nationalism from the 1930s and the post-1994 democratic era.

The first part delineates media power and drills down to the micro institutional level to examine the modalities of this power, – the processes and context in which the media shape their messages, – in the struggle to give meanings to social phenomena. The relationship between ‘language’ and the distribution of social goods (privileges and deference) in society is examined in this context. Secondly, I present a two-part grounded and context-specific understanding of the influential variations and relationships that typify South Africa’s public communication systems from colonialism to the present democratic dispensation. This study posits that the effectiveness of discourse and discursive formations involves more than semiosis. Discourses inscribe signs within social practices as a condition of existence of the meanings and subjectivities that they produce (Purvis and Hunt 1993: 479). Understanding the social circumstances therefore, within which discourses are formed and transformed brings into focus revealing conditions that make the formation and transformation of those discourses possible. This contextual focus is essential for meaningful media discourse analysis (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995: 12; Bendix 1963: 535) and thus in the understanding
of how land expropriation without compensation (LEwC) has come to assume its social, economic, and political meaning(s) in the discourses of *Moneyweb, Afriforum, City Press* and the African Farmers’ Association of South Africa (*AFASA*).

I borrow Hallin and Mancini’s framework (2004) to highlight in a two-parts discussion, the features of journalism culture, media policy, media markets, and media use in the different cultural and political contexts. Part one highlights these features in the context of land dispossession without compensation in colonialism and Apartheid. Part two utilises the same framework to discuss the contemporary political communication arrangements in the context of dispossession by accumulation under the democratic government.

**Media as a political institution**

The media are key among the liberal paradigmatic institutions that European settlers imposed on South Africa early in the 18th century. Over time, they worked collectively and cumulatively with others as the fulcrum of power, albeit unstable and contested, to advance complex social projects in the context of colonisation from 1652 to the present coloniality. As a political institution, the media are not just important for the exercise of power, but have an impact of their own on social structures (Thompson 1995: 13; Hallin and Mancini 2004: 8). Their symbolic power enables them to frame social events, shape public discourses, and act as a powerful source of social meanings (Bosch 2017; Devereux 2003). The power of the media in constructing meaning is equal to the power of constructing reality (see Bourdieu 1991: 281). They play a “central role” in the making of society (Curran 2002: 3; Bourdieu 1991: 166). Their power is linked to the cultivation and legitimation of social relations (see Dijk’s 1993; 2008; Thompson 1995), thus potentially inducing submission and paralysis to sustain unequal power relations. The media institution shapes the way Black and White South Africans see themselves and one another, and how they construct themselves as subjects in their unequal society (Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2009: 3; Schudson 2002: 266; Drury 1967).

As an institution, the media operates as a distinct organisation, using similar rules, in similar contexts (Cook 1998: 165; Thompson 1995: 13-14; Bourdieu 1996; Kaplan 2002). The

---

52 Thompson (1995) uses this phrase to describe institutions which provide privileged bases for the exercise of certain forms of power (such as coercive power, economic power, political power and the media’s symbolic power).
institutional perspective of the media incorporates different modalities of the news media, for instance print-based and the new online settings (Singer 1997; 2005; Arant and Anderson 2001), as well as alternative news media. Oppositional news platforms such as AFASA, use the similar conventions of newsgathering and reporting that mainstream reporters use (see also Eliasoph 1988: 313). In their sometimes credible struggles against unjust socio-economic systems they too, in important instances, end up conniving with them (De Sousa Santos 2014: 37) within the parameters of the broad sociopolitical system (Christians et al 2009: 181).

This study draws from the sociological and the cultural traditions of news making to examine how LEwC is represented in the discourses of Moneyweb, Afriforum, City Press and AFASA (Cook 1998: 95; Ryfe 2006; Schudson 2002; Lundby 2014; Cook 2006). It recognises discourse as a form of culture, a structured genre or set of genres of public meaning-making. News about LEwC is seen as a material product and that there are political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions to understanding its production, distribution, and appropriation by audiences (Garnham 1990: 10). The key implications of this approach include the following:

First, the constructions of LEwC are generally, shaped by those with economic power to retain their power, filtering out dissident, inconvenient information and opinion (see Herman 1999: 16; Becker and Vlad 2009; Lundby 2014; Badgikian 1983: 314; Nerone 1995: 174; Entman 2007: 166, among others). This is particularly true of mainstream media and theoretically, less so for alternative media (Atton 2004: 3). This is a consequence of a set of social relations of news production and a set of market imperatives from which devolve a systemic body of production values that are legitimised by professional journalistic principles and operationalised in professional journalistic practice (Cook 1998: 89; Schudson 2003; Gitlin 1984; Gans 1979).

Second, the meanings that are made in the discourses about LEwC are circumscribed by an unquestioned “central code of ethics” or “a system of overlapping constraints” (e.g. balance, detachment, objectivity) within which journalists perform their labour (Ryfe 2006: 138; Kaplan 2006: 174; Eliasoph 1988: 314; Gitlin 1984; Schudson 1982, 2003; Molototch and Lester 1973; Berkowitz 2009; Cook 2006: 182). The constructions of LEwC in the various discourses are constrained and also enabled, by these occupational demands and characterised by interesting dichotomies and contradictions – chance and intention, instrument and accident, expectation and surprise, narrative and interjection and hidden ideology – that make
up what LEwC became in the various discourses (Hall et al 1978; Schudson 2003: 8; Tuchman 1976; Philo 1983; Gans 1979; Gitlin 1984; Cook 1998).

Hallin’s (1986: 117) concentric circles offer a useful insight regarding how the liberal capitalist consensus (the good) and radicalism (the bad) are constructed and dealt within the discourses of *Moneyweb*, *Afriforum*, and *City Press* (McNair 2011).

![Sphere of Consensus, Sphere of Legitimate Controversy, Sphere of Deviance](image)

**Figure 1. Hallin’s Spheres of consensus, controversy and deviance.**

(Hallin, 1986: 117)

In the middle circle, *Sphere of Legitimate Controversy* is where the journalistic virtues of neutrality, objectivity, factuality and the like, reign supreme. The practice of objective journalism varies from recitation of statements by the powerful or rehashing of news subsidies (Harcup and O’Neil’s 2017: 1473) (near the border of the *Sphere of Consensus*) to adversarialism or derision where the ‘watchdogs’ rise up against ‘abuse of power’ by government. Bounding this sphere, inside, is the *Sphere of Consensus*. Here all the issues not regarded by journalists to be controversial reside. Reportage advocates or celebrates consensus liberalist values. Much of the journalist’s own contributions are reflected in punditry, editorialising and in their questions. Beyond the *Sphere of Legitimate Controversy* lies the *Sphere of Deviance*. In this realm are those views that liberal journalism rejects as unworthy such as social justice and welfare. Neutrality falls away and journalism becomes a boundary-maintaining mechanism playing a role of exposing, deriding or excluding from the public agenda those who violate the political consensus of the liberal capitalist monoculture (Hallin 1986: 117; De Sousa Santos 2014: 173). In this sphere, communication shows
heightened politico-ideological motivations and objectives (McNair 2011: 180). Journalism marks out and defends the limits of acceptable political conflict. Media discourses display multi-lingualism and extreme versatility in their constructions of policy concerns, code-switching from ‘neutral’ interpretations to authoritative accounts of social ‘consensus’ (and derision) and back again without missing a beat (Schudson 2002: 263). AFASA operates from the outer Sphere inwards. It mainstreams ‘deviant’ concerns and disrupts the consensus at the centre, but is itself also tied to some ideological hooks protruding from the Sphere of Consensus.

The third implication relates to the approach towards the platforms as socially, politically, and economically situated, with complex patterns of narrative storytelling, conventions of linguistic representation and to the content of their constructions. (Schudson 2002: 262; Shoemaker, Vos, Reese 2009: 73; Cook 1998: 90; Chibnall 1977). Coverage of policy in media discourses is constructed within the constraining force of cultural and symbolic systems. These include various means such as prima facie delimitation (Hartmann and Husband 1973: 274; Schudson 2002: 262; Cook 1998:94) and framing to bring out the ‘newsworthy’ elements of the policy and turn it into a compelling news story (Schudson 2002:261; Tuchman 1972: 672; Blumler and Kavanagh 1999). Once delimitation and framing are completed and the relevant news materials ‘gathered’, the meaning of the policy is transformed as it is “encoded” for publication (Fowler 1991:2). My analytic interest in these transformations of LEwC in the discourses, takes into account three interrelated concepts: language, discourse, and ideology.

I draw from Saussure’s (1974) seminal work showing that meanings do not exist prior to the system of a particular language. Meanings issue from a language (Saussure 1974). The key assumption is that language is ideologically saturated, and is a world view, even opinion (see Bakhtin 1981: 271; Hill and Montag 2000; Hill 2000; Fraser 1990 and Gardiner 2004). Language and discourse are central to the distribution of social goods, by allowing people to do things and to be things (see Gee 1999: 19 my emphasis). The language used in the discourses of the four platforms of this study imposes a structure of values, social and economic in origin, on the policy (Fowler 1991; Fairclough 2015). I seek to establish the social construction of their texts by referencing their genesis in the social relations of
production and to identify the social values which make up the perspective(s) that they share (Cook 1998: 101; Fowler 1991: 25).

In the context of economic inequality in South Africa, my interest is on the directionality (Fairclough 1989; Purvis and Hunt 1993) of the influences that the language of the four platforms seeks to exercise on the distribution of social goods (Gee 1999). I treat language as a constructive mediator, a structuring medium with its own structural features (Berger and Luckman 1976; Fowler 1991). I consider how it endows the LEwC policy with meanings or significances, how it organises it into categories and relationships which are not there naturally, and whose interests, values, and behaviours it represents (Saussure 1974; Fowler 1991). Media discourses are written in ways that are determined socially and have social effects (Fairclough 2015: 56). Their texts are not “disembodied cultural artefacts” that produce their own immanent messages independently of social relations (Cook 1998: 101).

As part of the social process, the language in the LEwC narratives constructs the discourses of groups of people (Fairclough 2015). “Discourse is semiosis [and more]” (Fairclough, Jessop, Sayer 2004: 33). It provides a powerful set of statements about LEwC and organises how the policy is talked about (Kress 1985). By concerning themselves with certain objects and putting forward certain concepts at the expense of others, the LEwC discourses represent an exercise of a form of power, a mode of forming beliefs/values/desires, an institution, a mode of social relating, and a material practice (MacDonnell 1986: 3).

Harvey’s (1996) dialectical view of the social process enunciates the foregoing point. He outlines six elements of the social process in which discourse is one: discourse (language), power, social relations, material practices, institutions (and rituals), beliefs (values and desires). The elements are distinct but related. When types of discourse work to naturalise and sustain unequal power relations, they are said to be functioning ideologically (Fairclough 1989: 33). Such discourses operate according to systems of meanings that install everybody in imaginary relations to the real relations in which they live (Althusser 1971: 31), shaping consciousness and cultivating the exercise of power through consensual submission of the very people who are dominated (MacDonnell 1986: 27; Litowitz 2000). This consciousness, Purvis and Hunt (1993: 474) argue, is borne through language and it makes a difference, that is, the way in which people comprehend and make sense of the social world has consequences for the direction and character of their action and inaction. This is hegemony. It
is insidious and complicated to achieve. It presupposes countless linguistic micro-mechanisms\(^3\) to realise (KhosraviNik 2010: 61). As the favoured vehicle of ideology – a key mechanism of rule by consent – discourse is of considerable significance in understanding asymmetrical power relations in South Africa and how these are sustained through political communication (Fairclough 1989: 34).

**Part A**

*The South African political communication arrangements: from colonialism to Apartheid*

The key feature of colonialism was the domination of the Global South by the capitalist West, economically and symbolically. The emphasis was on the economic variables (Horvarth 1972: 46). This study links economic survival in the context of serious economic hardships in the West, capitalistic aspirations and a sense of superiority as the motive force for the instantiation of the colonisation programme (Palmer 1971; Dussell 1993; O’Rouke 2006; Baines 1995; Rotberg 2014). The power of the press became the fulcrum for this domination. Britain exported its social and market institutions and liberal ideology ostensibly on a mission “to enlighten” South Africa (Ainslie 1966). From the beginning, newspapers were businesslike and professional, looking to London for their example and for a long time for editors and senior staff (Ainslie 1966). Strict regulation of the country’s public sphere by the missionaries and market imperatives reflected this professional and paternalistic ethos in a Liberal model of the press (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Early English newspapers avoided critical content and focused on positioning themselves within the ideological framework of liberal capitalism (Smith 1946; Sandwith 1998; Draper 2003). Colonial (and market) idiosyncrasies and their impacts on the social institutions they spawned, have formed the economic and political framework for the South African press and national communication arrangements since that time.

It was under the colonial regime though, in the 1830s, that ‘new’ ideas and echoes of decoloniality (Fanon 1963: 54-55) started budding inspired by a small group of missionary-educated, pioneering Black intellectuals. Their articulation of a decolonial impulse in discourse followed decades of brutal wars between a well-armed colonial invader and the

\(^3\)The term ‘micro’ is being used refers to textual processes that cover a range of linguistic categories ranging from lexical choices to argumentative strategies.
African forces of resistance that ended with the total military defeat of Black people and in the instantiation of Eurocentric socio-economic arrangements. The first isiXhosa press, for example, Umshumayeli weendaba (1837-1841), shares its genesis with the origins of the reimagining of the struggle against colonial domination through organised African political activity (Karis and Carter 1972). In a letter to Isigidiimi samaXhosa newspaper (1882), writer, politician, teacher and activist, Isaac Wauchope called for the transformation of the military struggle for rights and the dignity of amaXhosa to an intellectual battle in the press: “fire with your pen. Press on the page, engage your mind; focus on facts, and speak loud and clear…” he wrote.

In 1902, the Treaty of Vereeniging ended the war between two groups of colonial invaders, the Boers and the English, over South African land resources. The Treaty transferred the political control of the new Union of South Africa from the British to the Afrikaners. The latter used their new political authority to develop a corpus of literature in support of the paternalistic order of race-relations (Visser 2004) that would help transform the Union into an even more gruesome theatre of economic pain for Black people. They wasted no time in introducing even more grotesque innovations in unbridled racist capitalistic dispossession and accumulation (Daniels 1989; Ebrahim 2011; Kunnie 2000). The 1913 Land Act stands out as the giant wrong in the new Parliament’s “mad career” (Plaatje 1921: 202). Their negative, hostile, baaskap, or “white man boss” Nationalism was targeted against the British liberal cautious nibbling at theoretical Black-White equality, and predicated on their group identity and their treasured Black labor supply (Hepple 1960: 18; Lovell 1956: 310). This nationalistic impulse culminated in the powerful entry of “Apartheid” into the Afrikaans lexicon in 1930’s and into the South African government system under the Nationalist Party in 1948 (Lovell 1956: 308). The “Red Peril” and the “Black Peril” are themes that emerged in Afrikaner literature in the 1930s and 1940s in which communists (“Red Peril”) were depicted as enemies of private property and proponents of equality between Black people (“Black

54 See his poem Zemnk’ iinkomo magwalandini (There go your cattle, you cowards) https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/isaac-williams-wauchope
55 A system of institutionalised racial segregation that existed in South Africa before democracy. Apartheid was characterised by an authoritarian political culture based on baasskap (or white supremacy), which ensured that South Africa was dominated politically, socially, and economically by the nation's minority White population. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apartheid
Peril”) and White people (Visser 2004: 107). With time, the two themes came to mean one unified ‘threat’ in official thinking (Nel 1990: 2-3).

The Nationalist Party facilitated the establishment of a wide multi-disciplinary network of media organisations, businesses, academics, Afrikaner churches, ecclesiastical and government institutions that it coopted into supporting its ideological position. The emergent Afrikaner political hierarchy under Apartheid, introduced a Polarised Pluralist Model of the press, integrating the Afrikaans press that they created using the might of the state, into party politics to push the idea of the volkseenheid ([White] national unity) against the “Red Peril” and the “Black Peril” (Hepple 1960: 18; Hallin and Mancini 2004: 11; Visser 2004). The spectrum of ruthless fascism (Van Den Berghe 1962: 598) that the Nationalist Party government introduced in South Africa since 1948, transformed the country’s political communication arrangements in a significant way.

This is important background to the ethno-linguistic character of the country’s press that came to be known as the English, Afrikaans, and the Black Press (Jackson 1993; Potter 1975; Tomaselli, Tomaselli, Muller 1987). Each press broadly maintained its own ethnicised political identity that was shaped by its relation to the colonial [and Apartheid], state (Steenveld 2007). Both the English and the Afrikaans presses were committed to White supremacy and racist capitalism, but pursued this ideal with policies that were formulated in different terms (SPROCAS 1971: 160). The interrelation and complementarity between English liberalism and the Apartheid baaskap cannot be overemphasised. Within this dominant framework however, a broad spectrum of discourses reflect more than simply wholehearted efforts to support the racist liberal capitalist colonial and Apartheid systems (Karis and Carter 1972). Important discursive struggles against the system occurred, featuring

---

“oppositional” views including a decolonial perspective that caught the attention of both the colonial and Apartheid authorities.

**English Press**

Colonialism was a powerful, odious, and condescending narrative, a false doctrine of humanism cloaked in the garb of salvation that thrived on the pretext of “humanising”, “civilising” and “enlightening” Black people\(^\text{57}\) (Eze 2011; Ainslie 1966; Heese 1988). Its ethos in South Africa is eminently personified by Cecil Rhodes (Maylam 2005) in the colonial age of the fortune hunters (Palmer 1977) with Rhodes himself being a fortune hunter extraordinaire\(^\text{58}\) (Rotberg 2014). Along with the brutal dispossession of land by colonists, including through acts of corruption\(^\text{59}\) (Palmer 1977), the wealth of Black people was expropriated, alongside a damaging process of epistemicide. De Sousa Santos (2016: 18) uses the concept to describe the deliberate and systematic destruction of indigenous cultures and knowledge, and mental shackling (see for example Holden 1877:13, Stewart 1871: 4; Majeke 1952). Epistemicide contributed to the cultural dissolution of indigenous epistemologies, the related social, economic, and political arrangements, including how relations between individuals and with nature were understood and practised (Rubusana 1910; Plaatje 1921, 1930; Mqhayi 1974, 2009; Ngara 2007; Heese 1988). Self-interest (Jayawardena 1969; Marx and Engels 1848), liberal ideology, and racism were instituted in their place. The cognitive injustice that exists in knowledge production since colonialism is symbiotically linked to the social and economic injustice that has characterised South Africa since that era (Barreto 2014: 396).

From the first ‘independent’ English paper *The South African Commercial Advertiser* (1824),

\(^{57}\)See also *The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the year 1803* (1817). Vol XXX

\(^{58}\)For instance, by 1888, in his thirty-fifth year, Rhodes controlled much of the wealth of South Africa and was well on his way to being one of the richest men in the empire.

\(^{59}\)Under the title: the age of fortune hunters, Palmer details the role played by the millionaire imperialist Cecil Rhodes in late Victorian times, in reckless speculation, extensive land-grabbing, corruption and maladministration in Southern Africa. Much was promised with the rampant land-taking, usually that many jobs will be created and that there will be technological transfer, but such promises have rarely been honoured.
the country’s press was founded on a racist, liberal capitalistic legacy laid by Rhodes (Switzer and Switzer 1978). The liberal press, contributed to the construction of Eurocentrism that patterns the land question as a social imaginary, constitutive of the limits that structure the field of socio-economic intelligibility (Laclau 1990: 64). The English press was “an owned press, the rigid and regimented voice of its masters and a propaganda agency controlled by financiers in the interests of the gold mining trusts”60. The focus of the printing press of that era such as the Argus Printing and Publishing Company (1857), was on the financial and commercial interests in the Cape.

The English press was not on a mission to hold the colonial government to account for the gross economic, social, and immoral violations against Black people. The content of the liberal press was mainly on government with political content as its defining characteristic (Ainslie 1966; Palmer 1977). They focused on events and personalities rather than issues of land dispossession, ignoring the conditions and contexts in which those stories took place (Switzer 1997). News that might threaten the economic interests of their largely White, English-speaking readership was omitted, trivialised, or downplayed (Switzer 1997). What the English Press wanted, Gilliomee (1994) argues, was a pro-capitalist state that steadily absorbed Blacks as political managers while safeguarding ‘stability’. Stability in this context related exclusively to those with a stake in the economy rather than the dispossessed Black people.

Colonialists used the media for information and mind-management (Switzer and Switzer 1978: 10; Couzens 1982: 2 and 29). The prevailing commonsense linked newspapers to instruments of domination and paternalistic control that included the naturalisation of the colonial logic through modalities of race differentiation (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 4, Eze 2011). Colonialism [and later Apartheid] depended on the naturalisation of the “empty” concept of ‘race’ and its “ideological grip on … popular imagination and the effects it induced…” (Soudien 2011: 50), such as the ‘natural apartness’ of White and Black and the related iniquitous distribution of social goods and advantages (see Buchanan 1982, Gee 1999). The power and influence exerted by the press in this regard were linked to the adjustments of social norms and interpersonal relationships (Curran 1991) that cultivated the

---

60 Characterisation of the English daily press in the periodical, *The Trek* (28 August 1942: 9)
violent tendencies of dominant Western ideals (see Maldonado-Torres 2008: 5) in the service of racist class interest.

The dialectical relationship between the press, the colonialism narrative and the racialised economic establishment that birthed it, turned on favourable framing and cognitive legitimation of the oppressive socio-economic system. Prime Minister Jan Smuts, English mining capital and its media, following the 1922 general strike in South Africa, were concerned about the presumed “evils” inherent to communism and framed the strike as a “Red Revolt” or “Red Terror” (Visser 2004: 106). They were concerned about the “danger” if Bolshevism should take root among the Black population and deteriorate “into something reminiscent of the French Revolution” (Visser 2004: 106). “Political parallelism” describes the colonial tendencies through which media outlets became associated with different political tendencies – specifically liberal capitalism (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 27). This is what linked the English Press to the (later) Afrikaans press almost as two sides of the same coin in important ways.

**Afrikaans Press**

The Afrikaans press, a product and beneficiary of the Nationalist Party government largesse, was unashamedly partisan in its protection of the Apartheid capitalist enterprise and Afrikaner ethnic nationalism (Lovell 1956; Tomaselli et al 1987; Hadland 2012). The colonial ideology of White supremacy that Apartheid codified into law, was a system of settler capitalist colonialism in which racism was the ruling ideology and capitalism its economic policy (Tomaselli et al 1987; Kunnie 2000). The Afrikaans press was an integral part, co-architect, and a prominent institutional reflection of this establishment and its lifeblood through its character, conceptual laagering (Pinnock’s 1991: 136) of the White electorate, and ideological practice. Die Huisgenoot, a popular Afrikaans magazine since

---

61 Entrenchment of a position or viewpoint in a parochial sense, and that is defended against opponents.
the 1930s, was highly regarded in Afrikaner circles as the “poor man’s university” for its endeavours to “educate mostly lower and illiterate classes”, who were “leavened with communist ideas – probably without knowing it” (Muller 1990; Visser 2004). It sourced some of its contents from the writings of National Party ministers such as Finance Minister, Nico Diederichs’ Die Kommunisme: Sy Teorie en Taktiek [Communism: Its Theory and Tactics] (1938).

The press mobilised Afrikaans-speaking Whites on the basis of a separatist ideology and cultural rhetoric to foment a common White ethnic group solidarity (volkseenheid) against the “Red Peril” and the “Black Peril” (Visser 2004). Daily (re)production in discourse, of race and dehumanisation of Black people became the shrewd means for the inculcation and normalization of colonial and Apartheid war ethics (expropriation, exploitation, accumulation by dispossession, economic enslavement etc.) against them (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 3; Tomaselli 1991: 159-160; Rich 1986: 475). Its coverage of any possibility of social change suggested in the Black and liberal presses, on White lifestyles sought to promote siege politics and to contribute to the feeling of trauma (Tomaselli et al 1987; van Zyl Slabbert 1989: 53).


---

63 The South Africa Foundation is an association of South Africa's largest corporations and major multinational companies with a significant presence in South Africa. The Foundation is the independent, non-partisan voice of South African business leadership. It is financed entirely by private subscription from its corporate members to promote the interests of South Africa and its people. The Foundation seeks to formulate and express coordinated views on macro-economic and other national issues and to promote the interests and further growth of South Africa's private sector both domestically and internationally (see https://www.eldis.org/organisation/A4458)
Africa to the world (Ginwala 1972: 37). Within this controlled, collegial professional environment, the English press could indulge in an apparent opposition to the Boers’ obsession with race, and their contempt for the Boers themselves, while providing the facade behind which an inhumane system guaranteed privileges based on “race” and, more importantly, on class (Pilger 2022). The English ‘opposition press’ created the illusion of greater freedom for political dissent and debate than existed in South Africa and hence, the possibility of change (SPROCAS 1971: 160). Their liberal outspokenness when it occurred, when for instance matters reached disaster proportions (Ginwala 1972: 33-34), did not cut across the line of policy that was foremost the interests of business and the state (Smith 1946: 77).

The press was concerned almost exclusively with the economic and social life of people described by the state as White, and consumed mainly by them (Switzer 1997). They operated as “guard dogs” (Donohue et al 1995: 123) of the South African economy (Couzens 1982: 2; Johnson 1991: 22). Their agenda sought to lubricate the country’s foreign capitalist networks and to keep investors sweet. One way to do this was by managing how the domestic socio-economic situation was framed and understood in the liberal capitalist West. Black oppression and its causes were an intentional blind spot in their narratives (Ginwala 1972: 33-34; Nerone 1995: 100). As the South African dispossession crises were deepened to respond to a rapid increase in the numbers of poor Whites over the first three decades of the twentieth century (Fourie 2006), the news media projected a facade of calm and stability to conceal the throbbing agony of the social and economic stresses and strains visited upon Black people. The media played a key role in diverting attention from the economic exploitation of Black people under racist liberal capitalism (see for example Onslow 2009; Daniel 2009; Van Wyk 2009).

The press became the conveyors of an exclusive class culture (Pinnock 1991: 136) that valued individualism and private property rights as the “natural state of man (sic)” (Nerone 1995: 72; Lee Plaisance 2005: 293-294). It did not challenge existing legal rights, and was programmatically conservative (Calpin 1941: 322). Private property and market logic were

---

64 http://johnpilger.com/videos/apartheid-did-not-die
65 Neville Curtis makes a similar point, in the winter issue of *Foreign Affairs* (1972).
treated as sacrosanct and social justice was among the absences in the media discourses (De Sousa Santos 2014; Benson 2004; Lee Plaisance 2005).

By the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa had become a cauldron of the East vs West ideological contest between global economic systems – communism vs capitalism. In this conflict, South Africa was seen as an “outpost” of Western civilization in Africa (Visser 2004: 115). The liberation of the Portuguese colonies in Angola and Mozambique in 1974, Zimbabwe’s political independence in 1980, and increasing Black unrest and the ANC’s acts of sabotage inside South Africa convinced the Nationalist Party that an internationally coordinated “total onslaught” was being directed against White power in the country (Visser 2004). The “Red Peril” was seen to be applying a “psychological onslaught” against die Vaderland [South Africa] with the use of the media to influence world opinion negatively (De Villiers 1975). Publications such as Het Die Afrikaanse Volk ’n Toekoms? [Do Afrikaner people have a future?], and Die Stryd om die Wêreld [The fight for the World] urged that South Africa, under the leadership of America should make an all-out effort to check the advance of communism (see Van Jaarsveld 1962: 8; Van Rooyen 1993: 8). War was not beyond the realm of possibilities brought up in discourse. The result was that the average White South African, especially during the period 1974-1984, was imbued with the psychosis of a fear of a world-wide communist threat (see Nel 1993; ISMUS66 1987). But the “total onslaught” was found by USMUS67 itself, to have been a false preoccupation fueled by the media’s “simplistic” utterances on the so-called “Soviet onslaught” against South Africa. Moneyweb and Afriforum are epistemologically linked to this tradition.

Alongside the mainstream liberal and Afrikaner nationalistic presses, a collection of peripheral iconoclastic dual medium periodicals and small, less profitable Afrikaans newspapers existed in the late 1930s and 1940s. The Communist Manifesto was translated

66 ISSUS: Ms 368, File “Kommissie vir Sending onder Kommuniste”: Correspondence, P R Nel – P W de Wet, 12 June 1987.
67 The Institute for the Study of Marxism at the University of Stellenbosch was established following a call by A.M. van Schoor, editor of Die Vaderland – an Afrikaans daily, who advocated for the establishment of chairs at (Afrikaans-speaking) universities “to study world politics with special reference to Communism.”
into Afrikaans by members of the Afrikaans literary community in 1938 and formed part of a spectrum of Communist, Stalinist and independent critical periodicals such as *Voice of Labour, The Trek, The Forum, The Guardian, Fighting Talk, The Forward* (Smith 1946, Visser 2004). *The role of the Missionaries during conquest* (Majeke [Taylor] 1952) is an important example of an attack on the missionaries as a progenitor of conquest and mental shackling of Africans.

**The Black Press**

I look at the Black press in four interrelated contexts linked to Switzer and Switzer’s (1978) typology. The first is the Missionary press (1830-1880). This is the phase of Eurocentrism in discourse. The Elitist press (1880-1930) marked the birth and rise of Black-controlled presses. The phase of Black readers-White capital (1931-1977) saw the appropriation of Black presses by White capital for the promotion of White economic and political interests. The alternative press phase (1980-1994) (Tomaselli and Louw 1991) brought about a radical ideological ferment as imagined and real internal and external forces pushed the Apartheid government into a state of crisis – the total onslaught paradigm (Conway 2008; Roherty and Roherty 1992).

The Black Press, with a few exceptions68 according Switzer (1991), Couzens (1982) and Tomaselli (1991), was mainly a reformist protest press seeking acceptance of Africans in the colonial capitalist economic order (Lodge 1979; Switzer and Switzer 1978). Within this general practice however, important contributions of pioneering Black intellectuals who used journalism to reimagine and transform the battlefield in the struggle against colonialism started paving a new intellectual way for Black resistance. They did this through nuances in their writings, how they constructed their texts and the journeys they inscribed in them (Kuse 1978; Attwell 2005; Odendaal 1984). Their contributions account for the transformation of a liberal reformist character of the early Black press into an evolving radical orientation as they successfully appropriated it in important instances, as a means of struggle.

---

68 They cite for example, *Izwi Labantu, Izwi lase Township* or the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union’s Workers Herald where they argue, there were glimpses of radicalism in the second phase.

69 See also Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society Report 1838: 65 ([https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/search/archives/37673518-a23d-321a-aef7-ccadce9d875](https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/search/archives/37673518-a23d-321a-aef7-ccadce9d875))
Printing in the Missionary phase reflected the colonial ethos of symbolic domination and was designed for non-political, information, educational and religious purposes. The first isiXhosa printed works, Umshumayeli weendaba (1837-1841), Isibuto samavo (1843-1844), Ikwezi (1844-1845), Isithunywa senyanga (1850) and Indaba (1862-1865) were subject to strict missionary controls and designed for mission schools\(^6\) (Opland 2004: 33). Black writers framed their arguments within the missionary discourse while simultaneously giving voice to a strong belief in the integrity and values of African societies that colonialism sought to denigrate (Odendaal 1984: 27).

Tiyo Soga is credited with the first expression of an Africa-consciousness by a Black writer in Southern Africa\(^7\) (Odendaal 2012). Diasporic thinking linked his writing to a global and redemptive history emerging at the end of slavery (see Williams 1978: 97; Attwell 2005: 40). He started testifying to the harsh encounters between Black people and the colonists in the 1860s while also urging his readers to take pride in their traditions (Williams 1978: 154). Soga and like-minded peers developed an anti-colonial template of ideas and strategies that the succeeding generations of educated Africans drew upon in articulating their aspirations and ideas (Odendaal 2012: 27). Their efforts in re-purposing the missionary press contributed to the emergence of national African languages literature of protest in South Africa (Kuse 1978: 270).

In the second phase, Black writers deepened their intellectual struggle for political and social equality. Lamenting the amaXhosa’s dispossession of their cattle in Isigidimi samaXhosa in 1882, Isaac Wauchope called for the transformation of the military struggle into an intellectual battle in the media\(^7\). Code choices, and specifically code-switching, became the main vehicle for conveying intentional meanings of a social nature (Kunene 1986: 1043; Myers-Scotton 1992: 179; Maseko 2018: 37). Black authors had to be oblique, deploying elaborate simile and metaphor for their articles to escape censure by the missionary

---

\(^{6}\) See King Williams Town gazette 1865 (available at http://www.wright.edu/~christopher.oldstone-moore/tiyo.htm)

\(^{7}\) See his poem Zemnk’ iinkomo magwalandini (There go your cattle, you cowards) https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/isaac-williams-wauchope

\(^{72}\) Tiyo Soga wrote: “This ‘Morning Sir,’ of the Xhosa people whenever they see a White face is annoying” Isigidimi SamaXhosa 1882: 5 (https://cdm21048.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p21048coll72/id/963/rec/116)
authorities. Yet at the same time they were able to convey different anti-establishment connotations to attentive Black ears (Kebler 1987: 273). There are recorded instances of direct disregard shown for White supremacist philosophy, and where issues of the deprivation of rights, dispossession, White attitudes, brutality and nationalistic appeals for Black unity were engaged in different formats (Isigidimi SamaXhosa 1884, 1885; Opland 2004).

African-controlled journalism began during this phase when John Tengo Jabavu, with liberal financial support, founded Imvo zabaNtsundu (1884) to chronicle a range of African concerns such as deprivation of rights and dispossession (Karis and Carter 1972). Many publications by African intellectuals and activists followed, all articulating the rights of Black people, Izwi Labantu (1897) by Allan Kirkland Soga, Koranta ea Becoana (1901) and Tsala ea Batho (1910) by Solomon Plaatje, Indian Opinion (1903) by Mahatma Gandhi, Ilanga lasaNatal (1904) and Abantu-batho (1912) the mouthpiece of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) (Ginwala 1972). These publications provide evidence of increased recognition of the African intelligentsia’s power of the pen.

Literary work by Black intellectuals during this phase matured and influential publications such as Zemnk’ inkomo magwalandini (Rubusana 1906), The Natives and their Missionaries (Wauchope 1908), Ityala lamawele (Mqhayi 1914), Native Life in South Africa (1916), Mhudi (Plaatje 1930), emerged carrying subtle and finely tuned counter-narratives to the storyline of the colonial government. They idealised African societies of the past in different ways. They criticised and subverted ideological tendencies that denigrated precolonial systems and customs, and cultural practices resulting from those tendencies (Mpe 1998; Opland 2003; Remmington 2013).

In the 1930s White capital identified money-making opportunities in the Black publishing industry, and the need to mould native opinion so that political developments would follow the course of ‘reasoned protest’ and raise Black people to the “civilized standards of the White man” (Johnson 1991: 21). This pushed powerful White commercial interests into the tradition of the Black press. The profit for White capital that took over the Black press did not

---

73 See for instance Isigidimi SamaXhosa 1884 (available at https://cdm21048.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p21048coll73/id/1222/rec/145)
lie only in the annual balance sheets of the newspaper companies, but also in the promotion of White economic interests (Ginwala 1972). Many independent African newspapers came to publish under the English and Afrikaans owned companies such as the World Printing and Publishing Company and Afrikaanse Pers. The Voortrekker Press empire, under HF Verwoerd in 1965, received government contracts worth “at least £3 million” to enter into the field of publications “for Africans” (Ainslie 1966: 81).

The Black press was stripped of its meaningful ideological commitment in favour of common-denominator journalism to maximise sales (Johnson 1991: 22). The Black press was transformed from a Protest Press – a mix of strong political advocacy, history and liberal inclinations – into an apolitical, commercial ‘non-partisan, objective, non-ideological’ mass medium of communication that reported anything from sheebeens to witchcraft (Switzer and Switzer 1978; UNESCO Report 1972). By the 1970s Black people had no press, neither one they owned, nor one that reflected their views and aspirations, nor one that strove for the attainment of their freedom (Ginwala 1972: 28). City Press broadly resonates with the Protest Press tradition. It was founded by White capital at the height of Apartheid to target an urban, working-class Black readership (see Cooper et al 2008: 109).

There were important exceptions in era of the radical commodified Black press. The agitations for inclusive citizenship and shared prosperity predicated on the ANC’s broad policy became the golden thread that tied together the liberation discourse of this phase (Ngqulunga 2019: 1337). The African Claims document (1943), for instance, presented a Bill of Rights for the African people and focused on the abolition of discriminatory laws which included the Land Act, calling for a fair distribution of the land as a prerequisite for a just settlement of the land problem, and issues such as equal pay for equal work (ANC 1943). The Freedom Charter74 (1955) declared that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, [B]lack

---

74 The Freedom Charter was the statement of core principles of the South African Congress Alliance, which consisted of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies: the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People's Congress. It is characterised by its opening demand, “The People Shall Govern!” (Source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_Charter)
and [W]hite …” (ANC, 1955). The Charter envisioned a society in which all citizens would participate in the governance of their public affairs and a society in which the mineral wealth would be shared among its citizens. The Freedom Charter would become a dominant ideological touchstone and the ANC’s lodestar in the decades building up to 1994 (see Ngqulunga 2019; Hudson 1986). There were important ideological ambiguities that the Freedom Charter generated (see for example Bunting 1975; Hudson 1986). Some of these related to the interpretations of its principal economic clauses and its construal as ‘socialist’ or at least ‘anti-capitalist’ (Suttner 1984; Cronin and Suttner 1986; Hudson 1986). For instance, despite its declaration that “The People Shall Govern”, some have viewed it as demanding nothing more than the establishment of a classical bourgeois democracy and did not invoke the socialisation of the means of production (Bunting 1975; Hudson 1986). Nelson Mandela, in In our Lifetime, asserted that the Charter did not constitute “a blue-print for a socialist state” and stressed that the dispossession of the White “mining kings” and “land barons” called for in the Charter would result not in socialism, but would on the contrary, “... open up fresh fields for the development of a prosperous non-European bourgeois class” (Mandela 1956: 6). He envisaged a “non-European bourgeoisie” with opportunities “to own in their own name and right, mills and factories” and a booming “private entreprise” (Mandela 1956: 6). Embedded in Mandela’s vision is the desire to become like the master (Fanon 1968). Thabo Mbeki would later reiterate Mandela’s standpoint in The Fatton Thesis: a rejoinder, saying that the ANC “is not a socialist party... has never pretended to be one, has never said it was, and is not trying to be” (Mbeki 1984: 609).

A radical tone coexisted with the liberalist opposition to the colonial and Apartheid socio economic arrangements. The Torch (1943), official newspaper of the then Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), championed the idea of Black unity as a precondition for the overthrow of White rule (Adhikari 2005). The Spark, an organ of the Workers’ Party of South Africa, reflected spirited adherence to the class struggle (Hirson 1995).

From the 1970s, the press in South Africa operated under particularly strict authoritarian control by the Nationalist Party. Business think tanks advocating for reforms to improve the social condition of Black people that Black activists viewed as moderate, for example, The Urban Foundation (1976), were seen by the Nationalist Party as too critical (Wielenga and Rynhart 2021: 1).
Radical leftist newspapers emerged in the early radical ideological ferment phase, such as Izwilethu, SA Labour Bulletin, New Nation and, New African (Switzer and Switzer 1978; Tomaselli et al 1987; Louw and Tomaselli 1991). Broadly categorised as alternative forms of media, these presses were bound by the common purpose of providing alternatives to the liberal capitalist status quo (Bailey, Commaerts and Carpenter 2007; Johnson 1991). They focused on journalistic activism expressed through oppositional content, community struggles and espousing democratic socialism (see Mervis 1989, Ntshakalala and Emdon 1991; Louw 1991; Louw and Tomaselli 1991; Johnson 1991). During the same period and into the early 1990s, when the Nationalist Party government started talking about reforms, a spate of racist, fascist, and right-wing religious pamphlets, such as Aida Parker Newsletter, Stand To, The Freedom Fighter, emerged criticising the Left and government for selling out to Blacks (Tomaselli 1991: 160).

Epochal developments in the world economy that occurred in the decade of the 1970s are important to note here in the context of their far-reaching ramifications for South Africa. These developments are important in view of the role of foreign patronage and ties with capital that contributed to the ANC becoming the symbolic leader of the liberation struggle (Jayawardena 1969: 870). These developments, which the ANC would later embrace (Freund 2013; Padayachee 1998), included the deregulation of financial markets, new possibilities attendant to mass communication technologies, and how they are exploited by corporate capital that controls them (Bernstein 2003: 209; 2007: 38). Equally important, were the ideological and political ascendancy of neo-liberalism in (a selective) ‘rolling back of the state’, including the structural adjustment programmes, economic liberalisation and ‘state reform/good governance’ agendas imposed on the countries of the South (Bernstein 2007: 38). A new world economic order was emerging characterised by globalization under which political communication was undergoing significant transformation.

These developments marked the culmination of a process that began with Eurocentred colonial/modern capitalism as the basis of the New global order (Quijano 2000: 533). Under this system, transnational corporations, international currency speculators and large institutional investors are part of a transnational web of new power relations and their complex interconnections (Couldry and Curran 2003; Fraser 2008). With the intensification of worldwide social relations under globalisation, local occurrences are shaped by events miles away and vice versa (Giddens 1990: 64; Fraser 2008: 13). Discourse plays an increasingly important role in this globalised order characterised by a growing salience of
transnational public opinion which flows with supreme disregard for borders through global
mass media and cyber technology (Fraser 2008: 13-14; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Hart
2002).

This globalising tendency coincided with the reconfiguration of South Africa’s international
political relations, as the Soviet Union was coming to an end, bringing about significant post-
Cold War geopolitical instabilities (Fraser 2008; Bernstein 2003). The East/West divide was
being transformed and the old divisions between the coloniser and colonised were reemerging
in what is referred to as the North-South relationship (Said 1994:18). Nkrumah (1969) and
Spivak (1990) use the term ‘postcolonial or neocolonised’ world to describe the problematic
terrain where the ex-colonies operate in a world with the North as the apex of global power
while the South languishes at the subaltern bottom. The term captures a structure where the
African and the Western worlds collide under racialised, hegemonic, hierarchical, and
unequal terms. As the centre of global capitalism, Europe and North America not only control
world markets, but also impose their imperial dominance over the planet through discourse,
incorporating everyone into their model of power (Quijano 2000: 540).

While these global developments were unfolding, White capital in South Africa realised that
Black majority rule was unavoidable. Concerned about protecting their substantial economic
interests, they carved a central role for themselves in the transition through a "toenadering"
(rapprochement) internally and externally (Gumede 2008; Hirsch 2005: 43; Kunnie 2000). In
an historic visit to Lusaka, Zambia, a group of liberal White business people and political
leaders discussed change in South Africa with the exiled ANC (Nattrass 2017, Kunnie 2000).
A Swiss rendezvous later, also brought together big capital and key ANC policymakers
(Sparks 2003). Secret meetings with head of corporations that had shored up Apartheid took
place in England (Pilger 2022). Later, at key points in the transition story, this strategy would
prove critical (Wielenga and Rynhart 2021: 1) as some business champions ended up at
crucial ministries in the liberated SA. The available literature on economic policy of the
ANC prior to, and in the transition era in the early 1990s, confirms that the party was never
driven in its research, discussions, processes, and policy initiatives by a radical redistribution

75 Derek Keys had roles in business as a consultant for local and international businesses, and
a member of numerous Boards. He was also the Executive Chairman of Gencor. He was
succeeded by a banker, Chris Liebenberg, in the Finance Ministry.

Just before taking over the state in 1994, the ANC was always coy and tentative in its economic posture and issues of unity distracted the party from a discussion of core issues relating to the economy (Gumede 2008: 167; Padayachee 1997: 46; Turok 2008: 22). The party was also under immense pressure on many fronts, including campaigning on the part of capitalist forces (notably British and US), to move towards policies that would give business much of what it wanted to fit South Africa into the dominant neoliberal paradigm (Freund 2013; Padayachee 1998). The 1991 party conference sidestepped discussion of economic policy almost entirely (Freund 2013). During this time the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) advocating a labour-driven development programme (Wesbter and Adler 1999: 14) was in gestation. As all this happened on the eve of the 1994 transition, the ANC’s economic policy was in a state of flux at a critical time in its history (Webster and Adler 1999; Nattrass 1994; Padayachee 1998; Osborn 1997).

Towards the mid-1990s, the alternative press had become victims of a fundamentally altered socio-economic context for which they were largely ill-prepared, following the Nationalist Party government’s lifting of media censorship (Louw and Tomaselli 1991: 18). Post 1994, when funders withdrew their support, most of these presses folded.

The Afriforum and AFASA media, inspite of important differences in their ideological content and social motivations, fall within the broad, catchall alternative media definition (see for instance Atton 2004: 3). They provide exclusive and self-constituted groups with instruments for social mobilisation. Their operating model is enabled by digital technologies that give them capacities traditionally thought to be the purview of their mainstream counterparts. Their websites connect with their social media sites, harnessing the internet’s ability to spread messages instantaneously unrestricted by time and space. This study raises questions about the ‘independence’ of the Afriforum media based on its discourse about LEwC. In important instances, it is not self-evident it is part of the truly radical media category that is not integrated into the sociopolitical system (Christians et al 2009: 181; Tomaselli 1990, 1991: 158; Louw and Tomaselli 1991; Fuchs 2010: 180; McLure 1992: 123; Vatikiotis 2008: 112).
Christians et al (2009: 181) differentiate between two versions of alternative media i.e. the “truly radical” and “less challenging”. The South African experience with racist fringe media suggests that another category, reactionary alternative media, might be a useful addition. The functional and ideological differences between these categories of alternative media are important in the processes of democratic communication. Christians’ differentiation, on the face of it, reflects the fault line between liberalism and radicalism. Fascism, dramaturgy and conceptual laagering seem to be the hallmarks of the reactionary alternative media category. There are analytic and overt similarities between the less challenging and reactionary alternative media like Afriforum, on the one hand, and the mainstream liberal media. Both categories do not problematise the dominant liberal capitalist ideology. Inequality and glaring social injustice hardly feature as angles in their story materials. They deploy strategy or game frames (Brewer and Gross 2010: 160; Cappella and Jamieson 1997) in their narratives and adopt a zero-sum perspective in relation to issues of equality and injustice.

Despite the ominous signs of ideological capture by big business and betrayal of an historic mission (Fanon 1963), the Black majority and ANC’s centuries’ old dream of economic emancipation and universal rights were foregrounded in its 1994 election Manifesto, the RDP. It directly addressed the consequences of land dispossession under colonialism, racism, Apartheid, sexism, and repressive labour policies.

On coming to power however, it became clear that the strong overtures by big capital had catalysed the stripping of the ANC of any radical inclinations in favour of a moderate line in future economic policy (Hirsch 2005: 47; McKinley 1997: 88). The party was quick to reassure landowners that land redistribution would proceed according to market principles in line with the interim constitution and the Bill of Rights (Adams 2000: 9). For the ANC’s leadership the RDP was just a mobilising tool for election purposes (Padayachee 1998: 440). It assumed power with a macro-economic policy guided by a neoliberal framework, dismissing a left–Keynesian orientation (see Jahan, Mahmud and Papageorgiou 2014) to economic and social policy proposed by groups of progressive economic academics led by

the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG) (Webster and Adler 1999) that it had sought help from. The government-favoured policy was consistent with the framework of Apartheid neoliberalism under the previous NP government’s Normative Economic Model (Padayachee 1998: 439). The outcome was a qualified settlement of national liberation/national democratic revolution, less than some of its militants and popular base had envisaged (Bernstein 2003: 212). The deferral of the dream of Black emancipation was inaugurated by the ANC (Hughes 2002). This outcome was to become clear in the continuities of historic relations of property, production, economic power, and especially in the patterns of the colonial and Apartheid distribution of land and their associated exclusive control of agricultural production (see also Oxfam 2020; Bernstein 2003).

Trevor Manuel, who served three South African presidents as Minister in the Presidency and Finance Minister, is now serving Rothschild as an advisor and Deputy Chairman77. The Mandela Rhodes Foundation78 established 10 years before Mandela’s passing, in partnership with The Rhodes Trust79 is one of Nelson Mandela’s official legacy organisations. There are many other examples depicting poisonous intimacy between influential ANC figures and big capital.

**Part B**

*The South African political communication arrangements: the democratic era*

The democratic era in South Africa brought about a mixed-bag of transformative outcomes for the politics-mediascape in the country with undisturbed continuities, discontinuities and unheralded novelties that shaped the structure of media markets, the role of the state, and the practice of journalism. These transformations have important implications for the nature and

77 [https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-10-03-the-company-man-trevor-manuel-maries-the-rothschilds/about](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-10-03-the-company-man-trevor-manuel-maries-the-rothschilds/about). In the 20 years that Manuel served in the South African Government he was Minister of Finance and Minister in the Presidency, responsible for the National Planning Commission. During his ministerial career, he assumed a number of ex-officio positions at international bodies including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the G20.

78 [https://www.mandelerhodes.org/about/](https://www.mandelerhodes.org/about/)

79 The Rhodes Trust was founded by Cecil Rhodes to develop “people who are impatient with the way things are and have the courage to act.” [https://www.rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk/](https://www.rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk/)
structure of society and its emancipatory possibilities.

For the first three years of democracy, South Africa was by the Government of National Unity (GNU), a compromise to reassure conservative financial circles (Padayachee 1997: 48). It consisted of the ANC governing with the architects of Apartheid, the Nationalist Party, and business figures who took up key positions in the running the country economic affairs. Chris Stals continued as Governor of the Reserve Bank, his position under the Apartheid government. The Agriculture portfolio was assigned to another Apartheid minister, Kraai van Niekerk who, until his resignation in 1998, ensured that policy followed the deregulation approach started under Apartheid to integrate agriculture into the global trade environment (Dannson, Ezedinma, Wambua, Bashasha, Kirsten and Satorius 2004: 69; Parliament 2016: 10). The ANC listened respectfully to big business taking up their suggestions (Gumede 2008: 79). It was subjected to the carrot and stick approach: understanding the evils of racism and the need for change, but also what might happen if they tried to defy business consensus, both nationally and internationally (Freund 2013).

A state-centric evaluation of these outcomes such as Hadland’s (2012) is illuminating but may also be limited without due cognisance of the corresponding global network of relations after the Cold War, the related geo-political adjustments, and the ANC’s policy choices in this global context. The ‘new’ political communication system in the country, a product of an intricate relationship between these choices and the exogenous global developments, has become a transformed public sphere – both structurally and conceptually. Society today has become increasingly subjected to different forms of media, such as the Moneyweb, Afriforum and AFASA news, as critical sources of information about politics (Berger 1999: 113; Blumler and Kavanagh 1999: 213). The coincidence of the “third age of political communication” (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999), deregulation, and South Africa’s liberation,

---

80 Clause 88 of the interim Constitution required that any party holding twenty or more seats in the National Assembly could claim one or more cabinet portfolios and enter the government. This arrangement was known as the provision for a Government of National Unity (GNU). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_National_Unity_(South_Africa)


82 Derek Keys was succeeded by banker Chris Liebenberg, in the Finance Ministry. Derek Keys had roles in business as a consultant for local and international businesses, and a member of numerous Boards. He was also the Executive Chairman of Gencor.
brought about more complexity in political communication (Brants 1998; Buckingham 1987). It is this discursive nature of modern society that assigns an increasing pivotal role to discourse as the main apparatus of collective consent making (KhosraviNik 2010: 61).

Platforms with international reach, interoperable capacities, and that harness the power of converged technologies etc., are relatively easy to establish and operate. Power relations between message providers and receivers have undergone important rearrangement (Asp 2014). The culture of political journalism is being transformed and with it, the meanings implications, and expectations of ‘state power’, ‘democracy’ and ‘citizenship’ are subject to change in daily discourses. This is a demonstration of “strong commercialism” and the media’s move towards the centre of social processes (Allern and Blach-Ørsten’s 2011: 93; Landerer 2013: 251). The media are doing far more than just the liberal assignment to inform, educate, and entertain. The transformation of their task from mediation to mediatisation, comments on the ways in which media reshape social and political processes (Asp 2014: 80-1; Brants and Voltrer 2011; Kriesi et al 2013).

Assessments of the political communication system in the early years of democracy suggest that despite some shifts, the media did not make any significant changes towards becoming part of the ‘new’ South Africa (Berger 1999; ANC 1997). President Mandela lamented that the “bulk of the media in the country had set itself up as a force opposed to the ANC”\(^83\). Some posited that the media functioned as a drag on democratisation and socio-economic transformation (Berger 1999: 86). At the annual general meeting of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) in 2008, concern was raised about a lack of fundamental reorientation of the role of country’s media from its historical path\(^84\). Tomaselli (1997: 16) and Memele (1999) suggest that the media continued to serve the interests of elite groups: a case of old wine in new skins. But, there are perspectives that extoll the dilution of the historically high-level of media ownership concentration through Black economic empowerment deals (Task Group on Government Communications\(^85\)).

\(^{83}\) ANC National Conference 16 December 1997.
\(^{85}\) Task Group on Government Communications set up by Thabo Mbeki. The Group, popularly known as ComTask, submitted its final report to the then deputy President in 1996.
Much of the politics-media policy landscape in today’s South Africa bears Thabo Mbeki’s fingerprints. In 1996 as deputy President, his Task Group’s (ComTask) report covered three intricately related concerns that reflect the ANC’s political communication preoccupations and liberal inclination: (i) opening the communication profession and media management to disadvantaged groups; (ii) the state of government/media relations, and, (iii) the government’s international image in the context of a highly competitive global economy. The first strategy is based on the elitism of the ANC’s affirmative action and Black Economic Empowerment86 (BEE) policies; the second strategy is about targeted image and reputation management, some sort of stage-managed political optics, through collaborating with commercial media; the third speaks to the “African Agenda”87 and its aim of integrating Africa into the international economy (Ngcayisa 2020). This was to be an important element of the ANC’s efforts to build its hegemonic project on the altar of the marketplace as the champions of the lesser evilism (Wallis 2016; Saul 2001).

Shifts in social relations brought about by the BEE political society, including in the media, in terms of both the transformation of ownership and affirmative appointments, influenced new power alliances between the old and the new(ly) privileged classes as the Black stake in media houses started budding. While this empowered Black class had overcome debilitating colonial and Apartheid conditions of dehumanisation and economic violence, they had now become ‘masters’ themselves to enjoy economic power and become “human” like the White masters (see Fanon 1968). This was to become clearer in the country’s arrested social change and the degeneration of the emancipation project that deepened inequality alongside the sustained popularity of the ANC at the polls. The impetus of neoliberal capitalism can be so overwhelming that what ends up conniving with it, can credibly be seen as struggling against

86 Black Economic Empowerment is a policy aimed at expanding the economic horizons of the historically disadvantaged South Africans, but has been faulted for contributing to further impoverishment of the poorer groups in communities (Shava 2016).
87 This term has been used to refer to a policy landscape that Mbeki helped craft. A primary goal of this “African Agenda” was to integrate the continent into the global economy on the basis of “mutual responsibility” and “mutual accountability”. Mbeki and his allies sought to persuade a majority of African governments to support their agenda by engaging in “trade-off diplomacy” with the West (Mail and Guardian 18 June 2007).
it, while confined within the ideological field of the dominant capitalist ideology (De Sousa Santos 2014: 37; Thompson 2007).

*Umsebenzi Online* (2003)\(^8\), a publication of the South African Communist Party, carried a stinging rebuke of the market by Mbeki:

> The critically important task to end the poverty and underdevelopment in which millions of Africans are trapped… cannot be accomplished by the market. If we were to follow the prescriptions of neo-liberal ideology, we would abandon the masses of our people to permanent poverty and underdevelopment… Poor as we might be, and precisely because we are poor, we have a duty to contribute to the elaboration of the global governance concept … opposing the neo-liberal market ideology, the neo-conservative agenda, and the unilateralist approach.

This became a utilitarian political communication strategy – “speak-left, act-right” (Duncan 2000: 56) – that embalmed the ANC’s liberal inner-core for much of the democratic era. It helped propel the ANC beyond the two-thirds majority at the polls in 2004, its highest ever poll result. The socio-economic crises wrought by its diametrically opposite liberal policy choices however, continued to deepen the economic misery for the majority of the Black population. Inequality is now out of control (Oxfam 2020: 12). The ANC’s hegemony has started to unravel (Satgar 2019: 582). The poll result dipped below 60 percent in 2019 for the first time in the party’s electoral history.

Continuing liberal capitalist domination and the stranglehold of the colonial power matrix are causally linked to the transformation of colonialism into colonially. This transition relates to the less spoken-about dimension of the dynamic relationship between the liberated citizens, the liberators, and the political communication system. My observations are narrowly limited to the professionalisation of political communication, its instrumentalisation in political branding and salesmanship, as well as political patronage-cum-neopatrimonialism and how these have become important influences on the nascent political communication system in the “new” South Africa.

---

As early as 1994, in what was seen as a “brilliant coup for the ANC” (Martin Williams quoted in Rumney 2014: 43), Mandela gave blessings to his friend89, Tony O’Reilly and his global media giant, the Independent Newspaper PLC, when they bought the country’s then largest newspaper group, the Argus Newspapers90. This ‘transformation’, the unbundling of the old press duopoly (Louw 1993; Berger 2001), was so profound in the eyes of the ANC that it took the sting out of the organisation’s criticism of media concentration (Berger 1995: 126) and signaled the policy intentions of the ANC regarding political communication. A comprehensive policy91 initiative was introduced based on the ComTask review. This policy has transformed the relationship between the ANC government and the mainstream media that Mandela lamented in the late 1990s. Its provisions work symbiotically with the programmes and structure of the South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) and the National Press Club (Press Club).

To promote “free and pluralistic press” and “high professional standards”, SANEF and the Press Club opened their membership to political actors outside of the journalistic fraternity to include those who are “allied to journalism where they engage with the media in their professional capacities”92. This included ‘non-journalists’, government employees, and corporate giants as members and office bearers93 in media structures. The Club based itself at the seat of government, in Pretoria, for proximity to state power and to entrench its influence.

89 A lot has been written about the close relationship between the two, including mutual favours between them. See for example The Independent (https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/mandela-attends-irish-banquet-26196985.html); Financial Times (https://www.ft.com/content/0d6b9180-f5e9-11da-b09f-0000779e2340)
The mutual relationship brings the guard dogs and watchdogs together in an unholy communion with those that they are trained to guard against or watch over. It is a relationship that facilitates an insidious ideological cross pollination that consistently cultivates and underwrites the current liberal capitalist thinking in the dominant discourse. It is a thinly veiled basis for the media logic creeping into the normal political decision-making process in South Africa and diluting the political logic that should guide political practices (see Lundby 2014: 22).

Government communicators are required to “understand” what will make it into the news of the day. While determining what is newsworthy theoretically falls outside their remit, according to the government’s own policy this ‘ability’ accounts for their raison d’etre. The result is a conflation of government and media roles that reflects the dominance of media standards and logic in the performance of government work.

As an indispensable mediating institution for the government, the media choose between critical or admonitory terms on the one hand, and complimentary and affirming ones on the other, to whip politicians into line and keep them on a liberalist straight and narrow. This has led to observable effects on political actors’ behaviours (McNair 2011: 13), and hence the nature of economic policy options that are pursued. Major national titles in the country’s political communication environment, for instance the Mail and Guardian, run annual ‘evaluations’ carried in influential Cabinet Report Cards. The National Press Club runs an influential Newsmaker of the Year ‘award’ to which political actors offer public reactions and provide explanations regarding their purported performances. South African politics has become performative and performances by social actors have become political (Gluhovic, Jestrovic, Rai and Saward 2021: 1). The Black poor citizens are cast in this context, almost as passive observers of a small group of privileged decision-makers on a metaphorical stage (see also Winton and Evans 2014: 1). This model is related in interesting ways to Asp’s (2014: 359) “exchange relations”, where the politician and the media practitioner strive to satisfy the other’s hunger for news while at the same time maximising his/her favourable public exposure (Boorstin 1962).

94 https://mg.co.za/tag/cabinet-report-cards/
The exchange model breeds a corps of political sales people rather than communicators of substance, and self-interested political performers rather than emancipation-oriented leaders of society. Often the communication professionals in government are media-trained and are drawn from mainstream media organisations. Others have “a professional certificate in … marketing” from the Academy of Government Communication (see GCIS 2014: 160). The constituencies to whom they communicate are referred to as “target markets” in the government’s own publications (GCIS 2014: 157). They are designated as “strategic advisors” to their political principals, and their key responsibility is to leverage editorial opportunities as a means of building and protecting the image of the government that they represent\textsuperscript{95}. This leads to the preponderance of media logic as part of government policy making, and policy implementation that could seriously imperil radical proposals such as the LEwC policy. This is the heart of Asp’s thesis about the “invisible face of media power” (2014: 351): its Janus-face nature and its significant role in the distribution of societal power. This mediatizing role of the media in contemporary South Africa, is reflected in the degree to which the ANC government seeks to adapt to media norms of its own accord (Strömbäck, Karlsson, and Hopmann 2012; Asp 2014).

\textit{Structure of local media markets}

Since 1994, mammoth changes have occurred in the South African media system in the legal context, ownership and staffing, ‘race’, gender and class of the audiences, and in the quantity and quality of media (see Berger 1999: 112-3; Rumney 2014: 39). Some of the changes accorded with political change, some contributed to transformation, some ran counter to transformation, and many counted directly as transformation\textsuperscript{96} (Berger 1999). For example, neither the ‘Black Press’ nor the ‘English Press’ can any longer be confined to the convenient but deeply flawed Apartheid era categorisation (Hadland 2007). But ‘race’, language, and ethnicity as predictors of media consumption in the country’s marketplace continued into democracy (Futurefact 2004). Significant titles like \textit{Moneyweb} remain overwhelmingly white-owned with over 84% white ownership\textsuperscript{97}. The \textit{Afrikaans} Press is no longer as

\textsuperscript{95} See Policy on Communication for South African Government Institutions
\textsuperscript{96} Burger’s use of the term suggests that he links it to positive developments viewed from a progressive political angle.
politically partisan as it was, and many of its media products now meet most of the liberal criteria (Hadland 2012: 99). While Black ‘ownership’ of the media has undeniably grown through “empowerment deals” (ComTask Report 1996: 6), for example Sowetan and City Press (Emdon 1998), verifiable and measurable Black ownership and control remain unclear and speculative98 (see also Rumney 2014: 41).

Hadland identifies elements of the Liberal Democratic Corporatist99 and Polarised Pluralist100 models in the South African political communication system alongside influences of ‘race’, ethnicity, and language. These evaluations are based on print and broadcast systems and confined to the domestic context of South Africa as a nation-state. Globalization, aided by the new digital technologies, has brought about the emergence of transnational media (Waters 1995; Sparks 2001) and a complex transnational public sphere (Braman 1997; Strange 1994; Hirst and Thompson 1996). Exclusive primacy of the nation-state as an analytic category may, in such circumstances may not be inadequate (Featherstone 1990; Sklair 1995; Kraidy 2003). All the four platforms that form the subject of this study leverage the trans-border celerity of the internet.

The potential to reach global audiences brings political actors within the reach of various communication possibilities regarding the definition and framing of economic or political concerns. Among these possibilities is the replacement of nation-states with other forms of social organisations (Negroponte 1995; Dyson 1997). Multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and IMF, international capital networks, international lobby groups in today’s neo-Westphalian world, are prime examples of the powerful social organisations involved in

98 According to an Intellidex Report: Who owns the news media? A study of the shareholding of South Africa’s major media companies, a few systematic studies into authentic Black ownership and control have been conducted since 1994. Authentic Black ownership can only be determined based on the structure of ownership rights. The latest research by Intellidex was itself inconclusive due to what it calls lack of transparency by media companies. See Research Report: Researching capital markets and financial services July 2016 at https://www.intellidex.co.za/

99 Hadland attributes this observation to the existence of a multiplicity of forums and stakeholder involvement in policy processes. He also refers to signs of clientelism, shortfall in mass literacy, inadequate access to the media which prevent it from being an authentic member of Hallin-Mancini’s Democratic Corporatist cluster.

100 Hadland looks at the closeness between the media and political actors from the perspective of ownership, media acting as the conduit between the elites or former journalists moving on to become senior government officials.
local concerns such as the LEwC policy. Message construction and framing of domestic politics in this context tend to be adapted to the dominant ‘new’ wave of neoliberal capitalism as a global and interconnected system of accumulation (see also Gamble 2001: 131). Right-wing groups are among the internet enthusiasts using the platforms for political activism and pushing an agenda to do away with democracy by rendering it obsolete (Sparks 2001: 92). Their technology-savvy strategies are opportunistic and target the like-minded throughout the globe, constituting strong international reactionary solidarity lobby groups.

Influential trans-border platforms, such as Moneyweb and City Press have extended the political arena both geographically and temporally (see Krotz 2009; Giddens 2000; Mc Allister 2005; Hamilton 2004). They place LEwC on the international agenda and are central in galvanising international responses to the policy (Philo 1993: 105). Their discourses target public opinion at home and/or abroad as a new non-conventional instrument of power to shape the local policy environment (McNair 2011: 173; Greenway, Smith, and Street 1992: 87). This is important in view of the elevation of ‘image’ and stage-managed political optics, as key concerns in government. Image, the political spectacle (Winton and Evans 2014: 1) in public communication strategies in the digital age rivals substance in the calculations of politicians and their advisers (GCIS 2018: 18; McNair 2011: 173).

The continuing shifts and adjustments to the South African political communication market are pushing the frontiers for the preservation of the monocultural liberal capitalist dogma. The country’s public broadcaster, the SABC, combines its flagship news programming with a capital-driven multi-platform market giant in Moneyweb under a protected contract. This arrangement seems to be at odds with the mandate to “advance the national and public interest” stipulated in its Charter. The Moneyweb’s stake and role: the news policy, creation and the proprietary status of the news content, its business motive and the personnel who run the programme, are strategically veiled, including in on-air promotions.

In its rejection of a PAIA application for information regarding the ownership, development and utilisation of the information produced and broadcast under the aegis of the contract on SABC platforms, the SABC wrote “The SABC refuses to grant you access to the contract for the purposes of protecting commercial information of Moneyweb.” (Sylvia Tladi, SABC SOC Limited. 30 April 2020 via email)
The ‘partnership’ titled *Moneyweb market update* programme broadcasts on the “critical or watchdog” (Berger 1999: 106) *SAfm* current affairs programme and *Radio Sonder Grense*, (Radio without Borders), a nationwide Afrikaans programme of the SABC. The *update* is an ideologically exclusive voice of the market, driven by Moneyweb in the domestic policy space. On its website, *Moneyweb* boasts of its responsibility as “the official supplier of business news to SABC radio stations” – the so-called “credible voice and face of the nation”102. This practice, alongside the unprecedented retrenchment in 2021 of over 600 permanent SABC employees103, seems to lend itself to Watts’ (1994) characterisation of the privatisation of everything under neoliberalism. The SABC platforms provide a thick veil of legitimacy or strategic cover, and multiply the reach of Moneyweb’s issue constructions and ideology about an important economic policy.

Market logic is antithetical to the central concerns of LEwC, namely, economic transformation and social justice. It is bereft of any empowering character that is aimed at enabling a democratic society to take informed decisions in its political communication (Landerer 2013: 248). Market logic-based issue selection, organisation, and presentation in the constructions of LEwC depend on the criteria of competitiveness (Landerer 2013) where “any inherent qualities of newsworthiness or importance” count for less (Niblock and Machin 2007: 191; Strömbäck et al 2012: 726). LEwC as “market news” is accordingly constructed in the language of self-interest and self-maximisation where the goal is profit generation. The result is the “displacement of political logic” in public discourse and policy debates (Schrott 2009: 44). Readers (listeners) are not offered the opportunity to reflect critically on the social world that shapes their experiences (Steenveld and Strelitz 2007: 25) and those of their fellow humans. The South African media market’s structural gravitation towards commercialism is a serious inhibition to the media’s contribution to radical social change in the country beyond the ambivalent, incremental liberal- transformative process.

Since 1994, much has been promised, for instance a better life for all, and yet, very little has hitherto been delivered, a rich political elite and a small privileged and connected BEE

---

102 This is the SABC’s self-characterisation. https://www.sabc.co.za/sabc/
103 https://www.sabcnews.com
society enjoying the master’s kind of life in South Africa’s formerly White social spaces. The media operate in complex ways as an important pivot for the prevailing social arrangements in liberal capitalist societies.

**Role of the State**

To understand the power of the news media as an effective vehicle for ideology (Fairclough 1989: 34) we must also examine the connections between news-making and policymaking from the perspective of officials and other political actors in the context of the political communication they perform. The *game* of politics is increasingly played in the public eye as politicians become especially preoccupied with approval by the powerful liberal establishment (GCIS 2018; Schudson 2002). This tendency also falls under the rubric of ‘image management’ in government communication, and it accords a dominant role to the press in the process of governing and consideration of issues of government.

Hadland reflects on a ‘post-colonial’ African model of media-state relations that recognises the obstacles to democratisation such as the preponderance of a dominant single party, the rise of clientelism, inequality, and urban and rural divides. He locates the media’s national development agenda in this context. This study contributes a perspective to a South African model of media-state relations that suggests the dominance of the ANC to be a critical factor in the continued condemnation (Maldonado-Torres 2018) of Black people in a democratic dispensation. The model locates the media’s ‘national development agenda’ in the country in this context.

In post-1994 South Africa for instance, Mandela was venerated as a universal icon and christened as the Black Pimpernel by the press, and Mbeki was celebrated as the ‘Crown Prince’ and ‘Philosopher King’

104 Their ANC moved from being the revered symbolic leader of the struggle to becoming an unrivalled leader in state electoral politics. Without the ANC, its leaders believe, none of the country’s major problems could be solved

105 The government’s relationship with the media resonates with this chauvinistic political attitude of

---

104 Pretoria News 2008
105 Mbeki emphatically made this point in an address to ANC leaders in the Eastern Cape that was also broadcast on social media (News24. 31 May 2021)
being the Alfa and Omega of South Africa’s transformative options, the sole proprietor of Black emancipatory aspirations. This hubris mutated into a cult of political worship under Jacob Zuma\textsuperscript{106}. Political hero-worshipping and fear of the party and leader echoed in public statements including those by Alliance leadership such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions\textsuperscript{107}, high-profile activists such as Raymond Suttner\textsuperscript{108}, the ANC Youth League\textsuperscript{109} and many others.

The powerful political influence of the ANC has been an important factor in the containment of radical emancipatory impulses within and outside of the party. It has kept the popular imagination about South Africa’s economic options within the confines of the liberal capitalistic consensus, its policy holy grail (see for example Hirsch 2005: 47; McKinley 1997: 88). The unrivalled political power of the ANC has sacrificed the Black emancipatory dream on the altar of liberal capitalism. The party’s mission has nothing to do with radical transformation of the unequal and oppressive economic arrangements; it is the transmission line between the Black majority and capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today wears the mask of neo-colonialism (Fanon 1963: 152). Like the Nationalist Party’s treatment of criticism of its policy or exposure of its malfunction as treasonous (SPROCAS 1971: 87), the ANC adopted a similar scathing attitude, albeit without the threat of imprisonment or death. Criticism was branded “ultra-left” and hostile to the national democratic revolution\textsuperscript{110} for which the ANC fashions itself as the sole custodian and champion.

The ANC has brought about a neopatrimonialistic political climate that incorporates patronage politics supported by government largesse and an impulse of affection (Wallas 1910) based on a deep historical affinity with the organisation, its sacrifices and heroism in


\textsuperscript{108} eNCA 9 June 2017. Its’ cold outside Zuma’s ANC. But there’s little warmth left inside. https://www.enca.com/opinion/its-cold-outside-zumas-anc-but theres-little-warmth-left-inside


\textsuperscript{110} See Left Factionalism and the Democratic Revolution by: Dumisan Makhaye National Executive Committee Member – ANC, in ANC Today, Vol 2. No 48. 29 November 2002
the painful and long liberation struggle. Some authors such as Wasserman and De Beer (2005) observe that the Black Press’ support and advocacy for the ANC is linked to the conflation of ‘national interest’ with the political positions of the party as the champion of Black nationalist thought. There is, however, no one-on-one relationship between the national interest that is linked to the interests of the poor, for example, inequality, and the ANC and its unwavering commitment to liberal capitalism that has deepened inequality. Evidence continues to mount that the ANC government has not served the interest of the poor to whom LEwC is aimed (Padayachee and Sherbut 2011; Joffe et al 1993, 1994; Hirsch 2005; Gumede 2008; Habib 1996; Goedgedacht 2002\textsuperscript{111}). South Africa today remains the same anti-Black bifurcated societal structure that colonialism and Apartheid instantiated with a Black middle class joining White people in the “zone of beings” and Black people existing in the “zone on non-beings” as “not-yet beings” where patronage, appropriation and repression remain politics \textit{du jour} (Fanon 1963: 37-38; Madlingozi 2017: 124-125)

Reconciliation was a significant driver and measure of ‘transformation’ under Mandela, when it became the political norm for ‘national interest.’ It eclipsed social justice in political communication during the ecstatic Mandela era\textsuperscript{112}. Hadland identifies trends of instrumentalisation of the Black press by such influential political tendencies as well as close personal relations between ANC politicians and the media. This is when ‘national interest’ presupposes support for the democratically elected government’s policy, rather than criticising it. The intellectually debilitating ideological cooptation of political communication in this manner removes critical media focus from the necessary radical policy alternatives to address South Africa’s social injustices. Such essential options do not just become absent (De Sousa Santos 2014: 92) from the media discourses. When they appear they do so as deviant hollow concepts, reckless ideology, and utopian politics (O’Sullivan 1999; Viereck 2005; Kekes 1998; Quinton and Norton 2009).

\textsuperscript{111} Summary notes from the Goedgedacht Forum for Social Reflection of 2002.

Other views suggest that South African journalists still hold onto the narrative that the media ensure the democratic functioning of the state by acting as a “watch-dog” (for example Steenveld 2007; Wasserman and De Beer 2005). What this view does not reflect is that the nature of the relationship between the state and the media in the country is constituted in an important way in line with the ‘ecological model’ espoused by Molototch, Protess and Gordon (1987: 28). The model not only highlights a need for understanding how public and policy actors form their agendas and perspectives, but how journalistic agendas are shaped as well, and how these sectors of reality-making are interlinked.

The Policy on Communication for South African Government Institutions\footnote{Policy on Communication for South Government Institutions 2018 (Supplied by the Department of Public Service and Administration via email on 06 02 2020) See also https://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/default/files/Government%20Communication%20Policy%20Cabinet%20Approved%200ct%202018.pdf} reflects a liberal pluralist position and structures an ecology of mutual dependence between the state and the media. The policy provides for a large and complex infrastructure, a multi-level communication and image-management corps at national, provincial, and local government levels “to achieve reputation-enhancing, earned media coverage through the newsworthiness of [government] activities and announcements” (GCIS 2018: 31). Media-specific training for the most senior government leaders, including the President, are the main policy enablement interventions. The policy prescribes that politicians must ‘strive to gain access to the media’ by some means, including them and their communication advisers “understanding” the workings of the media sufficiently to ensure that political activities and messages are newsworthy and reportable. Government policy, by default or design, gives the media an extremely powerful role in determining what is of value in statecraft and policy implementation. Brand SA, a multi-layered, professional organisation is collocated with this national structure – the GCIS – with the Minister in the Presidency as their Executive Authority. Brand SA was formed in 2002 to manage what the “world thinks of South Africa”\footnote{https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/}. Their central duty is to promote an ‘understanding’ – across the globe – of the country’s liberal capitalist social arrangements that oppress Black people, daily.
An important consequence of this arrangement is the government’s “news subsidy” of the media (Harcup and O’Neil’s 2017: 1473). Custom-prepared news statements by media-conscious government communication cum marketing practitioners and neatly articulated sound bites by ‘well-trained’ political principals are taken up by media houses\footnote{See for instance Journalism in jeopardy: mitigating the impact of COVID-19 on newspapers in https://www.africaportal.org/features/saving-journalism-mitigating-impact-covid-19-newspapers/. Sanef appeals for help following numerous retrenchments at media houses https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/sanef-appeals-for-help-following-numerous-retrenchments-at-media-houses-20200719.}, as news items (Harcup and O’Neill 2017: 1473; Lewis, Williams, and Franklin 2008). Precast news constructs and serves the mutual interest of the government communication and the media. Newsrooms are shrinking in both quantity and quality with the ongoing capitalist restructuring despite an even greater need for quality news in the present times\footnote{See also Worldpressstrends 2019 Report on this claim.}. This erodes the qualitative transformational value of political communication by mutual ‘understanding’, between the government and media. It moves subjects of mutual interest and concern away from the “deviant” controversies of inequality and economic oppression (Hallin and Mancini 1984) towards ‘reportable’ liberal compliancy, notably corruption and the fight against it. This is the chilling effect on political communication of ideological cross-pollination and mutual dependence between those who are charged with difficult emancipatory projects and the guard-dogs of entrenched capitalist privilege. Disproportionate attention is given to building the “image of the Nation Brand”\footnote{https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/} in a global capitalist market system. Radicality, the perennial code for recklessness in liberal capitalist contexts, is likely to be treated accordingly, with fatal outcomes for \textit{bona fide} national interest issues such as social justice.


\footnote{\textsuperscript{116}See also Worldpressstrends 2019 Report on this claim.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{117}https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/}
The state-media interdependence is also reflected in the significant financial ‘investment’ that government makes in its media enablement programme. The government subsidises a sizable real estate, security, administrative, and related logistics within its precincts for the exclusive use of the media\textsuperscript{118} with no corresponding requirements regarding its mandate to the public, under the guise of media freedom. Media, in the assessment of the Switzerland-based Inter-Parliamentary Union, where South Africa is held as ‘best practice’ in this regard, are seen as the most important mediating institution between government and other social institutions (see Beetham 2006: 4), and a watchdog against all kinds of abuse (Beetham 2006: 6).

Government by image management is an important factor in the effacing and displacement of the ‘unnewsworthy’ daily strains and agony of inequality by officialdom, from effective political communication. In this way, the ever-closer linkage of news-making and policymaking extends to the point where they are indistinguishable (Cook 1998). As politicians adapt to the “media answer” to pressing issues (see McNair 2011: 27; Cook 1998:85) – the dominant media language and discourse – the role of the news media as a political institution, and of journalists as political actors, is cemented and solidified.

Conclusion

Throughout South Africa’s recorded history, the press has been a powerful, dynamic, and lively terrain of ideological contestation where issues of power and agency collaborate and collide incessantly in their discourses. This multi-faceted and complex contestation bears typical features that were designed from its inception in colonialism when the press was linked in complex ways with economic power and “race” issues. The discussion suggests that a highly adaptable, yet seemingly solid, connection links the different contexts and the media’s role from colonialism to the present.

\textsuperscript{118} See annexure 2: Correspondence from Acting Secretary to Parliament, B. Tyawa. Information in Relation to Media Within Parliamentary Precinct. Related arrangements are in place in the provinces.
Careful and nuanced interrogation that is capable of recognising texts beyond just their forms and in the context of their production and use is necessary for meaningful understanding of discourse. Broad categorisations such as White or Black press, or alternative and mainstream press, conservative and radical press are helpful, but could also be blunt instruments in uncovering important subtexts that carry important meanings in ongoing ideological struggles. This understanding underpins the analyses of the discourses from *Moneyweb, City Press, Afriforum* and *AFASA* on the policy on LEwC.

This chapter highlights multi-layered and multi-directional interconnections between media, history, economics, politics and culture. It builds a picture of the press that Joel Netshitenzhe\textsuperscript{119} noted, is a repository of immense ideological, economic, social, and political power. It is a press that continues to play a central role in the stubborn legacies of colonialism and Apartheid in the ‘new’ South Africa. But this power is not uncontested, nor does it guarantee specific outcomes. This view is reflected in the contributions of the Black intellectuals and the radical media since colonialism and lucidly espoused by Hall (1986) and Laclau (1977) in their conceptualisation of the social formation that accommodates language and discourse. *AFASA* and *City Press* are the present day sources of subversive ideologies against the dominant liberalist ideology in *Moneyweb* and *Afriforum* platforms. Working with other forms of power, the media are an important ingredient of hegemony.

The next step is about identifying an adequate, appropriate and reliable method to execute the analytic work of this study.

\textsuperscript{119}Head of the Government’s Communication and Information Systems (GCIS) from 1998 to 2006 made this remark in a speech of Media Freedom Day in October 2002.
Part 2

Chapter 4

Methods of analysis

The generative question and sub-question (Strauss 1987: 22) of this study centre language and texts in the context of political communication as the key epistemic concern. The methods for data analysis are accordingly geared towards their purposive examination with due sensitivity to the discourse units (news articles), the units of analysis (paragraphs, sentences, words, or phrases) and the relevant explanatory variables in the texts that include their descriptive significance (Decuir-Gunby et al 2011: 145; Bernard and Ryan 2010; Krippendorff 2013: 189). Time and capacity were critical considerations in the selection and construction of the methods (Bernard and Ryan 2010; Krippendorff 2013).

The analysis is carried out through a two-step interpretive approach: first qualitative framing analysis followed by critical discourse analysis to identify, analyse and describe the frames in the land expropriation without compensation (LEwC) narratives. Qualitative framing analysis uses text-based, inductive and manual coding techniques to reveal frames (Matthes 2009: 351). Frames are described without quantification to contextualise and describe the different narratives on LEwC (Matthes 2009: 360). The critical discourse analysis step draws from ideological, critical textual and qualitative framing analyses to examine the socially constitutive potentialities of the discourses.

Step 1: Qualitative framing analysis

There is a multiplicity of methods and innovations for finding frames in news texts (see for example Papacharissi and Oliviera 2008; Semetko and Valkenberg 2000; Payne 2001, Matthes and Kohring 2008; David, Atun and Monterola 2011). Definitions and how frames are operationalised, are therefore important in the conceptualisation of content analysis frames (Matthes 2009: 352). This study offers an interpretative non-quantitative textual analysis to identify and describe frames used in the media discourses about LEwC (Tucker 1998; Hoerl, Cloud and Jarvis 2009; Scheufele and Scheufele 2010; Downs 2002, Hall 2000). It is based on Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) method and relies on key operational definitions of frames offered by Entman (1993: 52) namely: problem definition, causal interpretation,
moral evaluation and treatment recommendations, as its guide to identify frame indicators in the narratives. Many things can be “in” a frame (Matthes 2009: 352). The coding frame here consists of variables of the central issue and actors, variables related to risks, benefits and responsibilities, and evaluations of LEwC (Gaskell and Bauer 2001). These variable shed important light on the ideology of the texts.

Framing essentially involves selection and salience (highlighting) to construct an argument about “issues”, their causation, evaluation and/or resolution (Entman 1993: 53). An increase in salience enhances the probability that readers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it and store it in memory (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Framing renders important policy concerns such as LEwC malleable to different ‘meanings’ and a rich repository of potential realities, just by altering the ways in which observations about the policy are categorised in discourse. This can be accomplished through subjective framing judgments in the course of packaging information about policy.

A frame is understood as a pattern in a given text, that is composed of several elements, where elements are framing devices that refer to previously defined analytical categories and not the simple appearance of words (Matthes and Kohring 2008: 263). When these elements are present in several articles, they are interpreted as frames (David et al 2011: 337). Stand out single content analytic materials that readily embody a theme are also recognised (Roberts, Dowell and Nie 2019; Shehzad 2019: 5). Frames are conceptualised as issue-specific to allow for specificity and detail (Tucker 1998) as opposed to generic frames that transcend thematic limitations (De Vreese, Peter, and Semetko 2001: 108). This method of analysis contributes an important descriptive understanding of the different LEwC narratives based on what was presented to the public (Matthes and Kohring 2008).

The interrelated instruments for analysis in the codebooks developed for each narrative, following Matthes and Kohring (2008), David et al (2011) and Gaskell and Bauer (2001), use three components: code name/label, full definition (an extensive definition that collapses inclusion and exclusion criteria), and examples.

**Problem definition** includes variables on the central issue or the primary argument around which all the other arguments within a discourse unit revolve and the actors in an article. Central issues both vary and coincide between the narratives. **Actor** at this level, refers to the person, group or the institution that prompted the article or the main entity which is the most
often cited in the text. Actors are variously state managers, experts, White farmers, Black farmers, journalists, financial institutions, and members of the public.

The *causal interpretation* element consists of actors who are deemed either to be responsible for the cause, solution, risks or benefits of the LEwC policy. Causal actor variables are similar to those of actors and define the central problem of the news story. *Moral evaluation* variables consist of the risk and benefits of LEwC as suggested in news articles. Risk and benefits variables range from financial losses, economic suffering, emotional costs, conflict and generalised calamity, to socio-economic advancement and justice, between the different narratives. Evaluations are deemed positive if the majority of words or context given in the article favour the central issue or actor; negative if the words predominantly used to describe the central issue or actor give undesirable effects associated with them including use of sensational, extreme, heinous, shocking or emotional language or negative associations (i.e. failure, failed state); or neutral if the descriptor(s) is both positive and negative. This includes instances where the actor/central issue is presented in positive and negative words and contexts in a balanced fashion to reflect alternatives without adding commentary to further frame the story either way.

The *treatment recommendation* element contains variables that are identified as a proposed solution to the ‘problem’ and the treatment or judgment of the issue. Treatment is the general argument regarding LEwC as communicated by the causal actors in the article. Where both the negative and positive treatments are present in the news article, the more prominent is chosen. Remedies include calls for or against the LEwC policy.

An assumption in the selection of frame variables was that the narratives of the different platforms could have radically different main issues, actors, moral evaluations and treatment recommendations. For comparative purposes the each individualized narrative has its own codebook. Images were excluded from the analysis. The method also meant that a cut-off point was implemented such that variables or categories that were infrequent (under a percent distribution of the overall number) were excluded from the analysis (Matthes and Kohring 2009). Any count above a percentage of the entire distribution of frames within each definition of framing was deemed not explainable by chance alone and thus included.

I used the definitions in the codebooks to develop the codes inductively, from initial exploratory analysis of each narrative and coded them (Simon and Xenos 2000; Husselbee and Elliot 2002). The definitions were not explicitly translated to frame identification and
extraction and are cited to ground the reader (Matthes 2009). Although the study is value-bound, I endeavored to adopt a lens predicated on the ontology and epistemology explicated in the theoretical review to identify codes without introducing bias from my self-bound world. A number of content analytical variables from the texts were inductively coded into a number of frame elements (Matthes and Kohring 2008: 263). I followed up this process by deriving the appropriate number of frames through cluster analysis and the clusters were treated as frames (David et al 2011: 332; Matthes 2009; see also Bakhshay and Honey 2018). The frames thus developed are individually characterised by a discernible pattern of variables that are mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and independent (Matthes and Kohring 266, see also Holsti 1969: 116; Flick 2006: 296). The definition of each frame sought to ensure that the codes were comprehensive, permitted to be classified, exclusionary, relevant to the research focus, related to the research questions, social context and theoretical framework, and allowed inferences to be drawn (Roberts et al 2019: 2). These codes in turn, functioned like coordinates on the emerging map-frame. When applied to the text they helped link features in the text (words, sentences, phrases and even paragraphs) (MacQueen Mclellan-Lemal, Bartholow and Milstein 2008: 124).

The NVIVO 12 computer software is especially dynamic in the inductive generation and ordering of invivo codes and provided versatile, intuitive options, including allowing for “memoing”, commentary, refinement and for thoughts to be jotted down throughout the reading, classification and reclassification stages (Crabtree, Miller and William 1999; Miles and Huberman 1994: 134-137, Adu 2019; Ando et al 2014). At this stage the raw data was transferred into NVIVO 12 to allow for a systematic coding approach with identified codes being added as nodes and the electronically coded text being matched to the nodes in a systematic way. This provided a reliability advantage (David et al 2011). I was able to reference the codes back and forth, into the text from where they came and out again, sort, cluster and compare codes between and within subgroups with aided ease and robustness. The emerging variables were ‘visibly’ grounded in the data from which they emerged and supported by it (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Denzin 1978; Lune and Berg 2017). Breaking up text into these units was necessarily painstaking, involved careful, iterative reading looking for meaningful conceptual breaks and linking them to my research questions and purposes (Krippendorff 1980; White and Marsh 2006, Krippendorff 2013: 98; White and Marsh 2006), to improve their reliability (Neuendorf 2002: 115) and to guide the research along a logical path (Toulmin 1958) in exploring meanings and frames in the text. The neatly ordered and
stable-looking codebooks are an outcome of this messy, loose, complex and dynamic process.

Everything in the content analytical material that could not be divided without loss of meaning was kept in coding (Krippendorff 2013: 84). This contributed to the operationalisation of sometimes-amorphous concepts from the texts (White and Marsh 2006), and to the building of a network of correlations to explain how the texts were connected to the possible answers to the research questions (Krippendorff 2013). The descriptive analysis of the texts benefitted immensely from thorough understanding of the data through graphic displays, tables, and summary statistics (Bernard 2013: 550). Laying out the data using NVIVO 12 and in some instances Excel’s visualising instruments were analytically valuable to get a good feel for them before and during the application of the framing analysis, in describing the framing devices and codes in the cross verification of the frames.

Frames in the discourses unfolded over time and over several issues, building on what was published previously (Krippendorff 2013: 100; Roberts et al 2019). The frames were frequently and repetitively used. This enabled two important decisions for my analysis. First, it was possible to code the full sample from each of the four platforms. This added to the validity of the analysis (Long and Johnson 2000) without overburdening the study. Secondly, differences in numbers of articles between the narratives could not introduce any concern of bias or strategic inequity.

Step 2: Critical discourse analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the context-based analytic approach that this study employs to identify key ideational strategies in the discourses of Moneyweb, Afriforum, City Press and AFASA, and to explain how these strategies accomplish different ideological functions (Fairclough 1989; KhosraviNik 2010; Gee 2011; Starks and Trinidad 2007; Brown and Yule 1983). The multi-level conception of context includes an intra-textual level (the anaphoric and cataphoric elements of texts), intertextual level (the interdiscursive and between-the-texts elements), extra-linguistic level (‘discourse-in-place’ in the society and public memories) and the socio-political level context (the socio-cultural public cognition and the society’s collective ‘old knowledge’) (KhosraviNik 2010: 67). The CDA interdisciplinary approach involves complex and varied processes (Khosravinik 2010: 55; Beland 2020: 166). Taking this complexity into account, an analytic mentality rather that adherence to a rigid set of formal procedures is the approach taken in this analysis (Billig 1988; Coyle 2006: 375).

The analysis process included ploughing through the datasets line-by-line to classify the data into meaningful units and to identify themes that shed light on the research questions (Corbin and Strauss 2008). I was looking for what is present/not present in the texts and how its presence or absence is operationalised at three interconnected levels: actors, actions and argumentation (KhosraviNik 2010). At the level of the actors, my focus was on what social actors are (not) present in the text and why, the qualities of such presence/absence, and the linguistic mechanisms were employed in perspectivizing this presence/absence. The second level relates to what actions are (not) attributed to the actors (in- or out-groups) and mentioned in the text against all the available choices. Thirdly, at the level of argumentation, the concern is with the evaluation of what arguments are present in the text against the possible available arguments, what arguments are kept out, and how arguments are put forward and related to the social actors.

Ideology saturated discourse structures that contributed to dominance or resistance (van Dijk 2016, 1993) referential strategies (Wodak 2001; Thompson 2007) enacted through reification and membership categorisation devices such as topical references by naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors, metonymies, eternalisation and nominals. This strategy yielded word choices, exemplars, catchphrases, representations, repeated word use as well as

---

120 KhosraviNik (2010) uses the concept to refer to a collection of linguistic mechanisms/processes that text producers strategically incorporate within the qualities of the texts. It also occurs by both choosing certain manners of linguistic realisation as well as lack of certain choices.
‘exclusions’ and dissimulation in the discourses (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Thompson 2007; Entman 1991, 1993; Pan and Kosicki 1993; and Tankard 2001). Each of the identified structures and their cognitive bias and power-relevance (Van Dijk 2016) are accounted for in holistic terms (Collony-Ahern and Broadway 2008: 369), taking into account what is included or excluded in them, and their socio-political and cultural functions in communicative and social contexts. A range of global (macro-level) structures such as discourse topics, positive self-presentation and negative Other presentation and legitimation, and local structures such as actor descriptions, rhetorical devices and argumentation (Thompson 2007; Wodak 2001; Van Dijk and Wodak 2000: 29) also emerged from this process as important analytical categories. Discourse topics of LEwC include predicational strategies (Wodak 2001) that associate LEwC to negative or positive consequences based on stereotypes, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits in linguistic forms of implicit or explicit predicates such as “crime”, “catastrophe”, “economic risk” or “transformation”, “freedom” and “access to land”. These topics are linked in different ways to the ‘established’ social macro-structure of the South African society.

The examination of these interlinked analytical materials was carried out in the context of intensification and mitigation as a commonplace strategy to topicalise and de-topicalise certain points of view about LEwC (KhosraviNik 2010: 57). These are important strategies by which texts perform their social constitutive tasks and by which they transform meanings into persuasive, convincing and/or acceptable fact (Parker 1998: 92). Opaque discursive manipulations through linguistic micro-mechanisms (Thompson 2007; KhosraviNik 2010: 63) embalm potent regressive ideology that goes against the sanguine liberal assumptions about the role of the press and the egalitarian-sounding prescripts of the Press Code.

All the analytic materials are directly connected to the LEwC context understood from the point of view of the research questions, the theoretical background of this study, the affordances of the texts of the narratives, and the socio-political features of the context of this study (see also KhosraviNik 2010: 56). All are backed by textual evidence from the discourses (Coyle 2006: 375). To ensure that the data is not divorced from its context, the coded materials were ‘read’ within the broader debate in which they occurred during the analysis, and up to and including, writing up. Reading to identify functions of texts and how they were fulfilled is not a straightforward exercise (Coyle 2006). The functions are not
always explicit. This challenge presupposed an iterative, systematic, qualitative and inductive process of de-contextualisation and re-contextualisation of texts (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Ayres, Kavanaugh, Knafl 2003; Morse and Field 1995). The analysis moved back and forth between critical textual, ‘topics’ and macro-structural analyses to establish how micro (linguistic) mechanisms and the textual analysis fed into (or fitted into) the marco-structure (KhosrasNik 2010: 62).

As themes and roles signified through language-in-use emerged from this process (Starks and Trinidad 2007), fruitful lines of inquiry emerged (Coyle 2006: 257). I was inclusive in coding the categories and only in the end excluded what appeared to be borderline instances of the research focus (Coyle 2006: 257). I used NVIVO 12 to organise and code my data. The software made it possible to code from each article in the corpus (N= 124) without the risk of unmanageable amounts of unstructured data to sift through (Coyle 2006: 374). The software is both adept and intuitive in managing volumes with efficiency. This gave me the advantage of selecting the best examples from the coded texts based on pragmatism (White and Marsh 2006: 30) and purposiveness (Bucy 2004). Sampling in discourse analysis need not be exhaustive (Daiute, Sullu, Cerovic, Micic and Vracar 2020: 7). What is important is to include a sufficient number of the best examples of texts to reflect the discursive forms that are commonly used for particular ideological functions (Coyle 2006: 374).

**Conclusion**

This chapter completes the presentation of a detailed ‘account’ of this study’s design (Krippendorff 2013; Lincoln and Guba 1985). It fits the following analysis of the empirical material into its theoretical context. The methods of the study are explained to knot this research project into a coherent design. They allow for sensitivity to the inferential and interactional aspects of language use that are crucial to answer the research questions.

Where the purpose is to generate deep understanding of social phenomena, quality and trust are key. The detailed discussion of the methodology is presented with the issues of research quality in mind. The application of the analytic mentality in the next chapters is undertaken with due regard for quality.
Chapter 5

Qualitative framing analysis of the narrative structure of the discourses on land expropriation without compensation

If we are to consider the way in which discourses systematically form the objects that they are referred to in any text, we should systematically itemize ‘objects’ that appear in this text

(Foucault 1969: 49)

The qualitative framing analysis of the coverage of the Parliamentary process on land expropriation without compensation (LEwC) below, identifies and describes the dominant frames used in the narratives of *Moneyweb*, *Afriforum*, *City Press* and *AFASA*. The four platforms are different enough, including in their *raison d’etre*, format and style, to warrant separate but parallel analysis. Ordering the analysis in this way, has a potential to build conceptual coherence in the comparison of frames in the discourses of the “White” and “Black” platforms that are linked to the colonial, Apartheid and the contemporaneous liberal capitalist democracy structures. In this first of the two-step analysis of the LEwC narratives, a comprehensive high-level summary of the narratives is presented, couched in everyday terms that also allows for exploration of frames and counter-frames raised in the research questions (see Deetz 1996).

The discussion of each platform starts with the description of the dominant frame(s) followed by a table to show a selection of critical frame elements. The description includes elements derived from Entman’s (1993) definition of frames and are deemed to be most relevant to answer the research questions. Each element is linked to the corresponding codes and an operational definition to delineate the analysis. Together, these elements systematically map the informational terrain of the narratives (MacQueen 2008: 123) in relation to what each selected and made salient in the constructions of LEwC. The approach is geared towards cross-platform comparison of frames as influential centres of power of the communicating texts in each narrative. The frames are linked to problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation of LEwC within the respective frames. There is one exception. For the unregulated content of the two interest groups, *AFASA* and *Afriforum*, there would be no real value in analysing the actors. Both have express political agendas and do not subscribe to any professional Code of Ethics and Conduct that prescribes ‘balance’ in their news ‘gathering’ functions. As advocates for causes, screening and filtration in this
regard is self-evident.

The analysis of each platform is organised as follows:

1. Identification and description of the dominant frame(s)
   a. Problem definition:
      • the central issue
      • actors
   b. Causal attribution
   c. Treatment recommendation.
   d. Moral evaluation

Moneyweb: Land expropriation without compensation frames

The dominant frame in Moneyweb’s LEwC narrative is economic consequences. The narrative deploys numerous indices including macroeconomic conditions and risk measures as influential codes. The indices are constructed to reflect poor economic prospects domestically and abroad to construct economic risk wrought by LEwC as an important framing device. The risk includes phrases such as “investment repellant”, “currency performance”, “stunted growth”, “poverty”, “loss of personal wealth”, “economic collapse” etc. Preponderant framing cognates and foreboding codes in them are located within the economy frame to strengthen Moneyweb’s problem definition of LEwC. These include a pathological view of the ruling ANC reflected in codes like “Ramaphosa’s playbook” and “ANC flirtation [with LEwC]” seeking a “panacea” for poverty. Radicalism is reflected in codes such as “seizure”; “total confiscation”. Fear mongering is in codes such as “scary”, “failed African governments”, “uncertainty”. The sacrosanctity of private property is a mobilising framing device constructed from urgings such as “ensuring [dehistoricised] property rights” of White wealth owners. The narrative pathologises the ANC’s Black voters as “stone throwers” who “relieve themselves in the bush” and thus a threat to White civilization and lifestyle. Recklessness is reflected in codes such as “reckless and damaging” and “catastrophic” LEwC policy while dishonesty on the part of the ANC is contained in linking its actions with a “maneuver” to “save [a] precarious [electoral] majority”.

Schematic devices that spell doom: “thrown the cat among the pigeons”, to suggest the threat to ‘stability’ that LEwC poses; “wild ride getting even more frenzied” to suggest the buffoonery that LEwC is purported to be; “chugging along” to paint a picture of a struggling economy; and
“end of the party” – an ominous reference to the end of the good times, are part of the stock of commonly invoked codes against LEwC in the discourse. The combined impact of the codes link LEwC with costly economic miscalculation while effacing any pressing social concerns that necessitate economic reorganisation of the country’s racialised capitalist arrangements that are responsible to the enduring poverty of Black people since colonisation. The codes and the schema constitute thematically reinforcing clusters of framing judgements in each news article and between the news articles against LEwC.

The “unity” (Entman and Rojecki 1993) of perspective in support of the adverse economic consequences of LEwC in the narrative constructs a powerful impression of an unproblematic and natural agreement against the policy. The assumed adverse economic consequences are constructed as valid and universal across the social spectrum of the country’s population. This categorisation is, however, a product of conscious and/or unconscious framing judgments involving journalists and experts, the most prolific contributors of anti-LEwC opinion in the discourse. The framing is also dialectically linked to the economic, social and political structures of colonialism and Apartheid. Economic discourses in the English press have historically turned a blind eye towards economic, social and moral violations against Black people. Their emphasis has been on “stability” where the government ensured optimum opportunities for capitalist extraction. Moneyweb’s discourse mimics the voice and propaganda agency for its capitalist owners and readers in its opposition to LEwC economic reorganisation.

The pro-capital prose and angles of the discourse displace and debase any counter-frames, such as equality, while constructing the LEwC policy in dramatic and eccentric elements viewed in the normative context of liberal capitalism. Codes such as “the ANC flirtation [with land expropriation]”, “muggy world of land expropriation”, “living in a world of slogans” etc. constitute a powerful assault on LEwC. “Flirting” constructs the policy as some playfulness motivated by excitement as opposed to proper consideration. Sloganeering signifies empty rhetoric, while muggy conjures up unpleasantness and reduces LEwC to reckless engagement. These signifiers are corrosive to the subject. They locate contrast a stereotypical view of LEwC with the economy as a major social concern that guarantees the welfare of individuals, households, and communities.

The economic framing legitimises and entrenches the status of the country’s race-tinged liberal capitalist economic rights that colonialism and Apartheid bequeathed South Africa – “ensuring your property rights”, “strongly against tipping over to dilute property rights” – are powerful codes that the narrative deploys outside of their historical context. The signifiers seek
to secure the prevailing ill-gotten White economic privilege behind a protective wall of liberal individualism and private capital thereby locking society in perpetual competitive mode predicated on the pursuit of private wealth. Economic framing disembodies the policy of its corrective socio-political purpose, the reordering of the country’s racially bifurcated economic inequality. The policy is characterised as “a very blunt policy”, “wreak[ing] havoc” to project it as an indiscriminate force of destruction with no benefits of any kind. The discourse’s antagonism to economic equality misleadingly implies that capitalist interests are above political calculation. It throws a liberal veil over the foundations of inequality i.e. conquest and Apartheid expropriation, thereby cloaking the oppressive status quo in the “legitimizing mantle of non-partisanship” (Entman and Rojecki 1993: 165).

A list of 19 actors was identified in the discourse which I recoded to 8 actors listed in Table 1 below. Opponents of LEwC are characterised as sources with expert capacity and institutional authority (banks, academic etc.) to analyse valid policy options and a formidable consensus about their opinion. Their expert knowledge and postulates use phrases such as: “markets fret…”; “…are unlikely to like it…”; “detrimental”; “the economy will stutter”; “not the way to go”; “ripple effects…” to impart wisdom and sound valid caution against LEwC. This treatment deligitimises potential mass (Black) support for LEwC that would ballast the urgency of the policy and pressure leaders to implement it. It also isolates it from its potentially wide political base and from legitimate public opinion against socially engineered inequality and poverty in South Africa. This is misrepresenting the public to itself (Entman and Rojecki 1993: 165) in that it constructs the minority views of wealth owners as the legitimate views of the public, the majority of whom colonialism, Apartheid and racist, liberal capitalism rendered poor and socially marginalised.

The framing of the proponents of LEwC, such as the ANC, EFF, state managers and Black people, is conversely, consistently unfavorable and suggests a lack of principle on their part, incompetence, and a proclivity for ideological manipulation and political trickery. “Ramaphosa’s playbook” and “uncertainty” suggest lack of thought and experimentation on the part of the President and leader of the ANC. Caution relating to a “rude surprise” and “placed [the country] in limbo” suggest an impending surprising and unpleasant discovery about the LEwC policy. Codes such as “ANC moves to save a precarious majority”, “cover government corruption” and “bureaucratic and administrative failures” locate dishonesty, incompetence and manipulation behind the LEwC policy that the discourse links to exclusive political motives of the ANC. The EFF, constructed as the proprietor of the policy in the narrative is coded as an “ultra-left” party lead by a “firebrand”. This characterisation of the EFF locates them as an oddity in the landscape
of established liberal capitalist economic intelligibility, and by association, their motion on LEwC. A spectre of violent takeovers, lawlessness, and a caricature of LEwC as a “low-key revolutionary Leftist project” ballast the oddity of the Loony-Left project that LEwC is constructed to be. Related words with violent undertones are deployed in the discourse to describe Black people. These include “violence”, “burn cars”, “hurl rocks”, “taking”, “occupation”, “invasion” to characterise their evolutionary lag and lack of civilization and values. Codes like “exhibit A: The Soviet Union”, “Venezuela/Zimbabwe”, “Socialism” and “State control” draw from Apartheid’s Rooi gevaar (Red Peril), Swaart gevaar (Black Peril) and Afro-phobia as inherent ominous elements of LEwC and the DNA of its proponents.

I operationalised causal interpretation as a frame element with codes that signify who was deemed responsible for the ‘risks’ of LEwC as indicated in Table 1. The strong attribution of causality to the ANC/EFF and state managers uses words such as the “backer” and “supporter” of the motion “by the EFF”, “poor Black [ANC] voters” and state managers implementing the “a very blunt policy”. This rhetorical strategy can lead people to perceive that the proponents are responsible for the ‘crisis’ and thus result in negative evaluations and mistrust towards them (Entman and Rojecki 1993). The capitalist political calculations of the opponents of LEwC quietly ‘escape’ any adverse framing judgments. This strengthens opposition to LEwC and leaves the legitimacy and the morality of economic redress and social equality inchoate and invalid.

The moral evaluation of LEwC in the narrative is negative and signified in economic terms such as “dire consequences for the economy”, “devastation”, “pain”, “catastrophe” etc. The discourse completely effaces economic and social devastation and the enduring pain that afflicts Black people since colonialism. The “call to stop” the policy permeates the treatment of LEwC in the Moneyweb discourse. Table 1 below summarises Moneyweb’s frames, framing devices and codes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame element</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem definition</td>
<td>Central issue: Economic risk</td>
<td>Linking LEwC with adverse economic consequences including through indices and citations of macroeconomic conditions</td>
<td>Investment repellent, 'undefined' economic risk, credit rating/worthiness, currency performance, loss of productivity, loss of personal wealth, economic collapse, stunted growth, inflation, food insecurity, employment, lack of capital, incompetent Black farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue:</td>
<td>Pathological view of the ANC</td>
<td>Casting the ANC as unprincipled, with a proclivity for manipulation and trickery</td>
<td>Indecision, incompetence, moral flexibility, power addiction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism</td>
<td>Central issue: Fear mongering</td>
<td>Implying a takeover and lack of regard for order and due process</td>
<td>Hot-headedness, violent takeover, lawlessness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue:</td>
<td>Fear mongering</td>
<td>Appealing to emotions by raising alarm and fear including dramatic, ominous words</td>
<td>Afro-pessimism, low-level racism, present and looming danger, <em>Rooi gevaar</em>, physical harm, ruin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacrosanctity of</td>
<td>Central issue: Pathologising Black people</td>
<td>Upholding private property ownership and individual rights within the existing legal instruments</td>
<td>Private wealth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private property</td>
<td>Central issue: Political economy</td>
<td>Casting Black people as simple minded and an urban nuisance</td>
<td>Incompetence, sexually voracious, entitlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame element</td>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Recklessness and damaging</td>
<td>Showing the LEwC process as irresponsible and a negative development</td>
<td>Ill-considered, wrong, lack of sobriety, danger, ill-timed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Dishonesty</td>
<td>Debasing the policy of LEwC linking it to nefarious intentions</td>
<td>Diversion, avoidance of responsibility.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Economic risk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Pathological view of the ANC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Experts, journalists, <em>Afriforum</em>, and Democratic Alliance decode the ANC position and motives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Radicalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: sacrosanctity of private property</td>
<td>Individuals or groups linked to each central issue</td>
<td></td>
<td>Experts, journalists, capital institutions, <em>Afriforum</em>, and Democratic Alliance highlight individual liberty and private property as non-negotiables. <em>Afriforum</em>, journalists, experts present constructions of Black people. State managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Stereotyping Black people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Afriforum</em>, journalists, experts present constructions of Black people. State managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal interpretation</td>
<td>economic risk</td>
<td>Actor who were deemed either to be responsible for or are the cause</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal actors: recklessness and damaging</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal Actors: Individual property rights</td>
<td>Actor who were deemed to be responsible for the solutions to the LEwC policy</td>
<td>Experts, journalists, capital institutions, <em>Afriforum</em>, White farmers and Democratic Alliance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral evaluation</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Associating LEwC with undesirable effects</td>
<td>Economic collapse, indiscriminate force, social strife.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 *Moneyweb* narrative framing devices and codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame element</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Judgment: negative</td>
<td>LEwC is negative and must be stopped</td>
<td>There are better options.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Afriforum*: Land expropriation without compensation frames

Similar to the framing of LEwC in *Moneyweb*, the *Afriforum*’s discourse constructs LEwC in terms of economic consequences. Framing devices in the construction of LEwC as a catalyst for adverse economic outcomes in the two discourses overlap and differ simultaneously. Distinct framing devices that *Afriforum*’s discourse couples with economic risk include globalisation, debasement of LEwC, farcical LEwC process and Black-people-do-not-need-land. Fear mongering, sacrosanctity of property rights, pathologising ANC/government and radicalism are common elements in the dominant frame in the two discourses and are constructed with largely similar analytic materials. There are important analytic differences though. The codes in *Afriforum*’s discourse are sharper and more pronounced. Where *Moneyweb*, for instance, uses words like “blunt instrument”, “looming large” and “scary” in constructing fear for LEwC, *Afriforum* deploys codes such as “kill the Boer”, “torture”, “murder” and “ethnic cleansing”. The *Afriforum* discourse signifies their own ethnic position, and constructs LEwC as a form of Black ethnic politics that will result in the ethnic cleansing of White people. Where *Moneyweb* uses codes such as “aimed at winning votes”, “a way to divert attention from failures” to create a picture of dishonesty and to debase LEwC as a policy, *Afriforum* uses stronger descriptors such as “Communist project” to invoke the Red Peril, “looting opportunities” to imply differences in values, and “racist agenda” by proponents who “romanticize murder [of White people]” to help the racist superiority imaginations of the followers.

Such codes constitute the framing devices that dominate the content of the 25 articles in *Afriforum*’s LEwC narrative. These are summarised in Table 2 below. They facilitate important framing judgments that impute irrationality, emotionality, and extremism (Entman and Rojecki 1993) to the proponents of LEwC, constructed as the ANC, EFF, and squatters. They are “land grabbers”, “economically naïve”, and seeking to turn South Africa into “the
Garden of Eden”. This framing is critical to the evocation of negative emotional state and behavioural responses (see Weiner 1986, Coombs 2007) towards LEwC and its proponents. It polarises society along racial lines, engenders conceptual laagering (Pinnock 1991: 136) of largely White people and renders the achievement of equality between citizens difficult and unimaginable.

Attribution-dependent emotion results from evaluating the cause of a crisis (Weiner 1986: 125). According to Lee (2004), where a group of people is considered responsible for a crisis (internal locus), individuals tend to have more negative impressions towards the group. In the subjective framing judgements of the authors of Afriforum’s LEwC narrative, the colonial, Apartheid and capitalist dispossession of the wealth of Black people is wholly excluded. This exclusion adds to codes such as “no hunger for land” and “Black people preferring money over land” to deligitimise LEwC and to attribute damaging causality to the proponents of LEwC “catastrophe”, the homogenised ANC/EFF/farm murderers/squatters. Proponents of LEwC are constructed as deceptive and pestilence through phrases such as “contortion of the past”, “crooked” and “plagued” to disemboby the LEwC policy of all legitimacy and to construct nefarious motives.

Afriforum’s LEwC discourse echoes the “coordinated total onslaught” under Apartheid when the average White South African was imbued with the psychosis of a fear of a world-wide communist threat (see Nel 1993; ISMUS 1987). The “Red Peril” under Apartheid, is replaced in the present discourse by codes such as “National Democratic Revolution”, “Marxist-Leninist” and “ideological principles that led to depression, poverty and starvation worldwide”. Under Apartheid, public discourses urged South Africa under the leadership of America, to make an all-out effort to check the advance of communism (see Van Jaarsveld 1962: 8; Van Rooyen 1993: 8). The Afriforum discourse incorporates a strong focus on seeking to mobilise involvement of the Western economic and political forces to stop LEwC. The Globalisation framing device includes codes like “head[ing] to USA for awareness”, “appeals” for “pressure” from “international investors”, “warning” by the IMF, “warnings” to “international investors” and trading partners that are targeted, enlistig the might of big capital against LEwC. Coupled with this are “visits to” and concerted “campaigns to encourage international community” and “foreign opposition” from key Western economic powers and targeting of “diplomatic missions” in the Global North.
Table 2 **Afriforum frames, framing devices and codes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame element</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Economic risk</td>
<td>Linking LEwC with adverse economic consequences including through indices and citations of macroeconomic conditions</td>
<td>Economic collapse, investment repellant, job security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Pathologising the ANC</td>
<td>Casting the ANC as unprincipled, with a proclivity for manipulation and trickery</td>
<td>Indecision, incompetence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issues: Radicalism</td>
<td>Implying a takeover and lack of regard for order and due process</td>
<td>Violent take-over, anti-White racism, Communism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Fear mongering</td>
<td>Appealing to emotions by raising alarm and fear including dramatic, ominous words</td>
<td>Anti-White agenda, conflict, Afro-pessimism, <em>Rooi gevaar</em>, death.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Sacrosanctity of private property</td>
<td>Upholding private property ownership and individual rights within the existing legal instruments</td>
<td>Property rights, injustice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Globalisation</td>
<td>Undermining democratic process and deferring to international economic and political forces.</td>
<td>International capital, foreign opposition.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Dishonesty</td>
<td>Linking the Parliamentary process to nefarious or illegitimate intentions</td>
<td>Farce, deception.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Blacks do not need land</td>
<td>Suggesting that Black people do not need or deserve land</td>
<td>Preference for money, failed experiments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with *Moneyweb*, the moral evaluation of LEwC is decidedly negative and the “call to stop” the policy in its treatment in the discourse is unambiguous.
City Press: Land expropriation without compensation frames

The City Press LEwC discourse deploys a dominant human interest frame that humanises, centralises and gives voice to Black people in the narrative. The frame brings human interest stories and emotional angles to the LEwC debate and employs visual information and personal vignettes to generate emotional reactions. The LEwC narrative in City Press is characterised by codes such as “the story of a workers’ farm”, “Frina Hadebe, a 72 year-old resident of Sibonelo does not only express her pride…”, and emotional appeals – “squashed like rats in the informal settlements”, “unhappiness” – that are linked to cautious positive evaluations: “if sustainable”, “harvested prosperity”, “watch this space”, of the LEwC policy. The frame is linked to measured transformative social change and reconciliation between race-groups: “ANC would not want to drown the economy”, “Boogying with the Boere”. The sanguine human-interest frame affirms the LEwC policy through related devices such as support, emancipation, circumspection, inclusivity, justice, equality, transformation, land hunger and democracy. The humanistic and emotion-steeped content analytical materials ‘in’ the framing devices are notably dominant in the City Press discourse. These are summarised in Table 3 below.

The discourse invokes the colonial and Apartheid contexts, using codes such as “Unconquering the nation”, “original sin”, “brutal dispossession”, “exploitation of [B]lack people”, “settler [W]hite colonial minority”, “unique history”, to construct strong external attribution for the policy and engender pity and support (Coombs 2007). The codes foreground the brutal history of conquest and racial expropriation of the wealth of Black people as the valid and legitimate basis for LEwC. Pity and support for the policy are evident in the broad array of supportive actors and codes in the narrative where state managers, notably the ANC, dominate as a rational (Entman and Rojecki 1993), unifying force for transformation and reconciliation. The party is linked to “calls on South Africans”, “looking out for each other”, and “promoting rational debate”.

The narrative’s moral evaluation of LEwC is supportive and links it to socio-economic advancement, constitutionalism, and justice. The “call” in its treatment is to implement the LEwC policy.
### Table 3 *City Press* frames, framing devices and codes

**Frame: Human-interest**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame element</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem definition</strong></td>
<td>Central issue: Supportive</td>
<td>Couching LEwC in positive terms that extoll, recommend, reflect or suggest support</td>
<td>Supported, Social cohesion, basic needs, celebration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Emancipation</td>
<td>Linking LEwC to colonial conquest and Apartheid dispossession</td>
<td>Freedom, dispossession, exploitation, indigenous people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issues: Circumspection</td>
<td>Reflecting caution and prudence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Process, legality, legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Inclusivity</td>
<td>Highlighting participation and involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultation, diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Apprehension</td>
<td>Show caution</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uncertainty, optimism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issues: Justice</td>
<td>Linking justice to human suffering and welfare</td>
<td>Human dignity, fairness, freedom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Inequality</td>
<td>Highlighting inequalities including in numbers</td>
<td>Inter-race comparison.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Transformation</td>
<td>Linking LEwC to social benefits</td>
<td>Empowerment, productivity, success, inter-race collaboration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Local, democratic change</td>
<td>Locating LEwC in the democratic space</td>
<td>Citizenship, democratic process.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central issue: Land hunger</td>
<td>Words or phrases that highlight the need for land</td>
<td>Need for land, emotional investment in land, sacrifices for land.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Supportive</td>
<td>Individuals or groups linked to each central issue</td>
<td>Journalists, state managers, public, farmers, financial institutions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Emancipation</td>
<td>Journalists, state managers, public, farmers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Circumspection</td>
<td>Journalists, state managers, public.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Inclusivity</td>
<td>Farmers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Apprehension</td>
<td>Public, journalist.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Justice</td>
<td>Farmers, public.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land hunger</td>
<td>Public, farmers, state managers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor: Equality</td>
<td>State managers, experts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>State managers, public, financial institutions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local, democratic change</td>
<td>State managers, journalists, financial institutions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal interpretation</td>
<td>State managers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal Actors: Supportive</td>
<td>Actor who were deemed either to be responsible for the benefits of the LEwC policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral evaluation</td>
<td>Associating LEwC with social benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Emancipation, human dignity, reconciliation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Judgment: positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEwC is positive and must proceed</td>
<td>Unstoppable, corrective.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AFASA: Land expropriation without compensation frames

Human-interest features strongly in the AFASA narrative on LEwC. Framing devices such as support, land hunger, apprehension and local people-centredness, coincide with similar ones in the City Press narrative. The discourse however includes equality as an additional frame for LEwC. Human-interest and equality codes are the most dominant frames in the discourse. The discourse advocates for LEwC as a “new way”, “necessary” and “pro-poor”. These codes breach the established liberal capitalist norm, by signaling an alternative imagination of the structure of society towards equality. LEwC policy is strongly linked to “redress”, “historical dispossession”, and “voices” as a way to deliver economic justice. Black people are constructed not merely as protégés of their more illustrious White counterparts, but as highly decorated farmers and role models in their own right. Codes like “pride”, “prestige”, “renowned breeder” construct Black farmers according them agency and independence. These are summarised in Table 4 below.

The moral evaluation and treatment of LEwC as a social equaliser is positive and the narrative’s “call” is for the policy to proceed.
Table 4 AFASA frames, framing devices and codes

Frame: Human interest and equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame element</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem definition</td>
<td>Central issue: Advocacy</td>
<td>Appealing directly or indirectly for government support including highlighting the aspirations of Black farmers</td>
<td>Access to finance, qualifications and capacity of officials, Black land ownership, new way, consultation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central issue: Transformation</td>
<td>Linking LEwC to social benefits</td>
<td>Transform agriculture, intergenerational wealth, correction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central issues: Supportive</td>
<td>Couching LEwC in positive terms that extoll, recommend, reflect or suggest support</td>
<td>Last resort, land rights, success stories, pride, prestige.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central issue: Land hunger</td>
<td>Words or phrases that highlight the need for land</td>
<td>Black farmers’ constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central issue: Justice</td>
<td>Linking justice to human suffering and welfare</td>
<td>Redress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central issue: Circumspection</td>
<td>Reflecting prudence in relation to LEwC policy developments</td>
<td>Transparency and participation, constitutionality, food security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral evaluation</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Associating LEwC with social benefits</td>
<td>New way, success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Judgment: Positive</td>
<td>Casting LEwC in positive lights</td>
<td>New way, redress.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary.

Qualitative frame analysis focuses on language as a carrier of ideology structured according to the subjective framing judgments that journalists (working with their sources) make in reporting about policy issues. These judgments are influenced by economic, social, and historical structures that inform all social actors and actions in the system of news construction. The focus of the analysis is on the nature, texture, and character of the texts as the manifestation of ideological power to influence the understandings of LEwC.

The narratives broadly reflect shared, albeit somewhat polarised, formats, rationales and structure. Their frames form a complex continuum with the norm of liberal capitalism as the centripetal ideological centre. Similar and distinct framings of LEwC between the discourse units emerged, reflecting what issues were selected and what were left out in each narrative. The similarities and distinctions reflect prominent ideological emphases and conspicuous absences¹ (De Sousa Santos 2014: 175) that characterise their contestations to fix (Carpienter and De Cleen 2007: 268) the meaning of LEwC. What is missing from all four discourses is a conception of private property in terms of social economy rather than of political geography. Their focus on landmasses, agricultural practices and technicist preoccupation with policy in terms of expropriation, compensation and subdivision of land-holdings insulates important capitalist circulatory processes that involve land as an economic asset and a social question.

Framing the LEwC policy in this way, rather than in terms of equality, renders capitalist processes of production and reproduction of wealth and labour under coloniality (of being, power and knowledge) associated with land ownership, impenetrable in their constructions. The frames are mainly future-focused. Pragmatism and empiricism, primarily in Moneyweb and Afriforum’s concern their discourses with the present. City Press and AFASA carry glimpses of the past as having a bearing on both the present and what is possible in the future. All discourses are however, driven predominantly by elite and counter-elite social actors. The diagram below summarises the nature and texture of the frames.
In the middle oval sphere, the frames of *Moneyweb* and *City Press* pull from the centre outwards to the left and to the right respectively.\(^{122}\) Jutting out of the oval centre on the left, are *Afriforum* frames radically oriented outwards into a reactionary sphericule (Gitlin 1989: 170). *AFASA* frames are on the right, jutting out towards a prefigurative politics. The frames in the liberal capitalist centre, and on either side, are not necessarily dichotomous with the closest frames in the outbound arrows. The frames are all anchored in liberal capitalism as their ideological universe albeit with jutting edges (supportive and oppositional) on both sides. The porous and overlapping ‘boundaries’ between the centre and the jutting ideologies signify potential inward and outward overlaps in important instances. The emboldened frames in the reactionary and prefigurative outbound arrows on either side of the oval centre reflect stronger, doctrinaire definitions and ‘transparency’ of their ideological content.

Extreme reactionary frames constitute themes around the globalisation of local politics in the *Afriforum* discourse, the strong dissimulation of the deviant (Thompson 2007; Hallin 1986) LEwC ideology, and paternalism. Shared frames between the *Afriforum* and *Moneyweb* are overwhelmingly negative towards LEwC and foreground the reproduction of ‘race’ through fear mongering, dehumanisation and polarisation, the exclusive voice of capital institutions, and reflect a ‘pure’ form of liberal-capitalist monoculturalism.

\(^{122}\) The directions are merely for illustration. Not to be confused with the Left–Right
dimension in comparative politics

Media discourses are not simply reflections of the truth about social issues. They offer specific viewpoints to readers that they construct and contextualise according to socially situated, subjective framing judgments. Discourse is a product of its social and cultural circumstances. *Moneyweb*’s elitist narrative is dominated by experts and advances commercial and financial interests of wealth owners with stability as its rallying call. In the *City Press* frames, state managers dominate, advancing the ‘national interest’ within a reformist frame seeking accommodation for Black people in the current economic order. *Afriforum*’s racist frame harnesses prejudiced emotions and promotes a siege mentality and imminent threat to White lifestyles, heightening the trauma wrought on them by LEwC. *AFASA*’s narrative shows glimpses of alternative thinking and radicality, but is itself steeped in the dominant liberal capitalist thinking looking to big capital for the facilitation of exclusive economic opportunities.

*Moneyweb* and *Afriforum*, work together to foment a predominantly White solidarity against any possibility of racial equality and meaningful transformation of the South African society in way that the English, Afrikaans and reactionary alternative presses did under Apartheid. Their discourses work to normalise colonial and Apartheid war ethics against the marginalised Black majority.

**Conclusion**

The foregoing qualitative frame analysis illuminates the text-based processes of social construction and meaning-making by the four platforms. Words in their narratives are selected or not, from many other options, sequenced, and linked together and to the subjects and objects in a sentence in specific contexts for particular ideational purposes. *Moneyweb*’s frame serves the interests of big capital. *Afriforum*’s leverages Afrikaner ethno-nationalism and superiority. *City Press* conjures up national interest related to the ANC’ ideology while *AFASA* suggest radical rearrangements to the social structure.

Political communication about LEwC operates in this comprehensive and creative discursive environment as a purposeful cognitively-driven project of ideological positioning that echoes, and in turn is echoed in, broader social, economic and political environments. Concepts like ‘economy’, ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ are transformed by their social context to link
to fractious interests that characterise historic societies such as South Africa.
Critical Discourse Analysis of the Land Expropriation without Compensation narratives

Finding coherent meanings in exclusions and above sentence. Investigating language as social practice.

The following two chapters present a critical discourse analysis of the relation between ideology and media texts and their framing as critical influences in the constructions of meaning. The separation of the analysis into two chapters follows the broad ideological polarisation reflected in the previous chapter with Moneyweb and Afriforum whose ideologies pull to the same direction deploying broadly similar “discourse topics” (Van Dijk 1991) being the subject of chapter 6, while City Press and AFASA’s discourses are dealt with in the following chapter. This separation is for organisation and presentation. Both chapters apply critical discourse analysis and draw from ideological (Van Dijk 1993; Thompson 2007) and qualitative framing analysis (Entman 1993; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Collony-Ahern and Broadway 2008: 369) to uncover the ideological functions and framing strategies in the texts of the four platforms. They centre language (Saussure 1974; Fowler 1991: 25; Fairclough 2015; Cook 1998: 101; Gee 1999: 19 and Purvis and Hunt 1993: 474), understood in the context of the action and epistemology of the texts (Potter 1996: 121). They draw from the epistemology of absent knowledges (De Sousa Santos 2016: 157) and “holistical[ly]” (Collony-Ahern and Broadway 2008: 369) expand “reality” beyond what exists in the languages of the discourses to identify what is missing and why.

Understandings of the social that language creates ideologically, has consequences for the direction and character of the action and inaction on the part of the people (Purvis and Hunt 1993: 474; Thompson 2007: 67). From the perspective of the Epistemologies of the South, the key issue is not whether the meanings are real or not, but whether they are “well-constructed as facts” and successfully resist the situations in which their solidity and consistency are challenged, or “badly-constructed as artefacts”, and hence vulnerable to criticism or erosion (De Sousa Santos 2016:197; see also see also Thomas and Swaine 1928: 572). “Knowing” links this understanding to ways of intervening in the world with the purpose of attenuating the oppression, domination, and discrimination linked to global capitalism and coloniality (De Sousa Santos 2016: 238).
My interpretative engagement with the discourses of the four platforms embeds them in their socio-historical conditions as the social context of their production and reception (Thompson 2007; Heritage 1985; Sacks 1992; Schwandt 1998; Krippendorff 2013). This is the paradigm of war imposed on the country in colonialism and connected structurally and ideologically to the present day coloniality – the fabric of South African racist liberal capitalist system – that still (re)produces daily, ‘race’, coloniality, and dehumanisation (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 3). Informed by their meanings in this context (Cook 1998: 101), key dimensions of discourse that allow variable choice (Van Dijk 1993: 260-1; MacDonell 1986: 3), specifically the modes of operation of ideology as Thompson (1992: 60) calls them, and the related strategies for meaning-making in each discourse (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Van Eemerson and Gootendorst 1992, 1994; van Dijk and Kleinpointner 1996) are identified and analysed on the basis of their relation to the prevailing social and economic system in the country. The interplay between these prominent power-relevant discourse structures and the status quo is analysed from hegemonic and (re)productive, to resistive, to the prevalent relations of domination (van Dijk 2016, 1993: 259; Thompson 2007: 59; Althusser 1971: 31; Purvis and Hunt 1993: 474).
Chapter 6

The qualitative framing analysis of the constructions of land expropriation without compensation (LEwC) locates the *Moneyweb* and *Afriforum* discourses on the conservative\(^{123}\) to reactionary\(^{124}\) side of the polarised ideological continuum. The two platforms are co-located in this chapter for analysis purposes based on the coincidence and complementarity of the ideology in their discourses.

*Moneyweb* discourse: Ideological structures and strategies in discourse

*Moneyweb* brands itself as one of South Africa’s premier sources of “business, finance and investment” news and information on the internet, radio, and print\(^{125}\). Its global content distribution network includes South Africa’s multi-channel public broadcaster, the SABC, where it is “the official supplier of news”\(^{126}\) under a protected contract\(^{127}\). The membership requirements of the SA Press Council's Code of Ethics and Conduct imposes ethical responsibilities on *Moneyweb* to be “truthful” and “objective” in its reporting (Coyle 2006: 258). The platform therefore embalms its hegemonic ideology, promotion of, and complicity with, the daily racism, dehumanisation and “exploitation of the cruelest kind” against Black people with optimum ingenuity (Plaatje 1921: 54; Maldonado-Torres 2008: 6). This section unmasks the platform’s shrewd *perspectivisation* strategy of deductive and induced argumentation (KhosraviNik 2010) to cater for its below-the-radar production of ideology about LEwC.

I start with the analysis of the grand metaphors in the discourse as a powerful anchoring structure and mechanism for argumentation and the *dialogicality* (KhosraviNik 2010: 62)

---

\(^{123}\) Showing an aversion to change and favouring market logic, private ownership and traditional ideas.

\(^{124}\) Favours political views that promote a return to the status quo ante, the previous political state of society, which they believe possessed positive characteristics that are absent from contemporary South African society.

\(^{125}\) See https://www.Moneyweb.co.za/


\(^{127}\) In its rejection of a PAIA application for information regarding the ownership, development and utilisation of the information produced and broadcast under the aegis of the contract on SABC platforms, the SABC wrote “The SABC refuses to grant you access to the contract for the purposes of protecting commercial information of *Moneyweb.*” (Sylvia Tladi, SABC SOC Limited. 30 April 2020 via email) Annexure 4.
between Moneyweb’s ideology, discourse topics and textual choices about LEwC. I then look at the expression of racist capitalistic ideology on the platform and the ways in which it (re)creates and (re)defines (KhosraviNik 2010: 59) this ideology through its discourse. This framework throws some light on the nature of, and the relations between, the macro-structures, such as the discourse topics, positive self-presentation and negative Other presentation and legitimation, and the micro-structures such as actor descriptions, rhetorical devices and argumentation, to induce the hegemonic capitalist ideological perspective on Moneyweb. This discussion is structured as follows:

Schema: the discursive anchor for Moneyweb’s discoursal integration.

Racism and its reproduction in discourse

Dichotomisation through semantic merger

Positioning through activity assignment

- The out-group
- The in-group
  a. Journalists, Democratic Alliance and experts
  b. Afriforum, White South Africans, White farmers, farmers groups and people

Polarisation through values and norms

Schema: the discursive anchor for Moneyweb’s discoursal integration.

Moneyweb’s discourse construction strategy employs dissimulation of its ideological manipulation expressed through metaphor (Thompson 2007: 62; see also Ricoeur 1978). Table 6. reflects intertextual relations between the constructed schema drawn from the discourse on the right hand (see underlined words in the sentences), and their analogical interpretations based on my reading-in-context on the left (Kitis and Milapides 1997). While I abstract these metaphors for analysis, they are not stand-alone structures in the discourse. Each is brought about to bear on the discourse by numerous textual pieces of the same puzzle scattered across the text that make sense in the context of the metaphor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analogical interpretation</th>
<th>Figurative use of language in the text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEwC is transformed into political rather than an economic issue. The analogy of a red</td>
<td>The motion today means land has been elevated even higher as a political issue to code red from code amber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traffic light invokes ‘danger’ and a need</td>
<td>(MW 28/02/2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘political gamesmanship’ about land has been a recurring (‘political’) ploy. Schema conjures up the ominous sounds of a bubbling liquid/lava to signify potential seismic danger.</td>
<td>The issue [of LEWC] has been bubbling under the radar for many years, but bubbling nevertheless (MW 20/03/2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The strategic frame repositions the economic land issue as a political programme of the ANC that is being processed with compulsion and force. The schema effaces the pressing economic hardship behind LEwC. The ‘compulsive approach’ is also a throw-away that signifies resistance but is not linked to evidence.</td>
<td>The ANC has decided to change the Constitution of South Africa so it can push ahead with its plans to expropriate land … (MW 31/07/2018).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEwC has caused an unwelcome and dangerous disruption to an economic arrangement that has been orderly and calm (for property owners). LEwC = the proverbial cat and, the economy = the endangered pigeons.</td>
<td>Economic growth has been low, the local market has disappointed and the uncertainty around land expropriation without compensation has thrown the cat among the pigeons. (MW 20/06/2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business is firmly opposed to crossing the line of sacrosanctity and to interfering with inviolable property rights and its accumulated meanings in a capitalist context. Tipping over signals a precarious crossing over into a sanctified space.</td>
<td>But business is very strongly against any tipping over into the dilution of property rights. (MW 04/06/2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With the buffoonery of the political leadership in the country, things are going to get even worse. ‘Wild ride’ and ‘frenzied’ conjure up dangerous, bumpy, up-and-down swings similar to a rollercoaster ride</td>
<td>South Africa has never been a boring country. The wild ride is about to get even more frenzied in the months and years ahead (MW 20/03/2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ANC has caused confusion and undermined any possibility of a ‘fair’ decision-making process regarding the LEwC motion. This by ‘prematurely’ expressing support for the motion. “The people” is an exclusive category of propertied, non-ANC supporters who are against LEwC. The ANC, not economic inequality, is centred in the process and is</td>
<td>That [action by the ANC] has actually muddied the waters in a manner that people are no longer feeling that whatever contribution they make to this will actually contribute towards the final policy (MW 06/06/2018)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
framed as dishonest and harbouring ulterior motive.

The government is causing irreversible damage to the country through the LEwC motion. An eggshell suggests brittle and fragile protection for something of value (the exclusive economy). Once broken it cannot be restored in the same way that scrambled egg can never be separated. You cannot ever get a scrambled egg back into its shell in one piece again (MW 20/03/18)

There will be shocking and unpleasant outcomes for all who believe in the LEwC policy. ‘Go down’ suggests a collapse or sinking deep. The schema places faith in the current economic arrangements as a cure for the poverty that they caused.

If South Africa goes down that route, many of those who think this will be a panacea for poverty will actually get a very rude surprise (MW 27/02/2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Representation of intertextual relations between constructed schema, on the right and their analogical interpretations on the left.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The Moneyweb discourse draws on “flexible schemata” (Thompson 2007: 148) to strengthen its articulation of LEwC as “well-constructed facts [my emphasis]” (see De Sousa Santos 2016: 197). It does so by reifying human-made economic inequality as a quasi-natural state of being, in its construction of LEwC as dangerous political game, as opposed to an economic imperative. Flexible schemata orientate the action and thoughts of individuals in the same way that well-formulated concepts such as written rules do (see Thompson 2007). Black citizens and their exploitation are not directly visible as the object of the schema. But they are conspicuous subjects of “damnation” (De Sousa Santos 2016: 18; Maldonado-Torres 2008:217) in the status quo that it ballasts. The colonially designated role and social station of Black people is to be the foundation of the economic system as its invisible source of labour128 with no identity and no rights.

The schemata eternalises “economic capital”129 (Thompson 2007: 148) and property rights in the context of the hegemonic colonial economic system that is kept alive by coloniality of power, knowledge and being (Quijano 2000; Wynter 2003; Maldonado-Torres 2004; 2007, 2008). The schema legitimises and reifies (Thompson 2007) this system as the natural order and life’s structure. Coloniality, the preservation of White privilege through the retention of

---

128 See for example Constitutional Court land restitution judgment Salem Party Club and Others v Salem Community and Others [2017] ZACC 46

129 Thompson uses this term to refer to property, wealth, and financial assets of various kinds. The term ‘people’ in the schema addresses itself deictically to this exclusive privileged White community (see also Lyons 1977: 636).
resources, is the heart of Moneyweb’s schemata (Mignolo 2003: 669; Maldonado-Torres 2007: 242). Moneyweb’s discourse is textured by racist exclusion; it justifies racialisation of human beings and the polarisation of the racialised identities on the bases of ‘their incompatible’ activities, values, and norms to naturalise their apartness and the related entitlements to privilege.

Racism and its reproduction in discourse

The master morality of dominion and control (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 2-3) that the Moneyweb LEwC discourse constructs and legitimises, presupposes both racial differentiation and the expurgation of the Other (Thompson 2007: 65) as its axis. Without the requisite transformation of relations at intersubjective levels to numb the human spirit to hate and deaden it to cruelty against a fellow human, the depth of the violence required to sustain South Africa’s economic status quo would not be easy to rationalise. This section identifies several ideological means of reproducing racism and hate in the Moneyweb discourse.

Colonialisation employed racialisation to install the pathological in the space of the normal that is reflected in the social relations between Black and White in South Africa (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 95; Fanon 1968). It normalised the many ways in which Black economic exploitation destroys ordinary lives in the (colonial and) so-called postcolonial and free South Africa. Once naturalized, ‘race’ differences are linked to hierarchies that justify domination and oppression of ‘inferior’ ‘races’ by the ‘superior’ White race. This was an invention of “biopolitical” social ordering in colonialism (Wade 2015: 1292). It has become the ideal loci from where ideals of war (expropriation, exploitation, accumulation by dispossession, economic enslavement etc.) radiate in the South African condition of economic inequality.

The Moneyweb LEwC discourse is infused with racism as the key ideological means that ‘explains’, rationalises, and ‘settles’ any concern about the current relations of Black domination and racial inequality. Much of the critical ideological labour it performs in defining ‘race’, the meaning that the imagery of ‘race’ carries and what the ‘problem’ of ‘race’ is understood to be, is inferential (Hall 2011). In the Moneyweb LEwC discourse, the apparently naturalised representations of events and situations relating to ‘race’ or which have racist premises and propositions inscribed in them, whether ‘factual’ or
‘fictional’, are constructed as a set of unquestioned assumptions (Hall 2011: 82). Intentionality is not a condition for racism. My analysis approaches racism from a systemic perspective and considers it a phenomenon that weaves itself seamlessly into culture and ways of society (Vala 2009), reflected in implicit biases in the discourse.

The Moneyweb discourse naturalises and narrativises colonial intersubjective relations and the related social institutions and, in the process legitimising and reifying them (see Thompson 2007). The discourse predominantly operates on the false and insidious supposition that one can distinguish between different races. There is a strong racial definition of people in the discourse. References to White and Black “races” are used without skepticism as normal parlance and unproblematic natural markers for different ‘races’. In one instance, reference is made to Apartheid “buffer zones separating the races” (MW 04/07/2018). I look at the structures of racist ideology in the Moneyweb LEwC discourse at two levels: racist social cognition (prejudices and racist ideology), and underlying racist practices (discrimination) that are enabled by categorising human beings into race-based categories (racialisation).

Naturalisation of racism in South Africa included making Black people invisible and voiceless under colonialism and Apartheid. This is generally the case in the Moneyweb’s LEwC narrative. In the few instances where Black people feature, this is done based on a selection of specific features that betray established racist assumptions. They ‘appear’ as “pestilence”, “violent”, “stone-throwing”, “arsonists” and “land invaders” with a simple-mindedness that is profiled to reflect a lag in their evolutionary progress: “An 80 year-old Mapara is a father of nine who built a shack in a park.” He pledges to vote for Ramaphosa in exchange for land. In another instance we are told how a “simple [matter] as a clothing line can generate a lot of conflict [among poor Blacks],” and how “children [are] raped while relieving themselves in dark fields and bushes” (MW 04/06/2018).

These examples construct or confirm a perception of an inability of Black people to guide their instinctive propensities, marking the ‘gulf’ between them and White people. The highlighted tendencies are constructed as natural for Black people, hardwired in them by evolution in the sociobiological versions of the argument, thus bringing a biological structure that placed Black people in a natural inferiority to White people into the equation (see also Maldonado-Torres 2007: 243; Wade 2015: 1293). They provide a convenient moral scaffold,
as Durrheim Quayle, Whitehead and Kriel (2017: 387) put it, for building distinctive social identification. This is part of the explicit and implicit story that is told about Black people in the discourse to construct their ‘real nature’ and to legitimise why they should be treated in particular ways.

The *Moneyweb* discourse is a repository of racist prejudices and bigoted ideology. LEwC is viewed from the vantage point of the conditions and economic interests of “whiteness” as a conceptual category. The discourse is trapped in the arsenal of complexes (Fanon 1968: 30) that was developed by the colonial environment: the threat that LEwC poses to (exclusive) property ownership, ‘law and order’, ‘stability’ and investments, while reinforcing the legitimacy of White capitalism and Black dispossession. The rings of modernity echo insidiously through the *Moneyweb* discourse.

Paternalism, alongside the stereotypes that characterised relations between Africans and the West, permeates the *Moneyweb* LEwC discourse based on a deeply cultivated inclination to classify people, a colonial taxonomic impulse, and a European self-congratulatory attitude as the providers and torchbearers for the Other. Indirectionality through hedging (KhosraviNik 20210: 64) is an important mechanism for inducing certain ideological perspective and positioning

> Agriculture accounts for less than three percent of national output but employs 850,000 people, 5% of the workforce. Threats to production would also fan food inflation, hurting low-income households.

*Moneyweb* 01 August 2018

White monopolistic ownership of land is transformed through narrativisation (Thompson 2007: 61) as a cherished tradition that is ‘beneficial’ to Africans. The landlessness of Black people is legitimised in this context as a redemptive sacrifice on their part (Dussel 1993: 75). White people are constructed as benevolent creators of employment who ensure food security for the country and all of Africa: *Africa’s top maize producer* (MW 01/03/2018). These are capacities, the discourse implies, that are innately beyond Black people and a province of the superior “white race”. Interfering with land ownership patterns would be catastrophic in this respect. The status quo ‘earns’ its legitimacy in the structure of the discourse from these unquestioned assumptions.
Exaggerated political caricature and lampooning of Black people is deployed as part of a demeaning racist strategy against Black people in the service of the present relations of power. President Ramaphosa, for an example, is framed as a likeable but naïve, dimwitted and dishonest ANC politician. His dogmatic hold on pursuing LEwC “without damaging the economy” is repeated multiple times throughout the discourse as his main contribution. No explanation is given about what he means by this. It is however consistently presented in the context of uniform disdain and dismissive commentary by “experts”: “… we are unclear at this stage as to exactly what is meant by land expropriation without compensation that doesn’t harm the economy…” (Nedbank’s Chief Executive Officer, Mike Brown: Moneyweb 5 March 2018). Looking at situated interaction and the ways dominance is enacted, the repeated use of his monotonous line caricatures him as a clueless, fumbling ‘typical African’ politician. This characterisation echoes Charles Dickens in The Noble Savage (1853) where Blacks are held up as examples of an underdeveloped race in need of moral improvement and mental refinement. Africans are stereotyped as brutish, dimwitted, naïve, emotional, undisciplined, and uncultured – in short, children of nature who needed to be civilized and domesticated.

In a cameo appearances by “poor Blacks” in the discourse, Moneyweb journalists report ‘from site’ as eyewitnesses, thereby signaling authenticity and objectivity.

“South African father of nine Frank Mapara has been waiting nearly three decades to own a plot of land in the Johannesburg slum he calls home... I see Ramaphosa as better. If they give people the land, they are going to vote for him,” said 80 year old Mapara, who built a shack in the then deserted Slovo Park in 1990, the year Nelson Mandela’s release from prison gave millions of poor black South Africans hope for a brighter future....
“You give them land, they start having hope,” said Slovo Park community leader Lerato Marole, waving at a group of bare-foot children kicking piles of rubbish.

Moneyweb 4 June 2018

In some instances, the emotive effect is heightened through argumentum ad populum [appeal to the people](Armstrong and Tennenhouse 2017) where prejudiced emotions and opinion rather than rational argument are appealed to: “just as Mugabe bulldozed his country’s white (sic) farmers, President Thabo Mbeki prioritised helping black (sic) citizens…” (Moneyweb
Mutual loathing between Mugabe and the West is well-documented (see Nyakudya 2013). The ideological significance of the juxtapositioning of the “bulldozing of white (sic) people” by Mugabe and the “prioritization of” Black people by Mbeki, is its powerful introduction of the guilt-by-association fallacy (Kolb 2018). This perspectivisation (KhosraviNik 2010: 67) relies on extra-linguistic and the socio-political level contexts. The text makes a hasty generalisation and constructs an irrelevant association between LEwC and the employment of a blunt instrument against a racial group outside of any legal provision in Zimbabwe to appeal to negative White emotions. It draws public memories and ‘old knowledge’ into the framing of the LEwC policy. What the text states about what the governments of Mugabe and Mbeki, could indeed be true, but is not a “true reflection” (Palmberg 2001: 10) of the issue reported. Guilt by association can have dire ideological consequences (Kolb 2018).

Empiricist definitions are the preferred fact construction instruments to hide ‘other facts’, perspectives and contexts, and to freeze situations in time to support racism in the discourse e.g. “stripping white farmers of land” (MW 01/08/2018). The ‘pure fact’ approach helps manage the dilemma of stake (Edwards and Potter 1992), in other words, the stake that the producers of the texts have in the social conversation about LEwC. It effaces the ideological investment that Moneyweb has in the construction of the ‘fact’, and directs the attention of the readers to the ‘objective’ issues that is reported. The ‘scientific approach’ protects the reporter from any charge of pursuing an ideological agenda by constructing the data as having its own agency and presence and with the facts speaking for themselves. This, while reproducing historical stereotypes and recasting causality (see also Hodge and Kress 1993; Fowler 1991).

The discourse employs euphemistic (Thompson 2007: 62) and neutral terms in relation to the cause and effect of the “poor Blacks”’ social conditions. There is no history and no context in the Moneyweb LEwC discourse about “poor Blacks.” Their pitiful situation is reported in a “disinterested discussion of pure facts” (Potter 1996:116) following a science-like model where the reporters ‘gather’ authoritative data and then present them without explicitly taking sides (Berkowitz 2009: 103). A whole variety of exploitative, anti-Black economic and social interest is however invoke-able to discount the scientist’s ‘claims’ here.
The Black vs White characterisation of LEwC in turn relies on unification of identities through standardisation (Thompson 2007: 64) and the locking of the racialised collectives into an unhealthy survivalist competition between them. Concealed pseudo-scientific claims in support of White supremacy emerge, albeit clothed in economic language:

Only the paranoid survive

*Why land expropriation without compensation could wreak havoc on your personal wealth.*

*Moneyweb* 20 March 2018

It’s not just about soil, it’s about our economy

*Moneyweb* 6 June 2018

The highlighted words are deployed in these instances as deictic terms – designating exclusive communities – that depend entirely on context for meaning (Buhler 1982). This context crystalises throughout the discourse and in the identity of the owners of wealth and the economy in South Africa: White groups. The historical racial boundaries and related social demarcations are engraved in the discourse, but there is also a strategic shift in linguistic choices in view of the post 1994 opprobrium to racism. *Baaskap* has been replaced by less crude alternative categories of domination such as deictic terms, economy and the assertion of minority rights and cultural identities have become compelling political concerns in promulgating and legitimating discriminatory practices. The expression of ideology is dynamic and adaptable and can be fitted and made compatible with specific situation. In presenting arguments as rational and objective criteria, the *Moneyweb* LEwC discourse invokes liberal values of freedom, tolerance and reason, while simultaneously justifying exclusion:

Among the main criticisms levelled at government’s land reform policy over the years has been that many farms transferred to emerging black farmers lay fallow and unproductive.

*Moneyweb* 28 February 2018

Investors trust Ramaphosa not to damage economy, and Ramaphosa pledges to give land to poor population.

*Moneyweb* 04 June 2018
Investors, *Moneyweb* reports, are concerned that “stripping white farmers of land” will be detrimental to the economy (MW 01/08/2018). To support the argument, statistical evidence – a powerful fact construction tool known as *argumentum ad baculum* [fear and force] (Jason 1987) – is pulled out to formulate the qualities of LEwC in economic losses and costs to the poor:

Agriculture accounts for less than three percent of national output but employs 850 000 people, 5% of the workforce. Threats to production would also fan food inflation, hurting low-income households.

*Moneyweb* 01 August 2018

Characteristic fixation in the discourse with an ‘inter-race’ dynamic as the key definer for LEwC, reflects and simultaneously brings about peculiar and contradictory ways of seeing social reality. The discourse dissimulates (Thompson 2007) and makes absent the socio-historical context and the concept of social justice to deflect attention away from the existing relations of inequality. Their displacement (Thompson 2007: 62) is effected through favoured descriptors drawn from racist, violent, liberal capitalist rights vocabulary such as “transfer of land from white to black (sic) owners” (MW 28/02/2018); “seizure of white-owned (sic) farms, banks and mines” (MW 05/03/2018) or “expropriate land from white (sic) farmers” (MW 04/07/2018) to challenge the validity of LEwC. The discourse establishes a dimension of society without history at the very heart of a historic society, as Claude Lefort puts it (Thompson 1986: 201). The ‘objective’ ‘reflection’ of the ‘truth’ in the present effaces the foundational causes of the socio-historical circumstances of the condemned of the earth and racialised subjects, like *utat’ u*Mapara [loosely, Mr. Mapara], who exist in a permanent hell, a man-made world where an otherwise extraordinary affair becomes a norm and living in it requires an extraordinary effort (Gordon 1997: 13-14; Maldonado-Torres 2008: 218).

Together with the ANC, Ramaphosa is constructed to reflect incompetent vacillation on crucial constitutional matters that could break the country. He is constructed to make bold yet, contradictory announcements:

ANC urges test of current land laws on expropriation
Constitution may not need to be changed for land-reform policy
*Moneyweb* 22 May 2018

---

130 See Santos B https://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/sociology_of_absence
The ANC has decided to change the Constitution of South Africa so it can push ahead with its plans to expropriate land without compensation” President Cyril Ramaphosa has said.

*Moneyweb* 31 July 2018

Such vacillation is accentuated to damage the character, credibility, integrity, honesty, expertise, and competence of Ramaphosa. The implied dimwittedness of the leadership of the ruling party in not understanding key provisions of the Constitution confirms age-old stereotypes about Black people. His capacity and moral justification to lead a sophisticated economy is questioned. The constructed ambivalence further exposes the party to serious accusations of “policy uncertainty\(^{131}\), a capitalist corrective instrument for ‘deviant regimes.’ The ANC and Ramaphosa are also profiled as using a serious matter that threatens the economic foundations of the country, such as land, while engaging in a political gimmick to get votes from ‘millions’ of simple-minded ‘poor Blacks’:

If they give people the land, they are going to vote for him, said 80 year old Mapara, who built a shack in the then deserted Slovo Park in 1990, the year Nelson Mandela’s release from prison gave millions of poor black South Africans hope for a brighter future

*Moneyweb* 04 June 2018

The ANC and Ramaphosa’s actions in support of LEwC, abetted by Parliament, ‘are not’ in the interests of the country and the citizens who elected them. The discourse holds up investors and foreign governments – a code for capital and White constituencies who know better about what is good for the economy – as a bulwark against the “recklessness” that LEwC is. The constructed connotations are transferred discursively to the reorganization of the country’s economic and social system.

---

\(^{131}\) Policy uncertainty is a class of economic risk where the future path of government policy is uncertain, raising the risk premium and leading businesses and individuals to delay spending and investment until this uncertainty has been resolved (see [https://en.wikipedia.org/](https://en.wikipedia.org/))
Dichotomisation through semantic merger

Dichotomisation through semantic merger entails naming, functionalization, aggregation and positioning (KhosraviNik 2010: 64) as Moneyweb’s mechanisms to drive the referential strategy of the social actors in its discourse. Simplistic and simplified symbolic unification of social actors (Thompson 2007: 64) in the discourse is an important element of its racialisation of the LEwC narrative. Racialised groups are unified through semantic merger (Wodak 2008), a simplifying tool used to constitute the groups into boxes as belonging together. The racialised groups are in turn fragmented through differentiation (Thompson 2007: 65) in the context of a polarising ideology. On the one hand, ‘White South Africans’, Afriforum, Democratic Alliance, farmers’ groups, academics, investors and economists are unified in one block against LEwC:

Afriforum, an organisation that mostly represents white South Africans on issues like affirmative action, said in a statement land expropriation without compensation would have “catastrophic results…”

Moneyweb 2 August 2018

The main opposition Democratic Alliance and farmers’ groups say the policy will deter investment.

Moneyweb 22 May 2018

Academics, investors and economists have warned the ANC that … it would have adverse consequences for the economy and … property rights

Moneyweb 31 July 2018

On the other hand the EFF, ANC, government, Ramaphosa, Parliament and the ‘majority’ (construed by contrasting numbers) are constructed as the ‘opposing’ block behind LEwC:

On Tuesday, Parliament backed¹³² a motion to change the Constitution. The decision to pass this motion was brought forward by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and backed by the ANC, to address the question of land ownership in South Africa. The motion was backed by 241 votes for versus 83 votes against.

Moneyweb 28 February 2018

¹³² Emphases to all excerpts added
The first group consists of White structures and weighty institutional authority that contributes to the legitimacy and reification (Thompson 2007: 61; Potter 1996) of its ideological viewpoint. The knowledgeable minority ‘White side’ seeks to ‘save’ the economy by preserving it in the interests of ‘stability’ and ‘growth’ from which they benefit. Stability and growth are instruments for obfuscation and masking of ideology – accumulation by dispossession. They are not a solution for the poverty catalysed by the structural exclusion of the majority of Black people from the economy since colonialism. Arguments for ‘stability’ and ‘growth’ of the White economy are however constructed as beneficial for the ‘country’, logical and reasoned and reflective of socio-economic intelligibility (Thompson 1995: 65) against the ill-conceived LEwC experimentation and unrealistic idealism.

In advocating this monocultural lazy reason, the discourse employs dissimulation to displace (Thompson 2007:63) alternatives, particularly non-Western knowledges and supplanting them with liberal capitalist epistemology at the heart of the oppressive economic status quo. The group is also constructed as ‘minorities’ to construct a ‘state of siege’ and elicit empathy. This is an ideologically loaded signifier that conjures up issues of ‘racial domination’, both in the South African and the ‘Black Africa’ contexts.

The positions of the racialised pro-LEwC group in the discourse are undermined, reworked, and damaged through numerous fact construction strategies which include, extreme case

---

133 Santos (2014: 165) argues that the laziness of reason occurs in four ways:

i) impotent reason – reason that does not exert itself because it thinks it can do nothing against necessity conceived as to itself.

ii) arrogant reason – reason that feels no need to exert itself because it imagines itself as conditionally free and therefore free from the need to prove its own freedom.

iii) metonymic reason – reason that claims to be the only form of rationality and therefore does not exert itself to discover other kinds of rationality or, if it does, it does so to turn them into raw material.

iv) proleptic reason – reason that does not exert itself in thinking the future because it believes it knows all about the future conceives of it as a linear, automatic and infinite overcoming of the present.
formulations (Pomerantz 1986): for example, markets are “definitely unlikely to like it”. There are warnings of “dire consequences for the economy”, “devastation”, “pain”, “catastrophe” etc. *(argumentum ad baculum)* [threat of force] (Jason 1987). Strategies are employed targeting the credibility of the knowledge of supporters of LEwC *(argumentum ad hominem)* [personal attack] (see Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992): for example, “… we are unclear at this stage as to exactly what is meant by land expropriation without compensation that doesn’t harm the economy or food security” (Nedbank’s Chief Executive Officer, Mike Brown: *Moneyweb* 5 March 2018 see also p127). There are forced comparisons, making strong arguments by analogy tinged with doses of Afrophobia: “But we’ve seen what that [expropriation] has done to investor confidence and asset values in our neighbour to the north, Zimbabwe, and the fear has always been that South Africa goes down that route.” The *rooi gevaar* also makes an appearance to reproduce threats, dangers and horror stories created during the Cold War: “No country ever became rich through its government’s seizure of private property (exhibit A: The Soviet Union), but politicians in South Africa want to give it another go.”

The narrative contributed by the pro-LEwC monolith is also subjected to ironisation (Potter 1996). This is achieved, in part, through what Potter (1996) calls ‘hierarchy of modalisation’ and ‘dilemma of stake’ (Edwards and Potter 1992). The former is used for ratcheting the group’s descriptions of LEwC down the hierarchy of modalisation as tentative, problematic, and provisional, reflective of their confusions or delusion. Under the ‘dilemma of stake’, the stated motives for the support for LEwC, such as redistributive justice are subverted:

“We are going to start expropriating land without compensation,” Magashule told reporters in Johannesburg after a meeting of the party’s national executive committee. “We are not going to wait any longer. It will be done in an orderly fashion.”

*Moneyweb* 30 May 2018

But the ruling ANC is supporting the measures [regarding LEwC] to distract attention from its own failed statist economic policies, which have produced sub-par growth and denied opportunity to poor South Africans. The first budget of the new president Cyril Ramaphosa suggests these policies will continue.

*Moneyweb* 20 March 2018
Modes of operation of ideology are dynamic and work together in a collaborative and complementary manner to achieve their purposes.

Positioning through activity assignment

With the racialised groups constituted and polarised as explained above, the discourse delineates the qualities of actor/action associations and further linking these with extra-textual and contextual effects to define their typical roles in society. Delineation of activities in the *Moneyweb*'s discourse is not a chance act, it is part of a discursive mental command strategy (Dijk 1993; 2008) to cultivate legitimacy for the naturalisation of differences between racialised people and to link or delink them from social goods and privilege. It is the discourse’s central and deliberate social and cognitive construction project connected with helping readers make sense of LEwC. They clarify questions such as: “what is going on in SA?”, “what exactly is LEwC?” and “who is doing what in SA?” The demarcation of activities in the discourse echoes the colonially perverted mode of relationality that instantiated inequality and takes the form of a divide between White and Black, between good and evil and between master and slave among similar Manichean hierarchies. These activities designate the ‘in-group’ as the social actors that do what ‘we do’ and ‘must do’, such as defend our values etc. (van Dijk 2016), and the ‘out-group,’ as those who are ‘different’ even weird and bizarre in how they act (Van Dijk 2006).

The out-group

The perspectivisation (KhosraviNik 2010: 64) of the EFF, ANC, Ramaphosa, government, Parliament, the ‘majority’ poor Blacks and Black citizens as actors in the discourse constructs them as strategic collaborators in support of the (economically) “reckless and damaging” motion. Their names are used interchangeably in the same articles and/or collectivized, KhosraviNik (2010) calls it aggregation, in relation to economically, culturally, and socially ‘destructive’ and deviant actions. The government is the “ANC government”, and President Ramaphosa is “ANC leader.” Parliament is “ANC-controlled”, “passes an EFF motion”, and is “backed by the ANC” using its “majority.” “Poor Blacks” vote for Ramaphosa based on his “promise of giving them land.”

From the first day when the LEwC motion was tabled, the narrative took the following form:
On Tuesday, Parliament backed a motion to change the Constitution to favour land expropriation without compensation. The decision to pass this motion was brought forward by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and backed by the ANC, to address the question of land ownership in South Africa. The motion was backed by 241 votes for versus 83 votes against

*(Moneyweb 28 February 2018)*

The narrative deploys various strategies in the construction of the identities and motives of the members of the group. The EFF’s credibility and integrity, and by association its LEwC motion, are targeted through *ad hominem fallacy* (Walton 1987). The EFF leader, Julius Malema, and his party are the only social actors in the Moneyweb discourse whose ideological leanings are highlighted: “radical far left Party”, “firebrand Julius Malema”. In the discourse, the party is the only social actor that never represents its intentions or explains its introduction of the motion. Besides the typical third person references, the ‘champion of the motion’ consistently occupies the ‘Sphere of Deviance’ (Hallin and Mancini 1984), and is continually derided and excluded from the substantive narrative. The reader has to infer the party’s motives and competence from the constantly negative characterisation it receives. The motion is refracted through an ideological lens with the only ‘explanation’ being the analogies (Zimbabwe/Venezuela/Soviet Union) and epithets (radical, firebrand) that are linked to it.

The narrative problematises the ANC’s relationship to, understanding of, and respect for, the Constitution. Together with Ramaphosa, they are constructed to face a dilemma of stake that undermines their honesty and bona fides, and thus the ‘real’ motives, in “pushing” for its change in order to “strip white [sic] farmers” of ownership rights. Their “move” “to take ownership of the issue [LEwC]” from the EFF is depicted as driven by expediency, a lack of original ideas and power aspirations as their “majority feels precarious ahead of next year’s election.” Ramaphosa also has the ironisation of his narrative to contend with. His action is equated with “a very clever chess move” (MW 02/08/2018) signifying thought maneuvering in the context of a tricky (political) situation:

Investors trust Ramaphosa not to damage economy, and Ramaphosa pledges to give land to poor population.

*Moneyweb 04 June 2018*
The juxtapositioning of the two parts of the sentence and their sequencing constructs a direct collision between two sets of values. On the one hand, is the ‘reverent’ economic class interest (represented by the investors) and on the other, the subordinated justice for the poor and the subject of Ramaphosa’s sacrilegious act of betrayal. The economy in this framing is elevated above economic justice. Giving land to the poor is undesirable and tantamount to economic destruction. The narrative strengthens and legitimises economic exclusion as both necessary and in the interests of the country, including the poor themselves. Ramaphosa’s insistence on “speed[ing] up the transfer of land to [B]lack people…”, is referred to alongside ample ‘evidence’ (see below) in the narrative about the incompetence and destructive nature of “black (sic) citizens” and “black (sic) people” to solidify the point. His position to pursue LEwC “without damaging the economy” is undermined by the ulterior motive to hoodwink the voters or by simply being obtuse. He also does not demonstrate concern for the country and ‘the citizens’ that he leads. He “believes that something like South Korea’s painful transformation is necessary in South Africa, too…” (MW 02/08/2018).

Doubt construction accrues from exaggerated repetition of Ramaphosa’s commitment to “push” LEwC “without damaging the economy.” Pushing signifies indecent haste, not damaging the economy requires a careful balancing act. The former cancels out the latter as a demonstration of a warped way of thinking on his part. He makes this all-important commitment without any evidence and in the context of “widespread panic” and grave, authoritative warnings, mainly by experts and journalists, about multiple adverse economic outcomes from the pursuit of LEwC. These warnings are universalized (Thompson 2007: 61) as corroborative and consensus views among actors with formidable category entitlements such as analysts, or some other high-profile financial or academic expert. In this context, his repeated message about not damaging the economy is constructed to reflect delusion, deception, or outright stupidity.

The majority, on the other hand, are a risk to the country in various ways. Their typical activities are introduced into the discourse:

I see Ramaphosa as better. If they give people the land, they are going to vote for him, said 80 year old Mapara, who built a shack in the then deserted Slovo Park in 1990, the year Nelson Mandela’s release from prison gave millions of poor black South Africans hope for a brighter future.
They are gullible and an urban nuisance prone to criminality such as “violent protest”, “burning of cars”, “throwing stones”, “rape” and “land invasions.” Details about a particularly large family ‘of nine’ fathered by an 80-year old Mr. Mapara, suggest an uncontrollable propensity to procreate. Numbers both in Parliament and in society are specified in “millions” or “overwhelming majority” and problematised around issues such as entitlement, laziness and naiveté. The narrative highlights a destructive nature on the part of Black people in respect of land use, financial management, and “civilized” existence. Through ideational shorthand, complex and multi-layered issues are simplified to harness and reaffirm prevailing racist stereotypes:

At first, in the 1990s, black South Africans received grants and subsidies to buy land plots, which resulted in overcrowding and poor land use.

Then, just as Mugabe bulldozed his country’s white farmers, President Thabo Mbeki prioritised helping black citizens buy into large-scale farming, and those who took advantage of the new policy ended up deeply indebted and barely able to compete.

Opinion is transformed linguistically into ‘neutral’ and ‘factual’ news through creative discursive constructions, such as argument by analogy. Argument by analogy is a cover for the journalists’ ideological tracks and transformation of ‘facts’: “just as Mugabe bulldozed his country’s white farmers, President Thabo Mbeki prioritised helping black citizens…” (Moneyweb 02/08/2018). Argument by analogy (Bartha 2019) or inductive argument leaves in its wake, the idea that ‘the facts speaks for themselves’ with no trace of the modulating effect of the chosen analogy.

The in-group

A closer analysis of the in-group in the discourse reveals two related subgroups within the group: (a) Journalists, Democratic Alliance and experts, and (b) Afriforum, White South Africans, White farmers, farmers groups and people. I will deal with each in turn.
Moneyweb journalists, the Democratic Alliance and experts are the key definers and sources of the dominant meanings of LEwC in the discourse. They are uniformly in opposition to LEwC, summarised simply: as “…South Africans don’t need … that” (MW 20/03/2018), based on a shared liberal pluralist world view concerning the sacrosanctity of property rights, the capitalist economy, and ‘law and order’. The definitions of the in-group evidence a positivist approach to knowledge construction as detached, factual (what is empirically known), and unchallengeable: the reflection of the ‘truth’ about what is good and bad for society. Their articulations (Hall 2011) are presented as legitimate (Thompson 2007: 61) and render LEwC abstract and accordingly dress it up as a risk and a threat:

**SA aims to expropriate land without compensation**

There are many issues and risks to be considered though (Journalist)

Moneyweb 14 March 2018

The main opposition Democratic Alliance and farmers’ groups say the policy will deter investment.

Moneyweb 22 May 2018

Economic growth has been low, the local market has disappointed and the uncertainty around land expropriation without compensation has thrown the cat among the pigeons. (Journalist)

Moneyweb 20 June 2018

Are we over-estimating Ramaphosa’s ability to deal with this land issue? ….. Investors are worried about this …” said independent political analyst Nic Borain.

Moneyweb 26 March 2018

The persuasive strength of the in-group’s discourse is rhetorically constructed so that it is hard to counter. Its application in headlines, lead paragraphs, and without the use of parenthesis around key claims about what LEwC is, reflects arrogant reason (De Sousa Santos 2014: 165) that ratchets it up the model of modalisation as unproblematic commonsense and generally good judgment. Its facticity is established through extreme formulations and universalization (Thompson 2007: 61) of the exclusive interests of the privileged White groups: “South Africans don’t need this…”; “experience around the world.” This is further supported by their discourses’s claim to legitimacy (Thompson
2007: 61) based on category entitlements – the notable institutional authority that grounds
the proponents’ descriptions – analysts, academics, economists, experts, researchers, chief
executives, as well as ‘history’ and ‘experience’ that ‘attest’ to their views. Thompson
(1992: 61) calls the latter strategy, narrativisation and serves to increase the plausibility of
their accounts.

In-groups have both the opportunity and authority to undermine alternative descriptions,
rework, or damage them:

We are unclear at this stage as to exactly what is meant by land
expropriation without compensation that doesn’t harm the economy or
food security.” Chief executive: Nedbank (see also p127)

Moneyweb 5 March 2018

This is an example of legitimation of the current relations of domination as just and worthy of
support (Thompson 2007) through ‘offensive argumentation’ (see for instance Krappmann
2014: 201-2) that out-groups have no access to. The ‘we’ invokes authority and legitimacy of
a peer group of the order of the Chief Executives of respected institutions, and discursively,
of a knowledgeable in-group. “We are unclear at this stage” echoes the Cartesian rationality
that claims to be intellectually perfectionist, morally rigorous and humanly unrelenting
(Toulmin 1990: 198). If the a priori monocultural North-centric (De Sousa Santos 2014,
Dussel 1993) wisdom denounces it, then any idea is fatally damaged and worthless.

As the custodians of universalised values and champions of the common good, the in-
group’s discourse ‘naturally’ coopts the poor whose interests they also ‘represent’:

Now, while the EFF may have issues with this, experience the world over shows that this is actually not something that the wealthy require, but
something that poor people require (expert)

Moneyweb 27 February 2018

DA leader Mmusi Maimane said by phone that ….land expropriation will
hurt the poor.

Moneyweb 05 March 2020

The discourse of the in-group is also a source of strong directives for policy makers regarding
the required choices in the interests of ‘growth’ and ‘prosperity’. This echoes the ‘civilising’
and redemptive character of modernity, where the ‘primitive’ opposed its processes, the
process of modernity had recourse to the violence (Maldonado Torres 2008) necessary to
remove the ‘obstacles’ to modernisation (Dussel 1993: 75). Where suffering is a result of modernisation, then the ‘immature’ peoples of the South simply have to grin and bear it as inevitable and necessary cost of modernisation:

> Hopefully Tuesday’s – 2.2% number will ignite the urgency necessary to address the structural constraints to investment and growth. The expropriation without compensation policy might be a good place to start

(Journalist)

_Moneyweb 06 June 2018_

Headlines regarding constitutional amendments for the expropriation of land without compensation are never greeted with much enthusiasm in this region of the world, Nedbank analysts wrote in a note.

_Moneyweb 01 August 2018_

This is the context for the series of seminars, titled: SA *Quo Vadis?* (SA, where are you going?) that *Moneyweb* hosted and gave ample coverage to, in 2018. These seminars sought “to analyse key challenges facing South Africa and the impact they will have on your money, investments and retirement planning.” Only experts feature in all the seminars. Interviewing journalists do more than just ‘probe’ the issue of LEwC (the stated subject of the seminars). They routinely make substantial points and provide critical descriptions for LEwC through long and loaded questions that at times, are preceded by bold statements of opinion in support of the economic status quo. The following examples make the point:

> Why will the policy of land expropriation without compensation have such a big effect on people’s investments and money?

_Moneyweb 04 June 2018_

> Do you think it’s only politics at play here, or is there merit in the argument for this policy?

_Moneyweb 05 June 2018_

Journalists are among the top contributors of opinion dressed up as facts in ‘hard news’ stories in the discourse. For instance, writing about a list of the “most important things in South Africa” on the day that the motion was adopted by the National Assembly, a journalist lists “land reform is backed” (MW 28/02/2018) in the first position. Elsewhere a journalist asserts: “investors are right to worry about the ANC’s land-reform deliberations” (MW
02/08/2018), and “downside risks include lower-than-projected VAT collections, public sector wage negotiations … and the discussions around land expropriation without compensation” (MW 16/03/2018). Their ‘hard news’ texts are full of snatches of other texts (Fairclough 2000), especially editorials: the genre that liberal journalism reserves for public, mass communicated types of opinion discourse par excellence (Hall 1996). This is reflective of intensifying journalistic ideological dishonesty in the third age of political communication (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999) where the assumed science-like, objective model doubles as an avenue where underlying conservative, neoliberal ideology gets articulated in routine texts in the press (Hall 2011: 137). Moneyweb’s discourse generally shows an aversion to economic change and favours market logic, private ownership and traditional ideas.

Moneyweb journalists employ multiple ways to stretch the versatility of texts and render them multi-functional, adaptable and ideologically potent without trace. They enact specific identities for themselves and appropriate the normative evaluative and prescriptive role of an editorial. Take the following example:

**It’s not just about soil, it’s about our economy**

*Moneyweb* 06 June 2018

This headline is derived from the slogan “It’s the economy, stupid” coined during the 1992 American presidential election. It reflects capitalist thought and logic. Anyone who thinks otherwise, the headline suggests, is “stupid.” This is an unattributed headline of a news article in the narrative, reflective of its consistency with Moneyweb’s standpoint or news policy on LEwC and the author’s ideological inclinations. The ideology in this headline contrasts directly with the alternative knowledges of the indigenous peoples’ cultural and spiritual understanding of the value of land. For Africans, while land is used for production, it is not a mere economic commodity subject to the primacy of the market, private ownership, and exploitation. It is linked to identity and being (see Plaatje 1921; 1930). Africans proudly refer to themselves as ‘sons and daughters of the soil’.

---

134 Nkosi Z: Spirituality, Land and Land Reform in South Africa; Mufeme E: Land: Breaking bonds and cementing ties (Echoes: Land and Spirituality in Africa Land and Spirituality in Africa (wcc-coe.org)
(b) **Afriforum, White South Africans, White farmers, farmers groups and people.**

This is the second of the two sub-groups within the in-group. The *Moneyweb* discourse groups *Afriforum*, White South Africans, White farmers, farmers groups and ‘people’ around shared economic interest and in their opposition to LEwC. ‘*Afriforum*’ and “South Africa’s white farmers” are used interchangeably in articles. The organisation is also introduced as a representative of “white South Africans on issues like affirmative action” (MW 02/08/2018). *Afriforum*’s ‘participation’ in *Moneyweb*’s narrative on LEwC, like the DA’s, is numerically insignificant. It features in only a handful of articles in the corpus. It is the resonance between the epistemology of their discourse and the dominating views in the *Moneyweb* discourse that make them major [f]actors in the narrative. It is no longer necessary, in the mediatized communication environment, for social actors to take up real estate in stories to be effective in their political communication. Thematic resonance with privately held views flows from the treatment of the subject of reportage by the authors who imbibe and assimilate dominant views. Where news platforms pursue capitalist objectives, stories run, almost on cue, in accordance with the monocultural understandings of the broader capitalist establishment, turning on both structural and constructionist levers. Actual presence in the articles is no guarantee for balance, adequate or fair representation of views.

Where for instance, a policy fellow at the Institute of Race Relations calls LEwC debate ‘reckless and damaging’ (MW 27/02/2018), *Afriforum* calls the ‘ANC land plan catastrophic’ (MW 02/08/2018). Both descriptions get the best possible treatment as headlines in the respective articles. The *Afriforum* headline is supported by *Moneyweb* in an elaboration (White 1997) of the headline: “Rand falls, cost of external debt jumps after speech.” This ‘factual’ elaboration combines with the headline, bringing together *Moneyweb*’s and *Afriforum*’s narratives to produce the news point of the story and its essential elements. By using “after speech” instead of “because of speech” or “as a result of speech”, the elaboration remains “objective” and “neutral” on issues of cause and effect. This kind of language use, according to Potter (1996: 120) is characteristic of reports where causality is being recast. Despite this line being part of the headline, ‘support’ for the claim it makes appears nine paragraphs into the article stating simply: “Market reaction to the speech was initially negative, with rand falling as much as 2%, but recovered almost half of those losses on Wednesday.”
All five social actors in this sub-group are linked positively to “property rights” and “individual rights” and thus the economic status quo. The power and sovereignty of the state in making decisions for them is subject to checks by powerful foreign capital interests in which there is more faith than in a constitution-governed Parliamentary process:

Civil rights group *Afriforum* has said it will launch an international campaign to inform governments and foreign investors “that property rights in South Africa are being threatened”, it said in a statement.

*Moneyweb* 01 March 2018

Through *Argumentum ad populum* or pathetic fallacy (Thomas 1961: 343), the discourse appeals to prejudiced emotions, opinions, and convictions of White groups (*vox populi*), instead of employing rational arguments. Zimbabwe and Venezuela’s economic difficulties are used simplistically as examples of a ‘catastrophic end’ to the violation of “ownership rights.” Language is used to make what is described graphic and believable, warranting the writer as a proper witness and to access the gut of the reader:

**Only the paranoid survive**

*Why land expropriation without compensation could wreak havoc on your personal wealth*

I’ve also met far too many ex-Zimbabweans, mostly ex-farmers or business people, who’ve told me their personal stories of survival (or not) after they were forced to flee their former prosperous farms with only the possessions they could get into the back of an old Land Rover or Humber

*Moneyweb* 20 March 2018

‘People’ in the narrative is a universalization (Thompson 2007: 61) to legitimise relations that serve the interest of some as if they served the interests of all. ‘People’ in the text relates to an exclusive imagined community. It is used deictically as an exclusive reference to White people. Wealth, economy, investments are, from colonialism and Apartheid, concentrated White hands in South Africa. References to these concepts of privilege are code words, some form of shorthand or proxies, for manifestly discriminatory words such as ‘White people.’ These deictic terms assume their referents intertextually throughout the discourse:

The 2018 series kicks off on June 18 in Pretoria. The core theme of the 2018 series is Land Expropriation Without Compensation – *Your Money, Your Business, Your Property*. Magnus Heystek of Brenthurst Wealth, one
of the keynote speakers, is on the line. Magnus, welcome to the show.
Why will the policy of land expropriation without compensation have such a big effect on people’s investments and money?

Moneyweb 04 June 2018

The Black majority and workers in the villages and townships, with no title deeds, no disposable income and no investments, are not in the position to talk about ‘my money’, ‘my business’, and ‘my property.’

Polarisation through values and norms

In dealing with the values that are constructed to distinguish the “in-group”, and the “out-group” (van Dijk 2016: 73), my argument follows a two-step model predicated on Hallin’s (1984: 177) concentric circles. Consensus in the discourse is reflected around specific social norms, values, ethics, and capitalistic concepts as the conspicuous markers of the discourse. The values associated with the in-group are celebrated and privileged through sanguine reflection, positive constructions, and strong warranting in the discourse. They have pride of place in headlines, tend to occupy lead paragraphs, and permeate the discourse in ways that enable them to constitute angles for stories. They are virtuous, desirable, unproblematic, and are held to be widely shared. Materialism, individual liberty, aversion for redistributive justice, profit-seeking and competition are examples of such values:

Why land expropriation without compensation could wreak havoc on your personal wealth

Moneyweb 20 March 2018

Investors trust Ramaphosa not to damage economy, and Ramaphosa pledges to give land to poor population

Moneyweb 4 June 2018

SA needs extraordinary measures to boost growth: Ramaphosa
Says land expropriation without compensation will be pursued but will not jeopardise economic empowerment.

Moneyweb 31 May 2018

Emphasis in the narrative is exclusively on the ‘economy.’ Grave doubt is constructed about the necessity and efficacy of LEwC. President Ramaphosa is ‘urged’ throughout to pursue the ‘right’ policies – the liberal capitalist policies that are constantly reified through eternalisation
Redistribution and social justice, norms and values advanced as the basis for LEwC, are treated as unworthy and are rendered absent.

The patterns of associations and contrasts between the celebrated and the rejected values on the one hand, and the various social actors on the other, are important pointers to the heroes and villains in the discourse. Villainy results from violating the political consensus, and heroism is earned for upholding the unstated but clear consensus centred on the underlying ideology of capitalism. The example below places Ramaphosa on a collision course with the celebrated values:

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s announcement of a proposed amendment to the Constitution that outlines conditions under which expropriation of land without compensation can take place caused widespread panic on Wednesday.

Moneyweb 2 August 2018

This is a lead paragraph in the article. Despite the dramatic effect and prominence of the assertion about “widespread panic”, the ‘facts’ in the same article belie the claim. The immediate next line states: “Less so for investors. While some weakness in the rand was evident, markets barely reacted.” Evidence and balance, however, are hardly the requirements in the critique of ‘deviant’ behavior of the members of the out-group. Widespread panic in response to an announcement by the President regarding land expropriation is arrogantly (De Sousa Santos 2014: 165) treated as self-evident and normal. On the other hand:

Academics, investors and economists have warned the ANC that if the land expropriation proposal is not carefully considered it would have adverse consequences for the economy and individual property rights

Moneyweb 31 July 2018

In this example, legitimation (Thompson 2007: 61) is mobilised through institutional authority. Discursive gravitas of knowledge-makers and experts is mobilised against ‘deviant statist conduct’ and in defense of the sacrosanct values and narrativised, cherished liberal capitalist traditions. Corroboration and consensus among these experts reify their position through naturalisation (Thompson 2007) thereby making their support for the prevailing economic relations credible and fact.
Language and economic praxis formalise consensus and are the pivot on which polarisation
swings between deference and ridicule. The predominance and dominance of the liberal
vocabulary in the discourse is matched by its potent performative influences. Liberal
capitalism is constructed in the discourse as the key and necessary component of the social
structure. Money talks, materialism trumps moral considerations without any shame in
Moneyweb’s discourse. Democratic principles and state sovereignty are subordinated to
economic interests and concerns. The following examples locate private interest in this social
structure:

The private sector should actually …. tell us the implications of this policy
on the economy and on the importance of property as collateral, as a
medium of exchange in a market economy. Analyst
Moneyweb 6 June 2018

Headlines regarding constitutional amendments for the expropriation
of land without compensation are never greeted with much enthusiasm in this
region of the world. Analyst
Moneyweb 1 August 2018

Nevertheless, he said markets are “definitely unlikely to like it.” Head of
Research
Moneyweb 2 August 2018

Democracy in the Moneyweb discourse, is acceptable as a tool for legitimate decision-making
(the discourse repeatedly urges government action in various ways), “but not as an authority
for what the decision ought to be” (Hayek 1960: 90-1). This authority to “tell us” (Moneyweb
6 June 2018) what the decision ought to be based on and what is good for society is reserved
for capital. There is no clearer demonstration of universalization of exclusive, selfish, and
oppressive interest. De Sousa Santos (2014: 123) calls it authority in indirect rule.

The reorganization of the economic foundations of the country behind the Parliamentary
motion on LEwC does not pass the liberal capitalist muster and therefore is rejected. This
view is warranted through category entitlement in the construction of agents. The sources of
the narrative vary between analysts, experts, executives, researchers, and other notables with
‘no stake’ in the matter. They speak from detached positions and the plausibility of their
arguments is strengthened by their titles, social station, and presumed knowledgeability.
Their counsel, cautions, and expectations are treated as commonsense and unproblematic. In other words, private capital, the cause of economic inequality and widespread suffering, has the right of veto over government-driven political processes to address economic inequality and widespread suffering. Disapproval by capital signifies all that is ill-conceived and undesirable.

At the centre of the polarising linguistic and economic praxis are private property ownership and law and order as a bulwark against “criminal undertakings” (Machan and Duncan 2005: 21) that impede individual rights. LEwC is projected as a “drastic step” and an “attack” on these rights. The *Quo Vadis?* series is richly coded and imbued with “practical purposes” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2000: 141): a call to action and a warning to reinforce the status quo and the legitimacy of capitalism.

The positivist pro-capitalistic approach towards LEwC in the *Moneyweb* discourse dissimulates (Thompson 2007) any sense of community interest in favour of individualism. Profit-making and materialism are freed from any constriction by agitations against inequality, landlessness, and poverty. While there is no denial of these historical social problems, the discourse deals with them at an individual level. A thick liberal ‘veil’ is pulled over personal interests and keeps them out of reach of any egalitarian social process. The collective citizen-based action facilitated by Parliament with the express objective of upholding universal human rights and redistributive justice is transformed into an exclusive economic debate. The discourse deploys performative concepts of liberalism, infused with implicit pro-capitalistic value judgements to (re)construct LEwC.

Why will the policy of land expropriation without compensation have such a big effect on people’s investments and money?  
*Moneyweb* 4 June 2018

Some investors are concerned that the move will result in white farmers being stripped of land to the detriment of the economy…  
*Moneyweb* 1 August 2018

Polarisation presupposes the construction of division and accentuation of differing forms of praxis amongst social actors. This is achieved through a simplifying mechanism that feeds from and reproduces colonialism and Apartheid designed fissures in society while meticulously leaving the violent history of land and wealth expropriation and the brutal present of accumulation by dispossession out of the framing of LEwC.
Summary

Moneyweb’s discourse as an example of coloniality in all its manifestations (knowledge, being and power) that links directly to colonialism-inspired non-ethics of war (see Mignolo 2003: 669; Maldonado-Torres 2007: 242) against the conquered Black people. The discourse espouses a colonial conception of humanity. The unintelligibility of equality between the White human and Black subhuman in colonialism is its defining feature, albeit with important adaptation in form to suit the times. The radical social exclusion it propagates is no different to the prevailing morality and thinking under colonialism and Apartheid discussed in the review chapters of this study. The capitalist discourse is built around racialisation as the anchor. For the racism in the discourse to make sense and to achieve its rationalisation of cruelty against the subhuman Other, much creative energy is spent constructing justifiable differences between the people it divides regarding epistemology, activities, values, and norms. Below the abyssal dividing line of the Moneyweb discourse is lawlessness, savagery, and illegitimate entitlement. This construction numbs feeling for the Other, constructed to be the subject of hate and relegated to the zone of endless, daily violence through continued dispossession and economic oppression.

Contrary to the values inscribed in the Press Code, the narrative, far from being the objective truth produced by dispassionate and professional journalists reflecting the ‘facts’ of the situation, the Moneyweb discourse on LEwC is a cold-hearted ideological practice that propagates the radical economic exclusion of Black people by promoting White interests at their expense, and privileging Westernization over social justice and universal rights.

Afriforum discourse: Ideological structures and strategies in discourse

The ideology and frames employed in Afriforum’s discourse on LEwC have a lot in common with Moneyweb’s. Both discourses employ racialisation to justify economic exclusion and to naturalise the non-ethics of war (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 218) against Black people. Both adopt similar articulatory practices and sometimes use identical editorialising formulae,
themes, and even quotations. The construction and demarcation of (White) in-groups and the racialised and dispensable (Black) out-groups follow generally similar patterns and rhetorical strategies. The norms associated with, and the identities constructed for, the social actors in discourse are substantially similar. It is a Eurocentric, abyssal and ahistorical discourse that completely dissimulates social justice.

Malema’s substantive contribution in both discourses is his call for “justice” on the land issue. Malema’s ‘justice’ is articulated to retribution in relation to “criminals who stole our land” (Moneyweb 28/02/18) and “a criminal by the name of Jan van Riebeeck” (Afriforum 03/03/18), thus giving it a negative inflexion. A comparison with the following City Press quotation demonstrates the motivations of the alternative constructions:

The time for reconciliation is over. If the grandchildren of Jan Van Riebeeck have not understood that we need our land, that over and above it is about our dignity, then they have failed to receive the gift of our humanity.

City Press 02 February 2018

In both discourses, the role of the “ruling ANC” in relation to the Parliamentary motion on LEwC is to “support” (Moneyweb) or “accept” it (Afriforum). Both consistently credit the EFF with its proposition, for important ideological reasons as I explain below. For both, property rights are sacrosanct and tampering with the free market is described as an economic “catastrophe” or “recklessness”.

However, in some instances where the Moneyweb discourse induces ideology through concealed cognitive constructs and strategies of meaning-making, the Afriforum’s argumentation is explicit, blatant, direct and overt in elaborating an openly racist argument and advancing racist views. Ramaphosa’s ‘naiveté, untrustworthiness and dishonesty’ provides one such example:

Afriforum: Presidential report on land reform economically naïve…

Afriforum 28 July 18

The discourse refers to the motion as a “violation of the 1994 agreement.” “The historic settlement of 1994 was one in which the ANC – under the leadership of President Cyril Ramaphosa, who [then] acted as Chief Negotiator for the party – gave the undertaking to
minorities that their interests would be protected in the new South Africa” (Afriforum 27/02/18). LEwC is constructed as a dishonest reversal of this promise.

Despite the material discursive coincidence, there are also important analytical differences between the discourses of Moneyweb and Afriforum. Differences manifest in the main, in terms of nuance and the degree of definition in the ideological constructions employed in relation to LEwC. Using the same analytic approach as above, this section focuses on new meanings in relation to identical themes and highlights Afriforum’s exclusive themes and their import. The section is organised according to the following themes:

Reproduction of racism
Globalization of local politics
Populism and anti-establishment positioning
Fear mongering
The paradox and moral entrepreneurship
Civic virtue: grounds for exclusion

Reproduction of racism.

Afriforum’s LEwC articles remind the reader that the organisation is “part of the Solidarity Movement.” This insert, on the face of it, suggests collective action by a much larger, formidable network that is founded on shared values and beliefs among different groups in society. But the reference is also an important code for White supremacy and solidarity based on racism and an array of colonial complexes, a heritage of racist hate, and bigotry. The origins of the Solidarity Movement135 in South Africa go back to 1902 when William Mather founded the Transvaal Miners’ Association. Mather rose to prominence for his anti-Black views:

Any man is not worthy of his name if he will accept the position and remuneration that have been secured to the nigger (sic), he declared.

“Solidarity has been protecting its members in the workplace since 1902. We have grown with our members and their needs. That is how the former Mineworkers Union developed into the Solidarity Trade Union. We are building a relationship of trust to ensure that you are not alone in uncertain times.”
Together with skilled White miners, he perceived efforts to appoint unskilled White miners on unskilled jobs not only as an economic threat, but also as a racial threat and undermining of the solidarity between Whites. (Hund, Krikler and Roeddiger 2010)

This is the legacy of coloniality that the Solidarity Movement’s “ancestors built … for the next generations.”

Bigotry does not exist as wordless impulses but is culturally constituted within social discursive interaction (Billig 2002: 179). This highlights a symbiosis between bigotry and discourse. Discourse breathes life into hatred and carries it across space and generations. Over a century later, new legal and normative pressures have increased the taboo in the public expression of some of the core racist 19th and early 20th century beliefs, like Mather’s. The expression of White supremacy and anti-Black beliefs continue, albeit in implicit forms. This “new racism” (Vala 2009: 1) in Afriforum’s discourse is characterised by attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours that expressly put the Other in a position of radical alterity (see Sanchez-Mazas and Licata, 2005). The same ideas that inspired perverted acts in war – particularly slavery, murder, and expropriation of wealth – are sustained in the Afriforum discourse through this new racism, thanks to the obviousness and non-problematic character of anti-Black racism in the discourse.

The discourse uses bigotry and racism in complex and interrelated ways as refracting lenses and strong explanatory concepts in its opposition to LEwC. These lenses help readers understand what is wrong with LEwC, identify who is to blame, and what needs to be done. Land expropriation is discursively coupled with words such as “farm murders”, “land grabs” and “trespassers” dis-articulating the meaning of LEwC from economic redistribution and articulating it with bigoted and racist understandings of social circumstances. Crime as a social phenomenon is eminently political. Its presentation outside of any framework of social process appeals to historical and theoretical understandings already present in the audience. Nunn (2002: 385) employs the concept “the pool of surplus criminality” to enunciate the relationship between ‘race’ and crime. The concept also recognises the cyclical connection of crime – to ‘race’ – to culture. The concept, Nunn (2002) argues, holds that African people constitute a pool of surplus or inchoate criminals in the collective psyche of White Americans:

Afriforum heads to USA for awareness on expropriation without compensation and farm murders

Afriforum 11 April 2018

At an “Information Session on land expropriation without compensation”, Gonda Louw, Afriforum's Regional Coordinator for the Kalahari, explains “what to do if land occupiers trespassed on your property”:

The most important thing is to prevent it, and to do this, you should always know what happens on your land. We may and we should protect our property, and we should therefore be equipped. If this information session contributed to this, we have succeeded in our aims, Louw said.

Afriforum 23 April 2018

In January 2018 there have already been double the amount of farm attacks than in January 2017," says Ian Cameron, Head of Community Safety at Afriforum. According to Cameron there are already incidents where land is illegally occupied due to political remarks — remarks such as that of Julius Malema, leader of the EFF, and President Cyril Ramaphosa's acceptance and approval of the policy to expropriate land without compensation

Afriforum 07 March 2018

Afriforum’s definition of ‘farm murders’ that it links to LEwC is race-based, ideologically loaded and contrary to the South African Police Services’ official definition of the same phenomenon. It depicts “white farmers being attacked, tortured and murdered on South African farms…the South African Government, the ANC and the EFF continue to publicly romanticise the murder of white farmers” (Afriforum 03/03/18). The murders, according to the discourse, are causally linked to “incidents where land is illegally occupied” and to

---

137 Acts of violence against persons on farms and smallholdings refer to acts aimed at a person/s residing on, working on or visiting farms and smallholdings, whether with the intent to murder, rape, rob or inflict bodily harm. In addition, all acts of violence against the infrastructure and property and property in the rural community aimed at disrupting legal farming activities as a commercial concern, whether the motive/s are related to ideology, land disputes, land issues, revenge, grievances, racist concerns or intimidation are included. https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-statistics-farm-attacks-murders-sa/
“remarks such as that of Julius Malema, leader of the EFF, and President Cyril Ramaphosa's acceptance and approval of the policy to expropriate land without compensation” (*Afriforum* 07/03/2018). This strategic coupling of LEwC and criminality is part of *Afriforum’s* problem definition. It seeks to define LEwC as a ‘racist crime’ against Whites and reflects the evil nature of the enemies of ‘the people’ to produce a permanent state of war that racialised and economically oppressed Black people cannot evade or escape.

The constructed nature of racism in the context of LEwC debate renders it an immensely flexible tool for identification that *Afriforum* uses to defend a fundamentally racist agenda. Racism in the organisation’s narrative manifests as both a moral and identity category. Whites as victims of crime linked to LEwC, become a form of “identity performance” (Durrheim et al 2017). This is an identifying, explanatory and mobilising form of action that is performed by leaders, and engaged by followers (Reicher 2007; Durrheim et al 2017: 387). By defining themselves, their followers, and their “enemies” in racist terms, *Afriforum* reinforces the *solidarity* of the White community, and the ‘Black criminals’ are expurgated (Thompson 2007: 65) as threats. This framing provides contours for a discourse of hate and fear in which LEwC is located as an urgent and politically significant matter as opposed to an economic intervention. The strategy instigates racial enmity and erodes empathy between people who are fragmented through constant differentiation in discourse (Thompson 2007: 65). In this way crime, imputed to a group, becomes a moral cushion for racial economic oppression by allowing it to be represented as a legitimate response to (LEwC/Black people) wrongdoing.

The narrative is the epitome of the monoculture of the naturalisation of difference. It essentialises Black people and ascribes to them immutable group-specific attributes that effectively make them natural objects and naturalises social hierarchies. An important colonial, despicable attribute projected onto Black people include depriving them of self-control (Joffé and Staerkle 2007), and their humanity (Haslam, Ban, Douge, Lee and Bastion 2005; Leyens, Cortes, Demoulin, Dovidio, Fiske, Gaunt, 2003):

Also, in the last year, there has been a decisive increase in the frequency at which white farmers are particularly being attacked, tortured and murdered
on South African farms. Despite this increase, the South African Government, the ANC and the EFF continue to publicly romanticise the murder of white farmers.

Afriforum 03 March 2018

This is the 19th century archetypal ‘savage’, lacking feeling and empathy, reflecting the malignancy and noxious characteristics constructed for Black people, their government, and political organisations. The repertoires of derogations include other despicable characteristics that derive from, and are a functional part of, the representational universe of the racist narrative that maintains the economic status quo (Jost, Hunyady, Stroebe and Hewstone 2002). Accordingly, stupidity and idleness are used to define the ‘natural kindness’ of Black people as infrahuman (Holtz and Wagner 2009: 421). The discourse draws heavily from these impulses and reinvents them:

Ramaphosa, who has since been sworn in as President of South Africa, said that expropriating land owned by white farmers could turn South Africa into "the ultimate paradise" and the "Garden of Eden."

Afriforum 03 March 2018

Roets added that the presidential task team obviously was economically naive.

Afriforum 28 July 2018

The South African government also admitted that more than 90% of farms distributed by the state to black African communities had failed and had usually reverted very quickly either to subsistence farming or to squatter camps.

Afriforum 12 March 2018

Racist ideologies in the Afriforum narrative are a key part of the organisation’s comprehensive response to LEwC. Another part of this response is aggressive and targeted globalization of local politics.

Globalization of local politics.

In today’s advanced capitalism, the axes of power have evolved. They have become more complex, polycentric, and interconnected across borders (Fraser 2008). When the LEwC motion served before the National Assembly, Afriforum was clear about the terrain and strategy for the “battle” against LEwC. It targeted foreign private interests, rating agencies, and governmental power in the United States of America and the European Union with a rhetorical strategy that constructed LEwC as ‘criminality’ and ‘economic disaster’.
discourse mobilises a neo-conservative logic to make sense of the complex South African social, economic, and political situation. The strategy leverages the shift in the balance of forces on the global front, favouring reactionary\textsuperscript{138} politics and ideologies and the (potential for) polycentricism of power in liberal democracy.

Much has been written about the rise of right-wing populist movements in the EU, South Africa’s largest and dominant trading partner\textsuperscript{139}, and the USA (see for example Mudde 2007; Wilson and Hainworth 2012; Adams 2017; Judis 2016; Mounk 2018; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). South African agriculture, thanks to the 1994 Government of National Unity of Nelson Mandela, has now taken its place as a fully integrated member of the global trade environment (Dannson et al 2004). LEwC is constructed as an economic risk that imperils “the economic well-being of …foreign investors and business partners” (\textit{Afriforum} 03/07/18):

\begin{quote}
Delegates of Afriforum flew to the United States of America (USA) this week as part of Afriforum’s campaign to garner support and promote awareness abroad regarding expropriation without compensation, and the prioritisation of farm murders

\textit{Afriforum} 11 April 2018
\end{quote}

\textbf{Expropriation without compensation:}\\
\textit{Afriforum appeals to international investors to put pressure on SA government}

\textit{Afriforum} 01 August 2018

Since the end of the Cold War, institutions in the liberal-capitalist world have extended their standard setting and normative purview to the protection of minorities and economic interests (Anagnostou 2005: 336; Crawford 2008). Human rights promotion for example, have since been integrated into all aspects of EU decision-making and implementation, including trade and external assistance\textsuperscript{140}. The World Bank, attacked in the past for indirectly supporting

\begin{footnotes}
\item[138] The \textit{Afriforum}’s discourse favours political views that promote a return to the status quo ante, the previous political state of society, which they believe possessed positive characteristics that are absent from contemporary South African society.
\end{footnotes}
authoritarian forms of modernisation in developing countries, now promotes the rule of law and “good governance” (Guilhot 1970). The result is the displacement (Thompson 2007: 62) from the world’s agenda of the suffering in the global South where these suffering peoples have become ‘invisible’ in influential discourses (Ellison 1999). Afriforum’s rhetorical strategies and fact-construction mechanisms are aimed at bringing this “thick and normative” (Checkel 2001: 336) global pressure to bear upon South African domestic institutions, practices and collective understandings regarding sovereignty, nationhood, and citizenship.

The organisation champions civil rights as a grundnorm (Kelsen 1998), consistently identifying itself as a civil rights movement in its discourse. The narrative is constructed to exert optimal pressure on the government to comply with the new norms in which national projects, however legitimate and urgent, are sacrificed for individual rights: a thinly veiled strategy of coloniality that sustains economic privilege of the White minority and prolongs the suffering of the dispossessed majority.

According to Alana Bailey, Deputy CEO of Afriforum responsible for international liaison, Afriforum embarked on a campaign to raise awareness amongst senior politicians and officials in amongst others, Europe, the UK, USA and in UN structures about concerns re: the protection of property rights immediately after the ANC’s decision in 2017 to start a process of expropriation without compensation

Afriforum 03 July 2018

The discourse turns on an opportunistic strategy taking advantage of the balance of fortunes regarding Afriforum’s agenda to appeal instrumentally to the dominant liberal norms to entrench racist economic oppression. It identifies the issues and ideas that attract the widest visibility, that resonate with ‘public’ opinion, and are potentially legitimate for audiences. This is known in right wing political theory as taking advantage of the available opportunities (Rydgren 2003: 49).

Populism and anti-establishment positioning

My analysis of populism is from a framing perspective proposed by Caiani and Della Porta (2012: 14), based on definitions of populism by Ionescu and Gellner (1969), Meny and Surel (2002), Mudde (2004), and Ruzza and Fella (2009). It focusses on attempts to centralise and idealise ‘the people’ and to create a direct connection between ‘the people’ and political
power while bypassing the electoral process. Thus understood, populism can be linked with other right-wing framings in the 
Afriforum’s discourse. This enables the mapping of references to “the people” in the discourse, locating them in complex configurations of different frames, and interpreting them in the context of the full narrative. Take for instance the following typical reference:

In order to illustrate the extent of the crisis, we encourage the public to add their names to the petition and to advise their friends, family and colleagues to do the same. Roets adds that Afriforum is aware of the fact that this petition can be regarded as a drastic step, but that it is a vital last alternative to prevent the South African government — by means of property rights disparagement — from destroying the country's economy to the detriment of everyone in the country.

Afriforum 05 March 2018

“The people” can mean many different things in many different circumstances (Canovan 1981; Mudde 2004). In the Afriforum narrative above, the “public” and “everyone” understood to be ‘the people’ are pitted against ‘the South African government’ – the political elite. This polarisation is contoured to Afriforum’s definition of “Us” vs “Them” constructed through explicit and implicit dichotomisation of the social, resulting in the unification through standardisation (Thompson 2007: 64) of two ‘distinct’ groups – one ‘pure’, the other ‘corrupt and elite’ to borrow Mudde’s (2004: 543) distinctions. Identities follow ethnic lines between “Us” – “white farmers”, “foreign investors”, “white tribes” versus “Them”, in various constructions: “black government”, “black African communities”, “trespassers”, “squatters”\(^\text{141}\), “black people”, “black tribes”. This is particularly clear in the development of diagnoses, prognoses, and motivations for action in the narrative:

To help prevent an economic catastrophe, international investors are therefore requested to intervene on behalf of millions of South Africans, Kriel

Afriforum 01 August 2018

\(^{141}\)This word was powerfully brought into being in South Africa during one of the capitalist transitions early in the 20\(^{th}\) century. “Awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth. The 4 500 000 black (sic) South Africans are domiciled as follows: One and three-quarter millions in Locations and Reserves, over half a million within municipalities or in urban areas, and nearly a million as squatters on farms owned by Europeans.” (Plaatje 1921: 17)
The economic well-being and stability of South Africa not only affects all residents of the country, but also foreign investors and business partners.

Afriforum 03 July 2018

According to the Afriforum’s populist paradigm, although politics should be an expression of the general will of the people, ‘the [White] people’s’ aspirations are betrayed by corrupt [Black] elite. The political class in South Africa is a category of state managers constructed through their activities and supporting rhetorical strategies, into a homogeneous group (Thompson 2007: 64) of ‘outsiders.’ Their activities unify them (Thompson 2007) with their ‘kind’ outside of government. These are signified through their supporting and/or voting behaviour, or a natural fit of some definition to their ‘kind’ or their action linked somehow to one of more state managers. This is ‘Them’, guilty of murder and incitement through their support for LEwC, and thus the looming ‘catastrophe.’ As a result of their ruinous activities, ‘the people’, an exclusive category, is universalised as “millions of South Africans” or “all residents of the country” are in peril (Thompson 2007: 61). Heroic, external, non-electoral capitalist forces are summoned, ‘justifiably’ in the face of a catastrophe against “the people”, “all residents [non-squatters] of South Africa” to save the situation – the exclusive economy – in favour of “the people” and hence preserve their power. This statement can be decoded as follows: Blacks, and their moribund government, are the problem because of their support for the destructive LEwC. LEwC is going to upset the economic status quo and affect the privilege of millions of White groups and their networked economic interests, globally. No one among us will be spared. Powerful economic forces must therefore perform their duty to preserve the mutually beneficial status quo and determine the political destiny of South Africa using their economic muscle.

The Afriforum narrative is typical of far-right extremism. It relies on charismatic personalities, is media-savvy, and appeals to the power of the common people to challenge the legitimacy of the democratic establishment:

According to EFF policy, the state must own all property. The ANC is driven by a project they describe as the "National Democratic Revolution", according to which the movement must present itself to the world as promoting the values of freedom, while the state apparatus in South Africa should be utilised to transform South Africa into a socialist state.
While this is happening, the South African Government, under the leadership of the President, has embarked on a campaign to encourage the international community to keep investing in South Africa, and to invest in agriculture in particular.

_Afriforum_ 03 March 2018

The text contains powerful ideological constructs whose appeal is based on both colonial thinking and related tropes bequeathed to the civil rights movement as “part of the Solidarity Movement.” Conspiracy theories, the purported contrived common agenda of the homogenised group comprising the ANC, EFF, their voters, farm murderers, squatters etc., an important extreme right ideological framework, are part of the rhetorical strategy to bring about and/or to strengthen an ideologically impenetrable enclosure, what Pinnock calls (1991: 136) conceptual _laagering_, among “the people” to undermine LEwC.

In the passage above, there is the _rooi gevaar_, packaged and connected to a threat to the wealth that White groups have expropriated and accumulated in the country since colonialism. State ownership of property and socialism are represented as the end-game in a ‘joint EFF/ANC project’ threatening individual property rights. The government is painted as two-faced and should not be trusted despite the ‘sweet rhetoric’ and apparent appeal. President Ramaphosa, despite the near universal approval reflected in what became known as ‘Ramaphoria’ in the early stage of his reign, is an active agent of this project.

The anti-establishment posture leads to consistently harsh criticisms of domestic political classes for their misbehaviour in the context of dominant liberal norms and values. Through ‘their corrupt ways’ they are only focused on themselves, and do not care about the country. This is an instrumentalist tactic in the discourse to link _Afriforum’s_ own racist frames opportunistically, with those present in the South African environment. In addition to lamenting obscene corruption in the ranks of government, the narrative criticises the government for “tarnishing South Africa's international image”, and for its failure “to arrest and extradite Omar al-Bashir, controversial Sudanese President, to the ICC” (Afriforum 05/07/2018). “The ANC's pursuit of expropriation without compensation is … exposed as nothing more than a ploy to gain more power and looting opportunities” (Afriforum 12/03/18).

---

142 See treatment in *City Press*’ discourse
The government is constructed in numerous ways as unaccountable to ‘the people’. These ways include dissimulation, to borrow from Thompson (2007), of critical information:

According to Kriel, the fact that Ramaphosa made the announcement to amend the Constitution even before the public participation process has been finalised is an indication that the current participation process is nothing but a farce.

Afriforum 01 August 2018

No mention is made of the specific legal or moral breach made by the President of the ANC in announcing his party’s political position.

Afriforum leaders in the narrative operate as “identity entrepreneurs” (see Reicher, Haslam and Hopkins. 2005; Wodak and KhosraviNik 2013) in their actions. One way in which this is enacted is by their promotion of an oppositional and victimised category of identity, linked to a cause with which followers can identify. The discourse makes strong associations between LEwC and “farm murders”, and even “land grabs” and “trespassing.” It speculatively references land expropriations in Zimbabwe using emotive adjectives and various synonyms of pain such as “destroyed economy” and “the sad state of Africa.” Leaders parade a White female victim of “farm attacks” to ballast the identity construction project “Afriforum heads to USA for awareness on expropriation without compensation and farm murders” (Afriforum 20/03/2018). This allows readers of Afriforum to ‘claim’ membership of a moral community of the ‘unprejudiced’, and to recognise themselves and their place in a country of ‘anti-White racial brutality and injustice.’

Fear mongering

A national survey of Afrikaners conducted on the eve of democracy (Hugo 1988) lists their fears of Black rule. The fears reflect a peculiar colonial and Apartheid logic including young Blacks, crime against Whites, White women being molested by Blacks, Communist policies, and a breakdown in law and order. A threat to “minority rights” according to Manzo and McGowan (1992: 15) is a code word for “white” power and privilege that colonialism and Apartheid were designed to guarantee. It occurs “more to the fore in the minds of many Afrikaners” (Hugo 1988: 569), according to the survey. More than two decades into democracy, Afriforum’s narrative reflects deeper entrenchment of these colonial fears among
the White tribes of South Africa. The politics of insecurity (Rojecki 2016; Beland 2020) operates a productive fear market that spawns new fears and an expanding array of victims (Altheide 2002: 3).

The Afriforum discourse produces and reproduces this fear among White people. It constructs land expropriation as the final destruction of White people economically and through criminal violence.

**Afriforum requests urgent discussion with Police Minister over farm murders and land grabs**

* Afriforum on 7 March 2018 sent a request to Genl. Bheki Cele, the new Minister of Police, with a view to arrange a meeting to discuss farm murders and illegal land occupation. This follows after numerous remarks from political circles since the beginning of the year over the expropriation of land without compensation

The discourse articulates LEwC to words like “farm murders”, “killings”, “torture”, “crisis”, “trespassing”, “land grabbing”, “theft” and is characterised by dramatic and vivid expressions such as “panic”, “serious threat”, “violent takeover”, “disastrous economic collapse”. The crimes are presented as discreet events without context and are ripped from their historical relations. The ‘law and order’ framing device is among the highest in article repeats in the qualitative frame analysis of the corpus of Afriforum LEwC texts. This is significant because media reports on crime and violence can have effects on readers’ perceptions and influence relations between historically estranged peoples (see Nunn 2002).

The Communist threat is coded in descriptors of the ANC, ANC government and EFF, using terms such as “Marxism-Leninism”, “transform South Africa into a socialist state”, and in loaded ideological constructs like the “state must own all property”, the “ANC is driven by a National Democratic Revolution”, an “ideology that led to starvation worldwide” and “more state power”. Danger is constructed and framed to build and deepen collective insecurity and fear and to appeal to the dominant liberal capitalist ethos. “Nothing is calculated to stiffen [W]hite resistance to change and promote siege politics more than this view to become the common perception that [W]hite South Africans have of the attitude of others to their presence in the land” (van Zyl Slabbert 1989: 53).
Building on this fear and to build legitimacy for its strategies, support for Afriforum is mobilised through the strategic positioning of the organisation as the protective shield for ‘the people’ against suffocating threats encapsulated in LEwC:

_Afriforum intensifies its campaign against expropriation without compensation after ANC announcement_

_Afriforum 22 May 2018_

The ANC recently announced that the party had drawn up a list of farms to be expropriated without compensation. Afriforum obtained a list of farms that have been identified for expropriation which is being circulated in the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. Please ascertain of [sic] your farm is on the list and, if so, kindly contact Afriforum so that we can prepare for a joint legal strategy.

_Afriforum 10 August 2018_

The construction of collective fear by the “unification of the audience-market’ into a single “population” of citizens-consumers (Cook 1998: 92; Thompson 2007) by exaggerating dichotomies in episodic articles (homogeneously good White people vs homogeneously bad Black people), is the central logic in the Afriforum narrative. It yields a negative ethno-nationalist discourse, a thick _laager_ mentality founded in Apartheid, about the vulnerability of ‘the people’ and the evil ways of their “Black enemy.”

When contextual factors and causal information on crime are included, readers are less fearful, especially regarding local crimes (Chiricos, Padgett, and Gertz, 2000; Heath, 1984). Researchers have also found that individuals exposed to extensive crime news are more fearful than those not so exposed (Einsiedel et.al. 1984; Gebotys et al. 1988; Jacob 1984; Liska and Baccaglini 1990; Loo 1995; Smith 1984; Williams and Dickinson, 1993).

Afriforum deliberately dissimulates any explanatory variables in the reporting of the social condition in the country as part of the tried and tested Apartheid mind-management tactics that won it the overwhelming electoral support in South Africa in its prime.

Fear might have begun with colonially constructed narratives about the evil black savage, but over time, with enough repetition and expanded use in discourses such as Afriforum’s, for some it has become a way of looking at life. Afriforum’s fear mongering narrative appears not to bear any burden of proof or robust justification. There doesn’t seem to be any inclination to substantiate and to provide evidence for the many, often-ludicrous claims about
the “Other”. In many instances in the narrative, the validation for such claims seems to be performed by a cultivated mind-set or prejudiced categorisations. The arena where racist fear mongers operate, with the benefit of colonialism, is epistemically and ethically democratised.

The paradox and moral entrepreneurship

Afriforum’s activism against LEwC ironically positions the organisation as torch bearers for morality at the scene of their gruesome, continuing crime against humanity. Guilhot (1970: 5) refers to this phenomenon as moral entrepreneurship which, far from fulfilling a counter-hegemonic role, as the Afriforum discourse fashions itself, represents a new way of political authority that exercises economic power for the preservation of ill-gotten privilege.

Afriforum’s narrative appropriates socially progressive repertoires of historical global collective activism for rights and emancipation causes. It opportunistically colonises the turf traditionally occupied by liberal or alternative media and brings direct and exclusive economic and material interest as a motivation for the programme of a “civil rights” movement. In its ‘fight against racist discrimination’ against White people, it opportunistically employs the linguistic, conceptual, and strategic instruments that oppressed peoples used in protests and campaigns using petitions.

An Afriforum invitation to “JOIN NOW”, shortly after Parliament adopted the LEwC motion, states: “One of the roles of a civil rights organisation is to address issues that may have a negative impact on society.” In an apparently patriotic stance, the narrative denounces acts that “tarnish South Africa’s international image” (Afriforum 05/07/2018). But South Africa became a ‘pariah state’ because of the White Apartheid government’s systematic denial of civil and political rights to Black people, becoming a target of opprobrium and censure on international platforms. Afriforum’s discourse seeks to conserve this legacy of the denial of right to Others by subverting a policy that seeks to instantiate universal rights.

Petitioning, famously denounced by a conservative, anti-abolitionist minister Calvin Colton as ‘mischief’, is among its repertoire for collective action at an international level (Afriforum 05/03/2018). Afriforum’s “International campaign against expropriation without compensation” (Afriforum 10/05/2018) mimics the strategies of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. The organisation discursively invents itself as the modern-day champion of human rights at the cutting edge of a new global activism. But on closer inspection Afriforum’s discourse reveals more than it hides. The organisation is structured and operates
like a multi-national firm. It is a proxy for institutionalised power. The economic interests of its White, privileged members indicate an emerging association between reactionary right-wing organisations and multi-national capital. To appreciate this dynamic, we should trace it to the contribution of the Nationalist Party’s then Minister of Agriculture in the Government of National Unity, Kraai van Niekerk. Until his resignation in 1998 under Mandela’s presidency, he ensured that policy direction followed deregulation changes that had been started under Apartheid to integrate agriculture into the global trade environment (Dannson et al 2004: 69). Agriculture is now increasingly an emerging asset (Chen, Wilson, Larsen, Dahl 2013) whose attraction is based on analyses by investors which all tend to underline the same driving factors: strong long-term macroeconomic fundamentals, attractive returns on land investments, a mix of current income and capital appreciation etc. (HighQuest Partners 2010; InvestAg-Savills 2011). The multiple food-energy-climate-finance crisis has opened a window for the promotion of alternative assets such as farmland (Margulis, McKeon and Borras 2013; Ducastel and Anseeuw 2017). Afriforum realigns and transforms the traditional boundaries between the institutional worlds of the ‘fighters for justice’ and big business by occupying positions in both arenas:

The civil rights organisation Afriforum today started to widely distribute a video message to international investors, grading agencies and governments. In the video, Afriforum appeals to investors to put pressure on the South African government and President Cyril Ramaphosa to give up their plans of expropriating property without compensation

*Afriforum* 01 August 2018

In the presentation … Afriforum makes it clear that the organisation wants to make sure that South Africa will continue receiving foreign investments that the economy must grow as well as job opportunities and opportunities for sustainable wealth creation for everyone in the country.

*Afriforum* 10 May 2018

---

143 Colton lamented in his 1840 pamphlet – *The Right of Petition – Petition (against slavery)* is doing more mischief than can be told. See also Susan Zaeske’s (2003) *Signatures of Citizenship: Petitioning, antislavery and women’s political identity*.

144 See also South African History Online: https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/aam-and-un-partners-international-campaign-against-apartheid
History teaches us that international investors, regardless of what Afriforum or anyone else says, are unwilling to invest in a country where property rights are not protected. For this reason, international pressure is needed now to prevent investors from being deterred.

*Afriforum* 01 August 2018

Such is the opportunism of the discourse to obfuscate and veil the real motive to hold on to ill-gotten privilege at the deepening expense of poor Black people of South Africa.

*Civic virtue: grounds for exclusion*

Republican thought in the 18th century considered property the material guarantee of civic virtue (Guilhot 1970). It is White people whose wealth, status, and social elevation guarantee that they “live for politics, without living from politics” (Weber 1978: 290), and present themselves as the upholders of morality, trustworthy bearers of virtue, and guardians of society’s foundational values who ‘matter’ in the discourse. The exclusive and racist nature of Afriforum’s discourse betrays a civic virtue disposition, and an aristocratic form of politics woven into its “civil rights” posture.

South Africans are asked to add their names to the petition that Afriforum will send to governments and international investors to officially request them to put pressure on the South African government to abandon plans to disregard property rights. More than 30 000 people have already added their names to the petition within a few days.

*Afriforum* 19 March 2018

The local and international constituencies in the deictic community in the excerpt are the White property-owning caste. They have raised themselves above material contingencies and can thus be trusted not to put their own interests before the common good (Guilhot 1970: 6). They represent the best guarantee against political corruption and the “destruction of the[ir] economy.” The largely landless poor Black people, alongside the “corrupt”, “Communist” ANC, government and the “socialist radicals” of the EFF, cannot be not part of this noble activism.

**Summary**

The Afriforum discourse consists of distinctly monoculturalist elements constructed to divide the human (White people) from the subhuman (Black people) in such a way that ‘human’
principles do not get compromised by sub-human practices. It is an example of the production of non-existence where any epistemological alternative that does not fit the totality of the *lazy reason* (see De Sousa Santos 2014) that it espouses is disqualified, and rendered invisible, unintelligible and discardable. Issues generally classified under the rubric of redistributive and social justice are conspicuously absent and delegitimised. Deep social and cultural problems are individualised, leading to victim-blaming. *Afriforum*’s articles are generally repetitive, shallow, single-event stories, particularly brief, and episodic. The presentation of both ‘issues’ and related ‘cures’ is similar, characterised by exemplars about individuals whose circumstances illustrate the negative framing of LEwC, involve limited individual cases chosen for their dramatic effect, and lean on sensational qualities rather than the accuracy of their representation.

Women in the patriarchal discourse of *Afriforum* “carry rather than create meaning” (Rakow and Kranich 1991: 16), in their cameo appearances and are used to illustrate consequences that appeal to paternalistic emotions around the inherent ‘violence of LEwC.’ The result is that readers are likely to hold individuals (Black people) responsible for causing and resolving their problems. The narrative employs textual strategies that interweave racist and economic determinants, using signifiers to universalise the social identities of Blacks as lazy, incompetent, criminal and amoral, while simultaneously reinforcing White supremacy and Eurocentrism. The discourse reflects a social activism in the form of a story told by “a handful of business conglomerates [and modern-day economic activists] that have something to sell” (Gerbner 1997:5).

The next chapter discusses the power structures in the discourses of the *City Press* and *AFASA* platforms.
Chapter 7

The qualitative framing analysis of the constructions of land expropriation without compensation (LEwC) locates the City Press’ and AFASA’s discourses on the progressive side on the ideological continuum of the four discourses. The two platforms are located together in this chapter for analysis purposes based on the proximity and complementarity of the ideologies and framing structures in their discourses.

City Press discourse: Ideological structures and strategies in discourse

City Press (CP), like Moneyweb, is a regulated platform that exists to serve society through independent scrutiny of the forces that shape society in support of democracy\(^{145}\). But the LEwC narratives on the two platforms however gravitate towards opposite ends of the normative journalistic continuum, from conservative (Moneyweb) to transformational-liberal\(^{146}\) (City Press). This is not to say one is more professional or more/less ‘balanced’ than the other in their reportage of the “truth” about LEwC. Both subscribe to the same media institutional culture: rules, norms, and values. But the form and substance of their constructions of LEwC reflect a fundamental epistemological and ideological difference that resonates with the history of the country’s system of social control. Journalistic norms and routines are relatively open to adaptive ideological usage as instruments for hegemony or subversion.

The City Press discourse elevates political and social issues in the political public sphere above “instrumentalisation” (Hallin and Mancini 2004). There is greater subversive ideology in its narrative in the struggle to confer power over lived experience: the discourse reflects material (political and economic) and ideological manifestations of the encounter between forces of domination and resistance. It demonstrates greater content diversity than Moneyweb’s unipolar perspective: for instance, in framing the dominant culture and alternative views. With this acknowledgement, the following discussion reflects a selection of the dominant interconnected patterns in the framing of LEwC in the City Press.


\(^{146}\)Socially progressive, change-oriented and supportive of individual rights, civil liberties, democracy and free entreprise.
These are political advocacy, social conditions and political context, reconciliation, discoursal habitus, social cohesion and inclusivity and, social justice and equality.

**Political Advocacy**

The *City Press* narrative on LEwC infuses an activist element of an advocacy kind that advances LEwC as a social/public policy initiative. The inaugural article in the discourse locates the Parliamentary motion in an emotional frame that captures the history, social, and sentimental significance of the policy, thereby constructing it as a proud moment of emancipation invoking conquest under colonialism:

**Unconquering the nation: EFF forge ahead with land expropriation motion**

*City Press* 27 February 2018

The ideological force of the improvised verb ‘unconquering’, takes the reader down a historical memory lane and invokes and reproduces the multiple meanings of land: a tremendous symbolic and moral force that is complexly linked to identity and citizenship, an integral part of an African’s being and a representation of capital and power. Colonial conquest and apartheid were about land just as was the struggle against these forces in South Africa. ‘Unconquering’ invokes this history and by signifying its undoing, re-appropriates it to construct from it hope, in framing LEwC as a land reform policy. It constructs it as a triumphant reversal of the historical effect on Africans of a long and murderous violence that forced them to lead lives that resemble an incomplete death (Fanon 1965) as indigents in their own country. It simultaneously signals true freedom and restoration.

The discourse frames and shapes the public discussion to reflect positively on LEwC and to increase support for it. Words like “overwhelmingly supported”, “landmark victory”, are used alongside corroborative statistical information such as “75% of the sample thinks that a change in the Constitution is required”, “241 MPs voted in favour, while 83 voted against.” The discourse builds a strong sense of optimism in affirmative ways that suggest pregnant victories.

We are hardly through the first quarter of the year, yet 2018 is already being described by many South African business people as one of the most promising years we’ve had in recent times.

*City Press* 06 April 2018
Under the headline **Ramaphosa’s plan could boost growth to 4.5%** (*City Press* 22/04/2018), an ‘expert’ asserts that President Ramaphosa and Minister of Minerals and Energy, Gwede Mantashe “bring a wave of optimism to the mining sector.” The narrative on LEwC is creatively linked to a positively constructed *Thuma Mina*[^148] political campaign of the African National Congress (ANC): “**Thuma mina was in our veins this weekend**” (*City Press* 15/03/2018). *Thuma mina* was inaugurated by Ramaphosa in the context of “renewal, of new beginnings”[^149]. The association of *Thuma Mina* and the blood running “in our veins” is a powerful construct linking LEwC with sustaining life itself.

The discourse moves the definition of LEwC upstream (Wallock 1994) beyond the individualist realm. Social institutions and political processes in the form of political parties, communities, the State, policy instruments and democratic participation are foregrounded and centralised in problem definition and remedial discourse. The narrative operates as an instrument for educating the public and policymakers about the positive potentialities of LEwC. It sets a positive agenda and seeks to introduce innovative perspectives for thought in relation to LEwC. The narrative’s rhetorical creativity also seeks to influence how audiences think about various aspects of the ‘land issue’ relating to its colonial genesis and potential resolution:

**The story of a workers' farm**

*In Sibonelo, a community of farm workers are now farm owners who, with the help of their former employer, have harvested prosperity for their families, writes Poloko Tau*

*City Press 22 July 2018*

[^148]: Loosely translated *Thuma mina* means ‘send me’. It is the title of a music hit by Hugh Masekela, the popular late South African trumpeter, cornetist, singer, and composer revered as the father of South African jazz. The campaign ‘appropriates’ the song linking politics to popular culture and taking it into private homes, and small and large cultural gatherings.

“Sibonelo is a Zulu name meaning something that is exemplary” the story states. It then describes a successful collaboration between farm workers and their employer, highlighting the roles of different actors (government funding, patriotic White farmer, and committed new Black owners) in a successful African farm approach to redistribution. Frina Hadebe, a 72 year-old resident of Sibonelo does not only express her pride, but urges that the model “should be implemented to benefit other communities out there. We don't only own a piece of land but we're living off it,” Hadebe says.

Advocacy frames in the City Press discourse present workable transformative models and are aimed at encouraging and influencing changes in policies that advance Black participation in the exclusionary economic space, as well as building goodwill towards an inclusive economy. The narrative targets the “power gap” (Wallock: 1994: 422). It works with individuals and groups to claim the power of the media to transform the context in which the debate about LEwC occurs.

Social conditions and political context

The City Press discourse includes more of the social and political context in its portrayal of LEwC. The articles are generally more content rich than Moneyweb’s and Afriforum’s, offering the perspectives of diverse social actors. The reporting takes on a public journalism character that helps citizens understand issues. The narrative has comprehensive features on topics like “Land expropriation without compensation: What does it mean?” (CP 04/03/2018) authored by an academic expert on land issues, Professor Ruth Hall. “The Land Myth: South Africans know more than politicians think” (CP 15/07/2018) is an academically referenced piece with a defined methodology, and analysis by a land expert, providing deep and conflictual positions from a national and racially diverse sample. There are similar features by diverse social actors sharing contextual information about LEwC. The articles are thematic and frame the issues broadly.

The articles also contain base rate information with details regarding the numbers and proportions of people and groups who are stakeholders in LEwC, including their stakes.

In an interview with City Press on Friday Nkoana-Mashabane said the shocking reality was that a mere 4% of land was in the hands of black people “in a place they call home”. This was despite the government spending R50 billion on land reform and restitution over many years.
City Press first revealed findings of the department's audit last month, which showed that blacks directly own only 1.2% of the country's rural land and 7% of formally registered property in towns and cities.

City Press 18 March 2018

In “Parliament to investigate ways to expropriate land without compensation” (CP 28/02/2018), for instance, substantial excerpts from the contributions of Parliament’s three largest parties (the ANC, DA and EFF) to the debate at the tabling of the LEwC motion are quoted verbatim. The full Resolution of the National Assembly, with detail about group land ownership patterns is included in the story.

Reconciliation

The City Press narrative cultivates reconciliation and peace by foregrounding dialogue, compassion, and regeneration (Hochheimer 2007). It constructs mutual acceptance, understanding and common respect between different racialised groups and genders in different ways. This is evident in articles such as “Boogying with the Boere” (CP 27/05/2018), “Land Expropriation is not a policy to drive Whites to the sea” (CP 27/03/2018), and statements like:

Local farmer Simon Roche criticised [W]hite people who opposed the process based on logical arguments of foolishness. “It is foolish to believe that you can make any difference particularly a positive difference to this matter by trying to convince people who believe that they have a legitimate grievance to abandon that grievance on the basis of that you know what is best for them. White people who think like that are fools, klaar! You would not accept that argument if it was used against you,” he said

City Press 01 August 2018

We are hardly through the first quarter of the year, yet 2018 is already being described by many South African business people as one of the most promising years we’ve had in recent times.

City Press 30 June 2018

Restoration of historically fractured relationships and the changing of destructive racist attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships is reflected in evidence of a sense of community across the colour line:

Botha says that he employs 36 people on his farm. They are like family and he even knows their children. Some have been here for more than 20
years and I have a good relationship with them.

Stockil provides machinery and other implements needed for each planting and harvest season. He is one of the trustees who helps to oversee the affairs and finances of the trust. Stockil said some of the original 38 still worked for him on his farm, as well as working their own land. “I am glad they are now living on their own land close to town, which means they are nearer to schools and other job opportunities. We call this model agrivillage and we believe it can work in many other places,” he said.

The City Press narrative is dialogic and ‘allows’ people to both challenge and nurture each other as a necessary condition to overcome hatred. For an example, in the article titled “Eastern Cape debate turns racial” (CP 01/08/2018) we are told how “the town hall was filled to capacity and could not accommodate everyone, many people were locked outside.” This is followed by narration of wildly differing opinions between Black and White contributors. It is, however, happening on a deliberative platform to resolve emotive differences. Mason (2003) and Mizo (2003) refer to this aspect of the narrative as ‘pneumologic.’ This is where, they argue, the media does something that symbolises peace, reconciliation, and hope.

Discoursal habitus

Habitus is conceptualised by Bourdieu (1990) as a function of social class. Organisational habitus links the concept to dispositions, perceptions and appreciations transmitted to individuals through common organisational culture (Mc Donough 1997). It has also been used in relation to racial and religious ideologies (e.g. Akon 2003), and viewed as a consequence of one’s career trajectory and experience (Schreiner 2003). Here I adapt habitus to media discourse analysis to understand the ways in which the City Press LEwC narrative promotes ideologies that empower and inspire while simultaneously resisting and undercutting established stereotypes and meanings. This is what I call discoursal habitus negotiated with the reader through regular production, consumption, and reproduction of specific affirmative ideological constructs. This is a useful concept that can be adapted to understand the processes of media appellation and enculturation in a nuanced way.

There are different discursive logics in the City Press narrative that could be said to generate ideological alternatives to dominant constructs, such as those in Moneyweb and Afriforum for instance, building resistant Black subjectivity that upsets their racist ideology. Take for instance the following article:
Boogeying with the Boere

I don't want us to fight as black and white, he says. Mathasane has farmed his crops, cattle and sheep for 15 years on his 1300ha farm. In 2003, I was working as a barman in a restaurant. I got to interact with many farmers and I grew up on farms. So when the land care programme gave me 388ha of land, that is how I started.

City Press 27 May 2018

Ideological constructs in the City Press discourse contribute a deviant and defiant performative dimension (Jackson 1993) against White racist constructions. Resistance to, and psychological transformation of, racist constructs about Blacks as violent, incompetent farmers, ill-disciplined etc. are challenged by constructions of Black identity reflecting entrepreneurial achievement and related positive descriptors. By organising Black achievement ideology (Akon 2003) in contrast to the ideology of White supremacy, the narrative negates the racist accounts in popular Conversations (Gee 1999; Billig 1987; Latour 1987) about Blacks and (in)competence.

The discourse links LEwC to descriptors such as “inclusive growth”, “enhancing land productivity”, “creating sustainable jobs” “growing our economy”, “to bring more producers into the agricultural sector”, “to make more land available for cultivation”, “lead this developing country to unprecedented heights of prosperity and progress” and “transformation of the economy.”

The ANC's policy resolution on expropriation of land without compensation continues to be applauded by most sectors of our society yearning for radical economic transformation. The country is echoing unprecedented optimism and conviction as we welcome this game-changer within the political arena and ideological framework of our flourishing democracy.

City Press 17 June 2018

Black-operated and worker operated farms are not just given prominence through catchy headlines, prominent play, and detailed positive information collected from on-site reporting, they are also constructed as contributing a strong oppositional social identity informed by a Black achievement ideology:

Back in Sibonelo, the harvesting has been done and the trucks, loaded with sorghum, have already left Winterton for delivery in the North West. Soon the small community will sit down and decide how they will spend their
biggest annual pay-out for the benefit of them all. Then, in no time at all, it will be time to hit the fields again and prepare for planting time - steadily growing the prosperity of their community one harvest at a time

City Press 22 July 2018

The descriptors are carriers of powerful counter ideologies in a politicised cultural resistance project propelled by the anti-establishment ideological constructions in the City Press discourse. The discourse extends the defiance beyond ‘race’ to influence how women construct their identities as farmers and repositories of transformative attitudes:

Women must seize the moment

In South Africa, women make up 43% of the agricultural labour force. They are close to half of the workers on farms, in cellars, abattoirs, processing factories or markets. When it comes to small-scale farming, 69% of these farmers are women. They are the ones who complement the local market of food production in our communities.

Overall in Africa, according to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation, women produce up to 80% of food on the continent for personal use and to sell. Women play key roles as producers of food, managers of natural resources, income earners, and main caregivers of their families and communities

City Press 30 May 2020

Black people, and women in particular, are meaningful participants in the narrative and are not just carriers of meaning (Spencer 2004). Women for example, are profiled out of the ‘usual’ domestic sphere and not as just decorative performers. Their roles are not limited to being victims or props located at the periphery of economic activity. The discourse transforms rather than reproduces stereotypes normally associated with the constructed identities of Blacks and women. Affirmative ideological constructs develop a counter-voice to wield power as a catalyst for progressive social and cultural change. The notion of Black success, including women is central to understanding the discoursal habitus in the City Press narrative. Humanisation, in this way, constructs them as deserving and productive members of society, human enough to have feelings and earn empathy and goodwill.

Social cohesion and inclusivity

The City Press discourse is ‘corrective’ in various ways. It integrates diverse meaning-making voices outside regular officialdom and the standard dominant definers of reality in telling the LEwC story. Sources of information in the discourse include “women”,

182

The discourse echoes the principles enunciated in the government strategy for social cohesion and nation-building. Visibility of a cross-section of social actors in the City Press discourse in this way couches LEwC as part of a broad social agenda and alliance of an inclusive nationhood, rather than in narrow ethno-nationalistic frames. It also creates complex social situations and thinking, as opposed to simplifications of complex issues that punt equally simplistic ‘solutions’.

Social justice and equality

The City Press discourse constructs LEwC as a remedy for human suffering and restoration of human dignity, valuing its concern with equality and human welfare beyond decontextualized equal rights. Key issues regarding land expropriation are constructed as social and political concerns, and the narrative assigns corrective responsibilities to social institutions as contemplated by Barry (1989). The narrative crystallises two distinct and interconnected paradigms in this regard. On the one hand is a paradigm of redistribution. Collectivities within this paradigm are grouped economically by their relations to the market and the means of production: “… people, many of whom are landless and still have no access to the means of production in this country,” said EFF spokesperson Mbuyiseni Ndlozi (CP 30/05/2018). In this regard the narrative provides a critique of the prevailing socio-economic situation of “winners and losers” (Smith, Stenning, Willis 2008: 1) and talks about incomplete freedom “without economic emancipation”, “fair distribution of land and access to land”, “creation of human settlements” and “social welfare”.

150 The South African Government Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and a Cohesive South African Society includes the following principles: Human rights and equality, non-racialism, non-tribalism and non-sexism, unity in diversity, inclusivity and social justice, redress and transformation, social solidarity, national consciousness. www.dac.gov.za
Let them too recognise that as South Africans, they have a duty to fellow South Africans. The ANC resolution that land should be expropriated without compensation speaks to a historical injustice and, as a party in government, the party had a duty to correct that and not fail the people of South Africa.

City Press 02 February 2018

“Them” in this extract, depends on the colonial and Apartheid project of dispossession for meaning. In that context, it depicts White people who are the beneficiaries of the colonial and Apartheid capitalist enterprise. The narrative locates the responsibility for the redistribution of “benefits and burdens” (Mcleod 2010; Barry 1989; Barry 2005) to correct the injustice to social institutions – the state in particular – and as part of a democratic political process. Within the currency of social redistributive justice, women are included: “our land reform and agrarian revolution must at its core empower women.” (CP 29/05/2018).

But for many mothers and daughters, this dream will be shattered if they continue to have limited decision-making power and control over how to use the land or its outputs. As it is now, women rarely own the land they are working on, or have poor tenure security and rights to the land.

City Press 11 March 2018

The redistributive justice narrative is about socio-economic transformation as a remedy for racial and gender injustices.

The other dimension of social justice in the discourse is about a “politics of recognition” (Fraser 1999: 72) and seeks to address the revaluation of unjustly devalued identities from Black and feminist cultural nationalist perspectives. Aspects of the argument under Discoursal Habitus and Social Cohesion and Inclusivity above, address relations of recognition for Black pride and humanity and women, specifically their social and political identities. In addition, the City Press discourse is characterised by positive valorisation of cultural diversity, a reflection of transformation of societal patterns of representation and interpretation in ways that change the dominant social identity of Black people and women: “Land Affairs minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane talks tough on land” (CP 18/03/2018); ANC Women's League secretary Meokgo Matuba told City Press... (CP 01/03/2018).

In South Africa, women make up 43% of the agricultural labour force. They are close to half of the workers on farms, in cellars, abattoirs, processing factories or markets. When it comes to small-scale farming,
69% of these farmers are women. They are the ones who complement the local market of food production in our communities.

*City Press* 30 May 2018

This framing casts women as social equals to other groups in society thereby constructing LEwC as a progressive leveler, a remedy for gender and racial-ethnic injustices defined economically, culturally, and symbolically.

**Summary**

The *City Press* narrative pursues the dream of the Rainbow nation[^151], reconciliation[^152], and working together for a planned programme of gradual change driven by liberal-capitalist “revolutionaries” operating within the conceptual limits set by the liberal establishment. The narrative places faith LEwC is constructed as an opportunity to give substance to this desirable vision in the context of the country’s colonial and Apartheid histories. The support for the ANC government is evident in the narrative, just as is the faith constructed around LEwC as a necessary and workable solution to the country’s historical problem of race-based inequality.

**AFASA discourse: Ideological structures and strategies in discourse**

The Association of African Farmers of South Africa’s (*AFASA*)[^153] LEwC discourse reflects a rebellious profile of nonconformism in response to the unjust economic system. The discourse is geared towards progressive social and political change and to shaping political

[^151]: Rainbow Nation is a term coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu to describe post-apartheid South Africa, after South Africa's first fully democratic election in 1994. Nelson Mandela later referred to the “Rainbow Nation at peace with itself and with the world.”

[^152]: The term reconciliation became synonymous with Mandela’s political reign. He championed it to restore peaceful relations between and among ethnic religious and/or political communities that have been in conflict under Colonialism and Apartheid.

[^153]: Also abbreviated in some instances as AF

[^154]: The discourse reflects an end goal that is both utilitarian and equalitarian.
consciousness, the association’s raison d’etre as a social movement. The rhetorical strategy reflects appreciation of the sociological, political, and cultural currents that shaped South Africa’s racist socio-spatial history. It reflects social motivations aimed at responding to societal inequalities caused by colonial land dispossession. As such, it could be characterised as social activism for ideological promotion and resistance. The social activism displayed by the narrative is enmeshed in media activism in pursuit of common\textsuperscript{154} political interest.

My analysis of the AFASA discourse is structured according to this characterisation and understanding to reflect its contribution to recreating society, back-to-the-land agitation, and championing radicality.

*Recreating society*

This study centres discourse in the context of land and labour to explanations about how South African society developed and assumed its structure and character. Colonial and Apartheid social and economic engineering through land theft, violent dispossession and a battery of racist legislation and strictures\textsuperscript{155} ‘whitened’ land ownership and ‘blackened’ the labour force. “Whiteness” was associated with salary, human rights, privileges, and access to power (Quijano 2000: 169; 217) to naturalise fragmentation through differentiation (Thompson 2007: 65) of a people according to designated Race-based economic and social stations. Land dispossession and forced migration to remove ‘Black Spots’ in colonial and Apartheid South Africa annihilated not only the economic wellbeing and political power of Black people, but also undermined the beliefs and cultures underpinning their spirituality as Africans and their spiritual connections\textsuperscript{156} that are interconnected with land. Ideological constructions in the AFASA discourse reflect a ‘rebellious’ movement towards articulating an-other politics: an anti-hegemonic politics of struggle against the violence of the politics

\textsuperscript{155} Laws such as the Masters and Servants Act of 1956, Black Land Act of 1913, Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 and many others prohibited Blacks from owning land outside designated reserves, implemented forced migration, drew Blacks outside the reserves into the White agricultural economy as cheap labour with tenuous relations to land (South African History Online: sahistory.org.za)

\textsuperscript{156} Nkosi Z: Spirituality, Land and Land Reform in South Africa; Mufeme E: Land: Breaking bonds and cementing ties (Echoes: Land and Spirituality in Africa Land and Spirituality in Africa (wcc-coe.org).}
that militate against the ethical (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 96; De Sousa Santos 2014: 239). It champions a different vision to the hegemonic policies, priorities, and perspectives in respect of the current social relations regarding land.

Overcoming poverty and inequality in South Africa: an assessment of drivers, constraints and opportunities refers to land reform slow progress and its impact on poverty and inequality. AFASA has publicly advocated for a process characterized by the rule of law, systematic, transparent and participatory, also recognizing that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.

AFASA 29 May 2018

Radical normative values and ideas define the AFASA narrative as a legitimate and moral alternative to the present-day manifestation of the country’s colonial history in liberal morality. Prefigurative politics – a term popularised by Epstein (1991) – provides a useful framework to understand the rhetorical structure of the AFASA discourse. Prefiguration refers to a future-oriented construction of humanistic political alternatives to the current system (Downing, Villarreal, Gil and Laura 2001). The discourse is constructed to ‘remind’ the reader that radical alternatives are available to ‘the way we live now’. Radical change is ‘prefigured’ in new values and social arrangements in the present, even without changes to the prevailing social structures. It does so, borrowing from Ganz (2000) and Yates (2020), through cultural expression (building understandings), mobilisation (broadening understanding of ideology) and coordination (marshalling activity towards a political goal). I outline the main areas in the discourse where the temporal distinctions between the struggle in the present and the emancipatory goals in the future are removed.

Alter-globalization defines the AFASA discourse. Alter-globalization rests upon a practice of social change that takes prefiguration as a significant means for bringing about the social change (Maeckelbergh 2011: 2). It employs a progressive universalism as an alternative to neoliberal globalization (Gill 2000: 137; Stephen 2009: 485). Progressive universalism is about a new form of globalism linked to democratisation and a search for collective solutions to common problems. It seeks to combine diversity with new forms of collective identity and solidarity in, and across civil societies (Gill 2000). In its submission to the World Farmers Organisation’s General Assembly (WFO) for example, AFASA urges that the WFO “should not take a position on a national matter [LEwC] that is currently following due democratic process and is participatory.” The submission makes the following point:

Where states choose to implement redistributive reforms, they should develop policies and laws, through participatory processes, to make them sustainable… and ensure
equal treatment of men and women in redistributive reforms

*AFASA 29 May 2018*

*AFASA*’s discourse constructs a counterhegemonic and planetary challenge to economic oppression. Gill (2000: 64) calls this, a “global political agency”, and is capable of revolutionising state–society relations in the transformation of South Africa’s political economy.

The discourse locates LEwC at the heart of substantive equality. Human rights according to *AFASA*’s narrative “are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated” (AF 29/05/2018). It speaks of economic social and collective rights and not just civil and political human rights.

Masithela said *AFASA* could not agree with other agricultural bodies who argued for the protection of property rights. As a black farmer organization, we cannot enter that discussion as our constituency don’t have those rights, to begin with.

*AFASA 11 June 2018*

Maldistribution and distributive injustice in society are problematised as an impediment to meaningful economic participation. As a remedy, political and social solutions, are proposed including mobilisation of members of the public to “make their voices heard” in the Parliamentary hearing, as opposed to individualistic and legalistic solution to political concerns.

The narrative denounces corruption in the ranks of government. References are made to “real [B]lack farmers”, “right beneficiaries” as opposed to “connected people.” The *AFASA* narrative “laments” practices in government where recipients “are handed farms not based on their farming credentials but on who they are connected to” (AF 22/02/2018). Strong calls are made for greater transparency and consultations with “farmer unions” and “commodity associations” when recipients are identified to “ensure food security and sustaining the economy.”

---

157 The *AFASA* discourse foreshadows a desired future through discursive modelling.
Black success is a dominant frame in the AFASA discourse carried in detailed stories about “rows of trophies” won by “successful Black farmers” at national shows, “certificates”, and various other notable accolades that “mean we are capable” (AF 12/03/2018). “Pride”, “prestige”, “burning passion” are used to construct a Black success ideology frame. Mbele is a “successful farmer.” He and his “renowned breeder” father have recorded a chain of successes, including being “named GrainSA’s 2016 New Era Farmer of the Year.” “At competitions, they ask ‘who is the owner here?’ – maybe they think it’s a [w]hite person” (AF 12/03/2018). Yet, “Mbele lives in a quaint house with his wife, mother and two children on the farm” (AF 12/03/2018), highlighting, positive family values and affirming their humanity in ways that are antithetical to racist tropes about Black people, their family sizes, and worldview.

Self-sacrifice is a common trait among the “successful farmers” who speak at length about the “hardships of entering the industry.” Their “journey[ies]” reflect various heroic acts of risk-taking: “By 1992, I was in the taxi industry. I had to sell all those combis and invest … on the farm” (AF 12/03/2018).

Meet two successful farmers
His teaching job and taxi business were the main sources of financing his dream of being a commercial farmer. In 2006, he could no longer ignore his passion, and he became a full-time farmer like his father. Sadly, his dad has since passed on in 2013, but he is proudly maintaining the family tradition

AFASA 12 March 2018

Competence and fitness-for-purpose are important values espoused in the AFASA discoursal utopia. “Government officials who are chosen to lead the agricultural sector are not always well-equipped”, the farmers charge.

Mbele said that if he had the opportunity to make important decisions concerning farming, he would employ MECs with a strong farming background. I would relook (sic) the policies and make sure that the director-general I appoint is a person with the basics of agriculture. He (sic) must be from the farmer organisation, he said.

AFASA 12 March 2018

The discourse highlights resilience and commitment in the face of lack of support for Black farmers described as “the reason why we have a bigger number of failures [in Black farming]” (AF 28/02/18). Descriptors for farming experiences of Blacks include “tough
journey”, “Black farmers’ struggle for land is just the beginning”, “the deposit that is required it is too high, and the land is expensive”, “the queues for government [aid] are too long”, “Letuka says the conditions attached to loans taken out through the Land Bank make it almost impossible for an ordinary South African to buy arable farmland”:

You need an upfront deposit of 10 percent. Five hundred hectares of land [costs] about R10-million. They need the cash up front. He says the barrier to entry for many black people is their scarce resources. We do not have the financial resources; there is nothing we can do. Now you want to buy a machine – once again you need a hard-cash deposit. You go to the bank, and they say you need collateral. We do not have hard cash, he said.

AFASA 28 February 2018

Down-payments and collaterals are the foundation of social and economic exclusion. Connections to people with capital or significant investments are the minimum requirements to access the resources that people need to make a living. This is what colonialism and Apartheid deprived Black people of – capital assets. This was the instantiation of coloniality aimed at the retention of resources in the hands of White citizens (see Mignolo 2003: 669; Maldonado-Torres 2007: 242).

The discourse ‘showcases’ radically democratic alternatives constructed to inspire and empower. Farming is framed in a non-transactional language of sustainability rather than in terms of capitalism. It is about “love for nature” (AF 12/03/2018). There is a deep appreciation of the value of the land as a sustainable source of livelihoods:

He also believes it is important for black people to get involved in the industry and build generational wealth through farming.

AFASA 12 March 2018

Young people with an ‘urban-outlook’ are powerfully reconnected to the land in a radical reversal of forced urbanization thrust upon Black people by their lack of access to land resources and that compelled them to seek employment outside the agricultural sector during industrialisation (see Bantekas 2005). This reconnection is constructed through narrations of positive role modelling for young Black students by successful Black farmers. The students ‘love’ it and aspire to be farmers too:

Mbele’s two blue-overalled interns help him with milk production and minding the cattle on his farm. But farmers don't get to "just supervise" – one of their duties is waking up at the crack of dawn to assist him as he
milks his cows. Third-year University of Pretoria agriculture student Hloneph Ntsoereng says working with Mbele has been a fantastic learning curve, underlining just how important mentorship is for aspiring young black farmers. It is difficult – but also nice [working with Mbele] – we do things wrong because we don't know how to do them properly. He is a good [at teaching us the skills], he says. Ntsoereng says his "love for nature" is why he wants to be a commercial farmer.

(AF 12/03/2018)

Women’s empowerment in the discourse centres on recognition. Dr Vuyo Mahlathi, a woman, is the president of AFASA and its chief spokesperson. She has a powerful voice in the narrative, constructing women’s identities as farmers and repositories of transformative attitudes. The discourse radically transforms stereotypes by locating women at the heart and in the leadership of farming and effective transformation of the country’s economy. Collaboration and co-creation between established White farmers and “exceptional farm workers” constructs them as equals. Competition between people where there is “no other goal, nor other garland but being foremost” (see Hobbes: 2001: 20) is replaced with collaboration, sharing and productive coexistence.

Back-to-the-Land

The discourse employs varied ways for back-to-the-land mobilisation inspired by its counterhegemonic ideas. The attractiveness of the countryside for residence and livelihoods is powerfully restored and constructed through positive imagery, symbolism, and cultural expressions in the context of a changing rurality. The land is “green and lush… and the atmosphere is serene” (AF 12/03/2018). The discourse is an implicit critique of modernity and all its trappings and accoutrements with new relations to land exemplified in farming.

The Black farmers in the narrative personify hard work, social modesty, discipline, and success. While “the journey has not been easy”, there was always a “burning passion for agriculture.” The walls of the “quaint house” are “plastered with certificates, ribbons and pictures of cattle.” Lives of the Black farmers are affirmed in glowing descriptors such as “pride”, “prestige”, “renowned breeder” (AF 12/03/2018).
A complex interplay of the economic, social, political, and spiritual value of land is constructed through utopian terms to reflect dignity, self-sufficiency, autonomy, and power among the “ample challenges and ample benefits” (AF 28/02/2018) of farming:

However, the first-born of 10 siblings says that business has been so good, it has attracted his siblings into cattle farming as well: “Definitely the money is there – if you do not make money then you won't last in farming. My brothers are also following me – they are also keeping cattle.”

AFASA 12 March 2018

Young Black students with ‘prestigious’ tertiary level qualifications – accounting, auditing, agriculture – are being “groomed” by organic Black famers. They express positive reviews and intrinsic satisfaction about their experiences in farming. One of them, “third-year University of Pretoria agriculture student, Hlonepho Ntsoereng, says working with Mbele has been a “fantastic learning curve, underlining just how important mentorship is for aspiring young black farmers. It is difficult – but also nice [working with Mbele] – we do things wrong because we don't know how to do them properly. He is a good [at teaching us the skills],” he says. Ntsoereng says his “love for nature” is why he wants to be a commercial farmer. (AF 12/03/2018). The fun element of farming and its accommodation of young people’s socio-cultural interests are highlighted.

Championing radicality

The AFASA LEwC discourse provides an intertextual critique of the dominant economic, social, and cultural structures in society that reflect liberal morality founded on individualism and property rights. Both individualism and property rights are juxtaposed according to the inherent dominant alternative value systems in the discourse. The liberal freedom that they advocate is projected as the freedom of capital to oppress the poor, something that is frowned upon in the prefigured world in the discourse. The discourse is antagonistic to, and subversive of corporate power, offering instead moral and humanistic alternatives to the prevailing economic system. It exposes a capitalistic concentration of power and how it locks Black people out of meaningful economic participation, mobilising opinion towards a fairer redistribution:

The one problem in agriculture is getting funding and getting a loan. They
do not know whether you will be able to pay it back. Unlike Mbele, Letuka does not own any land and has to lease his hectares. I do not have enough money to buy land. In this area land is very expensive – the average is R25 000 per hectare, Letuka lamented.  

AFASA 12 March 2018

The discourse also advocates a statist solution through government intervention to offset the exclusionary corporate power, and to enable fairer social redistribution. This reflects the ‘mixed nature’ of the solutions in the discourse. De Sousa Santos (2014: 239) refers to such enabling contradictions as hybrids of strangeness and familiarity:

Black Farmers: This Is What Government Should Do To Help Us
He said there are three key areas that government has to look at, to give [B]lack people a chance to be farmers. Land acquisition is a major constraint for [B]lack farmers, he said, along with the lack of financial support for them to keep their farms afloat long enough to establish going concerns.  

AFASA 11 June 2018

Property and individual rights are problematised in the context of colonial and Apartheid dispossession and coloniality in the present:

As a black farmer organization, we cannot enter that discussion as our constituency don’t have those rights, to begin with. Majority of black farmers don’t own the land they farm on.  

AFASA 11 June 2018

The discourse presents ‘a case’ for Black farmers located in a diverse and complex social and historical context of colonial economic oppression and social polarisation.

Summary

The AFASA discourse engages knowledges born in struggle with Western-centric conceptions and political instruments to design and carry out counterhegemonic, intercultural uses of such conceptions or instruments. The discourse creates a platform for the expression of the daily life experiences of Black farmers. These quotidian experiences are presented from an activist perspective as an extension of political contestation and agitation. The discourse appropriates routine degrading cultural representations of Black people and uses them in a positive way to empower readers. It involves ordinary people in some form of cultural resistance against the
“social stigma” (Deigh 2001: 163) associated with being Black and poor. Prestige and dignity are linked to being Black and owning and working the land. Government is urged to facilitate social redistribution. Creative tactics seek to make agriculture desirable to Black people across social stations and to raise their interest in consolidating a ‘pull force’ on government to see the LEwC policy through. The narrative is about creating a society in which each person has the maximum opportunity to develop fully in circumstances of equality, justice, and a non-puritanical version of the good life (Tamney 2005).
Chapter 8

Findings and Discussion

When we stop being afraid of what it could be, then we will start making great things happen.

Andrea Wen (2020: 8)

This chapter draws together the analytic insights gained from examining local media discourses on land expropriation without compensation (LEwC) from a Marxist and southern epistemological perspectives. Marxism foregrounds history as an important starting point to understand the present. Epistemologies of the South argue that contemporary culture and politics in previously colonised places are constituted by that history of colonization. The concept of coloniality enables a ‘re-reading’ and re-creolization of the connection between the history of violent dispossession without compensation in colonialism and Apartheid, and the present sociopolitical systems. The colonial ethos exists today as coloniality of power, knowledge and being (Quijano 2000), shaping contemporary social relations of inequality and related inter-race relations. I begin with a brief review of this social context and present the findings in a flat and factual account (Burnard 2004) to respond to the questions:

RQ1 What frames, counter-frames, and articulatory practices of land expropriation without compensation are used in the discourse(s) in Moneyweb, City Press and the websites of Afriforum and AFASA and what implied meanings about LEwC did they offer their different audiences?

RQ1.1 How do the frames in the discourse(s) relate to the broader issues of social justice and ‘race’ relations given the country’s history of colonisation?

The rest of the chapter discusses the findings in the following order:

Meaning of the land question: linking 1652 to 2018
Convergences and polarities in the frames on LEwC
Reactionary framing in the constructions of the land question
Conservative framing in the constructions of the land question
Liberal-transformational framing in the construction of the land question

Radical-prefigurative framing in the construction of the land question

This part of the presentation uses illustrations of the frames and their unique and shared epistemologies of LEwC made available to audiences nationally and globally. Accompanying descriptions are drawn from the whole study. Supporting discussion offers explanations about how these frames interacted with the potential meanings about LEwC and their perspectives on moral virtue in the discourses, linking the analysis with related scholarly work in the literature. This combination might be useful in contextualising commentaries and novel conclusions where these are offered (Burnard 2004; Drisko 2005). The broad structure of this chapter follows the continuum of meanings made about LEwC – from one extreme (reactionary) to the other (radical-prefigurative).

Political communication is an important window into society’s emancipatory impulse. Media analysis enables critical understanding of pertinent historical discourses and how the past might be connected to the present. An important development in the entrenchment of the liberal-capitalist value system under the New world order was the abyssal Western-centric standardisation of the discourses about global social and economic relations as if they are monolithic (De Sousa Santos 2014: 175). At the heart of this standard is an \textit{a priori} assumption about the sacrosanctity of individual property rights, championed without regard for the histories of violent expropriations of wealth that preceded their imposition. The discourses analysed in this study reflect a solid sedimentation of this heritage in the country’s political communication and how it contributes to the paralysis of South Africa’s development and emancipation. They reflect a dominating presence of a colonial ethic of racist economic violence in the present.

This study highlights the need for radical conceptual reorientation of the land question in political communication. The country’s socio-economic history and contemporary media discourse are dominated by a constellation of retrospective and prospective illusions where nothing is learned from history except to trust the future. This study contributes to a desperately needed alternative conception in which dispossession becomes a fore-reason for our outrage and non-conformity (see De Sousa Santos 2014). Its theorisation of media constructions of LEwC demonstrates an unbroken link between the
violent dispossession of land and the present condition of inequality and racism, highlighting the ways in which the dispossession of the past has enabled transformation and ‘reconciliation’ without significantly changing the present atrocious conditions of the majority of South African citizens. This general picture characterises the findings of the analysis of the discourses of Moneyweb, Afriforum, City Press and AFASA.

The absent-isation of lessons from history in the dominant discourse has led today, to the constitution of a broken society that is afflicted by extraordinary social contradictions and ongoing moral and ethical degeneration. Liberation without the requisite sensitivity to history, handed the future of Black South Africans over to Eurocentrism and left the hegemony of colonialism and racist capitalism almost intact. The organised Apartheid ‘crime against humanity’ was individualised and reduced (for example through the TRC process) from a relationship between the state and communities to one between the state and some individuals (see Mamdani 2002: 33-34; van Schoor 2014: 1). The ANC ‘borrowed’ colonial and Apartheid apparatuses to achieve its liberation outcomes. It jettisoned its responsibility to the long-suffering majority and adopted the oppressive Apartheid economic policy instruments and its social institutions, including coopting Apartheid ministers and bureaucrats, to construct the foundations of its liberation agenda. Liberal capitalism has restricted the imagination about positive economic alternatives to build a truly new and emancipated South Africa.

Media discourses on LEwC in South Africa’s liberal capitalist democracy employ specific articulatory practices that operate in complex ways as daily validation of capitalism, reproducing racism and debasing alternatives or making them absent. While there may be discursive differences in the ideological articulation of LEwC by the selected platforms, they do not necessarily imply different epistemologies. In other words, what is assumed to be (in)valid about LEwC. Coloniality of knowledge addresses itself to this observation (Mignolo 2003: 669; Maldonado-Torres 2007: 242). This is a mark of liberal capitalism’s discoursal resilience, where vociferous contestation occurs within its discoursal field without rupturing that order that the discourses instead opaquely and potentially inadvertently underscore and validate. De Sousa Santos (2014: 25-26) makes this point in his argument about the leeway that global capitalism has created that allows for anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric without challenging it in any significant way. This is what the City Press discourse, for
example, contributes by its strong attack on the colonial and Apartheid capitalist arrangements. The *City Press* and *AFASA* discourses generally, do not imagine any radically different alternative to the system that they oppose: they merely seek accommodation to differing extents, despite its inherent and uncontested (at least in the discourses) antihuman evils. The spectrum of the discourses operates within a liberal epistemological continuum and capitalistic intelligibility.

The discourses are both similar and diverse in their general form and substance. LEwC accumulated different meaning(s) that are constructed and negotiated in each (Laclau 1988: 254; Philips and Jorgensen 2000; Carpinter and De Cleen 2007). The discourses are repositories of powerful and dynamic discursive levers in a complex hegemonic struggle between legitimization of, and resistance to, economic inequality and racism. Constructed individuals in *Moneyweb* and *Afriforum*’s discourses are solely responsible for the consequences of the choices they freely make in South Africa’s democratic environment, their luck and misfortune. The perspective of the two discourses on moral virtue resonates with desert justice. It foments and validates resistance against dispossessed groups who suffer injustice caused by colonialism, Apartheid and the system of racist liberal capitalism.

*AFASA* and *City Press* on the other hand, in similar and different ways offer bottom-up, community-orientation and organic activism. Their conception of justice is adapted to different situations that affirms the historically dispossessed. They are more focused on promoting participatory parity in relation to social (re)distribution and intersubjective recognition as a deliberate remedy for colonial and Apartheid injustice. In their discourses, human solidarity and empathy override the logic of market-driven greed and individualism that dominate *Moneyweb* and *Afriforum*’s discourses. Despite their oppositional posture, *City Press* and *AFASA*’s discourses are themselves also a peripheral part of a formidable global vulgate where the market is the norm.

*Moneyweb* constructs a conservative account while *City Press* builds a hybrid one incorporating elements of liberalism and progressive transformation. The discourses of the two social movements, *AFASA* and *Afriforum* are the most polarised, with the former developing a radical understanding of LEwC operating uncomfortably alongside the establishment ethos, while ‘accepting’ key aspects of the socio-economic system.
Afriforum’s discourse presents a reactionary and uncompromising account of LEwC that proceeds on an end-justifies-the-means, non-utilitarian ethical approach.

Each discourse is adapted to its ‘circumstances’ in how it identifies, deploys, modifies and transforms the various cultural elements that are articulated to construct the meaning of LEwC for the readers. AFASA’s and Afriforum’s discourses display a no-holds-barred activist orientation aimed at different outcomes. City Press gives us progressive visions within the parameters of the established journalistic deontology. Moneyweb follows similar routines, but its articulation of LEwC differs markedly, reflecting a conservative orientation.

The character and texture of a discourse is an outcome of a dynamic and complex political project at the heart of the purpose of political communication. Undetected, unexposed, and unattended to, the (subliminal) cognitive forces that discourse cultivates work above and below the radar of consciousness, as a discursive bulwark against meaningful transformation, lending a thick patina of legitimacy to oppressive, human-made social and economic arrangements. Clarity, through knowing (De Sousa Santos 2016: 238) can be a powerful weapon against oppression. This chapter offers some clarity in this regard in the following order:

**Meaning of the land question: linking 1652 to 2018**

**Convergences and polarities in ideologies and frames of LEwC**

**Reactionary framing in the constructions of the land question**

**Conservative framing in the constructions of the land question**

**Liberal-transformational framing in the construction of the land question**

**Radical-prefigurative framing in the construction of the land question**

**Meaning of the land question: linking 1652 to 2018**

The liberalism-inspired discoursal construction of colonisation and Apartheid as historical events with a beginning and an end, is ideologically and epistemologically problematic. This red-herring fallacy obscures the solid links that connect colonisation and Apartheid to the dominant coloniality in South Africa today. These links hold in place their seemingly, indelible footprint in the country’s prevailing economic institutions and social arrangements, and their dynamic connections to the global capitalist network.
The deepening effects of the colonial and Apartheid expropriation of Black people’s lands and the rich natural resources beneath it, did not disappear with the transformation of colonialism into national liberation in 1994. Land dispossession set in motion complex, interlinked, dynamic, and ongoing processes of accumulation that today, extend beyond landforms to include a myriad of capitalist processes of production and reproduction of wealth and labour under coloniality of being, power and knowledge (Mignolo 2003; Maldonado-Torres 2007). Many scholars capture the meanings and significances of the land question in comprehensive economic, spiritual, social, political, and environmental terms (Nkosi 1999; Ziervogel 1969; Beinart et al 1986; Kepe and Hall 2016; Bernstein 2007; Ntsebeza and Hall 2007; Akinola 2016; Letsoalo 1987; Moyo 2007; Lahiff 2014).

This study highlights ongoing accumulation and dispossession rooted, in one way or another, in colonisation, understood to be the early form of globalization, and Apartheid. This approach offers meaningful explanatory perspectives on the ongoing human and opportunity costs, psychological and spiritual costs, and damage to lives. The land question, this study maintains, is the basis for continuing capitalistic destruction, extraction, oppression, and distraction viewed from the perspective of Critical theory and the Epistemologies of the South.

The range of understandings of LEwC constructed in the narratives of Moneyweb, City Press, Afriforum and AFASA, assume their explanatory meanings and transformative potential in this context as either ‘historic’ (regressive), current (conservative and transformational), and a new way (futuristic). The findings of this study synthesise these meanings to provide important insights into the workings of discourse in the continuing process of capitalist accumulation underpinning social injustice in South Africa today. It unmasks sophisticated modalities in which the media transform politics into a safeguard for inequality and normalise domination in society. The stubborn influence of land dispossession on the daily circumstances of the poor is understood in the context of an ongoing dialectic between the opposite ends of the country’s current polarised economic inequality barometer. The two ends exist because of each other and sustain each other. This barometer is the prime axis on which the four media discourses operate in their framing and general constructions of LEwC. The patterns of polarisation, consolidation, and coincidences between their frames, especially their perspective on moral virtue, (in)justice and racism, reflect both politically distinct, and
similar logics. Their logics reflect the ways in which the discourses either support and validate, foment and reproduce, or oppose and resist the current economic relations.

**Convergences and polarities in ideologies and frames of LEwC.**

The number of frame elements in the narratives of the four platforms constitute a mixed bag, reflecting an unstable discursive field of complementary and divergent signifiers for LEwC. But, in their complementary and divergent forms, the discourses are locked in a North-centric imagination. For the reactionary *Afriforum* discourse, the difficulty is to imagine humanity as one, without the hierarchies embedded in the colonial and Apartheid racialisation of people. For the hegemonic *Moneyweb* discourse, the difficulty is in imagining the end of capitalism as it is in imagining that capitalism has no end (De Sousa Santos 2014: 24). Its discourse punts liberal capitalist solutions to deepening liberal capitalist problems. For the oppositional discourses in *City Press* and *AFASA*, it is as difficult to imagine the end of colonialism as it is to imagine that colonialism has no end (De Sousa Santos 2014: 26). They are handicapped in their consideration of the socio-economic quagmire in the country by seeing the salvation of the dispossessed Black people as the ANC’s exclusive province, the same party whose liberal policy grail is responsible for their deepening economic oppression. For illustrative purposes, I use the four news platforms as ‘cases’, and using cross tabulation, match the various frame elements to them as cases as Table 1 shows.
Table 6. Cross-tabulation of frame devices of LEwC in *Moneyweb*, *City Press*, *Afriforum* and *AFASA* platforms.

The frame devices are listed alphabetically on the left, followed by the four platforms in the following columns. The values in the cells reflect utilisation (‘1’), or non-utilisation (‘0’), of a corresponding elements by the platform above each of the values.

Importantly, no device is universal across the narratives. No device is shared between more than two discourses. Shared discourses are predictable to a significant extent, split between White media and Black media. The media markets in the country’s political communication system still bear strong traces of the historic race-tinged class dynamic and all that

---

158 The Parliamentary process in rolling out LEwC is proceeding with care and due diligence
159 In a Liberal context ‘radicalism’ refers to take-over and conduct that shows a lack of regard for order and due process.
accompanies it from sociological, epistemological, and cultural perspectives. The polarisation of the Conversation in South Africa still bears the ‘race’ and class ethos that colonialism and Apartheid designed. The rhetoric of privilege in Afriforum and Moneyweb work together in most of their frames to accentuate LEwC as a threat to the prevailing social relations and against which ‘the people’ and/or ‘society’ need to be defended and protected. Their discourses are textured with metonymic and proleptic reason (De Sousa Santos 2014: 165). First, their claims are presented as the only form of rationality and therefore do not exert themselves to discover other kinds of rationality. Where they do bring up the other kind of rationality, they do so to turn them into raw material in the context of proving a favourable point about the prevailing social relations. Secondly, they not exert themselves in thinking about the future because they seem to assume that they know all about the future conceived of as a linear, automatic and infinite overcoming of the present.

Moneyweb and Afriforum discourses deploy strategy or game frames (Brewer and Gross 2010: 160; Cappella and Jamieson 1997) for political maneuvering against economic change. Their frames are conflictual, polarise, and are infused with racist stereotypes. They use emotive language to draw attention to the dramatic (corruption, incompetence, crime etc.), elevate the mundane (trespassing, people relieving themselves in the bush) and formalise conjecture in the news. They rely on flexible schemata (Thompson 2007: 148) to strengthen their articulation of LEwC as well-constructed facts. This political communication strategy works through associations and analogies to transform ‘factual news’ content into camouflaged but potent opinion and value statements in the service of economic power. Analogies and associations are woven into statements of fact to give objective journalism latitude to integrate cutting commentary into hard news without trace, thereby intertextually blurring whatever faint line exists between the two genres.

City Press and AFASA on the other hand, coalesce around several frames. Their constructions of LEwC are progressive in both similar and different ways. They use substance or issue frames (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Fallows 1997) to influence policy development towards equality. The key difference between the constructions of LEwC in the two sets of discourses, Afriforum-Moneyweb and City Press-AFASA, point to a degree of direct expression and transparency of ideology in them.

Table 7 illustrates the unique and shared frame elements in each discourse:
Table 7. Distribution of *Moneyweb*, *City Press*, *AFASA* and *Afriforum* frame elements.
LEwC frames in the discourses of the four narrative vie with each other in a constant discursive conflict for attention and relevance to earn themselves some stability as reflective of the truth about, and as transformative influences on the true meaning of, LEwC. Relative stability happens when frames achieve some fixity and become nodal points (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Carpienter 2005). Socially dominant frames in this endless struggle, fit the Gramscian notion of intellectual and moral leadership to win active and passive consent of society (see also Gramsci 1971: 57). Howarth, Glynos and Grigg (2016) go as far as to link policy change and stability to the outcomes of hegemonic struggles between different discursive formations.

Frames provide an important window to the ideological colouration of the discourses. Viewing discourses from a frame perspective however, provides a static picture that is ‘circumscribed’ by the form and manifestation of the physical aspects (language) of the discourses. In the divided picture of the frames in the four discourses, the market values on the one side are articulated around liberal norms and in support of the economic status quo. This is what *Moneyweb* and *Afriforum* frames show. Market frames adopt a zero-sum perspective in relation to issues of equality with racism as an important lubricant. On the other side, *City Press* and *AFASA’s* frames show glimpses of a differently constructed society to the present one, founded on participatory equality facilitated as a social and political process. Society is characterised in their frames by inclusive dialogue, social and racial harmony, and a diverse society of patriotic, proud and self-respecting people. The specter of class dynamics however, hover ominously around them dropping contaminating liberal capitalist debris on their visions of society. Figure 3 plots the different building blocks for the frames in the discourses on a continuum:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Colonial/Apartheid relations</td>
<td>Current ‘realism’/’pragmatism’</td>
<td>Major transformation of relations</td>
<td>Alternative economic paradigm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>A priori</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commutative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Context-specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social relations</td>
<td>Essentialised</td>
<td>Depoliticised</td>
<td>Rapid evolutionary</td>
<td>Rapid revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Depoliticised</td>
<td>Naturalised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of change</td>
<td>(retro) complete</td>
<td>None to ‘safe’ adjustments</td>
<td>Major (pro) complete</td>
<td>Novel social institutional arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Past institutional arrangements</td>
<td>Past and present to the future</td>
<td>Present to the future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal orientation</td>
<td>Past institutional arrangements</td>
<td>Present to the future</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations between citizens</td>
<td>Ethno-nationalism</td>
<td>Integration and affirmative empowerment</td>
<td>Equality and human capital development</td>
<td>Minimum ‘safe’ integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juridical law-fare undercutting political authority</td>
<td>Black political management and White economic control</td>
<td>Responsible state and supportive capital</td>
<td>Sovereign democratic state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State authority</td>
<td>Formal equality and White economic privilege</td>
<td>Formal equality and grudging co-optation</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral basis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 Criteria-based mapping of the frame devices between the four discourses reflecting dichotomies and overlaps.

---

160 My development of this customised graph was inspired by the creation of Burnett J. and Palmer J. 1967. Radical, Liberal, Conservative, Reactionary: Making them distinctions which distinguish. In *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 5(2) 225-244
Moneyweb, Afriforum, City Press and AFASA LEwC frames can be understood according to four political distinctions: reactionary, conservative, liberal-transformational and radical as the nodal points where the respective discourses are partially fixed. These distinctions help identify the key elements of the different frames while acknowledging their dynamism and overlaps.

The diagrammatic representation in Table 8 maps complex temporal, spatial, material, and cultural axes of coloniality and change. The demarcations between the four logics represent dominant structural and hegemonic influences of the discourses according to this spectrum. The distinct frames are understood as ‘constitutive outsides’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001) to each other in their individual relation to LEwC. The bi-directional arrows in the top row reflect discursive dynamism through the ‘soft boundaries’ and potential commonalities – some form of inflowing and outflowing residual ideology between the constitutive outsides that work to sharpen or blunt the frames – in their respective transformative potency and influence. Because of this inflow/outflow, the ontological and epistemic matter in the logics of different frames could be (is) both shared and different. The solid arrows suggest strong sharpening or blunting ideological residue and the grey arrow in the middle suggests a weak interrelation.

The configuration of mutual influences is an acknowledgment of relational imperatives of the post-structuralist view of how meanings are constituted. Accordingly, the four discourses are not completely ‘fixed’ in their framing of LEwC. The difficulty for discourses to reach a final closure (Howarth 1998: 112) is made explicit in the concept of the floating signifier that is overflowing with meaning (Torfing 1999: 301; Carpenter and De Cleen 2007: 268). Some of the criteria used in the graph show greater inflows and outflows of ideological residue between specific frame elements (social justice, social relations, relations between citizens under reactionary and conservative logics). In some instances, for example transformation, extent of change and temporal orientation under liberal and (prefigurative) radical logics, there is very low inflow/outflow of ideological residue resulting in stronger fixity. Even in their strongest fixity, frames are internally complex and harbour internal contradictions that show that they are impure and remain permeable to the inflows of ‘foreign’ matter. The explanation of these logics in the context of their predominance in the respective discourses recognises that floating signifiers in them have the potential to assume different meanings in different discursive contexts.
Reactionary framing in the construction of the land question

The Afriforum LEwC discourse bears the markings of a neo-conservative, anti-transformation right-wing phoenix on the South African socio-political stage. It integrates colonialism-inspired essentialisms and determinisms about Black people with White economic entitlement, formerly couched in Eurocentric White Apartheid supremacist ideology, reinvented, and renewed in a new vulgate and discursive frameworks under the new capitalism. The literature about right-wing discourses in America and Europe includes explanatory structures on right-wing discursive modalities that are centred around ‘taking advantage of the available opportunities’ (see Diani 1996; Kitschelft 1995; Rydgren 2003). The operationalisation of this opportunism cannot be understood only in generic terms or in terms of objective and universal opportunities with independent external existence. The available opportunities for right-wing populism spawned by liberal capitalism and their activations must be understood and linked to specific purposes in specific contexts. Purpose, geopolitics, and context are important factors in developing an understanding of their application and effectiveness. From the position of this study, reactionary opportunities are strategically brought into being and rendered effective in specific political and social situations and in specific ways with the aid of context-specific historical and contemporary socio-political system.

This study develops a geopolitical level context-specificity as well as the related models used in specific discursive and social contexts to aid a richer understanding how these ‘opportunities’ are developed and applied. This is particularly important for the Global South generally, and South Africa in particular, that we constructed as a “free space” under colonialism available for exclusive economic exploitation by Europeans, because people were deemed to be subhuman and with no rights (Dussel 1993). This attitude has continued in different iterations, into the present, demonstrating the coloniality of power, being and knowledge (Mignolo 2003; Maldonado-Torres 2007). In the discourse, as was the case under colonialism and Apartheid, the rights of Black people are subjected to the processes of modernity that continually disfavour their social and economic interests. The multi-layered ashes upon which the Afriforum phoenix rises in defense of accumulation by dispossession and in opposition to LEwC, are still warm.

The reactionary discourse is constructed with a White supremacist logic and entrepreneurially wrapped in a human rights veil. This creates an important internal contradiction, some form
of cognitive dissonance that the narrative is adapted to rationalise. White supremacist ideology has its roots in colonialism, segregation, and Apartheid when the superordinate (White) groups and subordinate (Black) groups were formed and transformed through the recognition of some people as human and others as ‘non-beings’, followed by a complete effacing of the human rights of Black people. This social structure was cultivated deep in the psyche of Black and White South Africans through comprehensive knowledge management and related social control processes (see Murphy 1973; Christie and Collins 1982; Kallaway 1987) to sustain the racist and oppressive economic system (Murphy 1973; Couzens 1982; Johnson 1991). The Afriforum discourse is a product of this economic structure and related intersubjectivities. It furtively reproduces it in its opposition to LEwC. Human rights in the formulation of Afriforum is an opportunistic and emergent strategy inspired by favourable shifts to the Right in post-war global politics. The Afriforum discourse is designed with optimum moral flexibility, it bears no shame of the historical human rights violations, to rationalise the advantage thus obtained, through coloniality. Its opposition to LEwC is aimed at ensuring that South Africa’s resources and wealth remain in the hands of White people alongside their undisturbed access to Black labour. The current land relations are central to Afriforum’s political project, and their retention are a mission-critical element of its discourse.

The discourse undermines the country’s nationhood, sovereignty, and state authority, substituting them with transnational capitalism and its model of power using a deliberate multi-pronged discursive strategy. The narrative is appeals to transnational audiences in the liberal citadels in the Global North. It is adapted to ride the dominant wave of neoliberal capitalism as a global and interconnected system of accumulation. It exploits the acute vulnerabilities wrought on developing economies such as South Africa’s by globalization. It harnesses the stranglehold of the colonial power matrix (Grosfoguel 2007; Quijano 2000) on such economies to maintain the economic status quo and the social and psychological power that hold it in place. The narrative is constructed around the nostrums of liberal capitalism: the paramountcy of the economy, sacrosanctity of property rights, and individual rights as foremost concerns above social justice, human welfare, and universal rights. The themes in the narrative coincide with both the dominant ideology of the ‘New’ world order and the discourse of globalization. The discourse resonates with what has become the new hegemonic creed in multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, and EU on which political regimes in the developing economies depend for their
functioning. The familiar language of modernity (human rights, private property) is given prominence to build the widest possible visibility and resonance with public opinion and legitimate concerns about LEwC in the eyes of targeted audiences in the liberal world, including South Africa’s propertied classes.

From there, the discursive strategy radiates out, drawing from this thick and normative global framework wired around human and property rights to mobilise a formidable transnational coalition of the like-minded, to dislocate the government’s authority and to push back against a rights-protected dispensation in the country. The narrative’s ‘rights talk’ is a bulwark against universal rights and erodes the state’s obligation to the dispossessed without any concomitant social obligation on its part. This ‘end of politics’ zeitgeist that it displays (Mouffe 2005), draws from the liberalisation of democracy and democratisation of liberalism (MacPherson 1978).

Through the globalization frame built to construct a transnational audience, the rhetoric transposes the ideology of the free market to gridlock the imagination about the South African land question. A national agenda for social redress is transformed into an economic and a criminal emergency to establish a climate of local and global opinion that requires and justifies urgent preventative action by government and international capital. The narrative undermines social and democratic institutions and disarticulates them from any meaningful role in determining the national interest. It circumscribes the role of the government to policing and managing local threats and risks to the workings of the market that are tied to the status quo. LEwC – and the associated reordering of social relations in support of substantive equality – is constructed as a major risk to stability, an ideational shorthand for continued ‘race’-tinged inequality. The shorthand helps make a solid ideological point without the discourse expressly doing so.

Criminal excesses by Black people, generally, against Whites, are ‘found’ and conflated in the LEwC discourse to reduce LEwC to a legal and criminal concern, and to pressure the state to ‘resolve’ it accordingly to ensure ‘stability.’ The use of crime as a bait to goad the state into policing action under the terms spelled out in the discourse has a strategic dual purpose. On the one hand, crime is a pressing social issue that the government cannot ignore. It is therefore an effective, albeit disingenuous discursive strategy. On the other hand, the inevitable government action is prefabricated as reactive, and therefore an affirmation of Afriforum’s reconstructive messaging that frames LEwC as the cause of the selectively
reported criminality. This strategy demonstrates that context and the related interaction frameworks are important variables in understanding the ways in which the power of the media is exercised. Socially, historically, and culturally embedded dynamics are an important means of linking political communication to its purposes and in assessing its effectiveness for political meaning-making.

In contemporary reactionary discourse, the sovereignty of the state is problematised as a legitimate means of making important decisions regarding social and economic relations within the nation state. Such attempts by government, as with the LEwC process, are projected as an impediment to the attainment ‘freedom’, and ‘unjust’ in their violations of ‘human rights.’ The onslaught on the democratic process is strengthened through opportunities constructed from state corruption and ineffectiveness to delegitimise a political and social solution to the land question driven by the state. The resultant democratic deficit and oversimplification of complex social and political situations that LEwC seeks to address plays into the hands of a racist liberal mind-set of a ‘lean’ government, or an absent government, reduced to playing a ceremonial role in economic affairs.\(^{161}\)

LEwC in Afriforum’s discourse is constructed as a battle of wits, ripped from its historical and social contexts, and emptied of its substance and legitimacy. In this context, judicial solutions and significant forms of pressure, instead of political and social solutions involving popular participation, are legitimated. Human welfare and the suffering bequeathed to the Black people of South Africa by colonialism and Apartheid are excluded from its discursive ontology. This is in part a consequence of deeply inculcated capitalistic greed and racist intersubjectivity naturalised in the White psyche through hate-talk carried out on platforms of out-group hate throughout Apartheid.

Racism on the Afriforum platform is an important means for the renewal, deepening and renegotiation of inter-‘race’ hatred to justify economic injustice. It is central to the rationalisation of exclusive access to land and wealth. Because racism is such bad faith, no one is ever convinced – neither the victim nor the victimised, nor those who think in racist terms – its ‘fixity’ depends on constant recreation and reproduction through discourse (Carpienter and De Cleen 2007; Memmi 2000: 58). The constant erosion of the personhood of Black people and the valorisation of White selves in the discourse is the foundation of the ongoing racist socialisation and its cognitive effects.

The discourse is framed in the context of “perceptual deprivation” (Collin and Preciphs 1991: 67): an inability to observe experiences, actions, and behaviours without biased interpretation. White identity is constructed through a laagering rhetoric. Afriforum’s discourse on proposed economic reorganisation in South Africa mimics a crime documentary, with its framing of Black-on-White brutality, Black lawlessness, and disorder. The interpellation of ‘the people’ as the prime targets of the ominous (LEwC) threat is conducted through an enactment of the politics of fear and insecurity by the management of Afriforum. They rely on constructed and tenuous associations between LEwC and crime to reproduce racial anxieties and antagonisms to create a climate of intense fear and ‘moral panic’ (Entman 1991). Crime, corruption, incompetence, and various other pathologies are opportunistically drawn on to ‘prove the point’ and fuel a sense of disgust and threat posed by Black people to ‘the people’, their culture, and way of life. The narrative seeks to animate White groups at a gut level (De Noronha 2018) and to reproduce the historic racist stance against economic equality between Black and White. The preservation and even deepening of enmity between racial groups is a critical ingredient in Afriforum’s discursive strategy, encouraging the suspension of ethical behaviour towards Black people and sustaining the state of war instantiated in colonialism.

The human rights movement title ballasts the opportunistic positioning of the group as a well-meaning ally and the protective shield for ‘the people’ against the menacing Black threat or swart gevaar, that LEwC is framed to be. Social contractualism is replaced by individual
contractualism among increasingly unequal people, while ‘rights’ are legally violated in the name of national security, and a global attack against social and economic rights is orchestrated (see De Sousa Santos 2014: 44). Individual rights of White people and their cultural identities are constructed as the ultimate and compelling social concerns in support of the narrative’s promulgation and legitimation of discriminatory capitalistic and racist practices.

In the narrative’s construction of ‘the land’, Eurocentrism also finds expression in the framing of South Africa as an outpost for capital exploitation and profiteering, rather than a proud homeland. This appears in the sustained activation in the narrative of internal and external allies to sustain the historic triadic dialectic between labour, capital, and land in the country. It rationalises control by global capitalist forces of the local economy, and land primarily. The narrative provides moral legitimation for the continuation of colonial and Apartheid exploitative ways concerning the access and use of land, the reproduction of labour, and the accumulation of capital. The discourse advocates the use of the law and an array of punitive capitalistic measures that have come to replace the violence of the colonial era, to remove obstacles such the LEwC, to civilised living and modernity.

The instrumental application of an \textit{a priori} concept of justice and a complete disregard for the ways in which injustice occurred in South Africa creates an important lacuna in AfriForum’s discourse. It leads, for example, to problematic silences about historical wrongs, unequal economic rights, and substantive inequality. The discourse constructs a weird imaginary where human rights can be violated in the name of human rights, and where civilian lives can be destroyed under the pretense of defending civilian lives. The discourse compensates for this in at least five interrelated ways: first, economism, – through the substitution of what Maldonado-Torres (2008: 96) calls ethical politics; second, market logic and realpolitik, – through a race-based utilitarian approach to social relations; third, hyperbole which is manifested in a narrow racist definition of crime and its association with LEwC; fourth, identity performance, – involving constructions of Whites as exclusive victims of Black crime and government incompetence; and finally, moral entrepreneurship – masquerading as human rights champions.

Typical right-wing conspiracy theories and racist stereotyping of Black people decorate the discourse echoing the norms developed in colonialism and Apartheid. The discourse
constructs justice around equal political rights and the pursuit of these rights through judicial means. This is a misapplication of justice driven through agitating for equal treatment of people before the law, instead of a corrective morality and context-specific justice given the country’s historical and present circumstances. These glaring omissions for restoration alongside an over-emphasis on formal equality expose as fallacious, the egalitarian commitment of the human rights movement. They render Afriforum’s commitment to justice and human rights irredeemably flawed, revealing its racist underbelly where ‘human rights’ equate to ‘White privilege.’

The Afriforum platform deceptively fashions itself as an ‘alternative’ to mainstream media under the ‘catchall’ nature of the alternative media category (Kidd 2007: 114). But this study uncovers an interesting class association in the ways that Afriforum’s reactionary discourse and Moneyweb’s conservative mainstream discourse complement each other. This relationship between right-wing and liberal mainstream media discourses is significant, if somewhat disconcerting. It warrants more research about the continuing mutations and transformations in political communication in post-liberation South Africa, and their connections to the socio-political system. It gives rise to several interrelated problematics for nation-building and human advancement: i) the state/media relations in the context of institutional transformation and the present regulatory framework and norms, ii) lingering claims of racism in the media and the less-than-successful substantive transformation of the country’s economy, and iii) the associated growing frustration among the increasingly marginalised Black groups.

The narrative contradicts the characterisation, including the roles, ascribed to alternative media by authors such as Fuchs (2010), Downing et al. (2001), Rauch (2016), Vatikiotis (2008), Christians et al. (2009) and Bailey et al, (2007). The Afriforum site is a reactionary sphericule. It is an offshoot of hegemonic globalised liberal capitalism that thrives on subversion and generation of confusion to mask its capitalistic orientation, racism, and opportunism. Its organisational structure and practices suggest that it is more like a multinational firm with veiled links to institutionalised power whose business interests suggest interconnection between right-wing groupings, the latter-day civil rights champions, and global and interconnected system of accumulation. The emphatic reliance in the discourse on international capital suggests hidden linkages between this reactionary sphericule, the
exclusive racist community it serves, and the global economic system of accumulation and international racist movements.

The pronounced ethno-nationalistic, racist activism and the narrow capitalistic agenda and purposes in *Afriforum*’s discourse differ mostly in degree from those of the mainstream *Moneyweb*. They both evidence White ethnocentrism and attitudes associated with coloniality. Their presentation in distinct categories here should be understood in this context rather than as a suggestion of a fundamental difference between them. For both, LEwC is constructed as lunacy or a ‘Loony’ Left project. Their invocation of economic pragmatism, modernity, and racism is evident in their postulates about the nature of society. This shared discursive culture is hard-wired in the ‘hardware’ (the sources and participants) and ‘software’ (frames and framing) of their respective discourses.

*Conservative framing in the construction of the land question*

The conservative creed in the *Moneyweb* discourse consists of the following components summarised from Huntington (1957: 456): (i) a divine sanction that infuses the legitimate, existing, social order; (ii) existing institutions embody the wisdom of previous generations and right is a function of time; (iii) prudence, prejudice, experience, and habit are better guides than reason, logic, and metaphysics; (iv) except in an ultimate moral sense, men are unequal. The discourse espouses this strong conservative framing in its opposition to LEwC. The conservative framing imbues it with the status of being a social imaginary and, to borrow from Laclau (1990: 64), a condition of possibility of the emergence of any object. The discourse constructs the country’s colonial history as a product of nature, a natural sequence of events. Conservative discourse presupposes the long-road in its analysis. In other words, it requires analytic probing below the layered veil of naturalness and commonsense with which it cloaks itself. I had to ask ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ questions of the data repeatedly, to breach the discursive ingenuity with which its conservative framing embalms the potent ideological constructs that constitute it.

Ideology in the *Moneyweb* discourse is hidden in well-constructed, solid, and robust facts and couched generally, in professionally packaged news articles that reflect the ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’. The narrative constructs LEwC as news in a “quasi-natural” manner (Cook 1998: 70-1), strengthening the assumption about capital being ‘the only way’ to run an economy. The conservative framing carries out much of its ideological work from this
supposedly non-ideological position as simple truth, and ‘outside’ of all political contestation, and as oppositional to ideology itself and utopian politics. The smooth integration of the conservative ideology in professionally constructed news articles enables it to present ordinary day-to-day language as non-political. Conservativism in the discourse constitutes itself as the centre of sanity and logic around which the oppositional ideologies for change orbit futilely.

The Moneyweb discourse transforms a unifying, people-based idea in the Parliament-led democratic process and reconstructs it according to media logic and a market pragmatism that threads together ‘what’ and ‘who’ matters, is politically relevant, and important. Universal rights fall foul of its naturalised market considerations. Social actors’ entry into its discourse is adjusted to the discursive architecture of this epistemology and practice. The more aligned the ideological contributions that social actors bring with the postulates of conservatism, the better the treatment they get in the discourse. Journalists, operating under the cover of the naturalness of the conservative ideology adopt and/or amplify these views to offer ‘authoritative, fair and disinterested’ commentary on LEwC on their basis. Tuchman (1972) calls it a strategic ritual. Journalists in the Moneyweb discourse seamlessly “code-switch” (Schudson 2002: 263) back and forth from being purveyors of ‘objective’ input from ‘unattached experts’ and global political institutions, to taking up the cudgels in defense of the ‘social consensus’ and ‘common sense’ in current social relations. Moneyweb journalists ‘factualise’ the sedimented views of capitalism at regular intervals, writing them up as virtuous and widely shared, without the ‘usual journalistic skepticism’ or attribution. This is how the media builds social standards by underwriting cultural practices as natural, unproblematic, and universal (Thompson 2007).

The discourse frames LEwC as a threat to the assumed natural order of things. It is constructed as an attempt to dislocate the ‘realism’ of a ‘depoliticised economic order’ and the social relations that are legitimised (Thompson 2007) as a natural consequence of that order. Presenting the conservative framing as the “common good”, the narrative universalizes its ideological position (Thompson 2007) in support of inequality and speaks for the ‘whole
society’ (capital lords, workers, job-seekers, and the ‘unemployable’) as members of this uniformly threatened social order (by LEwC).

The narrative’s construction of LEwC over-emphasises ‘race’ in its references to society. This emphasis is not simply about slotting groups into relevant ethnic or social compartments and depicting their roles for clarity’s sake. It is a means of segregation by ‘Othering’ Black people through identity constructions drawn from a negative social schema developed over centuries of colonial and Apartheid pathologisation. Black people are constructed as the natural source of labour in this context. Where they develop alternative social designs contrary to their ‘natural’ station in life, they are constructed as a threat to civilization, modernity, and progress.

The *Moneyweb* LEwC discourse is the voice of privilege and the capitalist establishment. While social actors from the out-groups are featured among the main participants in the discourse, their inclusion only serves to give an ‘illusion of participation’ (Lunt and Livingstone’s 1996: 175). They are added to the stories to satisfy the ‘balance’ requirement of the Press Code or to give the stories legs to run and wings to fly across the globe. Their ‘non-contributions’ (or absence) in the narrative reflect their cluelessness and help fit them into the stereotype as Loony and comical, legitimising the marginalisation of their ideas. The treatment of the out-groups orients itself to related notions of socioeconomic rectitude that the out-groups’ social justice agenda opposes: “economic risk”, “sacrosanctity of private property”, “personal wealth”, “market economy” and “damaging recklessness” of radical economic change. Conspicuous inputs and framing coincide with the core values and norms of liberal capitalism that are systematically promoted with or without the ‘participation’ of the in-groups. The conservative discourse of *Moneyweb* is a thinly veiled racist and self-justifying stance against attempts at reorganising the South African economy. It constructs strong affirmation and unmistakable political, moral, and social permission for capitalist exploitation.

These observations problematise the generic classifications and attributes that are credited to what has been called the ‘quality’ press, a nebulous term that characterises news content and publications. Available definitions suggests that the quality press is the mainstay of the Fourth Estate (Carpinter 2005), something a democracy cannot do without, some kind of ‘brained up’ journalism that deals with weighty and socially relevant subjects offering
objective information that enables citizens to make informed choices and hold those in authority to account (RSA Press Code, McNair 2003; Vekhoo 2009; Eiders 2007, Gittins 1995; Beckett 2018). This study however suggests that this category is part of journalism’s myth about itself, rather than a clearly demarcated empirical category of news, platforms, or newspapers. Media under capitalism are, instead, in form and substance, purpose-driven carriers of political communication, structured in its constitution and operation, by economic imperatives of privileged identities and conditions. They are capitalist establishments that primarily exist to underwrite capitalism and its ways (Switzer 1997; Rotberg 1981).

*Moneyweb* would possibly disagree with the foregoing observation. The platform would point to their express commitment to “independence,” the egalitarian commitment that it signed up to in the Press Code, and observance of professional standards and established journalistic practices, norms, and traditions. To complicate matters, the Press Ombudsman (SAHRC Report 2000: 90), in a submission to the study on the role of the media in transformation, states that he does not ‘think’ that racism in the mainstream media is a concern in South Africa. A subsequent Media Monitoring Project (Mntwana and Bird 2006) agrees with this position and blames ‘juniorisation’ and ‘lack of resources’ for stereotyping, discrimination, and lack of context in reporting. In a different study of media discourses (De Wet 2001), racism was found to be enacted as a justifiable ‘force of fact’, in other words, in retaliation for unacceptable conduct of the Other. Racism, in other words, manifests as a response to some stimuli rather than as an embedded political practice, a recurring phenomenon in discourse, and a key element of the social structure, what Williams (1985) calls institutional racism. Van Dijk (1993: 114) also suggests that racism in the news is identifiable – “journalists use quotations when the topic is delicate, such as discrimination.” This study adopts Hall’s view on inferential racism, “the naturalised representations of events and situations relating to ‘race’, whether ‘factual’ or fictional’ which have racist premises and propositions inscribed in them as a set of unquestioned assumptions” (2011: 82-83). This ‘new terrain of racism’ (Durrheim et al. 2005: 19) is also normalised in institutional journalistic practices and constitutes them as the bases on which it is legitimised in ‘professional’ conduct and tradition, and defended as unavoidable conduct.
A closer look at the intersection between ‘race’ and class in the *Moneyweb*’s discourse reveals intricate layers of complexity in how dispossession and the guarding of White privilege continue to be maintained. National liberation dislodged the moorings of racism and economic inequality from coercion to hegemony. Racism in discourse is not simply and only a matter of fact to be ‘identified’ or ‘heard,’ nor is it always intentionally inserted. Racism can be present and effective in instances where ‘race’ is not specified and ‘visible’, and where it doesn’t stand-out and hit you in the face. Even in its subtler form (Johnson, Dolan and Sonnett 2011), racial neoliberalism (Melamed 2006: 7) is interwoven and symbiotically linked, economically and culturally, with colonial and Apartheid structural inequalities and interactional patterns.

Some scholars are of the view that race and racism exist independently of class relations (Omi and Winant 1994; Pulido 1996) but interact with capitalism in significant and variable ways (Robinson 2000). But this is not how racism was imposed on the people of the South. The racism in *Moneyweb*’s narrative is underwritten by the country’s historical capitalist and Apartheid social structure and simultaneously serves as its legitimating instrument. It contributes to the ubiquity of racial designations thereby ensuring that colonial and Apartheid’s racial grid is strongly imprinted in the subjective experience of ‘race’ (see also Posel 2001: 87).

My approach interrogates the protean nature of racism. It recognises it as versatile, flexible, and adaptable. Hall describes it as a ‘floating signifier’ (Hall 1997). This approach, as opposed to looking for manifest racist words, is an important way to track the complexity of the relations that racism has accreted to society and how these operate. Racism can be inserted seamlessly and without detection into professional routines and daily parlance. Racism, beyond its overt manifestations in explicit racial stereotypes, racist hate speech or the linking of race with crime, has the same oppressive consequences as the old-school colonial and Apartheid racism. It still develops an equally effective framework for economic exploitation and domination (Harris 1993: 1714). In this adapted state, racism stays out of the reach of regulation, or does it?

Commercialism and *Moneyweb*’s frames almost completely efface the interests of Black people. Economic terms are used to define the White propertied minority in a manner that distances and differentiates this group from the Black dispossessed majority. Capitalist
notions are foregrounded and reified (Thompson 1995), while contesting radical views are either made absent or reduced to the level of an ill-conceived, irresponsible experiment and an economic miscalculation by ideologues, contemplated in violation of reason and the natural logic that underpins the current social relations. Crime, poverty, and social decay are ‘found’ and constructed as irrefutable evidence of individual negligence and pathology linked to Black people and their social circumstances. Human aspirations, conduct, and social entitlements are adjusted to the prevailing system and not the other way round. Lebaron calls this “symbolic violence” (2001: 146). This violence unmasks *Moneyweb* and its discourse as nothing more than an exclusive conversation of the wealthy justifying their privilege, and far from quality journalism at the service of citizens.

**Liberal-transformational framing in the construction of LEwC**

The *City Press* discourse reflects a complex liberal-transformational frame that both supports and advocates LEwC as a tool for the transformation of the economy and society. The transformative impulses simultaneously point to urgency and caution. This points to the difficulty in the discourse to imagine the end of colonialism alongside a similar difficulty in imagining that colonialism has no end (see De Sousa Santos 2014: 24). There is strong discursive endorsement of the government’s position on social change that echoes Ramaphosa’s ‘land reform without damaging the economy’ rhetoric. Key pressure points for change, equality, and racial harmony in the government-centric discourse coincide with the position and the general objectives of the government’s nation-building discourse contained in its strategic documents and/or articulated by the ANC on public platforms. The central ideational thrust of the narrative conjures up and resonates with terms such as reconciliation and nation-building that marked Nelson Mandela’s presidency. This philosophy inspired liberal economic policies that supported a conciliatory approach to business as the means of redressing social and economic inequalities (Fine and Van Wyk 1996; Adelzaheh 1996).

---

City Press discourse weaves LEwC into the struggle for liberation as an inevitable and unstoppable march of history and the nucleus of the liberation mandate. A history shaped by colonial and Apartheid atrocities and the pain and suffering they wrought on the Black community is the recurrent theme in the discourse. LEwC is presented as an emancipatory and a socially corrective economic, social, and political intervention. It is framed as a solution for social inequality and related racial discrimination. It is located optimistically in a transforming economic and social order characterised by inclusivity and reconciliation. LEwC is also constructed as a major corrective step for failed transformation, and a hollow freedom based solely on political rights.

City Press discourse incorporates a distinct cautionary liberal transformational approach to economic change. It cultivates social alliances between aspiring Black people with progressive White people with racial harmony and dialogue as a conspicuous backdrop to social relations. While the prevailing economic establishment is frame as problematic, the discourse advances an incremental approach to changing it reflected in a gradual and orderly transformation rather than the radical dismantling of the status quo. The discourse’s language of renewal, conciliation, inclusivity, and optimism in its framing of LEwC as a catalyst for social transformation, gives a powerful and ubiquitous presence to the voice of the ANC and government’s messaging.

This study applies the term ‘discoursal habitus’ to identify subversion in City Press’ discourse against racist and stereotypical representations of Black people. The discourse improvises alternative affirming framing linked to positive democratic possibilities and accomplishments. Discoursal habitus is about empowerment through consciousness transmitted to the readers in ideological construction. Knight’s (2000: 878) definition of communication as resistance echoes this study’s construction of discoursal habitus as a space for ideological opposition with a social and political purpose. The discourse constructs positive self-valuations shaped as pedagogical resources (Stark and Kelly 2006) to weaken the colonial and Apartheid cultural systems and modalities of domination and damnation. Discoursal habitus provides a space for psychological engagement and symbolic push-back against the damaging assault on Black people’s psyche by tropes (Thompson 2007) and racist characterisations. It provides space for organic intellectualism to build cognitive resources for emancipatory resistance and redefinitions, and for the cultivation of an alternative
transformational ideology. Were it not that discoursal habitus leads to an overcoming of the colonial condition, the struggle to be recognised as human embedded in it would equate to a logic of delusion (Maldonado Torres 2008: 130) and a desire to look and live like the Master. Is this what Black people want (Fanon 1968: 10)? An implied question in this study is about the media’s role in putting an end to colonialism’s power frames and logics which inaugurated the relation between master and slave. A world structured according to the relation between master and slave creates a field that makes aspirations for humanity collapse into aims for inclusion and projects of assimilation based on the ultimate value of “the master’s kind of life” (Maldonado-Torres 2008:131). This is the way in which oppression reinvents and sustains itself when it entails the superficiality of putting “white masks on Black faces” (Fanon 1968).

Observations in this study regarding the synergies between City Press and the ANC/Government’s ideological orientations about change are generally consistent with those of scholars such as Sesanti (2011), Jacobs (1999), Hadland (2012) and Wasserman and De Beer (2005). They attribute the supportive attitude of Black media towards government to Black nationalist thought, an inclination to defend the gains of democracy, patriotism, and striving towards a human rights culture, equality, and redress of previous imbalances. The interconnection between the government and the media’s reality-making agendas in South Africa is also equally strong from an “ecological exchange” framework (Molototch et al. 1987: 28): the quid pro quo arrangements between them as self-interested meaning makers. Black leadership success stories provide content for a transformative ideology in the news that is a hallmark of City Press’ framing of LEwC. It is a winning card to deliver a market and engenders continued market relevance. The ruling ANC is a numerically dominant political actor in the country’s politics. Its following is strengthened by its credentials as the symbolic leader of the liberation struggle and the profiles of its individual leaders, from Mandela who brought with him the Madiba Magic, to Ramaphosa who came to power amidst wild Ramaphoria.

The ANC has mastered government by publicity and performance politics and is deliberate in its transactional media policy approach, a trait that has inspired its government/media
relations and communication policy framework (GCIS 2014). The framework sets up a formidable national communication infrastructure tasked with the responsibility of transforming government/media relations. Government programmes are developed and communicated with image and political optics in mind. Precast messaging comes custom-made and in easy-to-use formats produced by a media-conscious corps of communicators or their media-trained principals. The Black press is also not immune to, and at best is invested in, the government’s transformation agenda, whatever its provenance, as it directly relates to the social circumstances of its journalists, editors, and BEE owners.

The coincidence between the adoption of the motion on LEwC, the election of a new popular ANC leader in Ramaphosa, and the election fever in 2018, exposes a deep structural and epistemological connection between City Press’ discourse and the government’s transformation agenda and political ideology. The ANC’s ideological positions in City Press are co-owned by party officialdom and journalists, sans professional skepticism in revealing instances.

**Radical-prefigurative framing in the construction of LEwC**

The AFASA discourse constructs LEwC in prefigurative terms (Epstein 1991) as a paradigmatic shift and a new economic system for South Africa. Its radical framing produces a fundamentally alternative way of life that revolutionises social relations. It opens unchartered social and economic options predicated on substantive equality. There are strong currents of revolutionary thinking in the Epistemologies of the South and Marxism mixed with other creative, but less socialist and decolonial ideals. Decoloniality in its discourse is like journeying with crude maps (see De Sousa Santos 2014: 2) without a complete plan of action or a complete design of the new decolonised reality (Maldonado-Torres 2016: 30). The narrative builds a symbolic arena (Ryan, Carragee and Schwerner. 1998) for social justice and human progress, substantive equality, and spiritual fulfilment. It constructs a newly envisioned utopian ideal that foregrounds a social alternative culture (Mbiti 1971; Mokgoro 1998).

---

163 See also Annexure 2. Correspondence from Acting Secretary to Parliament, B. Tyawa. Information in Relation to Media within Parliamentary Precinct. Dated 10 December 2019.
The counter-hegemonic discourse disarticulates and remodels the hegemonic articulations in the reactionary, conservative and transformational-liberal discourses and forms radical, emancipatory articulations infused with ethical politics. The rhetoric provides constant reminders to the reader that there is a different way of living and being to the way that things are, with different values and norms and a different social reality. It offers a discursive attack on the forms of social organisation that keep the country’s social system in place. The social classifications and sources of mental construction that underpin economic domination are problematised without much qualification.

The *AFASA* discourse escalates change to the ‘next’ level of transformation: collaboration becomes co-creation, Black affirmation advances into Black independence, tolerance becomes mutual respect, and social cohesion is ‘demonstrated’ and defined in active terms as a way of life. This is the hint of a decolonial turn in the narrative highlighting the epistemic relevance of the enslaved and colonised in their search for humanity. The epistemic realities it incorporates involve a shift away from pathological stereotypes about Black people. Black people inhabit the aspired-for world, they are visionaries, agents for change, successful, they question and offer solutions. Change is multi-directional with all the people both contributing and benefitting.

The narrative is a radical intertextual rejection of the dominant economic, social, and cultural structures in a society that reflect liberal morality. Individualism and property rights are rejected in favour of pluriversal rights and equity. The alternative vision that it champions addresses itself critically to the sociological, political, and cultural currents that shaped South Africa’s racist development. Moral concerns and social motivations that respond to societal inequalities caused by Black land dispossession and the resultant relations to land are at its core. Land is celebrated in a special way as a treasure for its own sake, and as the foundation of all that is good in the life of a people.

The narrative is antagonistic to coloniality, and subversive of domineering corporate power, offering instead moral and humanistic alternatives that are accessible to the poor. It exposes capitalistic concentration of power in the present system that locks Black people out of meaningful economic participation. Democratic public opinion towards a fairer redistribution
is mobilised through direct and partisan messaging unrestrained by professional routines. It advocates statist solutions to offset exclusivist corporate power and to enable equitable social redistribution.

Prefiguration in the narrative assumes four important, interrelated practices: political education, channeling of social energy though modelling, temporal adjustment, and advocacy for morality in social relations.

At a pedagogic level, the narrative resembles umrhabulo\textsuperscript{164}, a form of organic ethnography-oriented ideological consciousness development. Others call it consciousness raising (Mangcu 2009: 50), or ideological training (sic) (Nehawu 2016: 11). It is an anti-hegemonic political act of talking with (not “talking about”) the people and collaborating with them in the process of becoming human. It seeks to cultivate new ways for people to develop an alternative vision. It empowers people to think differently, to ‘see’ what is wrong in society and to inspire them to seek and work for change. Intertextual cultural expressions are employed to engage problematic social and political issues such as structural exclusion and corporate domination. These are contextualised historically, politically, socially, and culturally, and are canvassed ethnographically and in a story-telling approach in the discourse. The discourse reads more like peoples’ conversations, some form of grassroots exchanges of upliftment and mutual inspiration.

In its active mobilisation of counter-hegemonic, emancipatory discourses, the narrative is forthright in its construction of a progressive ideology that broadens its understanding by applying it to real life situations. Ideology is deployed in the discourse to marshal activity towards an unambiguously defined political goal. ‘Back-to-the-land’ mobilisation in the discourse is a bold social programme inspired by its rebellious ideas. It goes directly against capitalist structurizations of commodified Black life in the labour reserves (locations) and offers the freedom of the land and economic opportunity associated with land ownership to Black people. It espouses the African philosophy of land seen in non-commutative terms,

\textsuperscript{164} Umrabulo is a term that has been in use in South Africa at least since the 1980s to denote political discussion or debate, and thus political education (see https://gqom.wordpress.com/2017/01/26/south-africas-culture-of-umrabulo/)
as a means of protecting the poor against abuse and exploitation by the rich. A deliberate interplay of the economic, social, and political value of the land is constructed using empowering language to reflect shared success, dignity, self-worth, self-sufficiency, autonomy, and power. The discourse does this through modelling to produce ‘evidence’ of the workability of the radical alternative it promulgates. Living examples of Black excellence in the form of experiences, achievements, priorities, values for success are constructed to ground the reader morally and culturally, and to promote its Black consciousness ideas. The utility of the land is linked to a cross section of prestigious professions. Young people are located at the centre of this theme in a way that constructs land as a desirable option for them. The narrative carries a broad meaning of land: economic, social capital, spiritual, cultural, and even as part of a wholesome healthy, family, lifestyle.

By modelling the future in the present, the discourse removes the temporal distinctions between the struggle for change in the present and the futuristic social paradigm to make “faith in the future” (De Sousa Santos 2014: 88) tangible, accessible, and visual. This future buoys organic social change agents by placing the alternative economic order within reach and in sight, serving an important recruitment function for more converts. Strategic social battle-sites are reinvented in favour of change. For example, neoliberal globalization is ‘replaced’ with alter-globalization where counter-hegemony and pluriversalism are highlighted as the new normative. These sites are carefully chosen and linked to the structural impediments to successful Black land ownership and use. Prefiguration is constructed to undercut reactionary and conservative characterisations of utopia and their pie-in-the-sky notions of social change.

Centrering morality in social relations in the discourse is achieved through strong denunciation of malfeasance and corruption in the ranks of government, ‘race’-profiling by banks, the subversion of Black initiatives through discriminatory practices, and animosity between different race groups. Values such as transparency and consultation, family values, self-sacrifice, competence and fitness-for-purpose, women’s empowerment, collaboration, co-creation, and alleviation of human suffering are extolled and affirmed.

The frames in the AFASA discourse capture the essence of the traditional characterisation of alternative media. The motives are beyond profit and point to a profound socioeconomic reconstruction. The frames espoused in its discourse set counter-zones for radical debate
and democratic mobilization, seeking to expose the concentration of social power and agitate for its redistribution.

Conclusion

The framing of LEwC in the four discourses, radically diverse as they are, reflects to varying degrees a disturbing sedimentation of colonial complexes. They generally fall short of the threshold of the ideal “preferential option for the oppressed” (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 96). They engage the land question exclusively in accordance with landforms and agricultural practices rather than universal equality. Their criticism leaves intact and sometimes even becomes complicit with configurations of power that extend the reign of what Maldonado-Torres (2008: 99) refers to as the pathological and inhuman. The progressive frames look to capitalistic solutions to problems caused by capitalism. Questions of dehumanisation cannot be addressed by liberal humanism such as broad and inclusive (Black Economic Empowerment) schemes without adequate consideration of the history of the cruel dispossession under its watch. Capitalism and capitalistic solutions to its own problems are the cornerstone of corruption, morally, spiritually and in every other conceivable respect.
CONCLUSION

Enjoy the journey because the destination is a mirage.

(Steven Furtick\textsuperscript{165})

The belated arrival of freedom and democratisation in South Africa brought with it major optimism and hope for the long suffering Black citizens. For over three centuries they had been forced to lead dystopian lives in the country of their birth constructed in discourse as non-entities with no rights and stripped of all human dignity. Economic, physical, emotional violence, and trauma had become routinised in their daily lives under colonialism and rationalised in political communication. Scores were killed in battle against a well-armed colonial invader characterised in the dominant discourse of the day as “savages”. Many lost their lives on the streets, in prison and in foreign lands fighting the racist and oppressive Apartheid state characterised as “terrorists\textsuperscript{166}” (see Dewey 2013). Multitudes today suffer from hunger, homelessness, substance abuse and the violence of economic oppression characterised as inchoate criminals, “farm murderers”, “land-grabbers” and “trespassers.” At stake is their land and its array of natural resources and riches.

Powerful international media such as New York Times and Washington Post framed the 1994 transition to encourage reconciliation and the formation of the government of national unity (see Reta 2000). Reconciliation became Mandela’s legacy as he presided over the GNU in the first three years of democracy. Despite the high expectations and the undeniable afterglow of the ‘peaceful’ political transition, the neo-liberal capitalist system that the ANC elected to follow since 1994 has produced dismal social outcomes for the majority. It ensured that the agony and the stresses visited upon them over centuries continued under the “lesser” evil of the democratic dispensation. Even the party’s political authority following a successful inaugural democratic election, is being hollowed out daily, by the force of globalisation, intellectual drain, corruption and dwindling moral authority.

\textsuperscript{165} https://quotefancy.com/steven-furtick-quotes

\textsuperscript{166} The US and Britain followed South Africa’s lead on characterizing the ANC, naming it a terrorist group in the 1970s. Mandela had to get special State Department clearance to enter the U.S. in 2008.
South Africa today, is a society in which conditions for politics (Amadae 2003: 16) have been severely curtailed by neoliberal domination. The system keeps Black people on the violent underside of modernity (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 2) that enabled the relatively high economic returns for the colonisers and their offspring, resulting in their contemporary privilege at the expense of Black people. Political communication in dominant discourse shows ‘tolerance’ for inequality, class divisions, social segregation, and poverty, as the inexorable outcomes of South Africa’s vacuous change, notwithstanding the extension of legal, civil, and political rights to Black citizens.

It came as no surprise that the adoption by Parliament of the motion to expropriate land without compensation (LEwC) for equal redistribution was greeted simultaneously with intense excitement and a matching disbelief in media discourses. The complexity of what were simultaneously complementary and contradictory discourses reflected the prevailing social fault lines between colonial and Apartheid privilege and deprivation on the one hand, on the other, ideological bankruptcy, a sorry absence of alternative ideas, and a lack of will to generate and sustain actions for the common good of South Africa’s broken society.

For City Press, LEwC promised the potential of true liberation, a moment of “unconquering the nation” that presupposed extreme care and caution in relation to the implementation of the social intervention that the policy signaled. A moment of national rebirth according to AFASA’s framing of LEwC, had arrived. New values and new norms in the context of different social relations became the theme in their discourse. Residual influences of liberalist ideas however make strange cameos in the discourse alongside a strong yearning for change. Both discourses, with different emphases, invoke the history of colonisation as the basis of the deepening economic oppression in the country.

For the mainstream Moneyweb, and right-wing Afriforum, shock and disbelief were their reaction to what they saw as a catastrophic and reckless development. In their respective asocial and ahistorical conservative and reactionary constructions, the LEwC policy was a serious threat to economic stability and progress that the White groups in the country have enjoyed since colonialism. Strong institutional voices of concern occupied conspicuous and influential roles in their discourses. These voices are linked to different institutional economic objectives and causes nationally and internationally. Their propositions in turn link the discourses that they dominate to those objectives and causes. Their liberal and racist
framing of South Africa’s colonial and Apartheid land expropriation are typified by the public views of the former leader of the Democratic Alliance, Hellen Zille\textsuperscript{167}, who contended that colonialism wasn’t “all negative.” Zille extolled its “benefits”, highlighting the judiciary, transport infrastructure, and piped water among its accomplishments.

Zille’s view echoes the colonial and Apartheid rationalisations of modernity and the sociocultural norms that accompanied it. Under colonisation and Apartheid, social improvements and development justified different forms of inhumane and cruel expropriation of property from the “immature” Black people. Their economic suffering was deemed a necessary ‘sacrifice’ (Dussel 1993: 75) to advance ‘civilization’ or more correctly Westernization (Mignolo 2002). The history of violent expropriation is renewed and reincarnated in discourse in the present almost without trace. It is intertextually woven in political communication as the logical basis of, and reason for, (Western) modernisation and a source of economic advantage for ‘the country’. The landless and the economically marginalised in the coloniality-themed and politically invested frames of \textit{Moneyweb} and \textit{Afriforum} are reflected as collateral damage, participants in a process of redemptive sacrifice (Dussel 1993: 75). The sporadic mini-social eruptions like spiraling crime, violent protests, and substance abuse, – linked to the horrendous and deepening social agony are framed as a law and order concerns.

The first chapter introduces the research questions of this study and its design. A series of interlinked decisions that structure this research to take it to its objectives are elaborated. The qualitative paradigm is presented there as the overall methodological context that allows for emic understandings of the complex social context of this research and its interrogation of the related ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions at its heart.

The second chapter presents the theoretical framework, Epistemologies of the South in the various works of De Sousa Santos, Mignolo, Fanon, Dussel, Quijano, and Maldonado-Torres, and Marxism that situate this research. A range of critical concepts that inform this study, like colonialism, liberalism, capitalism, justice, land question, discourse, ideology, frames and framing in the context of political communication, are explicated within this conceptual framework. Importantly, colonisation is [re]viewed as the early stage of globalization as we

\textsuperscript{167}See Mail and Guardian 16 March 2017.
know it today. It was the violent lever to allow Europe’s poor\textsuperscript{168} (Dussel 1993: 74) to become capitalists or property owners themselves in the colonies they regarded as free spaces\textsuperscript{169} (Dussel 1993: 74). O’Rourke (2006) details evidence of this central assertion in a discussion of the economic impact of the bloody, lengthy, and widespread conflict between Great Britain and France from 1797 – 1815, that widened to include many the other European countries. This forced an orchestrated outbound migration by that continent’s people chasing an economic dream. Black people in their view, were infra-human and their property, wealth and labour were available for expropriation by White people at no cost.

Today’s inequality and social injustice in the country exist \textit{because}, and not in spite, of liberal capitalism that has been the economic system from colonialism to the ‘new’ South Africa. The liberal hegemony of sacrosanct individual property rights, that today paralyses substantive transformation and redress in South Africa, followed forced and comprehensive social restructuring through expropriation in colonialism and Apartheid. Colonialism radically changed the triadic dialectic between labour, capital, and land in the country.

Chapter three constructs a dynamic picture of the media as an important battlefield in the complex struggle for hegemony from colonialism to democracy. It develops a corpus of intricate understandings of the politics-media relationship highlighting a number of transformations that changed very little in terms of the dominance of liberal capitalism in discourse. The role of the media, their power, and how they exercise it, are explained in a three-pronged approach. At the abstract level, the discussion delineates the normative status of liberalism and the radical critique of the role of the media in an integrated discussion that simultaneously reflects the agency and dynamism of discourse. The discussion includes a system-level exploration of the country-specific idiosyncrasies that shaped and adapted the media’s role in South Africa from colonisation to liberation. At a micro level, I look at what accounts for the power of the media and how they exercise this power as an institution. This

\textsuperscript{168} Dussel (1992: 74) argues that Europe had a “surplus” or chronically poor population, it sent this population to the Third World.

\textsuperscript{169} Hegel believed that history is the configuration of the Spirit in the form of becoming. The people that receive such an element as natural principle is the dominant people at this moment in World history. Against the absolute right that such people possess by virtue of being the bearer of the development of the World Spirit, the spirit of other peoples has no rights (Hegel, G. 1969. Encyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschatten: im Grundrisse. In Nicolin, F. and Poggier, O. (eds). See also Dussel 1993: 73).
constitutes an important part of the context of this study in which the discourses it analyses are situated.

Chapter four discussed the methods used to identify the frames in the discourses and to develop argued propositions about their presence and purposes. Qualitative framing analysis and critical discourse analysis are introduced as a suitable and powerful combination for a triangulated approach to answer the research questions.

Qualitative frame analysis is the subject of chapter five and presents a comprehensive summary of the texts at a sociological level. The critical discourse analysis is separated into two chapters. Chapter six deals with the Moneyweb and Afriforum platforms and chapter seven deals with City Press and AFASA. The separation reflects the polarisation of frames between the four platforms and acknowledges the coincidences of frames between the two platforms in each of the two chapters.

The findings in chapter eight proceed from this basis to explain the frames and their use in the four discourses on the one hand, and their connections to justice and ‘race’ on the other. This interpretation gives a comprehensive sense of the framing, counter-framing, and articulatory practices used in the constructions of the LEwC policy in the various discourses.

Throughout the different parts of this study, the pervasive presence of discourse as an integral part of social and economic institutions is the connecting thread. There are strong, dynamic, and transforming intersections between the social arrangements and cultural representation. Ideology is imbricated structurally, sociologically, and culturally in complex ways in media discourses and powerfully shapes how social goods are distributed in society. Discourse is central to the denouement of complex social concerns such as the policy of LEwC. People react to issues based on how they understand them. Discourse and social action or inaction are connected at this intellectual level.

While this study offers no recommendations regarding how to address the many deep concerns that it unearths in relation to social justice, ethics, and universal freedom, I believe that it could whet a dormant emancipatory appetite and inspire the necessary social action to re-think and reinvent our social circumstances for peaceful coexistence and a universal advancement of humanity. We would do so with the necessary clarity that I hope this study contributes about the dark forces of injustice, shaping the prospects of the downtrodden and
continuously activating through discourse, the abyssal trap into which the dream of emancipation of Black people in South Africa has collapsed. Forces of justice are animated by the awareness of injustice. The media are an integral part of the complex relationships that constitute ‘the state’, a terrain of struggle between contending forces of social domination and those fighting for justice. If we can’t transform popular discourse and humanise it, discourse will transform us and dehumanise all of us, just as the architects of colonial and Apartheid hate had hoped it would.
Bibliography


Akinola, A. 2016. Human rights, civil society and the contradictions of land reform in SA. In *Politeia* 35(2). 52-70


Anagnostou, D. 2005. Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation? The Europeanisation of minority rights and Greek citizenship. In West European Politics. 28(2). 335-357.


Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and South Africa. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN


245


and European Politics. New York: Columbia Global Reports.


Lahiff, E. 2014. Review Essay: Land reform in South Africa 100 years after the Natives’


Lindegren-Lerman, C. 1983. Dominant Discourse: The dominant voice and the control of


Mamdani, M. 1998. *When does reconciliation turn into a denial of justice?* Pretoria: HSRC.


Mandela, N. 1956. *In our Lifetime*. In sahistory.org.za


Marx, K. and Engels, F. 1848. *The Communist Manifesto*. Karl Marx on the necessary task the ‘bourgeoisie’ was doing in putting an end to ‘feudal and patriarchal relations’ (OLL. Libertyfund.org)


Nehawu. 2016. SACP Linda Jabane Free Ideological Training. In *Nehawu Weekly*
International Monitor. 4(10).


Nunn, K. 2002. Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or why the “war on drugs” was a “war on Blacks.” In Journal Gender, Race and Justice. 6(1). 381-445.


Odendaal, A. 2012. The founder: the origins of the ANC and the struggle for democracy


Palmer, R. 1977. Land Racial Domination in Rhodesia. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Palmer, R. 2011. Would Cecil Rhodes have signed a code of conduct? Reflections on global land grabbing and land rights in Africa, past and present. In the Proceedings of the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, Sussex, UK (pp. 6-8).


Pooley, S. 2009. Jan van Riebeeck as pioneering explorer and conservator of natural resources at the Cape of Good Hope (1652-1662). In Environmental History. 15(1). 3-33.


Journal of Political Communication. 23(2). 135-144.


276


Singer, J. 2005. The Political J-Blogger: “Normalising” and new media form to fit old norms and practices. In Journalism. 6(2). 173-198,


282


Mr J S MALEMA: Hon Speaker, EFF leadership, members of the House, fellow South Africans, almost 400 years ago, a criminal by the name of Jan van Riebeeck landed in our native land and declared an already occupied land by the native population as a no-man’s land. Van Riebeeck, a first descendent of the Dutch to arrive in the Cape would later lead a full blown colonial genocide, anti-black land dispossession criminal project, arguing that simply because our people could not produce title deeds, this land, that they have been living in for more than a thousand years, was not their own. Essentially, he was disregarding their humanity, treating them as part of the animal world. To him and those that would come after him, Africans were less than human, not deserving of land ownership. On this basis, the project of disempowering Africans of the ability to call this place their land was initiated in blood and pain. Millions ended up in humiliating, conquered township conditions of being cheap and disposable labour. Cecil Rhodes, Paul Kruger, Jan Smuts, General Hertzog, Verwoerd, Botha, even De Klerk, all laboured under the Van Riebeeck assumption that Africans are less than human. They all, one after the other, assaulted the humanity of Africans, keeping them dispossessed of land and as cheap and easily disposable labour.
Since those painful days when the Khoi of the Cape were defeated and conquered at the establishment of the Cape Colony, to the area of the 1 800, with the expansion of the colonial control into the hinterlands, the days of the Battle of Ncome River in 1838 against the Zulus, the Battle of Marico River in 1837 against Mzilikazi in the north of Transvaal, the attacks of Thaba Bosiu of King Moshoeshoe in 1865, the village raids of Vhavenda that led to the heroic resistance by King Makhado in 1867, the capture and imprisonment of Khoi chiefs in Robben Island fighting for land in 1870 up to the Land Act of 1913. Colonial crimes against the humanity of the native population did not end there with the Land Act of 1913, they continued with the forced removals through the Group Areas Act that displaced millions of black people to live in prison camps we now call townships. The so-called township is not a settlement for human beings. It is a prison camp. Those who came in power in 1994 carrying the popular mandate of our people to restore the dignity of the African child by reinstating land to the dispossessed forgot their mandate. They became drunk in luxury and glory, building false reconciliation without justice. It took the formation of the EFF 20 years later to revive the question of the dignity of our people in the need for our land. It took the arrival of the EFF in these chambers to return in the central agenda of human freedom, the need for the land that was dispossessed through brutal crimes against humanity.

The time for reconciliation is over; now is the time for justice. If the grandchildren of Jan van Riebeeck have not understood that we need our land. But over and above, it is about our dignity, then they have failed to receive the gift of humanity. We do not seek revenge though they caused so much evil in our land, we do not wish for their suffering, though they caused so much humiliation of countless generations. All we want, all our people ever wanted, is their land to which their dignity is rooted and founded. Today let us close this question once and for all, let us unite and pay no one for benefitting from the crimes against humanity. Let us come together and agree on this noble, historic and human call to expropriate land without compensation for equal redistribution. Many want us to debate food security and economic development but how can we do so if we do not have the land. They want us to come to the table with bosses as beggars because that is unacceptable. The ability to develop policies on food security depends on land redistribution, not the other way around. Those who hold the land labour on the false idea that to distribute it we must first establish a food security programme. No, we must distribute the land then we can all talk about the food security programme.

We invite you, not to pick up spears and guns, we invite you to come to the table and realise that nothing means anything for our people except their dignity in land ownership. For a lasting peace, security and justice, land must be expropriated without compensation for equal redistribution. We would have failed these who came before us if we were to pay anyone for having committed genocide. We cannot thank them for having killed innocent people who were fighting to protect their own land. Many say people who came here were running away from their own problems in Europe and our people welcomed them here in South Africa. It is not true. Why would you engage in a programme to kill people who have welcomed you? Those who are saying we must pay for the land are actually arguing with us that we must thank those who killed our people because those who did so did so with an intention of wiping out a black generation. We must ensure that we restore the dignity of our people without compensating the criminals who stole our land. Those who continue to protect these crimes are themselves accused of the crime because those who protect crime are
criminals themselves. All of us must come together and say, ‘enough is enough, our people must get the land’. We have offered the ANC our 6% to amend the Constitution and that 6% still stands to the ANC. [Applause.]

We want to say to the ANC that it is now an opportune moment since you have agreed in your conference to amend the Constitution. Anyone who says we can expropriate land without compensation without amending the Constitution, that person is misleading us because if that was the case, the ANC would have long already expropriated this land without compensation. So we need to amend the Constitution and we must do so unashamedly. It is not unconstitutional to amend the Constitution. It is constitutional to amend the Constitution. [Applause.] That is why the Constitution makes such a provision. We must stop being cowards. We must stop walking on eggshells around white minorities who are governed by the fear of the unknown when it comes to the question of land expropriation without compensation. The investors in this country just want policy certainty. Once we say we are expropriating land without compensation there is no investor that will leave the country. They will look at our policy and say, ‘how do we continue to make money within the expropriated land?’ So those who do not agree will continue to ridicule our struggle because they never suffered the pain of losing land. They do not know what it means to lose land.

[Time expired.] So we are saying to all political parties, particularly the ones that represent black people, today, let it be the day of black unity in honour of Robert Sobukwe. [Interjections.]

[Applause.]

**[Input by Minister of Water and Sanitation redacted]**

Ms T MBABAMA [Democratic Alliance]: Madam Speaker, in *Cry The Beloved Country*, Alan Paton reveals many dimensions of what land means to us as South African people. He warns us that:

The ground is holy and that we must keep it; guard it; care for it, for it keeps men; guards men; and cares for men. Destroy it and man is destroyed

That last line of the quote, illustrates the extricable link between men and the land. A man’s land, no matter the size is his refuge, a place where he finds shelter, sustenance and a sense of wellbeing. Former Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke said:

Justice Dikgang Moseneke said:

Land is very spiritual. It is in land that we bury our people and connect and speak to our ancestors. It is land on which churches, temples and mosques are built, and it is from land that we eat and survive. Seize that land and you take away not only man’s livelihood, you take away his identity too. Black people were brutally dispossessed and forcibly removed from their land. Decades later, the wounds still run deep. There is an indisputable need to right that wrong, to make amends.

My fellow countrymen, sizwe sakuthi, expropriation without compensation cannot be part of the solution.
Expropriation without compensation cannot be part of the solution. [Interjections.] Only a few months ago, members on the right side of the House fully agreed with this position when they opposed the previous EFF motion to expropriate without compensation. Today, they have backtracked. What has changed? [Applause.]

Expropriation without compensation fundamentally undermines property ownership in South Africa. The property clause in Section 25 of the Constitution states that property is not limited to land. This poses serious risks to investment in agriculture and South Africa if expropriation without compensation is implemented.

Cassim Coovadia MD of the Banking Association of South Africa writes that:

Expropriation without compensation erodes property rights and once this happens land can no longer serve as collateral. Most productive agricultural land is bonded to financial institutions under a total debt of approximately R160 billion. What will happen to that debt should the encumbered farms be expropriated without compensation?

Kristen and Sihlalo, two agricultural economists, raise a valid query. They argue that in a typical productive farming operation, considering both movable and immovable assets, the land is roughly 10 percent of the value of the operation. Under expropriation without compensation would the infrastructure and assets also be seized?

The problem is not Section 25 of the Constitution. Expropriation without compensation is a way to divert attention away from the failures of the ANC-led government. [Applause.] As former President Kgalema Motlanthe’s High Level Panel report points out that:
The need to pay compensation has not been the most serious constraint on land reform in South Africa – Mr Nkwinti knows this -

other constraints, including corruption by officials, the diversion of the land reform budget to elites, lack of political will, and lack of training and capacity have proved more serious stumbling blocks to land reform.

It is shocking that at the current rate it will take 35 years to finalise restitution claims lodged before 1998. How is this justice for poor black people in this country? The process to lawfully implement expropriation without compensation will only prolong the wait for the landless in this country.

The government needs to address the weakness in implementing the provisions in the Constitution instead of bowing to populist rhetoric. [Applause.] The fact is this: expropriation without compensation is a blatant lie. It is a lie being peddled by a desperate ANC that fears being outflanked by the EFF. We in the DA believe that redressing the wrongs of the past is not a game and we can never use the scars of the past to score cheap political points.

Land reform is a social justice issue and the government’s newly changed position will not benefit the poor but will instead benefit the elite and those with connections to the ANC government. Fellow South Africans, the DA believes it is possible to achieve the aims of land reform and to do so in a way that truly empowers black people and strengthens the economy.

One of the ways in which this can be achieved is through partnerships with community organisations, an initiative that has enabled the DA to accelerate the pace of land reform here in the Western Cape. This approach has led to the success of 62% of all land reform farms in the Western Cape. [Applause.] This is in stark contrast to the 90% failure rate of land reform programmes in the rest of the country.

*IsiXhosa:*

Mamelani ukuze nifunde. [Uwelewele.]

*English:*

Our approach means we have more black farmers participating in the formal economy with the state playing a role in providing the support they need. Another method of ensuring that land reform serves as a tool of economic freedom is to give title deeds to farmers. Most people do not know that is it national government policy to withhold title deeds from black farmers, this is a barrier to land reform.

Here in the Western Cape, the DA has delivered 82 830 title deeds since 2009. [Applause.] This not only provides black farmers with the dignity of owning their own property but it also provides access to funds through financial institutions. Surely this is true economic freedom.

*IsiXhosa:*

Bantu bakuthi umbutho weDA uyavumelana nokubuyiselwa komhlaba ebantwini bawo. Kunyanzelekile ukuba abantu abantsundu, abahluphekileyo babandakanyeke kwezomhlaba ukuze
Mr J S MALEMA: Deputy Speaker, I think that South Africans will begin to appreciate that a party with 6% of the vote is doing what a party with 60% of the vote hasn’t been able to do for many years. [Interjections.] Imagine what could have been delivered if this party had had the same percentage.

HON MEMBERS: Yes!

Mr J S MALEMA: In our discussion after the 2016 elections, we gave the ANC certain conditions. One of them was that Zuma must go, Die Stem must fall, and there must be one capital city, a Gupta commission and free education. The ANC seems to be meeting all of the conditions we gave them during those negotiations.

[Interjections.]

We gave the same conditions to the DA. However, the DA seems not to be meeting any of the conditions we gave them on why they should run the metros. [Interjections.] They are forever drifting away from the EFF.

Hon MEMBERS: Yes! Yes!

Mr J S MALEMA: So, we will really have to find a way of dealing with the situation in the metros.

[Interjections.]
Comrade Terror, when you went to prison on Robben Island, you were a black consciousness supporter. When you came back, you became an historical mistake, which came out of Robben Island. [Laughter.] [Interjections.] Every time you open your mouth to speak here, it is extremely disappointing. That which you thought you represented, you have abandoned.

You can’t ask the question, Who are your people? The national democratic revolution answers that question. It says the motive forces that stand to benefit from the victories of this revolution are our people. Those are the motive forces of the national democratic revolution which you went to prison for. [Applause.] The motive forces of the national democratic revolution are the oppressed. Who are the oppressed? The blacks, in general, and Africans, in particular.

Consciousness, when it escapes you, however, doesn’t say goodbye. You are such a typical example of a person who has just lost his political consciousness. Those teachers should have taught you on Robben Island but clearly, that university of life failed dismally when it came to you. So, it is actually extremely wrong of you to stand here and want to distort history.

All the EFF is saying is this. Let us subject this whole matter to consultation. We don’t have a problem with that. We cannot come and meet here as a group of elitists and take a decision on behalf of our people. Let it be referred to committees. Let our people be consulted. Let ordinary South Africans make their input. We are not opposed to that, as long as this Parliament agrees that, indeed, we are at one. Let us go and take a further mandate from our people.

So, the EFF is happy with the types of amendment the ANC wants to make. This is not about party politics. It is about an issue of national interest.

So, as I conclude, on 6 April, the day of Jan van Riebeek’s arrival, the day of the formation of the PAC by Sobukwe, and the day of the hanging of Solomon Mahlangu, in honour of these people and also as a demonstration of our seriousness about this land issue, we will be passing a motion of no confidence in the Mayor of Port Elizabeth, as a warning shot to the DA. Thank you very much.

Debate concluded.

The DEPUTY CHIEF WHIP OF THE MAJORITY PARTY: Hon House Chairperson, the ANC would like to make the following amendments to the EFF’s motion:

That paragraph 6 be amended, as follows ...

[Input by Dr C P MULDER redacted]

[Input by Mr N F SHIVAMBU redacted]

[Input by The HOUSE CHAIRPERSON (Mr C T Frolick) redacted]

[Input by Dr C P MULDER redacted]

[Input by The HOUSE CHAIRPERSON (Mr C T Frolick)]

Deputy Chief Whip of the Majority Party please proceed? The DEPUTY CHIEF WHIP OF THE MAJORITY PARTY: Thank you, hon House Chairperson. The ANC would like to move to amend the EFF’s motion, as follows:
That paragraph 6 of the motion be amended as follows:

(1) “recognises that the current policy instruments, including the willing-buyer, willing-seller policy and other provisions of section 25 of the Constitution, may be hindering effective land reform”;

(2) delete paragraph 7 of the motion as printed on the Order Paper;

(3) substitute paragraph 8 of the motion with the following:

“notes that in his state of the nation address, President Cyril Ramaphosa, in recognising the original sin of land dispossession, made a commitment that government would continue the land reform programme that entails expropriation of land without compensation, making use of all mechanisms at the disposal of the state, implemented in a manner that increases agricultural production, improves food security and ensures that the land is returned to those from whom it was taken under colonialism and apartheid and undertake a process of consultation to determine the modalities of the governing party resolution”; ... our conference resolution taken in December ...

(4) amend paragraph 10 as follows:

“with the concurrence of the National Council of

Provinces, instructs the Constitutional Review Committee to -

(a) in sub-paragraph (a) before the words “to make” to insert “review section 25 of the Constitution and other clauses where necessary”;

(b) in sub-paragraph (b) after the word “amendments” to insert “where applicable” and delete all the words after “needed”;
(c) delete sub-paragraphs (c) and (d); and

(cl) in sub-paragraph (e) to amend the date for reporting to the Assembly to “30 August 2018”.

[Input by The HOUSE CHAIRPERSON (Mr C T Frolick)redacted]
[Input by Mr N SINGH redacted]
[Input by The HOUSE CHAIRPERSON (Mr C T Frolick)
[Input by The DEPUTY CHIEF WHIP OF THE MAJORITY PARTY redacted]
[Input by The HOUSE CHAIRPERSON (Mr C T Frolick redacted]
[Input by Mr N SINGH redacted]
[Input by The HOUSE CHAIRPERSON (Mr C T Frolick)redacted] [Input by Mrs C DUDLEY redacted]
[Input by The HOUSE CHAIRPERSON (Mr C T Frolick)redacted]

[Input by The CHIEF WHIP OF THE OPPOSITION redacted]
[Comments by political parties on the amendments redacted].

Question put: That the amendment as moved by the Deputy Chief Whip of the Majority Party be agreed to.

Division demanded.

The House divided.

Voting

[Input by AN HON MEMBER redacted]

The HOUSE CHAIRPERSON (Mr C T FROLICK): Order hon members! [side comments redacted]

We want to complete the vote.

Question agreed to.
Amendment accordingly agreed to.

Question put: That the motion, as amended, be agreed to.

Division demanded.

The House divided.

Voting

Question agreed to.

Motion, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

[Subsequent business of the House redacted]
Annexure 2

PARLIAMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
PO Box 15 Cape Town 8000 Republic of South Africa
Tele 27 (21) 403 2911
www.parliament.gov.za

10 December 2019

Mr L Jacobs

Director: Communications Rhodes
University GRAHAMSTOWN
6140

Via email: l.jacobs@ru.ac.za Dear

Mr Jacobs

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN RELATION TO MEDIA WITHIN PARLIAMENT-ARY PRECINCT

Your request dated 14 November 2019 bears reference:

1. Request for total number of square meters assigned by Parliament for occupation by journalists within parliamentary precinct,
2. Total number of square meters assigned for journalists in each of the two Houses of Parliament (media bays)
3. Special access and security arrangements for journalists (e.g. permanent access cards etc.)
4. Special facilities availed by Parliament/government to journalists operating from Parliament (e.g. office furniture, telephones, Wi-Fi connectivity etc.)

Below kindly find the responses per category:

Request for total number of square meters assigned by Parliament for occupation by journalists within parliamentary precinct (Accommodation arrangements)

1. Office Space
   • Accredited media is accommodated in 100 Plein Street Building and Marks Building.
   • A total of 32 offices have been allocated for media use in 100 Plein Street
• Offices in 100 Plein Street are used by members of the media affiliated to the Parliamentary Press Gallery Association (PGA).
• A total of 438m$^2$ usable space is dedicated to the media in 100 Plein street
• ABC occupies the first floor of Marks Building and has 425m$^2$ at their disposal.
• ENCA has an office in Marks Building and currently they are not using it.

2. Total number of square meters assigned for journalists in each of the two Houses of Parliament (media bays)

• The National Assembly has 66 seats allocated as media bays.
• The National Council of Provinces has 36 seats as mediabays.

3. Special access and security arrangements for journalists (e.g. permanent access cards etc.)

• Media Houses that wish to have representatives stationed at the Parliamentary precinct on full-time basis to cover parliamentary proceedings must apply for full time access.
• The application form, obtainable from the Media Relations Unit must be accompanied with a letter from the employer (Editor will do) indicating the role/designation of the applicant and a copy of the South African Identity Document.
• Once submitted to the Media Relations Unit, the forms are processed, including security checks and clearance by the Parliamentary Protection Services Section.
• The Secretary to Parliament may approve applications received for media accreditation of media representatives for disseminating information to the public,
• All approved media receive Parliamentary access cards clearly stating the media organisation they work for. The Media Relations Unit must revert back to the applicant with the outcome of the application.
• Accreditation is also given to media for temporary access to cover a specific event or an activity. Media Houses requesting access also apply for Second Level Accreditation (temporary) and this applies to foreign journalists and media representatives who do not cover proceedings on a full-time basis or could for other reasons not be granted first-level accreditation may be considered for second-level accreditation;
• Applications should be forwarded to the Media Relations Unit and must have full-names as they appear in the Identity document(ID)/passport, date of birth and ID numbers of the applicant;
• The Media Relations Unit processes the applications including submission for Security Clearance;
• The Secretary to Parliament or his/her delegate may approve applications received for media accreditation of representatives of organisations or freelance journalists who wish to cover the proceedings of Parliament for their specific publications / journals, which are distributed to the broader public.

298
• Special facilities availed by Parliament / Government to journalists operating from Parliament (e.g. office furniture, telephones, wi-fi connectivity etc). In all buildings and in each floor, journalists have full access to the passage ways and ablution facilities the same as parliamentary officials. All offices are provided with furniture, access to the telephone and internet connectivity. Parking is also allocated to journalists same as parliamentary staff members.

I trust you will find the information useful. Yours sincerely

MS PN /TYAWA

ACTING SECRETARY TO PARLIAMENT
Hi there,

How are you doing? Glad to hear from you.

Moneyweb is a member and was a member in 2018. I cannot recall any complaints we received against the publication in 2011 that complaints were handled by our former public advocate, Lee Takelegana.

We are working remotely so not in the office to check on the files. If there is anything specific you need, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Take care and stay healthy, Letheba.

---

From: Luzuko Jacobs
Sent: Thursday, 14 May 2020 00:00
To: Luleka Mobre <l.mobre@embudis.org.za>
Cc: Luleka Mobre <l.mobre@embudis.org.za>
Subject: Membership Inquiry

Good Day

I am a registered PhD student at Rhodes University. My student number is 5513294. As part of my research, I would like to establish whether Moneyweb (publishing online) was a signatory and/or otherwise operating under the Press Code between January and August 2019.

---

Luleka Mobre
Executive Director
Tech: 011 444 3832
Fax: 011 444 3910
Embudis Island Office Park
Building M, 4th floor
AT1, Innovation Avenue
Cape Town, 2796

Dear Madam,

RE: APPLICATION FOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION, (IN PARTICULAR THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE SABC AND MONEYWEB (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE "CONTRACT"), IN TERMS OF PAIA ACT 2 of 2000 (THE "APPLICATION")

We refer to the above mentioned Application and your correspondence dated 09 December 2019, which was only received by the SABC on 31 December 2020 via email, wherein you advised that you act on behalf of Mr Luzuko Jacobs, (your client).

We regret to advise that your client's Application for access to information is refused on the following grounds:

1. The SABC refuses to grant you access to the Contract for the purposes of protecting commercial information of Moneyweb. The SABC thus invokes the provisions of section 36 (1 (c) (i) (ii) of PAIA which provides that:

"36 Mandatory protection of commercial information of third party
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the information officer of a public body must refuse a request for access to a record of the body if the record contains (c) information supplied in confidence by a third party the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected -

(i) to put that third party at a disadvantage in contractual or other negotiations; or
(ii) to prejudice that third party in commercial competition."

2. The SABC's refusal to grant your client access to the Contract is also justified in terms of sections 37 (1) (a) of PAIA which provides that:

"Mandatory protection of certain confidential information, and protection of certain other confidential information, of third party

(1) Subject to subsection (2), the information officer of a public body-

(a) must refuse a request for access to a record of the body if the disclosure of the record would constitute an action for breach of a duty of confidence owed to a third party in terms of an agreement;

Kindly advise your client accordingly.

Yours Faithfully,

Sylvia Tladi

SABC SOC Limited
## APPENDIX
Platforms, Article titles and dates of publication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLATFORM</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>DATE PUBLISHED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFASA</td>
<td>SA government slams Australia’s plan to fast-track visas for white farmers</td>
<td>19 June 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expropriation to make land available</td>
<td>11 June 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black Farmers’ Struggle For Land Is Just The Beginning</td>
<td>28 February 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black farmers’ body supports ANC land-expropriation policy</td>
<td>06 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black farmers’ body supports ANC land-expropriation policy</td>
<td>09 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meet two successful black free state farmers</td>
<td>12 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black Farmers: this is what government should do to help us</td>
<td>12 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Australia considering fast-tracking visas for white South African farmers</td>
<td>14 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Untitled</td>
<td>13 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Farmers Association of South Africa (AFASA) statement</td>
<td>29 May 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>at The World Farmers Organization’s General Assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutional review committee: public hearings in provinces</td>
<td>11 August 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on proposed review of section 25 of the constitution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moneyweb</td>
<td>Land expropriation debate ‘reckless and damaging’</td>
<td>27 February 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Five things making headlines in South Africa today</td>
<td>28 February 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rand flat as hawkish Fed chair comments weigh</td>
<td>28 February 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote in parliament moves land reform closer</td>
<td>29 February 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EcoBank to be strongest contributor to Nedbank earnings in 2018</td>
<td>02 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 questions about expropriating land without compensation</td>
<td>01 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ramaphosa says aims to resolve land issue ‘once and for all’</td>
<td>01 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land expropriation a risk for SA banks</td>
<td>03 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nedbank forecasts a better 2018</td>
<td>05 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zuma’s exit sparks shifting political alliances</td>
<td>05 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banks can contribute to land expropriation debate: FirstRand Sachs</td>
<td>07 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land expropriation plans making markets nervous – Goldman Sachs</td>
<td>07 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA future just got a lot more positive – Anglo American CEO</td>
<td>07 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unused land is main target of SA’s expropriation plan</td>
<td>07 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ramaphosa says won’t allow illegal land grabs</td>
<td>14 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA aims to expropriate land without compensation</td>
<td>14 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign investors upbeat on SA stocks</td>
<td>16 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land rights dominate Nene’s foreign investor charm offensive</td>
<td>16 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Jabu Mabuza: SA now has a good story to tell</td>
<td>19 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klépierre-Hammerson bid tops company news</td>
<td>19 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only the paranoid survive</td>
<td>20 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA braces for first ratings verdict of Ramaphosa era</td>
<td>20 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadblocks ahead for Ramaphosa after Moody’s win</td>
<td>26 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sars hopes to restore public trust and credibility</td>
<td>04 April 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA’s growth forecasts likely to be increased— Nene</td>
<td>05 April 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State capture; private sector; corruption and investor attitudes</td>
<td>01 May 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC urges test of current land laws on expropriation</td>
<td>22 May 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC wants constitutional test on land seizures</td>
<td>30 May 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA needs extraordinary measures to boost growth: Ramaphosa</td>
<td>31 May 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis: South Africa’s cities hold key to Ramaphosa’s land plan</td>
<td>04 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment prospects in view of land expropriation</td>
<td>04 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African activity stagnates while its African peers cheer</td>
<td>05 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The muggy world of land expropriation uncertainty</td>
<td>05 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s not just about soil; it’s about our economy</td>
<td>06 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mountain Ramaphosa must climb is - 2.2% higher</td>
<td>06 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 strategies to protect and grow your wealth</td>
<td>20 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade wars; land expropriation; low growth: Where to from here?</td>
<td>25 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rand stocks falter as trade tensions rise</td>
<td>26 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa reels as rout spreads from Egyptian stocks to rand bonds</td>
<td>29 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market rout sends African assets from the rand to bonds reeling</td>
<td>29 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA’s ‘dispossessed’ urban poor call for land reform</td>
<td>04 July 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA expropriation plan to exclude Black-owned land</td>
<td>07 July 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC moves to expropriate land without compensation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramaphosa says land expropriation will be done through a parliamentary process</td>
<td>31 July 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rand bonds weaken as ANC pushes ahead on land expropriation</td>
<td>01 August 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking the land: ANC grasps South Africa’s most emotive issue</td>
<td>01 August 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afriforum calls ANC land plan ‘catastrophic’</td>
<td>02 August 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muted market reaction deceptive</td>
<td>02 August 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa’s land problem won’t go away</td>
<td>02 August 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unconquering the nation: EFF MPs forge ahead with land expropriation motion 27 February 2018

Parliament to investigate ways to expropriate land without compensation 28 February 2018

The FF Plus’ five -point plan to keep the land where it is SA won’t follow Zim down land reform road; says Duarte 05 March 2018 01 March 2018

Land Expropriation without compensation: what does it mean? 04 March 2018
Robots could cut 3000 jobs at Nedbank 04 March 2018
ANC wasn’t ready for Reserve Bank debate 11 March 2018
Citizens will decide on land grabs 11 March 2018
Ingonyama Trust called to order 11 March 2018
Women must seize the moment 11 March 2018
Apart from propaganda; ‘thuma mina’ was in our veins this weekend 15 March 2018

Hits and misses for Ramaphosa as he faces questions on land; Zuma; legal fees 15 March 2018
EFFS steals ANC’s state bank thunder 18 March 2018
Maité talks tough on land 18 March 2018
The politics of land: How South Africa can avoid the Zimbabwean style of reforms 23 March 2018

Land expropriation is not a policy to drive whites into the sea – Mantashe 27 March 2018
The three tectonic plates of politics 01 April 2018
Jacob Zuma’s Long shadow over the ANC 01 April 2018
Land debate targets the constitution 01 April 2018
Ramaphosa’s Headaches 04 April 2018
Changes have brought about economic confidence but hard work lies ahead 08 April 2018

Ramaphosa’s plan could boost growth to 4.5% 22 April 2018

Maimane: EFF land expropriation policy is a ‘terrible solution’ 01 May 2018
‘Shut Up’ – Ramaphosa loses his cool; snaps at DA in heated Parly session 08 May 2018
Housing minister: Do more with less 14 May 2018
Soweto’s middle class rises up 14 May 2018
ANC calls on South Africans to join in on Thuma Mina campaign 29 May 2018
You can withdraw my membership from tis useless parliament: Malema 23 May 2018
Boogeying with the Boere 27 May 2018
The state should be custodian of land 30 May 2018
Which SA do you want? 24 May 2018
Political parties hijack land hearings
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018/07/01</td>
<td>Owning a farm is a privilege not a right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/07/02</td>
<td>Give the land to the people not the state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/07/08</td>
<td>We want our own land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/07/15</td>
<td>The land myth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/07/17</td>
<td>‘Watch this space’: Ramaphosa on land ANC Conflict and state capture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/07/18</td>
<td>EFF marks Mandela day by taking part in land hearing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/07/22</td>
<td>The story of a workers’ farm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/08/01</td>
<td>Eastern Cape land debate turns racial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022/07/22</td>
<td>UAE may invest in SOEs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018/07/05</td>
<td>‘Focus on the stolen land’: EFF Contralesa join forces on expropriation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Afriforum**

- Motion over land reform a violation of the 1994 agreement: 2018/02/27
- Afriforum Campaigns: 2018/03/01
- Afriforum launches international petition against property rights threat in South Africa: 2018/03/01
- Afriforum requests urgent discussion with Police Minister over farm murders and land grabs: 2018/03/08
- Afriforum attends public hearing on expropriation without compensation: 2018/03/12
- Afriforum says facts show that the disregard of property rights and farms murders is a serious threat in South Africa: 2018/03/19
- Critique on Afriforum based on prejudice and stereotyping: 2018/03/29
- Afriforum says facts show that the disregard of property rights and farm murders is a serious threat in South Africa: 2018/03/19
- Afriforum reveals new information on land ownership as well as memorandum to international community on expropriation without compensation: 2018/04/24
- Afriforum heads to USA for awareness on expropriation without compensation and farm murders: 2018/04/11
- Afriforum and AfriBusiness host international session in Vryburg on land expropriation: 2018/04/23
- Afriforum and AfriBusiness host international session in Kimberley on land expropriation: 2018/04/23
- South Africa in crisis: 2018/05/07
- Afriforum continues with international campaign against expropriation without compensation with handovers to diplomatic missions in South Africa: 2018/05/10
- Farm murders and expropriation without compensation in the spotlight on Fox News: 2018/05/10
- Afriforum intensifies its campaign against expropriation without compensation after ANC announcement: 2018/05/22
| Afriforum investigating legal action regarding expropriation without compensation 2018/05/28 |
| Afriforum submits memorandum and petition against expropriation to Parliament 2018/06/12 |
| Afriforum wants to make oral submission to Parliament on expropriation without compensation 2018/06/13 |
| Afriforum welcomes increasing foreign opposition against intended land expropriation 2018/07/05 |
| South Africa indecision regarding withdrawal from International Criminal Court tarnishes international image 2018/07/05 |
| South African Police Service statistics indicate an increase in farm murders 2018/07/25 |
| Afriforum: President report on land reform economically naïve and fundamentally racist – intensified campaign envisaged 2019/07/28 |
| Afriforum shares Zulu King’s sentiment regarding expropriation without compensation 2018/07/05 |
| Expropriation without compensation Afriforum appeals to international investors to put pressure on SA government 2018/08/01 |
| Farm identified for expropriation without compensation 2018/08/10 |
Declaration of interest

This is a media study that seeks unmask ‘hidden’ links between the ‘regular’ media content and politics. The media I believe, are part of a complex system that produces and rationalises poverty, deprivation and racism that I deeply abhor. The project resonates with my personal biography and involvement in different South African social and historical contexts. How is it possible, the question lingers on my mind, almost three decades into democracy and freedom, that inequality in the Rainbow Nation is deepening while retaining its old Apartheid face of Black poverty and White affluence? Why do some prominent members of society such as the former Democratic Alliance leader, Hellen Zille, find it in themselves to publicly state that colonialism was “beneficial?” What leads a human being to think that way? Why is the world ‘simply looking on’ at the worsening aftermath of the Apartheid crime against humanity? Why are loans sharks, alcohol retail, charismatic churches and funeral palours the main thriving business entreprises in Black townships today? Why is the Black unemployed youth perishing to substance abuse? Why is crime a defining character of our liberated Rainbow nation? These issues haunt me. My intellect won’t rest.

I draw from my own life’s path as a Black South African who grew up on a White-owned farm and in a typical township environment amidst mud houses, filth, drunkenness, violence, and impoverishment, to do this work. Those circumstances informed the powerful forces of socialisation and cognitive structuration of my identity and that of ‘my kind’, within ‘our’ social station. Things as they were, the social and economic order, ‘appeared’ to be natural, life’s structure, or was at least not out of the realm of normalcy within the prevailing mindset. While we had many critical political questions, they were somehow conceptually circumscribed within the invisible parameters of an assumed socio-economic and political intelligibility, or perhaps what was simply accessible, or ideologically dominant or resonant. The main, visible, realistic, and desirable progressive social ‘alternative’ within the

---

170 Arch-Bishop Emeritus Desmond Mpilo Tutu optimistically coined the term to refer to post-Apartheid South African nation.
impenetrable and murky parameters that embalmed much of the critique of the system, was ‘inclusive’ liberal capitalist normativity.

In the social order of the day, work, educational opportunities and individual agency and drive, were the way to self-improvement and a successful life. We stood against discrimination at the workplace, in education and sports and, generally against unequal opportunities afforded to Black and White. The anatomy of colonial dispossession and the foundation of the social system, except in an odd slogan or another half-hearted pursuit, hardly featured in our effective liberation discourse that centred on the right to vote. Our aspirations about pushing back against the colonial condition, great and progressive as they might have been, were fatally yet invisibly circumscribed. They had collapsed into a yearning “based on the ultimate value of the master’s kind of life” (Maldonado-Torres 2008:131).

I also draw from decades of experience that combine senior roles in media, media pedagogy, government communication and politics. I was a teacher, a journalist, head of communication for a provincial and a national department, and have spent 14 years as the head of Parliamentary Communication. I led the project to establish the Parliamentary Communication Services. I led the development of its strategy and became Parliaments’ first spokesperson. I was responsible for, among other functions, the ‘image’ of Parliament, media management and provided media advice to the Presiding Officers of Parliament and its Committee Chairpersons. A post-graduate experience in social science’s conceptual schemes serves as an aid to my “reflections” in this project (Willis: 2007: 203).